
Security and Risk Assessment Statement

Intelligent Risks

3 June 2019

David Riches
Head, Projects NSW
Infrastructure NSW
David.riches@infrastructure.nsw.gov.au

Statement Security & Risk Assessment Strategy Statement for Sydney Football Stadium Redevelopment Stage 2 DA

The NSW Police Force Terrorism Protections Unit has been involved in the process to develop the Security & Risk Assessment Strategy Report for the Sydney Football Stadium Redevelopment Stage 2 DA.

The Terrorism Protections Unit does not support the public release of the complete Security & Risk Assessment Strategy Report.

The Security & Risk Assessment Strategy Report outlines details surrounding the security design and operation of the new Sydney Football Stadium (SFS) site and covers direct & indirect terrorism-related hazards to the stadium and surrounding public domain. The Terrorism Protections Unit believe that if the report was released to the general public it could be used for the purpose of hostile reconnaissance by terrorists or other criminal elements.

The NSW Police Force Terrorism Protections Unit support the public release of the Secretary's Environmental Assessment Requirements (SEARs) statement, in lieu of the publication of the complete Security & Risk Assessment Strategy Report for the Sydney Football Stadium Redevelopment Stage 2 DA.

Regards,



Colin GREEN
Chief Inspector
Commander
Terrorism Protections Unit

COUNTER TERRORISM & SPECIAL TACTICS
PO BOX 5102
Parramatta NSW 2124

Telephone 02 9919 9299 Facsimile 02 9919 9211 ENet 69299 EFax 69211 TTY 9211 3776 (Hearing/Speech impaired)
ABN 43 408 613 180



ABN: 87 095 442 014

Suites 1, 300 Pacific Highway
Crows Nest NSW 2065
Australia
Tel: 02 9439 2933
Email: andrew.mcwhinney@irisks.com
Web: www.irisks.com

17 May 2019

Mr Tom Kennedy
Director
GTK Consulting
(For Infrastructure NSW)

Dear Tom,

**Statement Security & Risk Assessment Strategy Statement for Sydney
Football Stadium Redevelopment Stage 2 DA**

As per our discussions, I have prepared the statement overleaf for your consideration and inclusion in the Stage 2 Development Application report for the Sydney Football Stadium Redevelopment (SFSR) project.

Background

The statement seeks to provide an outline of the approach taken to address the Secretary's Environmental Assessment Requirements (SEARs) as they relate to security. The statement is provided in lieu of the complete report (which has been subject to the necessary stakeholder consultation) due to the sensitivities attached with publicly releasing information regarding the security design and operation of the new SFS site.

I trust the statement meets your requirements. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you require any clarification on aspect.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Andrew', followed by a horizontal line.

Andrew McWhinney
Manager NSW & ACT

**SYDNEY AUCKLAND BRISBANE BANGKOK LONDON
BEIJING JAKARTA RIO DE JANEIRO TOKYO**

Security Master Licence (NSW) 408292828

Introduction

A Security & Risk Assessment Strategy Report was prepared by Intelligent Risks as part of the State Significant Development (SSD) Stage 2 Development Application (DA) for the redevelopment of the Sydney Football Stadium.

The Secretary's Environmental Assessment Requirements (SEARs) for the Environmental Impact Statement for the proposed development included the following:

SEAR
9. Traffic Transport and Accessibility strategies and associated infrastructure to segregate hostile vehicles from public transport users (including paths between the stadium and public transport nodes) and areas of people congregation;
Plans and Documents CPTED assessment (including a safety and security assessment).

The report also addressed the future assessment requirements set out in Schedule 2 Part B of the State Significant Development Consent SSD 9249 as follows:

Deliverable	No.	Condition of Consent
Security, Crime and Anti-Social Behaviour Prevention	C53	The future development application must include the following: c) a Security Risk Assessment strategy in relation to the development, to identify, assess, manage and minimise the risks of exposure to hostile vehicles, including areas of people congregation and paths between the new stadium and public transport nodes. The Security Risk Assessment strategy must be supported by a plan listing all the facilities provided to support the Hostile Vehicle Mitigation requirements in the Moore Park Precinct in accordance with Australia's Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism and Hostile Vehicle Guidelines for Crowded Places.
Security, Crime and Anti-Social Behaviour Prevention	C54	The above strategies required by Schedule 2 condition C53 must be developed in consultation with the CCC, NSW Police Force, Sydney Coordination Office and Transport Management Centre within TfNSW, Roads and Maritime Services (where relevant), Sydney Cricket and Sports Ground Trust, Centennial Park and Moore Park Trust and the Council. Where the provision of details relating to security measures are considered sensitive and a determination made that publishing of these details presents a security risk, evidence of consultation with relevant parties must be provided as a part of the development application to satisfy this condition. Evidence of consultation with the public authorities must be provided to the Department as a part of the future development application.

The strategy has considered the security requirements for the stadium in event and non-event periods and is consistent with Security Principles Report prepared by Intelligent Risks for the Stage 1 DA.

Report Outline

Security Risk Assessment

A security risk assessment was developed covering direct and indirect terrorism-related hazards to the stadium and surrounding public domain for both event and non-event periods.

The assessment found that terrorism risks are inherently High for event periods, and Medium for non-event periods; although when targeted and well-considered mitigation measures are applied (as described in the Security Strategy section and further developed through design development) would be reduced to Medium and Low, respectively. These risk levels represent – when applying a best practice approach to security risk management, including the 'As Low as Reasonably Practicable

(ALARP) principle – acceptable risk levels beyond which further mitigation is not considered necessary or cost-effective.

The risk assessment was conducted following a methodology consistent with the International Standard, *Risk Management – Guidelines* (ISO 31000:2018) and Australia/New Zealand *Security Risk Management Handbook* (HB 167:2006). It also referenced guidance materials produced by the Australian & New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC) for the protection of crowded places, along with reporting and data from the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and NSW Police.

Security Strategy

The Security Strategy has outlined the approach for the management of security for event and non-event periods at the new SFS. The strategy seeks to integrate the physical and technological elements of the design with the operational elements in a holistic approach which will address security objectives (Prevent, Prepare, Respond, Recover) and provide a secure environment for all stadium and precinct users.

The Strategy proposes to leverage the SCG Trust's existing security and emergency management framework for current precinct and stadium security management. This framework provides the basis for a risk-appropriate and effective security overlay and ensures application of best practice risk management and treatment principles across all areas of security. It will necessarily undergo review and refinement as the design of the stadium and surrounding public domain progresses to reflect changes to venue security operations brought about through the new design.

Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Strategy

In accordance with condition of consent C53, a detailed Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM) Strategy was prepared with reference to current guidelines on best practice implementation of vehicle security measures:

- Australia's Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism (ANZCTC, 2017)
- Hostile Vehicle Guidelines for Crowded Places (ANZCTC, 2017)
- Protective Security - Security Managers Guide: Vehicle-as-a-weapon protective security measures (ASIO T4, November 2018)

The strategy emphasises the importance of addressing vulnerabilities resulting from contributory factors such as: the large expected attendance of SFS events; proximity of roadways to pedestrian areas; movement flows of patrons based on the transport modes used to arrive/depart; and vehicle dynamics (including mass, speed and distance) relevant to the site context.

The specific areas of vulnerability – principally on or near Moore Park Road and Driver Avenue – were mapped and rated for event and non-event periods, which informed the positioning, design and performance criteria of HVM elements to deter and prevent ramming or intrusion by hostile vehicles.

The strategy will inform the design development for HVM. It is envisaged it will incorporate security elements that address the risk requirements while also being cohesive with the landscape design and aesthetic for the venue. Those elements will include a mutually supportive mix of security barriers (e.g. bollards), engineered solutions (street furniture and architectural elements) and landscaping.