Australian Turf Club

Royal Randwick Racecourse

Night Racing
Security Management Plan Report

February 2021

Contents

Version Final

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Disclaimer

Prepared by Sheridan Consulting Group Pty Ltd for Australian Turf Club Night racing February 2021.

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1   Executive Summary

Sheridan Consulting Group Pty Ltd has been engaged by Australian Turf Club (ATC) to provide the Security Management Plan Report for the Night Racing Program to be held at Royal Randwick.

This plan covers a multitude of security related management practices including physical security, security planning, threat and risk vulnerability assessment, hostile vehicle management, staff training and response to critical and emergency incidents.

The plan provides the security requirements in relation to Night Racing at Royal Randwick and an assessment of the security management practices that will provide a strong security presence and culture to the precinct. Key to managing the Royal Randwick Night Racing program is the completion of a risk assessment specific to each planned event to ensure the appropriate security resources are deployed to effectively manage the security risk and requirements applicable to each Night Racing event.

A number of key risks and impacts have been identified specific to Night Racing at Royal Randwick and primarily centre around strong access control, crowd management particularly on ingress and egress, security screening and good lighting of the precinct. Royal Randwick has a number of strong security management practices in place which sets a strong foundation for the Night Racing Program of events.

Assisting in the management of the identified risks is a set of strong mitigations strategies that concentrate on eliminating and reducing the risk factors through consistent processes, systems, standards and training. The report provides a summary of additional protocols put in place to ensure a COVID Safe environment consistent with NSW Public Health Principles and Guidelines (refer section 9).

2 SEARs Cross Reference Table

SEARs for the Environmental Impact Statement that is applicable for the Security Management Plan

9. Safety and Security

The EIS shall include a Security Management Plan which:

- details measures (including but not limited to Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design) to minimise opportunities for crime and anti-social behavior of patrons prior to, during and after the events. The assessment should cover the racecourse site and a wide catchment area around the site, taking into consideration a broad range of likely origins and destinations of the patrons.

- includes measures (e.g. use of security/marshals) to direct patrons along primary travel routes to and from the events and away from surrounding residential areas.

- details any strategies/plans agreed upon by stakeholders including event promoters, Randwick City Council, other government agencies and the Eastern Beaches Local Area Command relating to event security and safety (including but not limited to an operational management plan details to minimise anti-social behaviour, crowd control and traffic).

10. Operation

The EIS shall include an operational framework to address any ongoing operational and management issues, including:

- a key stakeholder group to be established to oversee the environmental performance of the events for the duration of the consent.

- requirement for a coordinated process including consultation and endorsement by the key stakeholder group of any proposed event dates, to avoid racing events on consecutive nights and overlaps/clashes with other major events.

- preparation of updated management plans (i.e. security management plan, risk management plan, pedestrian transport and traffic management plan, noise management plan and waste management plan) tailored to each event, to be reviewed and endorsed by the key stakeholder group and relevant government authorities.

11. Emergency Provisions

The EIS shall include:

- a draft Emergency Evacuation Plan detailing potential site risks and provide a framework for the management of such risks.

- An assessment of the proposal under Australia's Strategy for protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism.

A draft Emergency Evacuation Plan is contained within the Royal Randwick Security Management Plan, Night Racing Draft 1.0 and the Royal Randwick Emergency Management Plan Draft 1.0.

The EIS must include all relevant plans, architectural drawings, diagrams and relevant documentation required under Schedule 1 of the *EP&A Regulation 2000*. Provide these as part of the EIS rather than as separate documents.

In addition, the EIS must include the following:
- Site layout and lighting plans
- Site survey plan
- Site analysis plan
- Consultation Statement
- Access Statement
- Visual impact analysis and photomontages
- Lighting Impact Assessment
- Heritage Impact Statement
- Acoustic Assessment
- Noise Management Plan and Monitoring Plan
- Transport and Traffic Assessment
- Pedestrian, Transport and Traffic Management Plan

- Draft Event Traffic and Transport Management Plan
- **Security Management Plan**
- **CPTED assessment**
- **Draft Emergency Evacuation Plan**
- Operational Management Plan
- Waste Management Plan.

3 Introduction

3.1 Project Summary

Sheridan Consulting Group have been engaged by the Australian Turf Club to complete a Security Management Plan Report incorporating the Emergency Evacuation Plan, Risk Identification and Terrorism protective planning and management for the Night Racing program proposed for Royal Randwick.

Royal Randwick is situated in the Eastern Suburbs, located about 6kms from Sydney CBD and 8kms from Sydney Airport making the location easily accessible for both locals and visitors to Sydney. Royal Randwick operates all year round with a particularly busy schedule in the Spring and during Autumn carnivals.

The Australian Turf Club is currently seeking approval under State Environmental Planning Policy (State and Regional Development) 2011 to host a total of 16 - Night Racing events to be held at Royal Randwick. The night races are scheduled to be held between 6pm and 10pm (daylight savings time) on Thursday, Friday and Saturday, weekday public holidays (Sundays only if it falls on a public holiday). The Night Racing Program will be limited to Class 2 (4 events) and Class 3 events (12 events). The Class 2 event will run with a maximum patron attendance of 10,000 – 15,000 pax and Class 3 events will have a typical patron attendance of less that 10,000.

There are several transportation options available including a purpose-built bus terminal along Alison Road , taxi set down and pick up area via the Taxi entrance on Ascot Street and the Light Rail L2 Randwick and L3 Kingsford line which runs between Circular Quay and Randwick. The Light Rail Royal Randwick stop on the L2 line is located on Alison Road opposite Gate 1 of the racecourse main entrance. The services run regularly from 5am until 1am on weekdays and weekends.   During carnival times and major events, special arrangements are made for public transport optimization with additional express shuttle services. The existing supporting facilities including an infield car park entered via High Street and a multi-deck carpark available to members. Access points, day stalls etc will be utilised as per the day races, with the support of track lighting. No other structural modifications are proposed.

3.2 Purpose of this report

This report presents an outline of the security and risk management practices to be applied to the facility and precinct for the purpose of Night Racing. There are a number of security considerations and additional risk factors that are specific to Night Racing and these have been highlighted in this report.

The scope of the report includes;

- A description of the Royal Randwick Site and the surrounding precinct;
- A description of the Night Racing program proposed to be held within the racecourse;
- The existing Security Management Plan arrangements which are in place for race day and non-race day events;
- Updated Security Management Plans (security management plan, risk management plan) addressing current Night Racing security needs and risk mitigation strategies;
- The existing Emergency Evacuation Plan with recommendations for additional strategies and detailed actions to meet Night Racing specific requirements; and
- The assessment to be completed in line with Australia's Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism.

4 The Racecourse Venue

4.1 Royal Randwick

Royal Randwick is situated in the Eastern Suburbs, 6kms from Sydney CBD and 8kms from Sydney Airport making the location easily accessible for both locals and visitors to Sydney. Royal Randwick operates all year round with a particularly busy schedule in the Spring and during Autumn Carnivals.

The racecourse has operated for over 150 years and provides world class standard in racing and hospitality offering many bars and restaurants and facilities for visiting patrons. Royal Randwick also offers many options for both private and corporate functions.

There are several transportation options available including a purpose-built bus terminal along Alison Road , taxi set down and pick up area via the Taxi entrance on Ascot Street and the Light Rail System - L2 Randwick line which runs between Circular Quay and Randwick . An infield car park subject to availability entered via High Street will be available and the multi-deck member carpark.   In relation to Night Racing there will be parking availability of;

- 574 spaces available within the Members and Owners car park
- 3500 infield car park
- 700 offsite car parking in Moore Park.

Image: Royal Randwick Precinct Map – Race Day

4.2 Site Capacity

Royal Randwick provides numerous event spaces and has encountered up 55,000 for music festivals.

Royal Randwick Night Racing is expected to see crowds of varying sizes as per the following table;

Event	Est Crowd Size	No of Events
Class 2	10,001 – 15,000	4
Class 3	10,000 or less	12
	TOTALS	16

The majority of the Night Racing program, 12 out of the proposed 16 are expected to fall within Class 3 – Small event with a typical patron attendance of 10,000 or less. The security management plan for Night Racing is tailored to address event classes 2 and 3 requirements.

Royal Randwick has approximately 550 staff to provide services on race days to cover gates, bars, food outlets, information and all other services.

4.3 Light Rail Operational Status (normal conditions)

- Each light-rail vehicle can move up to 450 passengers (same as about nine buses).
- Between 2700-5400 passengers per hour (weekend frequency of every 5-10mins) boarding and alighting (approx. 100 fully loaded large city bus loads per hour).
- With an achievable frequency of every 2 mins during event mode a total capacity of 13500 passengers per hour can be catered for.
- The standard frequencies are:
  - Around every 8 minutes between Moore Park and Randwick, and Moore Park and Kingsford weekdays (7am to 7pm)
  - every 10-12 minutes at other times on weekdays
  - every 5 to 10 minutes on weekends and public holidays(7am to 7pm and until 1am Saturdays)
  - every 15 minutes 5am to 7am and 7pm to 1am Sundays and public holidays
- Largest canopy for weather protection 48m x 4,800mm
- The Royal Randwick stop has advantage of turn back bay to facilitate additional trams waiting in event mode.

4.4   Light Rail Operational Status

While there is no COVID vaccine rolled out in Australia as of January 2021 and the threat of infection transmission remains, the following will apply;

- Light rail services will run regularly but will operate at a reduced capacity to maintain physical distancing

- Patrons are advised to allow for extra time and plan by checking real-time capacity indicators. This can be checked using trip planner/ opal travel app;

    - On station indicator screens (where available).

    - Using trip planner/ opal travel app.

5   Process

5.1   Security Review

- Adequacy of existing security levels for Night Racing.

- Composition of the security workforce for Night Racing.

- Level of training required to address Night Racing requirements.

- Adequacy and development of security procedures in addressing Night Racing.

- Recommendations for improvement of security management measures and plans for Night Racing.

5.2   Emergency Management Plan Review

- Adequacy and development of procedures for Night Racing.

- Identification of additional emergency procedures to address Night Racing emergency incidents.

- Assess Emergency Evacuation plan in the context of Night Racing and identify additional requirements.

5.3   Terrorism Vulnerability Assessment

Sheridan Consulting Group has completed Terrorism Vulnerability Assessment Royal Randwick racecourse identifying vulnerable areas and providing a rating and mitigation actions to be implemented. The vulnerability assessment is assessed using a number of components security, controllability, attention and locality to provide a score that identifies the vulnerability of the site based on its inherent characteristics such as physical layout, location, type of use. A further component is then applied Environment which seeks to represent the wider threat

environment upon the site.

5.4   Target Hardening Assessment

Sheridan Consulting Group has completed an assessment of Royal Randwick racecourse precinct regarding hostile vehicle vulnerable areas and provided options and recommendations for target hardening of the racecourse area.

6   Methodology

6.1   Australia's Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism

With the continued evolution of the security environment and the ongoing threat of Terrorism to crowded places such as stadiums, shopping centres and major events the Australian Government published a strategic guide for owners and operators of crowded places to understand their roles and responsibilities and the importance of strong and sustainable partnerships across Australia between governments and the private sector to better protect crowded places.

The objective of the Australian Strategy for protecting crowded places is to have a national consistent approach which preserves the public's use of a space and provides guidance on prioritization of risk as not everything can be protected.

The ANZCTC coordinates an effective counter-terrorism capability across Australia and maintains arrangements for intelligence and information sharing between all jurisdictions and relevant agencies.

The Strategy involves four core elements, which provide a structure for building a consistent national approach to protecting crowded places. The four core elements are;

- Building Stronger partnerships – the building of strong and sustainable relationships rests on not only government but the private sector and the whole community.
- Enabling Better Information Sharing and Guidance – providing access to information and intelligence for all owners and operators is key in the success of this strategy.
- Implementing Effective Protective Security – owners and operators have responsibility to undertake a risk assessment and or vulnerability analysis of their crowded place, implement the appropriate mitigations, monitor them for effectiveness and review them at regular intervals.

- Increasing Resilience – Well considered and tested protective security will reduce the likelihood of a terrorist attack occurring and consequences of an attack. Building a strong security culture is central to developing resilience to terrorism.

The flow of information between governments and those responsible for crowded places is not one-way. Owners and operators should be willing to share information, advice, and lessons they have learned with governments and their peers. Building a strong and inclusive security culture is a responsibility shared by all.

Hardening and improving the resilience of crowded places relies on all stakeholders taking action to apply the government's strategy.[1]

6.2   National Threat Assessments

The National Threat Assessment Centre (NTAC), located within ASIO, prepares assessments of the likelihood and probable nature of terrorism and protest violence, including against Australia, Australians and Australian interests here and abroad, special events and international interests in Australia.

Threat Assessments support jurisdictions and agencies to make risk management decisions to determine how best to respond to the threat and mitigate risk.

6.3   National Threat Level Advisory System

The National Terrorism Threat Advisory System is a scale of five levels to provide advice about the likelihood of an act of terrorism occurring in Australia:

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[1] Australia's Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism

When the threat level changes, the Australian Government provides advice on what the threat level means, where the threat is coming from, potential targets and how a terrorist act may be carried out.

Australia's current National Terrorism Threat Level is **PROBABLE**

Credible intelligence assessed by our security agencies indicates that individuals or groups have developed both the intent and capability to conduct a terrorist attack in Australia.

6.4   Security Audit and Gap Analysis

Sheridan Consulting Group completed a Gap Analysis revising the existing security practices at the facility to identify compliance and ability to meet new security requirements for Night Racing under the current threat environment. Underpinning this methodology is professional experience and the guidance from standards / codes of practice and publications.

SCG Gap Analysis methodology;

- Undertaking a baseline assessment of the current security capabilities.
- Conduct a Gap Analysis including technical, physical and administrative review identifying gaps and vulnerabilities on site in regard to the security and safety practices against best practice.

6.5   Strategic Risk Review

The Sheridan Consulting Group Strategic Risk and Security Review methodology incorporates the identification of strategic risks within a thematic framework around **People, Property, Information and Reputation**. Underpinning this methodology is professional experience and the guidance from standards / codes of practice and publications.

This enables a detailed, nuanced and holistic approach to Strategic Risk and Security Readiness within the context of the review project.

Strategic Risk is measured in terms of the likelihood of an event occurring and the magnitude of the consequences. The methodology was undertaken in accordance with the Australian/New Zealand Standard – Risk Management – Principles and Guidelines (AS/NZS ISO 31000:2018) and the companion document Risk Management Handbook (HB 436:2013 companion to AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009).

As an outcome, those risks identified and the analysis of likelihood and consequence as well as suggested mitigation strategies have been entered into a risk register. Once mitigation strategies are suggested, the identified risks are then further reviewed to determine how the likelihood / consequence and risk level can be influenced. A final residual risk level is then achieved for each identified risk. Methodology references include;

- WHS legislation and Codes of Practice.
- AS/NZS ISO 31000:2018 Risk Management Principles and Guidelines. (Standards Australia).
- HB 158-2010 Delivering assurance based on ISO 31000:2018 - Risk management - Principles and guidelines (Standards Australia).
- HB 167:2006 Security risk management (Standards Australia).
- AS/NZS 4421: 2011 Guards and Patrol Security Services
- AS 8004: 2003 Protection Programs for Entities
- HB 229: 2006 Why and How of Complaints Handling Handbook (Standards Australia)
- Australia and New Zealand Police Advisory Agency Recommendations for CCTV Systems (2014).
- Security Risk Management Body of Knowledge (SRMBOK) – RMIA.
- NSW Government Accessibility Guidance
  https://www.dpc.nsw.gov.au/tools-and-resources/event-starter-guide/accessibility/
- National Emergency Risk Assessment Guidelines: practice guide Australian Government
  https://www.aidr.org.au/media/7600/aidr_handbookcollection_nerag_2020-02-05_v10.pdf
- Active Shooter Guidelines For Places Of Mass Gathering - Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee

  https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Media-and-publications/Publications/Documents/active-armed-offender-guidelines-crowded-places.pdf
- Australia's Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism – ANZCTC Terrorism 2017
  https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Media-and-publications/Publications/Documents/Australias-Strategy-Protecting-Crowded-Places-Terrorism.pdf

- National Guidelines For Protecting Critical Infrastructure From Terrorism - Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee

    https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Media-and-publications/Publications/Documents/national-guidelines-protection-critical-infrastructure-from-terrorism.pdf

- AS3745:2010 'Planning for emergencies in facilities'.

- Facility Management Association 'Guidelines for managing risk' 2004.

- Safe Places Vehicle Management Comprehensive guide

    https://www.emergency.nsw.gov.au/Documents/publications/guidelines/Guidelines-Safe-Places-Vehicle-Management.pdf

- NSW Police Assessment tool, Safer by Design Evaluation and a Companion to the Safer by Design Evaluation are based on AS/NZS ISO 310000: Risk Management - Principles and Guidelines.

6.6   Threat Assessment

The objective of this qualitative threat assessment methodology is to develop a qualitative analysis that provides a general indication of the threats that an asset can potentially be subject to, based on the likelihood and consequence / intent and capability of the threat if it were to occur, and to provide recommendations to ameliorate the threats. The methodology involves two steps:

- Threat identification and assessment: identifying and characterising threats, assessing the vulnerability to these threats and the level of threat.

- Threat management: defining actions to mitigate the threats. The actions would be assessed on how effective they would be, how feasible they are and the cost-benefit of performing the action.

6.7   CPTED – Safer by Design Evaluation

Sheridan Consulting Group has experience in The Safer by Design Evaluation program which commenced in NSW in the early 1990's. The program is a co-operative initiative involving the NSW Police, local councils, government departments and key private sector organisations.

Safer by Design aims at assessing developments for crime risk at the design stage however the assessment tool Safer by Design Evaluation and a *Companion to the Safer By Design Evaluation* are based upon AS/NZS ISO 31000: Risk Management - Principles and Guidelines can be successfully applied at any time to an existing environment. The

Companion provides research based strategies that can be applied to minimise crime in a built environment.

The *Safer By Design Evaluation* process is a contextually flexible, transparent process that identifies and quantifies crime hazards and location risk. The evaluation measures include crime likelihood (statistical probability), consequence (crime outcome), distributions of reported crime (hotspot analysis), socio-economic conditions (relative disadvantage), situational hazards and crime opportunity.

By reviewing problem areas and applying CPTED principles, existing problems can be significantly minimised. CPTED is based on four design concepts being;

- controlling access to decrease accessibility—for example, fences and gates to control public access to premises
- assisting natural surveillance to enable observation—for example, removing vegetation and providing adequate lighting to reduce places of concealment
- applying territorial reinforcement to delineate between spaces and areas— for example, the use of signage and barriers to identify public and private areas.

Under CPTED Sheridan Consulting Group is accredited to provide the following reports;

- Risk Assessment – analysing crime statistics for the local area and assessing the design, usage and other aspects of the proposed development or study area.
- Recommendations – identifying positive and negative crime prevention elements of the design and recommending improvements. Recommendations can vary from CCTV to different lighting to different landscaping to ensure optimal crime prevention strategies and tactics.

6.8   Selecting Security Systems

The Sheridan Consulting Group selection of security systems and hardware methodology incorporates the identification of physical security needs of the facility and the technical capabilities of systems under consideration. The methodology principles seek to reduce risk by deterring or delaying the compromise of key resources and increasing the likelihood that an effective response can be initiated.

Operational requirements need to be developed, which is the statement of needs once a thorough and systematic assessment of what security measures are needed to provide a fully integrated security solution, the requirements should highlight issues, performance requirements and operator interfaces to assist developing a performance specification.

The selection of security systems and hardware to reduce the level of risk to a tolerable level based on the outcome of a site-specific security risk assessment which is conducted in line with the AS/NZS ISO 31000:2018 Risk Management - principles and guidelines.

Security in Depth principle

The security-in-depth principle supports the philosophy that it is more difficult to defeat multiple security layers than a single layer; for example, putting in place multiple measures to detect and respond to security breaches instead of relying solely on the use of a single barrier, such as a fence.

Deter, Detect, Delay and Respond principle

The Deter, Detect, Delay and Respond (DDDR) principle supports security measures that:
- deter potential intruders by means such as signage, patrolling or a static security force, CCTV or lighting;
- detect intruders by means of intrusion detection systems or a security force;
- delay intruders by means of walls, fences, locked doors, or other barriers; and
- respond to intrusions in a timely manner by means of appropriately trained and equipped security personnel.

6.9   Target Hardening Assessment

The target hardening assessment and strategy was formulated using Australia Security Intelligence Organisation T4 Protective Security, Security Managers Guide – Hostile vehicle mitigations redeployable vehicle security barriers.
- Work closely with ATC key stakeholders and relevant NSW Government agencies.
- Interviewed key stakeholders including representatives from the Traffic Management Centre (TMC)
- Determined the appropriate rating for each racecourse.
- Identified target hardening options appropriate to the site rating.
- Formulate a preferred target hardening strategy

The methodology was undertaken in accordance with;

- The Australian/New Zealand Standard – Risk Management – Principles and guidelines (AS/NZS ISO 31000:2018) and the companion document Risk Management Guidelines (HB 436:2013).
- National Guidelines for The Protection of Places of Mass Gathering from Terrorism - Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee
  https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Media-and-publications/Publications/Documents/Australias-Strategy-Protecting-Crowded-Places-Terrorism.pdf
- HB 167:2006 Security risk management (Standards Australia).
- National Guidelines for Protecting Critical Infrastructure from Terrorism - Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee
  https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Media-and-publications/Publications/Documents/national-guidelines-protection-critical-infrastructure-from-terrorism.pdf
- Security managers guide, Hostile Vehicle Mitigations – redeployable vehicle security barriers, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation T4 protective Security.
- Guidelines NSWPF Safe Places Vehicle Management
- Threat identification and assessment: identifying and characterising threats, assessing the vulnerability to these threats and the level of threat – hostile vehicle attack.
- Threat management: defining actions to mitigate the threats. The actions would be assessed on how effective they would be, how feasible they are and the cost-benefit of performing the action.

7   Key Security Management Practices

7.1   Access Control Management

7.1.1   Patrons

- Pedestrian access and egress limited to gates along Alison Road after 8pm.
- Crowd Management plan to be put into place under DIM ICE methodology.
- ATC Staff/ Contractors to be strategically placed for ingress and egress.
- ATC Staff/ Contractors to manage Taxi way, Bus zones and Light Rail.
- ATC Staff/ Contractors to patrol and manage Multi Level carpark.

- Close monitoring of CCTV in relation to anti-social behaviour (proactive approach).
- Utilisation of user charges Police commensurate to Risk profile for each Night Racing event.
- ATC Staff/ Contractors to have an increased number specially trained RSA Officers at entrance and bar areas for mitigation against intoxication issues.
- ATC Staff/ Contractors stops at the ATC property line.
- TFNSW/ Light rail coordinate and manage light rail ingress and egress at Alison Road and onto the Light Rail Stop, taking into consideration public transport limited capacity conditions during pandemic and ongoing.

7.1.2   Staff and Contractors

Previous Royal Randwick Strategic Security reviews have recommended strengthening of security management practices to improve the access control arrangements for staff and visitors to the racecourse.

Implementation of strong access control management practices throughout Royal Randwick to manage, monitor and record all staff and visitors that attend the racecourse.


Image: Spectator Exit Paths vehicle (via Ascot Street) and pedestrian (via Alison Road Gates)

7.2 Light Rail Security

Royal Randwick Light Rail stop has the following security measures in place;

- Hostile vehicle barriers (bollards)

- CCTV coverage.

- Good lighting, a canopy, tiling and help points with a push button emergency call.

- The Light Rail Depot is located at Pyrmont - TRANSDEV where an Emergency Operations Centre is located and where all light rail CCTV will be monitored, including the Inner West Line. There will be a maintenance facility for the light rail adjacent to Royal Randwick.

- TRANSDEV engaged NSW Police Counter Terrorism and Special Tactics Command in all security consultation on the network.

- Transport NSW to assist in the management of the Randwick precinct as a whole;
  - Randwick Local Area Management Group which includes stakeholders from ATC, NSW Police, SCSGT, Ports and National Parks.
  - Moore Park Entertainment Group (MEOG) meet to discuss large scale events, operations and management.
  - Through the formation of these committees, security needs can be aligned and integrated through common goals making the overall precinct security stronger which will be particularly pertinent for Night Racing.
  - An Emergency Management Sub Plan developed for the entire precinct with regular exercising and interoperability.
  - The TMC Transport Management Centre have a key/lead role in major event planning and have developed the traffic and transport plans for the precinct.
  - Collaborate on the development of how all stakeholders coordinate support to Police and Emergency Services in the Event of an incident occurring.

7.3 Security Guarding

Royal Randwick has a combination of security personnel which includes fulltime ATC security personnel, contracted security personnel for race meetings and events (EGroup) and user pay Police (number of Police engaged depends on the scale and risk assessment of the event).

The same security guarding processes and procedures will be adopted by Night Racing.

Security personnel are tasked throughout Royal Randwick including;

- Identity checks
- Removals and ejections of patrons from the racecourse
- Refusing entry to patrons
- Security patrols
- Identifying suspicious behavior or items
- Bag searches
- Entrance Screening
- Managing anti- social behavior
- Supporting emergency response including evacuation
- Incident reporting
- White level inspections
- Tight Security Management on Precinct egress
- Heightened awareness of anti-social behaviour on ingress, egress and circulation
- Security management of transportation mode egress points

7.4   Security Screening

Security screening to be conducted at the main entrance by Security personnel and throughout Royal Randwick;

- Identity checks
- Refusing entry to patrons
- Bag searches
- White level inspections

7.5   Security Control Centre

As per the existing Security/ Emergency Control Centre located at Randwick Racecourse.

Each Night Racing Event to be assessed utilizing the emergency management and risk management framework and documentation.

Heightened awareness and proactive CCTV monitoring of any anti-social behavior.

7.6   Surveillance Camera Assessment

Royal Randwick is assessed as strong in regard to the CCTV system in place. There are 492 cameras located around the course providing good coverage of the site.

The system is monitored onsite from the Emergency Control Centre.

Operation and monitoring of surveillance cameras to be conducted in respect to Night Racing. There is potential that areas of the racecourse within the night context require further surveillance particularly areas of poor lighting providing opportunity for undetected crime in the dark.

The surveillance cameras need to be assessed in consideration with the Night Racing lighting plan.

7.7   Perimeter Fencing

The perimeter fencing within the Night Racing context is considered a critical security measure in maintaining access control and management of the site. The perimeter is considered more vulnerable at night due to poorer visibility, thereby providing great opportunity for undetected and unauthorized entry.

7.8   Security Lighting

Security Lighting needs to be considered for the following patron populated areas;

- main entry, ingress and egress chute from Alison Road (Gate 1) for the safety of patrons
- Infield carpark area
- Ingress and egress route between new multi-level carpark and Alison Road Entry Gate 1.
- Evacuation Points and Assembly areas in the event of an emergency evacuation incident.
- Surveillance camera locations that are poor visibility areas due to poor/no lighting.

7.9   Hostile Vehicle Management

Hostile vehicle management recommendations made in Sheridan Consulting Group's review submitted September 2017 will stand as for Night Racing.

- The Hostile Vehicle Review was assessed on the site under a racing and non- racing day mode.
- Additional assessment will be conducted on main patron ingress and egress entrance and route at Alison Road Gate 1 in relation to Night Racing.
- Recommendations made for hostile vehicle management include;
    - Vehicle security barriers (VSB's) rated to IWA 14-1 or PAS 68 deployed, installed and operated following the principles outlined in ASIO's Hostile Vehicle Management Security manager's guide.
    - Vehicle security barriers that offer a lower rating based on the actual risk location within the racecourse.
    - Visual deterrent street furniture installed as part of a ring of defences protecting the inner perimeter of the racecourse.
    - Considering standoff distance will also influence an attacker's perception to the viability of their attack.
    - Standoff distance will also assist in minimizing injury to people from vehicle debris and allow the crowd critical time to move to safety.
    - Bollards along the grassed area inside Black Gate E and at top of Loading dock to prevent vehicle access to patrons during race days.
    - 1 x removable bollard on walkway outside temporary day stalls to prevent any vehicle breach from internal parking locations or High Street entry.
    - Bollards alongside the Administration building to stop vehicle access unless authorized vehicles are allowed access, but not restricting foot traffic.
- Bollards have now been installed at Gate 1.
- Temporary measures are installed for specific events with over 30, 000 spectators.

7.10   Security Staffing

- Contracted Security company to be responsible for ensuring all contracted security operatives are trained in any additional Night Racing security requirements and additional risks to be aware of.
- Core and contracted security staff to be trained in Night Racing security process and procedures.

- Security staffing numbers to be assessed for each Night Racing Event for the additional management of egress from Royal Randwick and the immediate precinct, particularly in relation to public transport limited capacity conditions which will likely impact on queue time and queue crowds.
- Security staff to undertake additional training in Night Racing emergency evacuation response.

7.11 Staff training and Exercises

- Racecourse staff to be given additional training in Night Racing emergency evacuation response.
- Racecourse staff to be given a briefing on additional risks that are associated with Night Racing, individual responses and mitigations appropriate to the risks identified.

8 COVID Safe Management

The following measures have been implemented due to the current COVID-19 pandemic and will be in place until such time a vaccine is available and infection transmission is reduced/ eliminated to a level acceptable to NSW Public Health.

COVID Safe considerations and practices include;

- Critical nature of access control and perimeter fencing of the site particularly given the added complexities relating to the management of the current COVID -19 environment such as physical distancing, entry and exit points and capacity limits.
- Additional ingress processes will continue to be conducted Post COVID until such time a vaccine is available, including identification and contact tracing process and temperature check prior to entry being granted.
- During the current COVID environment, public transportation services are operating at a reduced capacity to maintain physical distancing across the network and therefore patrons are being advised to allow for additional travel time and plan ahead by checking real-time capacity indicators.
- COVID Marshalls to be deployed within Royal Randwick and Alison Road/ Light Rail Stop precinct to manage physical distancing and crowd movement.
- The Emergency Assembly Area (Doncaster Lawn) will need to cater for physical distancing of crowd numbers until COVID Safe protocols are no longer required in the event a vaccine becomes available.

9 Mitigation Measures

Table 1 – Mitigation measures

Impact	Potential Impact	Approach	Residual Impact
Access Control	Unauthorised patrons entering the racecourse with potential to commit a security breach Unauthorised vehicles entering the course with potential to commit a security breach	*Management Measure* A security Management plan will be developed and implemented A Risk Management plan will be developed and implemented *Mitigation Measure* Implementation of an electronic access control management system throughout Royal Randwick to manage, monitor and record all staff and visitors who attend the racecourse Access point to the racecourse to be limited to Alison Road Main Gate 1 and the busway at Gate A and B. Private Security to be strategically deployed for ingress/ egress monitoring and management Utilisation of NSW Police commensurate to Risk Management Planning for each Night Racing event Deployment of security to manage the immediate vicinity of Royal Randwick during egress	Strong access control measures in place to minimise the potential for unauthorized patrons and/ or vehicles to enter the racecourse area
Security Screening	Increase in security vulnerability with potential security breaches compromising patron safety Increase in undetected contraband entering event area	*Management Measure* A security Management plan will be developed and implemented A Risk Management plan will be developed and implemented *Mitigation Measure*	Strong security screening measures to eliminate the potential for contraband to be taken into the racecourse area

		Strong Private security presence at the main entrance Gate 1 Alison Road and the busway at Gate A and Gate B. Security operatives to conduct bag searches and personal screening of patrons during ingress Security operatives to complete warranted identification checks during ingress	
Intoxication	Heavily intoxicated patrons resulting in anti-social behavior and potential assaults Patrons unable to follow instruction and disregarding directions on egress and emergency evacuation Patron egress lengthy with increased noise level	*Management Measure* A Security Management plan will be developed and implemented An Alcohol Management plan will be developed and implemented *Mitigation Measure* Private contracted security to have an increased number of specially trained RSA officers at the main entrance on ingress and in the bar areas of the racecourse Private Security and NSW Police to proactively observe intoxicated behavior of patrons Staff to be aware and report immediately to security unacceptable behavior / intoxicated patrons Utilisation of the large CCTV network to identify and react rapidly to intoxicated patrons. Security staff to have heightened awareness of non-compliance by patrons in an emergency evacuation and act according to security procedures.	Early detection and strong management of intoxicated persons and resulting anti-social behavior reducing the likelihood of alcohol related incidents
Terrorist Attack	Hostile vehicle entering the racecourse area intent on causing death and/ or major injury to patrons	*Management Measure* A security Management plan will be implemented and developed	Increased awareness amongst staff in the current threat environment.

	Active Armed offender entering racecourse area intent on causing death and/or major injury to patrons Offender carrying or planting an IED device intent on causing death or major injury to patrons.	A training plan for staff covering preparedness and response to an Active Armed Offender Attack in the current threat environment Implementation of specific procedures in relation to active armed offender, IED's, hostile vehicle attack and dynamic lockdown *Mitigation measures* Hostile vehicle vulnerability assessment and target hardening strategy resulting in Implementation of Vehicle Security Barriers and visual deterrent barriers Regular staff exercises and drills to be conducted on Terrorist attack scenarios to assist staff in understanding their response and role in an attack.	Increased knowledge of staff in how to prepare and respond to an attack. Increased security measures in response to a hostile vehicle attack within the racecourse area.
Security Resources	Ineffective deployment of security operatives resulting in undetected security breaches Ineffective management of ingress, egress and circulation Ineffective management of intoxicated persons and potential assaults Ineffective response to and management of patrons in an emergency evacuation.	*Management Measure* A Security Management Plan will be developed and implemented An Emergency Management Plan will be developed and implemented A Crowd Management Plan will be developed and implemented to manage crowds effectively on ingress, circulation and egress including public transport hubs from Royal Randwick *Mitigation Measure* A risk assessment to be completed on each night racing event prior to the event. Each private security operative to be well educated on their role and responsibility in respect to security management and emergency management at the racecourse	Security Management deployment will be based on a risk management assessment of each event providing appropriate numbers and locations to effectively provide and manage security at the event.

Lighting	Lack of lighting in high patron traffic areas entrances and pedestrian routes resulting in patron injury Insufficient lighting around event area resulting in undetected security breaches Insufficient lighting in Emergency Evacuation assembly areas resulting in patron confusion and injury	*Management Measure* A lighting plan will be developed and implemented *Mitigation measures* Identify and/or assess lighting requirements in the heavy pedestrian traffic areas. Identify security lighting needs to ensure no opportunities for crime in dark areas to exist Assess the lighting and upgrade if necessary the emergency evacuation area at Doncaster Lawn.	Minimisation of areas vulnerable to crime in dark. Minimisation of patron injury through good lighting along main pedestrian routes and areas within the racecourse and surrounding area.
Perimeter Security	Impact on event security through fence and gate breached due to vulnerable locations along fence lines and damaged fence Impact on event security through unauthorized persons using climbable gates to gain access to the racecourse	*Management Measure* A risk management plan will be developed and implemented A lighting plan will be developed and implemented *Mitigation Measure* Rectification work to damaged fence line Strong lighting at vulnerable fence lined areas Regular security patrols along fence line Deployment of CCTV monitored and viewed in the Security Control Room Implementation on non- climbable fences	Strong perimeter fencing minimising the potential for unauthorized and undetected entry.
Staff Training	Impact to staff and patron safety if safety and response training is insufficient Impact to staff and patron safety if emergency	*Management Measure* Development and implementation of A security Management plan A training plan for staff covering security procedures, safety procedures	Well trained and knowledgeable staff on emergency and evacuation procedures with a clear understanding of

	response and emergency evacuation is not trained and exercised in a regular basis	and emergency procedures including emergency evacuation Implementation of specific procedures in relation to emergency management and response *Mitigation measures* Regular staff exercises and drills to be conducted on Emergency Management and evacuation to assist staff in understanding their response and role in an emergency incident.	their role and responsibilities minimising the potential impacts to staff and patrons
COVID-19 Transmission Control	Impact to staff, patron and community health and safety in the event of a COVID-19 outbreak resulting in large-scale infection transmission	*Management Measure* Implementation of a COVID Safe Plan for Royal Randwick A training plan for staff covering COVIDSafe protocols, procedures and reporting consistent with NSW Public Health guidelines A comprehensive communications framework in place to advise patrons of COVIDSafe protocols and conditions of entry *Mitigation Measures* Medical services onsite with rapid response plan in the event a patron becomes unwell Additional Security resources to perform COVID Safe protocols effectively Implementation of trained COVID Marshalls to monitor and manage COVID Safe practices such as physical distancing, contact tracing registration, minimal crowd movement etc.	Strong infection control measures in place to minimise the potential for transmission on a large scale.

10 Emergency Management

10.1 Evacuation Assembly Areas

The Evacuation plan is contained within the The Emergency Management Plan for Royal Randwick Night Racing.

The Evacuation Assembly Area A is located on the Doncaster Lawn.

The Emergency Assembly area located on the Doncaster Lawn must have appropriate lighting for Night Racing Events.

The Evacuation Assembly point is located close to the egress point at the Main Gate 1.