Warehouse and Distribution Facility
Lot 1C Oakdale Central
Horsley Park NSW

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Fire Safety Strategy
Warehouse and Distribution Facility
Lot 1C Oakdale Central

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Report Details

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Report Revision History

REV	DATE ISSUED	COMMENT	PREPARED BY	REVIEWED BY
01	10 October 2013	Draft Issue	**Thomas Newton** *Adv. Dip. Mechanical Engineering, Master Fire & Safety Engineering*	**Trent De Maria** *Grad Cert Performance Based Bdg & Fire Codes, Grad Dip Building Fire Safety & Risk Engineering*
02	22 October 2013	Final Issue		**Adrian de Booy** *BTech (Mech), Grad Dip (Bld & Risk Engineering)*
03	10 March 2015	Issue for Section 75W modifications		**Graham Morris** *MEng (Structural and fire safety engineering)*
04	17 March 2015	Updated drawing references		

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 OVERVIEW

This Fire Safety Strategy has been undertaken to nominate proposed Alternative Solutions for assessing compliance with the nominated performance requirements of the BCA [1] in accordance with the methodologies defined in the IFEG [3].

In order to develop and assess the nominated non-compliances the following flowchart process is to be adopted.



Figure 1-1: Fire Safety Strategy Process

The scope of the Fire Safety Strategy is to detail the nominated non-complying BCA DTS provisions with the performance requirements of the BCA and provide methodologies for establishing a workable and safe Fire Safety Strategy through a trial design.

1.2 FIRE SAFETY OBJECTIVES

The objective of a Fire Engineering Assessment is to develop a Fire Safety System, which satisfies the performance requirements of the BCA whilst maintaining an acceptable level of life safety, protection of adjacent property and adequate provisions for Fire Brigade intervention. At a community level, fire safety objectives are met if the relevant legislation and regulations are complied with. As stated in the BCA, “A Building Solution will comply with the BCA if it satisfies the Performance Requirements”. In addition to this certain non-regulatory objectives exist as detailed below.

1.2.1 Building regulatory objectives

The following items are a summary of the fire and life safety objectives of the BCA:

- **Life safety of occupants -** the occupants must be able to leave the building (or remain in a safe refuge) without being subject to hazardous or untenable conditions. The objective of the Fire Engineering Assessment is to demonstrate that the proposed building design and fire safety systems would minimise the risk of exposing building occupants to hazardous or untenable conditions in an event of a fire.
- **Life safety of fire fighters -** fire fighters must be given a reasonable time to rescue any remaining occupants before hazardous conditions or building collapse occurs. The objective of the Fire Engineering Assessment is to demonstrate that the proposed building design and fire

safety systems would facilitate fire brigade intervention and minimise the risk of exposing fire fighters to hazardous or untenable conditions in an event of a fire.

- **Protection of adjoining buildings** - structures must not collapse onto adjacent property and fire spread by radiation should not occur. The objective of the Fire Engineering Assessment is to demonstrate that the proposed building design and fire safety systems would minimise the risk of fire spreading from one building to another.

1.2.2 Fire Brigade objectives

The overall philosophical Fire Brigade objectives throughout Australia are to protect life, property and the environment from fire according to the Fire Brigade Intervention Model (FBIM) [5] as per the Fire Services State and Territory Acts and Regulations.

Over and above the requirements of the BCA, the Fire Brigade has functions with regard to property and environmental protection and considerations regarding occupational health and safety for its employees.

1.2.3 Non-prescribed objectives

Fire Engineering has an overarching benefit to many facets of the built environment where non-prescribed objectives can have an influence on the Fire Safety Strategy adopted. Although not assessed within, the following can be considered if requested.

- **Business continuity -** will the loss of a particular facility due to fire / smoke damage result in excessive financial impact on the client? For example, is the facility critical to business continuity?
- **Public perception -** should a fire occur within the facility is there likely to be questionable public perception about the safety and operation of the facility?
- **Environmental protection –** fires of excessive sizes can have significant effects on the environment which may require a detailed risk assessment to minimise such outcomes.
- **Risk mitigation / insurance limitations -** are there specific limitations on insurance with respect to risk mitigation and fire safety design? i.e. Does the relevant insurer have concerns with respect to open atriums through the building?
- **Future proofing (isolation of systems) -** what flexibility is required in the overall design to allow for future development or changes in building layout?
- **OHS requirements -** buildings may have specific fire safety requirements pertaining to OHS requirements.

1.3 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF THE FIRE ENGINEERING ASSESSMENT

1.3.1 Building Code of Australia

One of the goals of the BCA is the achievement and maintenance of acceptable standards of safety from fire for the benefit of the community. This goal extends no further than is necessary in the public interest and is considered to be cost effective and not needlessly onerous in its application.

Section A0.5 of the BCA [1] outlines how compliance with the Performance Requirements can be achieved. These are as follows:

(a) complying with the Deemed-to-Satisfy Provisions; or

(b) formulating an Alternative Solution which –

  (i) complies with the Performance Requirements; or

  (ii) is shown to be at least equivalent to the Deemed-to-Satisfy Provisions or

(c) a combination of (a) and (b).

Section A0.9 of the BCA provides several different methods for assessing that an Alternate Solution complies with the Performance Requirements. These methods are summarised as follows:

(d) Evidence to support that the use of a material, form of construction or design meets a Performance Requirement or a Deemed-to-Satisfy Provision.

(e) Verification Methods such as:

(i) the Verifications Methods in the BCA; or

(ii) such other Verification Methods as the appropriate authority accepts for determining compliance with the Performance Requirements.

(f) Comparison with the Deemed-to-Satisfy Provisions.

(g) Expert Judgment.

Section A0.10 of the BCA provides methods for complying with provisions A1.5 (to comply with Sections A to J of the BCA inclusive). The following method must be used to determine the Performance Requirements relevant to the Alternative Solution: These methods are summarised as follows:

(i) Identify the relevant Deemed-to-Satisfy Provision of each Section or Part that is to be the subject of the Alternative Solution.

(ii) Identify the Performance Requirements from the same Section or Part that are relevant to the identified Deemed-to-Satisfy Provisions.

(iii) Identify Performance Requirements from the other Sections and Parts that are relevant to any aspects of the Alternative Solution proposed or that are affected by the application of the Deemed-to-Satisfy Provisions that are the subject of the Alternative Solution.

1.3.2 International Fire Engineering Guidelines

The IFEG [3] document has been developed for use in fire safety design and assessment of buildings and reflects world's best practice. The document is intended to provide guidance for fire engineers as they work to develop and assess strategies that provide acceptable levels of safety.

The document is particularly useful in providing guidance in the design and assessment of Alternative Solutions against the Performance Requirements of the BCA. The prescribed methodology set out in the IFEG has been generally adopted in the Fire Safety Strategy.

2 PROJECT SCOPE

2.1 PROJECT SCOPE

RAWFiRE Safety Engineering has been engaged to undertake a fire safety review of the new industrial development to be located on Lot 1C of the Oakdale Central Estate in Horsley Park.

The completed development shall form a storage and dispatch facility with ancillary office space.

The purpose of this fire safety review is to outline the fire engineering principles that will be utilised in ensuring that the non-compliances with the DTS provisions of the BCA are resolved in order to conform to the building regulations. The complete fire engineered analysis will be completed in the Fire Engineering Report, and as such is not documented herein. This Fire Safety Strategy outlines the construction and management requirements considered necessary to achieve an acceptable level of life safety within the building and satisfy the Performance Requirements of the BCA.

2.2 RELEVANT STAKEHOLDERS

This Alternative Solution has been developed collaboratively with the relevant stakeholders as identified below:

Table 2-1: Relevant Stakeholders

ROLE	NAME	ORGANISATION
Development Manager	Richard Seddon	Goodman
Design Manager	Michael Ossitt	
Planning Manager	Guy Smith	
Principal Certifying Authority	Dean Goldsmith	Blackett Maguire + Goldsmith
BCA Consultant	Tony Heaslip	
Planning	Andrew Cowan	McKenzie Group
Architect	Greg Baird	SBA Architects
Fire Safety Consultant(s)	Thomas Newton Trent De Maria	RAWFire Safety Engineering
Fire Safety Engineers	Sandro Razzi	

It should be noted that at times some parties may have a vested interest in the outcome of the Fire Engineering assessment. Such parties can include local fire brigades, insurers, project control groups, end users and community representatives. Although not always a legislative requirement, the design team should give due consideration to their inclusion in the Fire Engineering process. Where not required by legislation it is the clients' decision to involve such parties, especially local fire brigade, to ensure a transparent and adequate fire safety solution for all. Where we are not notified of the inclusion of such parties it is assumed the client / representative has given due consideration to the above.

2.3 SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The following sources of information have been provided by the design team:

- Preliminary Building BCA Compliance Assessment produced by Blackett Maguire + Goldsmith. Report No: 130335, dated 10 October 2013, Revision 0.
- Architectural drawings produced by SBA Architects as listed below.

Table 2-2: Referenced Drawings

REF	DESCRIPTION	REV
OAK DA-01	Cover Sheet & Title Page	G
OAK DA-02	Estate Masterplan	M
OAK DA-03	Staging Plan	C
OAK DA-04	Subdivision Plan	D
OAK DA-05	Estate Signage Plan	B
OAK DA-06	Land Use Plan	E
OAK 1C DA-10	Site Plan / Floor Plan	K
OAK 1C DA-11	Roof Plan	D
OAK 1C DA-12	Office Plans	E
OAK 1C DA-13	Dock Office Plans	D
OAK 1C DA-14	Elevations	D
OAK 1C DA-15	Sections	D

2.4 LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS

In this instance the Fire Engineering Strategy is developed based on applicable limitations and assumptions for the development which are listed as follows:

- The report is specifically limited to the project described in Section 2.1.
- The report is based on the information provided by the team as listed above in Section 2.3.
- Building and occupant characteristics are as per Section 3 and 4 respectively of this report. Variations to these assumptions may affect the Fire Engineering Strategy and therefore they should be reviewed by a suitably qualified Fire Engineer should they differ.
- As per any building design, DTS or otherwise, the report is limited to the fire hazards and fuel loads as prescribed in Section 5.2. The report does not provide guidance in respect of areas, which are used for bulk storage, processing of flammable liquids, explosive materials, multiple fire ignitions or sabotage of fire safety systems.
- The development complies with the DTS provisions of the BCA [1] with all aspects unless otherwise specifically stated in this report. Where not specifically mentioned, the design is expected to meet the BCA DTS requirements of all relevant codes and legislation at the time of construction and / or at the time of issue of this report.
- The assessment is limited to the objectives of the BCA and does not consider property damage such as building and contents damage caused by fire, potential increased insurance liability and loss of business continuity.
- Malicious acts or arson with respect to fire ignition and safety systems are limited in nature and are outside the objectives of the BCA. Such acts can potentially overwhelm fire safety systems and therefore further strategies such as security, housekeeping and management procedures may better mitigate such risks.
- This report is prepared in good faith and with due care for information purposes only, and should not be relied upon as providing any warranty or guarantee that ignition or a fire will not occur.
- Where parties not nominated in Table 2-1 have not been consulted or legislatively are not required to be, this report does not take into account, nor warrant, that fire safety requirements specific to their needs have been complied with.

3 PRINCIPAL BUILDING CHARACTERISTICS

3.1 OVERVIEW

Principal Building Characteristics

Building characteristics are assessed as part of the Fire Engineering Review due the following:

1. The location can affect the time for fire brigade intervention and potential external fire exposure issues.
2. The structure will impact on the ability to resist a developing fire and support condition to allow occupants to escape the building and the fire brigade to undertake fire fighting to the degree necessary.
3. The floor area determines the potential fire size and area required to be evacuated in the event of a fire.
4. BCA details such as Type of Construction, Class and Height will dictate passive and active fire safety systems.

3.2 SITE DESCRIPTION

The development site is located in Horsley Park, approximately 40km west of Sydney's central business district. The sites are located on Milner Avenue which is accessed from Old Wallgrove Road.

The two nearest fire brigade stations that are provided with permanent staff are located in Huntingwood and Mount Druitt approximately 8km and 11km from the estate respectively. The estate layout is detailed below, with this Fire Safety Strategy detailing the works associated with Lot 1C.



Figure 3-1: Site location and Lot 1C highlighted

The development consists of a single warehouse building with ancillary office and external onsite carparking. The development is considered a large isolated building for certification purposes and as such is provided with a sprinkler system throughout, vehicular perimeter access around the building structure and a smoke hazard management system.

The warehouse has a floor area of 25,545m^2 with a two storey administration office and two dock offices on the eastern and western sides of the warehouse. The administration office occupies a floor area of 1200m^2 while the eastern and western dock offices occupy floor areas of 190m^2 each.

Dispatch loading docks are located on the eastern and western sides of the warehouse with a high level awning extending 15m over the hardstand and central dispatch doors.



Figure 3-2: Site Plan

3.3 BUILDING CHARACTERISTIC ASSESSMENT

Table 3-1: Building Characteristics

CHARACTERISTIC	DESCRIPTION
Location	The site is located within the industrial area of Horsley Park. The two nearest fire brigade stations are located within 11km of the site. The site influences the likely fire brigade intervention times, and given the close proximity to the nearest fire station is expected to facilitate a relatively convenient and expedient fire brigade response. Furthermore being located within a major city outer suburb the development is provided with the services and facilities expected in an urban setting.
Layout	The building shall be constructed as a single fire compartment and is intended to be utilised for the temporary storage of stock prior to final dispatch. The warehouse parts shall have high-bay racking running in a single direction permitting a clear line of sight along the racking aisles that will assist in occupant evacuation in a fire emergency. Conversely occupant's line of sight will be highly obstructed in the opposite directions creating a barrier in determining the safest path of egress in a fire emergency. Exit doors are generally situated around the building perimeter providing occupants with multiple egress opportunities in the event of a fire emergency.

CHARACTERISTIC	DESCRIPTION	
Structure	Materials and finishes shall be in accordance with the DTS requirements for Type C construction. Construction materials will include masonry/concrete and steel construction, with external steel sheeting. Materials used in construction will conform with the testing methodology outlined in the DTS provisions so as to avoid the spread of smoke and fire and minimise the risk to occupants and fire fighters.	
Total Floor area	The total floor area of the building is detailed below. **Lot 1C** ■ Warehouse: 25,545 m^2 ■ Main office: 1,200 m^2 ■ Dock office east: 190 m^2 ■ Dock office west: 190 m^2 ■ Gate house: 15 m^2 ***TOTAL:*** ***27,045 m^2***	
BCA Assessment	Classifications	Class 5 - Offices Class 7b - Storage facility
	Construction Type	Type C Construction *(Large Isolated Building)*
	Rise in Storeys	The building has a rise in storeys of two (2) due to the administration office and the western dock office.
	Effective Height	The building has an effective height of less than 12m (approx. 3.5m).

4 DOMINANT OCCUPANT CHARACTERISTICS

4.1 OVERVIEW



The occupant characteristics are assessed within the Fire Safety Strategy due to the following:

1. Population numbers can dictate the time required to evacuate the building and the required life safety systems to be provided due to evacuation times.
2. Physical and mental attributes affects the occupants capacity to respond to various fire cues and react accordingly.
3. Familiarity of occupants can affect the time taken to evacuate the building and subsequent active / passive requirements.

4.2 OCCUPANT CHARACTERISTIC ASSESSMENT

Table 4-1: Occupant Characteristics

CHARACTERISTIC	DESCRIPTION
Population numbers	The number of occupants expected within the building is considered to be generally less than that assumed in the BCA Table D1.13 [1] due to the type of function and use. However the BCA values shall be used on a preliminary basis to provide an estimated value in the absence of accurate numbers being provided by the building tenant. The BCA assumes the following occupant densities. ■ 1 person per 30 square metres in the plant room and warehouse. ■ 1 person per 10 square metres in the office areas.
Population location	The population is expected to be distributed throughout the building. The office is considered to 'on average' be more densely populated than the warehouse and plant areas, however the building's function and use may dictate an overall lower occupant number in the office areas.
Physical and mental attributes	Occupants in the building may be of mixed age, although the elderly and children are generally not expected to be present. The population is therefore expected to be that of the general working public and be adults between the ages of 16 to 70. Due to the nature of the work conducted the majority of occupants are assumed to be able bodied people with a small number of less mobile occupants requiring assistance during an evacuation. All occupants are expected to be awake and alert adults or in the direct company of an adult, capable of entering the leaving the building under their own volition. Occupants in all of these areas are not expected to be adversely impaired by drugs, alcohol, fatigue or other adverse conditions to degrees greater than in other warehouse and office buildings. ■ ***Staff and Security*** – are expected to be mobile with normal hearing and visual abilities, and occupants in this group are considered to take and implement decisions independently, and require minimal assistance during evacuation in a fire emergency. This occupant group is expected to be awake and fully conscious at all times when inside the building; and ■ ***Clients / Visitors*** – are expected to be mobile with normal hearing and visual abilities, this occupant group are expected to be capable of making and implementing decisions independently however may require assistance in locating the nearest and safest egress path in an emergency;

CHARACTERISTIC	DESCRIPTION
	and ■ ***External Maintenance Contractors*** – are expected to be mobile with normal hearing and visual abilities and occupants in this group are considered to take and implement decisions independently and require minimal assistance during evacuation in a fire emergency. The contractors are expected to be awake and aware of their surroundings at all times when inside the building; and ■ ***Fire & Rescue NSW*** – are expected to be equipped with safety equipment and will be educated in fire fighting activities and the dangers associated with fire incidents. This occupant group would be expected to be in a position to assist other occupants requiring assistance to evacuate. It is not expected that this occupant group would be present in the building at the time of fire ignition; however, they are expected to enter the buildings at a later stage to assist with the evacuation of occupants, if required, and to undertake fire suppression activities.
Familiarity with the building	■ ***Warehouse Staff and Security*** – can be expected to have a good familiarity within the building they are located and the fire safety systems provided and may be trained in emergency procedures; and ■ ***Office Staff*** – can be expected to have a good familiarity with the administration areas of the building they are located and the means of exits from these parts. General familiarity of their building as a whole and the location of main exits; and ■ ***Clients / visitors*** – may or may not be familiar with the building layout and may require assistance in locating the exits; and ■ ***External Maintenance Contractors*** – this occupant group is expected to have a reasonable familiarity with the building within which they are located as they would have to undergo site specific induction prior to commencement of work on site; and ■ ***Fire & Rescue NSW*** – are not expected to have any familiarity of the building layout, however are assumed to obtain the required information from the site block plans and tactical fire plans available prior to entering the building. Notwithstanding this they will be equipped with breathing apparatus and specialist equipment to prevent them from being adversely affected by fire hazards.

5 FIRE HAZARDS AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES

5.1 OVERVIEW

The fire hazard analysis forms the basis for the review of non-compliances within the building. In assessing expected and statistically validated hazards, preventative and protective measures are developed commensurate with those expected risks. The following section reviews applicable hazards and recommends possible measures to address those risks. Furthermore, hazards identified can form a justified basis for selected scenarios.

5.2 FIRE STATISTICS

In order to assess the most likely fire hazards within the building, and subsequently the risk presented by these hazards it is necessary to develop an understanding of the factors that have an influence on the fire safety of building occupants. The best method in doing so is to review existing statistical data.

Existing data is an invaluable tool in providing an overview of the situations in which occupant deaths have, and are likely to occur, and factors that contribute to more severe fires. This aids in understanding, and helps evaluate the effectiveness of, and the need for various fire safety systems. Reference is made to the American database as it is significantly larger than Australian data sets, but is generally considered to be representative of the Australian situation.

Table 5-1: Fire Statistics in all building types

STRUCTURE TYPE	FIRES PER YEAR	CIVILIAN FATALITIES PER YEAR	CIVILIAN FATALITIES PER 1000 FIRES
Offices	**5,800**	**1**	**0.17**
Storage facilities	**22,900**	**15**	**0.66**
Retail shopping complexes*	NA	NA	0.74
Public assembly, excluding eating/drinking	6,000	5	0.83
Facilities that care for the sick	2,600	5	1.92
Hotels & Motels	4,900	28	5.7
Apartments	96,200	632	6.57
Homes	406,400	3,498	8.61

*From the FCRC 'Fire Safety in Shopping Centres' Project 6 all other data from the NFPA 'U.S. Fire Problem Overview Report' [11]

Based on the National Fire Protection Association, the statistics are based upon recorded fire events occurring between:

- 2003 – 2007 Structure fires in Warehouses (excluding cold storage)

Note that the statistics below have been compiled from U.S. fires reported to U.S. municipal fire departments between 2003 and 2007, and do not include fires where private or government fire brigades responded or fires that were not reported. Further, it should be noted that cold storage, residential storage and self-storage are excluded. Despite the fact that cold storage is not reported within the statistics it is considered that they still provide a reasonable basis for the general understanding of the risk presented by a high storage warehouse, cold storage or otherwise.

It is a common misconception that fires do not occur in cold store. However, factors such as an ultra dry atmosphere and the highly combustible nature of polyurethane or polystyrene foam insulation, wooden pallets and plastic wrapping present a high fire risk in these environments. Electrical faults from conveyor/transport equipment, lighting, or hot spots caused by maintenance operation can also contribute to this risk. Additionally the holding capacity of a cold store demands specialized high

volume storage racking which can affect the airflow and impede the detection and response to a fire event.

These statistics represent a much greater number of events than Australian statistics and therefore have a greater statistical reliability. Building construction types and fire hazards are estimated to be sufficiently similar between Australia and the U.S. for the following results to be applicable.

Warehouse (excluding cold storage) Fire Statistics

A total of 1,350 structure fires occurred in warehouses. The fires recorded resulted in 5 occupant fatalities, and 21 occupant injuries and $124 million in direct property damage per year. The leading cause of fires in Warehouses (excluding cold storage) is from electrical distribution or lighting resulting in 17% civilian injuries. The leading area of fire origin in warehouses comes from an unclassified storage area resulting in 21% civilian injuries.



Figure 5-1 Leading causes of fires in warehouse (excluding cold storage) structures

The potential fire hazards (inclusive of the leading causes, as well as area of origin of a fire) identified throughout the development are illustrated in the graphs below. The statistics as illustrated in the figures below have been obtained from the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) website (www.nfpa.com).



Figure 5-2 Structure fires in warehouse (excluding cold storage) structures by area of origin

Office Facilities

Fire statistics for offices in Australia as reported in Technical Report 96-02 [14] show that the most common cause of fires in these types of buildings are attributed to faults in electrical equipment, with lighting fixtures being the equipment most often cited. Ahrens (2001) [16], reports that fire statistics from the U.S. confirm the same key ignition sources. It should be noted that with so few fire fatalities in office fires, the data for fatalities should be considered holistically, representing a low likelihood of fatalities overall in offices. The identification of the comparative risk of fatality within different areas or by different ignition sources is lacking in accuracy by virtue of a limited data set of 1 fatality per year.

Table 5-2: Office fire statistics by cause of ignition

CAUSE OF FIRE	FIRES	CIVILIAN FATALITIES
Electrical Distribution	21.1%	51.6%
Other Equipment; motors, generator, elevators, office equipment etc.	17.0%	21.4%
Incendiary or suspicious	15.7%	26.9%
Smoking Materials	8.6%	0.0%
Heating equipment	8.1%	0.0%
Appliance, tool or air conditioning	7.5%	0.0%
Open flame or torch	7.3%	0.0%
Cooking equipment	5.7%	0.0%
Other, less than 6% of fires per area	9.0%	0.0%
Total:	**100% 5,800 fires per year**	**100.0% 1 fatality per year**

Ahrens also indicates that 17.7% of all recorded office fires occur within the specific office area. This figure is likely to be highest by virtue of the proportion of the buildings which the general office space

occupies and as such may not actually represent the high ignition risk of the office space but the risk of fire resulting from the application of a minor risk over the majority of the floor space. The next four most frequent areas of ignition are grouped around 5% each and include kitchens, exterior walls, concealed spaces and heating equipment rooms. Any correlation between the area of ignition and the likelihood of fatalities is likely to be misrepresentative due to the low number of fatalities relied upon to draw such conclusions.

Table 5-3: Office fire statistics by area of fire origin

AREA OF FIRE ORIGIN	FIRES	CIVILIAN FATALITIES
Office	17.7%	40.7%
Kitchen	6.0%	0.0%
Exterior wall surface	5.6%	0.0%
Attic or ceiling/roof assembly or concealed space	5.2%	0.0%
Heating equipment room	5.1%	0.0%
Hallway, Corridor or Mall	3.5%	21.2%
Crawl space or substructure space	1.6%	21.2%
Other, less than 5% of fires per area	55.3%	16.9%
Total:	**100% 5,800 fires per year**	**100.0% 1 fatality per year**



Figure 5-3: Area of fire origin in office buildings

Statistics shown in Figure 5-3 are published in the document 'U.S Structure fires in office properties' by Flynn (2007) [15], and is the most recent available statistics from the National Fire Protection Association in the U.S.A, relating to office buildings. A total of 3,810 fires were considered in the statistical data and had recorded one civilian fatality in these fires. It can be seen from the above figure that office, cooking and rubbish areas are the most common areas for fire origins within office buildings, which is consistent with the findings of Ahrens.

5.3 SPRINKLER EFFECTIVENESS & RELIABILITY

The effectiveness of automatic fire sprinklers in general in limiting fire spread and growth is supported by statistics and studies undertaken into the effects of automatic fire sprinklers within buildings. These studies show that fire sprinkler systems operate and control fires in 81% to 99.5% of fire occurrences [3]. The lower reliability estimates of 81.3% [8] as well as some of the higher values of 87.6% [10] appear to reflect significant bias in data in terms of the small number of fire incidents and the lack of differentiation between fire sprinklers and other fire suppression systems. A number of the lower figures are results of dated studies.

It must be noted that the higher reliability of fire sprinklers reported by Marryatt [12] of 99.5% reflect fire sprinkler systems where inspections, testing and maintenance exceeded normal expectations and applies to installations specifically in Australia and New Zealand. The statistical data indicate that sprinklers with appropriate maintenance are highly effective in reducing the loss of life and limiting fire spread and in particular the storage (ESFR) system has an exemplary record.

With reference to FM Global data sheet (2-2) as of 2002 [5] there had been six known fires involving suppression mode sprinkler protection.

In all of these incidents, the sprinkler system was successful in suppressing the fire and no more than four sprinkler heads operated. Therefore for the purposes of this assessment, on the activation of the ESFR fire sprinkler system, the fire growth is considered to be suppressed within the area of activation.

FM Global Data Sheet 2-0 states, *"loss history over the past twenty years indicates approximately 25% of the time, the operation of a single sprinkler will control or suppress a fire if the sprinkler system has been properly designed and installed."* This percentage increases to approximately 50% of the time with the operation of 3 or fewer sprinklers, and 75% of the time with the operation of nine or fewer sprinklers.

In addition analysis of the likelihood of sprinkler failure shows that most sprinkler system failures are due to impaired water supplies such as closed valves, blocked pipes, impaired sources, etc., which tend to affect sections of or the entire system [10]. As such, system reliability can be increased by active monitoring of water supplies and controls. The general consensus within the fire protection industry is that problems with individual sprinkler heads are rare. This information combined with sprinkler reliability data is favourable when compared with the reliability of fire compartmentation [3].

Moinuddin and Thomas [10] have found that masonry fire rated construction had a reliability of 81-95%, and gypsum 69-95%, with the upper level in both instances having been reported within the IFEG [3]. Both reported ranges are considered to be less than that offered by automatic sprinkler systems. Table 5-4 lists the effectiveness of sprinkler systems in the event of a fire growing to a size that facilitates sprinkler head activation [10].

Table 5-4: Effectiveness of Sprinkler systems

PROPERTY TYPE	EFFECTIVENESS OF SPRINKLERS IN EVENTS WHERE SPRINKLERS OPERATE
Public Assembly	90%
Educational	93%
Health care / Correctional Centre	95%
Residential (average)	97%
Office / Retail	91%
Manufacturing	93%
Storage	86%
Cold Storage	89%
All properties	7%

Statistics for general sprinkler effectiveness in storage properties is provided in the table below which is drawn from the research of Rohr [13]. The data indicates over 77% of storage fires and 84% of manufacturing facility fires are confined to the area of fire origin where sprinklers are fitted.

Table 5-5: The Effectiveness of Sprinkler in Storage Facilities

EXTENT OF FLAME DAMAGE	FIRES WITH SPRINKLER PROTECTION	FIRES WITHOUT SPRINKLER PROTECTION
Confined to object of origin	50.0%	19.9%
Confined to area of origin	27.8%	14.1%
Confined to room of origin	6.7%	4.9%
Confined to fire-rated compartment of origin	1.1%	0.6%
Confined to floor of origin	2.4%	1.1%
Confined to structure of origin	10.0%	45.0%
Extended beyond structure of fire origin	2.2%	14.3%
Total:	900 fires	29,330 fires

According to the tests undertaken by FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets [5], automatic smoke exhaust systems would operate prior to an installed sprinkler system. This would result in the removal of hot smoke from the ceiling causing a critical delay in sprinkler operation. As such, FM Global recommends that a sprinkler system should not be installed in conjunction with automatic smoke exhaust systems.

It is considered likely that the BCA DTS smoke management would hinder and prevent the activation of the sprinkler system as discussed in the FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets. The failure of the sprinkler system would allow fire development and cause uncontrolled spread throughout the building leading to a more rapid onset of untenable conditions, significant property loss, and restriction of fire fighter access into the building.

Furthermore, rapid fire development and spread could eventually overrun the sprinkler system by resulting in the activation of several fast response sprinkler heads, over and above the system design requirement, potentially depleting the water supply. In this instance, the system may be rendered ineffective and unable to hydraulically perform as intended. As such, it is recommended that the removal of the BCA DTS smoke management system would allow hot smoke to build up in the ceiling leading to the activation of the sprinkler system as intended by design parameters which are based on tested systems and therefore improving the likelihood of fire control and/or suppression.

5.4 FIRE LOAD

The fire load within a room or compartment will influence the duration and severity of a fire and resultant hazard to occupants. The effective fire load for the building has been estimated by consideration of the typical spaces within the building.

The following fire loads have been extracted from Chapter 3.4 of the International Fire Engineering Guidelines [3] and are listed in Table 5-6. This data is derived from Switzerland, however is also deemed applicable to buildings in Australia of similar use.

The warehouses are considered to generally contain mixed types of commodities, where in some cases cellulosic materials are mixed with plastics and non-combustible materials on the same racks. There is a large amount of data concerning the burning rates of items and materials; however, this information is not often presented such that it is sufficiently generic to be universally adopted.

Also, while the current tenant and stored commodities may be known during the design stages of the development the length of their occupancy can not be definitively identified. Therefore while what can be representative of the current fuel loadings for the enclosure, these may not be the case in the future use of the building. Therefore, it would be a rare assessment in which the specific items forming the fuel load had been tested to provide the fire heat release data. As such it is considered that the application of generic burning rates, translated through simplified mathematical expression (time squared growth rates) is a suitable means of estimating fire development.

Table 5-6: Fire Load Densities

TYPE OF OCCUPANCY	AVERAGE FIRE LOAD
Office, Business	800 MJ/m^2
Forwarding facility dealing in; Beverages, food, furniture, glassware, plastic product, printed goods, varnish/polish.	Range from; 200 MJ/m^2 - 1700 MJ/m^2
Storage of rubber products	5000 MJ/m^2 per metre stored height
Storage of paper	1000 MJ/m^2 per metre stored height

5.5 FIRE GROWTH RATE AND INTENSITY

As the fire increases in size, the rate of fire growth accelerates. The growth rate of a fire can result in various hazards for occupants due to the following:

- Protective and preventative measures may not be adequate.
- Occupants may have insufficient time to evacuate.
- Occupants may perceive a reduced threat from slow growing fires.

The rate of fire growth is generally expressed in terms of an energy release rate. The most commonly used relationship is what is commonly referred to as a quadratic time-squared fire. The basis of the time squared fire arises from the fact that the growth during the flaming stage can be approximated by a smooth curve that can be expressed mathematically. The rate of heat release is given by the expression:

$$Q = (t/k)^2$$

Where: t = time from after ignition of the fire (seconds)

K = the growth time (seconds)

Q = a heat release output of 1.055 MW.

Studies of actual fires have led to the adoption of five (5) standard fire growth rates covering a wide range of potential fire scenarios and fuel loads. It should be noted, the times of fire incubation are not included in the time-squared growth fire models. National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 92B [10] provides information on the relevance of time-squared approximation to real fire as depicted in the figure below.



Figure 5-4: NFPA 92B: T-squared fire, rates of energy release



Figure 5-5: NFPA 92B: Relation of t-squared fires to some fire tests

The rate of fire growth can also be estimated from data published in British Standard (BS) 9999:2008 [5] as shown below in Table 5-7, and Table 5-8.

Table 5-7: Summary of Fire Growth Rates per Building Type

BUILDING AREA PROVIDING FUEL	GROWTH RATE	BUILDING AREA PROVIDING FUEL	GROWTH RATE
Reception area	Slow	Restaurant/Canteen	Medium
Office	**Medium**	Teaching Laboratories	Fast
Shop	Fast	Meeting Room	Medium
Warehouse	**Medium – Ultra Fast**	Waiting Room	Slow

The variation in warehouse growth rates can be understood from the following table illustrating the types of stored items.

Table 5-8: Fire Growth Rates as described in BS 9999:2008

FIRE GROWTH RATE	STORED MATERIALS
Slow t^2	Banking hall, limited combustible materials.
Medium t^2	Stacked cardboard boxes, wooden pallets.
Fast t^2	**Baled thermoplastic chips, stacked plastic products, and baled clothing.**
Ultra-Fast t^2	**Flammable liquids, expanded cellular plastics and foam.**

From the above tables (and figures) it is concluded that the likely fire scenarios in the high bay racking may be approximated by an Ultra-Fast standard time-squared fire growth rate curve, while the office areas can be approximated with a Medium time-squared fire growth rate.

5.6 FIRE SOOT YIELD

The materials that make up the fuel load will determine the soot yield of a fire. The fire soot yield should be assessed with respect to hazard due to the following:

- Soot yield can affect visibility for occupants trying to escape a fire.
- Soot yield can be directly related to other products of combustion which may cause untenable conditions.

The NFPA Fire Protection Handbook provides test values of soot yield for some common plastics which vary from 0.012 to 0.23kg/kg [18]. Data for polyurethane is provided in the SFPE handbook which quotes a range between 0.104-0.227kg/kg [17]. As the quantity of fuel in any particular building is expected to be of mixed type, taking the upper value in the range of plastics is considered overly conservative in representing the entire fuel load. The soot yield, quoted by various sources, for wood

is 0.015kg/kg which confirms that utilising 0.1kg/kg is a conservative average for fire modelling in pre-flashover conditions where a mixture of plastic and cellulosic fuel is expected.

5.7 FIRE HAZARD SUMMARY

Subsequent to a review of the relevant fire statistics and hazards, the fire hazards for the building are listed in the following table.

Hazards due to functions or characteristics are reviewed based on the building in question and relevant statistics; and

1. A description is provided on the nominated hazards; and
2. Relevant preventative / protective measures are provided to address the nominated hazards.

Table 5-9: Building Hazard Assessment

POTENTIAL HAZARDS DUE TO:	DESCRIPTION / DETAILS		PREVENTATIVE & PROTECTIVE MEASURES TO ADDRESS HAZARDS
Building layout	Egress provisions	Exits are generally provided around the building perimeter to allow for multiple alternative egress opportunities. Due to the size however, extended travel distances to the nearest of the alternative exits, and between alternative exits exist. Areas within the buildings have limited dead end travel routes to exits.	■ Type C construction ■ Fire hydrants ■ Fire hose reels ■ Fire extinguishers ■ Fire suppression (sprinklers) ■ Occupant warning system ■ Smoke clearance system ■ Fire brigade monitoring ■ Emergency lighting ■ Exit signage ■ Vehicular access
	Fire exposure hazards	Within the subject buildings it is not expected that there will be any greater exposure to fire as a result of the Alternative Solution. No hazards to adjoining buildings have been identified, hazards generally relate to any internal exposures. Occupants in the area of fire origin are expected to be aware of fire and commence evacuation – apart from those intimately involved in ignition are expected to be aware of the fire.	
Activities	With regard to activities it is not expected that regular hot work processes, use of highly flammable materials, manufacturing processes or operation of high friction or high temperature machinery will be performed within the buildings. The building is used as storage and dispatch facility containing a large number of high piled and racking containing combustibles. These items are only stored temporarily before being dispatched onward, thus there is no degradation of old stock. Notwithstanding the assumed turnover, the storage is assumed to be constantly filled to capacity due to the constant rolling stock. ■ Corridors, stairs and lobbies will generally be used only for transient purposes, occupants travelling to and from the various parts of the building.		
Ignition sources	Based on the statistical review contained above the ignition sources relevant to this site, in order of occurrence and likelihood ■ Electrical Equipment / lighting ■ Intentional fire starts ■ Stored waste or rubbish ■ Heating equipment		

POTENTIAL HAZARDS DUE TO:	DESCRIPTION / DETAILS		PREVENTATIVE & PROTECTIVE MEASURES TO ADDRESS HAZARDS
Fuel sources	Quantity of materials	Dangerous goods cannot be discounted from being present in the building. However the quantity will be limited by the space available and relevant workplace health and safety regulations will apply governing storage allowances (quantity) and requirements.	
	Location of materials	Products in high storage racking, store room, waste and rubbish containers. The lobbies, stairways and corridors are to be maintained clear of furniture, stored items and the like and constructed with materials and assemblies in accordance with C1.10 to reduce fire spread and smoke production in the event of fire in common areas. Significant fuel loads will therefore be generally limited to the warehouse and offices.	
	Fire behaviour	Fire growth rates will vary with fuel type and conditions of ventilation and compartmentation. The most likely outcome of any fire outbreak within the building is expected to be sprinkler controlled fire. This would be expected to grow at an Ultra-Fast time squared fire growth rate until sprinkler activation. An office fire would likely be smaller in size due to the limited fuel density and would be expected to grow at a Medium time squared fire growth rate.	
Fire origins	Refer to previous charts whereby fires are likely to occur in the following origins: ■ High storage racking areas. ■ Waste and rubbish containers. ■ Store room.		

6 BCA DTS NON-COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT

6.1 OVERVIEW

In this instance the BCA DTS non-compliances have been formulated based on the regulatory review as provided by the project building surveyor and / or design team. Where not listed herein the building is required to achieve compliance with relevant DTS clauses or if existing, comply with relevant codes, reports and / or Standards approved at the time of consideration.

The following table lists the departures from the DTS provisions of the BCA for the proposed building and the analysis methodology proposed for the Fire Engineering assessment, which is to be generally in accordance with the IFEG [3].

Table 6-1: Summary of Alternative Solutions

BCA DTS PROVISIONS & PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENT	PERFORMANCE BASED SOLUTION
BCA DTS Provisions C2.4: Requirements for vehicular access ***Performance Requirement(s)*** CP9	***BCA DTS Provision*** <u>Clause C2.4:</u> The building must be provided with continuous perimeter vehicular access with no part of the roadway less than 6m in width and no more than 18m from the building. The pathway must also permit the passage and operations of fire brigade appliances. ***DTS Non-conformance*** The following non-conformances have been identified:- ■ Access from the Milner Avenue frontage is greater than 18m from the building (up to 38m from the warehouse and 27m from the administration office). ■ The access pathway along the eastern side requires truck to pass beneath high level dispatch awning. ***Alternative Solution*** The acceptance of the above non-conformances is based on the following fire safety systems/measures. ■ Roadways are provided around the whole of the site and although not entirely within the allotment, a continuous forward travel is available to allow quick and efficient access. ■ The areas greater than 18m from the building are accessible for pedestrians and smaller vehicles via the carpark hardstand. ■ The dispatch awning will have an unobstructed clear height greater than 5.5m to allow unrestricted passage of appliances beneath – as outlined in FRNSW Policy 4. ***Assessment Methodology*** The assessment methodology adheres to BCA clauses A0.5(b)(i), A0.9(b)(ii) and A0.10 of the BCA based on an absolute approach, where a qualitative fire safety engineering assessment has been conducted using a system similar to the Delphi Technique to establish that the design matches the Performance Requirements. The assessment will, in consultation with project stakeholders, demonstrate that the configuration of perimeter access combined with the fire safety systems installed within the building ensure that fire fighting capabilities are not adversely disadvantaged.

BCA DTS PROVISIONS & PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENT	PERFORMANCE BASED SOLUTION
BCA DTS Provisions Clause D1.4: Distance to the nearest exit. Clause D1.5: Distance between alternative exits. Clause E2.2: Smoke hazard management ***Performance Requirement(s)*** DP4 and EP2.2	***BCA DTS Provision*** Clause D1.4 travel distance to the nearest exit must not exceed 40-metres. Clause D1.5 travel distance between alternative exits must not exceed 60-metres. Clause E2.2 *(Table E2.2a)* requires an automatic smoke exhaust system be installed. ***DTS Non-conformances*** The following non-conformances have been identified:- ■ Travel distances of up to 90m to the nearest exit and 180m between alternative exits exist in the warehouse in lieu of 40m and 60m respectively. ■ A manual smoke clearance system shall be installed to the warehouse in lieu of the DTS required automatic smoke exhaust. ***Alternative Solution*** The Alternative Solution will rely upon the volume of the warehouse enclosure to act as a smoke reservoir for hot combustion products with significant reserve so as to provide the population with adequate time to safely evacuate the building prior to the onset of untenable conditions. ***Assessment Methodology*** The assessment methodology will adhere to Clauses A0.5(b)(i), A0.9(b)(ii), and A0.10 of the BCA. The analysis will be absolute and quantitative where the results of the deterministic assessment are measured directly against the agreed acceptance criteria, with a supporting qualitative argument. Computational Fluid Dynamic (CFD) programs will be used to simulate the fire development and smoke spread in the warehouses with these results utilised in an ASET/RSET time-line analysis.
BC DTS Provisions Clause E1.3: Fire hydrants ***Performance Requirement(s)*** EP1.3	***BCA DTS Provision*** Clause E1.3 (AS2419.1) requires internal hydrants be installed within 4m of an exit (additional hydrants permitted thereafter), and coverage be achieved from a single hose length. ***DTS Non-Conformance*** Internal hydrants located beneath the warehouse awnings shall be treated as external hydrants, thereby allowing two hose lengths for coverage. ***Alternative Solution*** The hydrants located beneath the awnings are to have all the requirements of external hydrants per AS2419.1:2005 except in that they are located within the building footprint. That is:- ■ Provided with 90/90/90 protection ■ Use two hose lengths to achieve coverage ■ Located in (an area equivalent to) open space ■ Twin hose connections ■ Have hardstand adjacent to stage fire fighting equipment Additional external fall back hydrants shall be provided to achieve DTS compliant coverage under the awning. ***Approaches and Method of Analysis*** The assessment methodology will adhere to Clauses A0.5(b)(ii), A0.9(c), and A0.10 of the BCA. The analysis will be comparative and quantitative in demonstrating that the fire hydrant system facilitates the needs of the fire brigade to an equivalent degree to a DtS compliant design.

BCA DTS PROVISIONS & PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENT	PERFORMANCE BASED SOLUTION
BCA DTS Provisions Clause E4.6: Direction exit signs **Performance Requirement(s)** EP4.2	***BCA DTS Provision*** BCA DTS Clause E4.6 (NSW) states that if an exit is not readily apparent to persons occupying or visiting the building, then exit signs must be appropriately provided in accordance with AS2293.1. AS2293.1 Clause 6.8.1 requires exit signs be mounted not less than 2m and not more than 2.7 above floor level. ***DTS Non-conformance*** The exit lighting design shall incorporate signage in the warehouse that is positioned above a height of 2.7m to permit the passage of picking machinery below. ***Alternative Solution*** The Alternative Solution relies upon the volume of the warehouse enclosure to provide for adequate time for building population to evacuate prior to the directional exit signs becoming compromised by the hot smoke layer. Further to this, the simplicity of the racking layouts and staff presence within the building shall provide for a rapid evacuation along obvious egress routes. ***Assessment Methodology*** The assessment methodology will adhere to Clauses A0.5(b)(ii), A0.9(b)(ii) and A0.9(c), and A0.10 of the BCA. The analysis will consist of a semi quantitative and qualitative comparative discussion to demonstrate compliance with the relevant Performance Requirements. The assessment will demonstrate that the risk associated with obscuration of the exit signs is equivalent to the risk in a DTS Solution.

7 PROPOSED FIRE SAFETY STRATEGY

The fire safety strategy outlined below has been proposed to satisfy the fire and life safety objectives specified for this project by the relevant stakeholders. In addition, the fire safety strategy is required to adequately address the specific fire and life safety hazards identified for the proposed building, and as such have been generally derived from the preventative and protective measures outlined within the BCA, and fire engineering literature and research. Where items of non-compliance have not been identified by the design team in the concept design it is expected that those items are to meet the Deemed-to-Satisfy (DTS) provisions.

The specified Fire Safety Strategy will undergo analysis as part of the Fire Engineering Report to ascertain whether the relevant Performance Requirements of the BCA are satisfied. The fire safety strategy will incorporate the following elements:-

7.1 EGRESS PROVISIONS

7.1.1 Evacuation Strategy

Activation of any sprinkler head shall initiate the evacuation of all areas of the building. Dedicated fire wardens from the warehouse and office areas shall ensure that all clients, visitors, and staff are promptly evacuated.

7.1.2 Egress Provisions

The travel distances to a point of choice, to the nearest exit, and between alternative exits must comply with the BCA DTS provisions with the following exceptions identified and illustrated in Figure 7-1:-

- Travel distances of up to 90m to the nearest exit and 180m between alternative exits exist in the warehouse in lieu of 40m and 60m respectively.

Note that exits must be provided as necessary to ensure that occupant travel distances do not exceed the limitation defined by Fire & Rescue NSW; that is - *“no point in a fire compartment is to be more than 100 m from a hydrant external to that compartment”*.



Figure 7-1: Nominal Location of Warehouse Travel Distances

7.1.3 Door Hardware, Operation and Mechanisms

All exit doors and doors in a path of travel to an exit are required to be DTS compliant throughout. This includes the swing of doors, the applied latching and locking mechanisms and the force required on mechanism used to open sliding doors.

7.1.4 Signage and Lighting

Emergency lighting is to be provided throughout the building in accordance with DTS Provisions E4.2 and E4.4 of the BCA and AS2293.1:2005.

Exit signage is to be provided throughout the building in accordance with the DTS Provisions E4.5, E4.6, E4.8 of the BCA and AS2293.1:2005 with any directional signage in the warehouse permitted to be installed at a height greater than 2.7m (up to approximately 4.5m above FFL).

- All directional exit signs above 2.7m from FFL must be ‘jumbo size’, with a minimum pictorial element size of 200 mm.

7.2 PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION

7.2.1 Type of Construction Required

The building shall be built in accordance with the BCA DTS provisions for Type C fire-resisting construction.

7.3 ACTIVE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

Location of the site fire safety provisions are detailed in the following diagram.



Figure 7-2: Location of Site Fire Safety Systems

7.3.1 Fire Indicator Panels

The building shall be provided with a Main Fire Indicator Panel (FIP) within a compliant Fire Control Centre in the main entry to the administration office.

The Main FIP must be installed in accordance with BCA Specification E2.2a and AS1670.1:2004 and have the following capabilities:-

- The FIP must be capable of isolating, resetting, and determining the fire location within the building.
- A red strobe shall be installed externally at the main entry to the Fire Control Centre alert arriving fire brigade of the fire alarm origin and FIP location.
- Smoke clearance fan controls shall be provided on or adjacent to the Main FIP. If a separate fire fan control panel is provided it shall include a display to indicate the operation or otherwise of the fans.
    - The panel shall include clear signalling of the operational status of the fans.
    - A local fire fan control panel shall include override controls of any exhaust and supply fans.
    - A blockplan shall be provided detailing the location of each fan units and the switch required to activate that unit.

7.3.2 Building Occupant Warning System

A building occupant warning system shall be provided throughout all parts of the building. The system shall be in accordance with the prescriptive requirements of Specification E1.5 and Clause 6 of Specification E2.2a of the BCA and AS1670.1:2004.

- The occupant warning alarm shall be sounded throughout all areas of the building upon fire detection.

7.3.3 Fire Sprinkler System

A fire sprinkler system shall be provided throughout the building in accordance with the relevant regulatory requirements. The site shall have an independent system with dedicated fire pump, water supply tanks and booster assembly.

- In the office and beneath the warehouse awnings of the building the system shall comply with BCA Specification E1.5 and AS2118.1:1999.
- In the warehouse a storage mode system shall be provided in accordance with BCA Specification E1.5 and AS2118.1:1999, with the sprinkler head location, spacing and design capacity in accordance with Factory Mutual Guidelines 2-0 and 8-9 (or NFPA regulations). Sprinkler activation temperature must be no greater than 101°C and have a Response Time Index (RTI) no greater than $50m^{1/2}s^{1/2}$ (i.e. fast response type).

Upon detection of a fire, the building occupant warning alarm shall be initiated throughout that building and the direct brigade notification activated.

7.4 FIRST AID FIRE FIGHTING

7.4.1 Fire Hose Reels

Fire hose reel shall be provided throughout the building in accordance with Clause E1.4 of the BCA and AS2441:2005.

Locations should be signposted and readily accessible to occupants. Use of facilities should be monitored for abuse, mistreatment and servicing. The fire hose reels shall be located within 4m of an exit and provide coverage to all areas of the building based on a 36m hose length with a 4m water stream (i.e. maximum 40m coverage from the hose location).

7.4.2 Portable Fire Fighting Equipment

Portable fire extinguishers are to be provided throughout the building in accordance with Table E1.6 of the BCA and selected, located, and distributed in accordance with AS2444:2001.

■ General office areas	Dry Powder (ABE type)	2.5Kg
■ Computer/server rooms	CO_2	3.5 Kg
■ Plant rooms	Dry Powder (ABE)	2.5 Kg
■ Designated exits	Dry Powder (ABE)	4.5 Kg
■ Adjacent each fire hose reel cabinet	Dry Powder (ABE)	4.5 Kg

7.5 FIRE BRIGADE INTERVENTION

7.5.1 Fire Brigade Rendezvous

The site shall have a dedicated fire brigade rendezvous point at the fire control centre where the Main FIP and a set of tactical fire plans shall be located.

The hydrant booster assembly shall be located adjacent the site entrance off Milner Avenue and in sight of the main building entry and Fire Control Centre.

7.5.2 Fire Hydrants

A dedicated hydrant system, with independent booster assembly, must be provided to serve the site. The fire hydrant system shall be in accordance with BCA Clause E1.3 and AS2419.1:2005 with the exception of the following:-

- Hydrants located beneath the warehouse dispatch awnings are not required to be located within 4m of an exit and may be considered external hydrants in regards to system coverage.

The above shall be addressed through an Alternative Solution based on the following minimum design requirements.

- Hydrants located beneath the warehouse awnings are to have all the requirements of external hydrants except in that they are located within the building footprint. That is:-
  - Provided with 90/90/90 protection
  - Use two hose lengths to achieve coverage
  - Located in (an area equivalent to) open space
  - Twin hose connection points
  - Hardstand available adjacent to stage fire fighting equipment
- Fall back hydrants shall be provided to achieve DTS compliant coverage of a fire under the awning. The proposed fall-back hydrant locations are illustrated in Figure 7-3.

- The systems must be capable of providing coverage to all parts of the building based on a 30m (internal hydrant connections) and a 60m (external hydrants and those under the warehouse awnings) hose length with an additional 10m water stream.
- As far as possible the hydrant system should consist of external hydrant points, with internal hydrants only provided to achieve coverage to those areas not able to achieve coverage from external hydrant points.
- Each system shall incorporate a ring main with isolation valves that are external to the building and numbered with the corresponding numbers indicated on the blockplan at the booster assembly.
- External hydrant connections shall be provided with the heat shields per the requirements of AS2419.1 (i.e. FRL 90/90/90 2m either side, and 3m above the hydrant connection point) or be setback more than 10m from the building.
- All hydrant connection points and the booster assembly must be fitted with Storz hose couplings which comply with Clause 7.1 and 8.5.11 AS2419.1:2005. Further information is available from the FRNSW Guide Sheet No.4 '*Hydrant system connectors*' available at www.fire.nsw.gov.au.
- The hydrant booster assembly shall be located within sight of the office entry and adjacent one of the site's main vehicular entrances.
- Per the request of FRNSW; where internal hydrants are installed within the warehouse these shall be designed to allow progressive movement through the building such that an internal hydrant is within 55m of an external hydrant and 25m of an internal hydrant.



Figure 7-3: Hydrants under the Dispatch Awnings and available fall back hydrants

7.5.3 Manual Smoke Clearance System

In lieu of the BCA required automatic smoke exhaust system, the warehouse shall be provided with a manually operated smoke clearance system. The smoke clearance system shall be designed to achieve the following minimum performance requirements.

- Initiation switches shall be located on the Main FIP, or an adjacent panel, at the office's main entry.
- Signs alerting the Fire Brigade to the operation of the smoke clearance system must be provided.
- Fire rated fans and fire rated cabling shall be designed to operate at 200°C for a period no less than 60-minutes.
- System capacity must be capable of an exhaust rate equal to one enclosure air change per hour.

- It is recommended that multiple fans be provided and be evenly distributed to otherwise comply with the requirements of Specification E2.2b Clause 5 of the BCA.
- Adequate make-up air shall be provided at low level to facilitate the clearance system's designed operational capacity. The make-up air shall be provided at low level by:-
  - Permanently open natural ventilation louvers; and/or
  - Mechanically operated louvers that open upon activation of the fans. All motors and cables to automatic louvers, vents or supply fans must be fire rated to operate at 200°C for a period of 60-minutes.
    ***Note** that manual opening of the dispatch rollers doors is not considered an acceptable method of achieving the required makeup air supply.*

7.5.4 Vehicular Perimeter Access

The vehicular perimeter access pathway shall be provided around the whole of the building. These shall be designed and constructed in all-weather surface capable of supporting all FRNSW appliances in accordance with BCA Clause C2.4 and NSW Fire Brigade Policy No. 4 '*Guidelines for emergency vehicle access*', available at http://www.fire.nsw.gov.au/gallery/files/pdf/guidelines/vehicle_access.pdf with the following exceptions permitted:-

- Access from the Milner Avenue frontage is greater than 18m from the building (up to 38m from the warehouse and 27m from the administration office).
- The access pathway along the eastern side requires truck to pass beneath high level dispatch awning.



Figure 7-4: Location of Non-Conformant Vehicular Access

To facilitate the perimeter access Alternative Solution, the following measures shall be provided:-

- The dispatch awning will have an unobstructed clear height greater than 5.5m to allow unrestricted passage of appliances beneath – as outlined in NSW Fire Brigade Policy No. 4.
- All gates, security fencing and boom gates shall be readily openable by the fire authorities. This can be achieved through one, or a combination of, the following:–

- Fitted with locks that are openable with a 003 key; and/or
- Fitted with locks / latches that are openable with a master key, swipe or badge with copies of these keys/swipes/badges provided to the two local fire brigade stations; and/or
- Mechanical gates and boom gates shall open on fire trip and power failure.

7.6 BUILDING MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES

The ongoing management of the building is as important in maintaining a high level of life safety as the provisions recommended during the design phase of the building.

7.6.1 Maintenance of Fire Safety Equipment

The fire detection systems, fire sprinkler systems, emergency warning systems, fire hydrants, hose reels, portable fire extinguishers, emergency lighting and any other fire safety equipment shall be tested and maintained in accordance with Australian Standard AS1851 or other relevant testing regulatory.

The smoke clearance system shall be tested in accordance with the AS1851:2012 requirements for an automatic smoke clearance system as applicable.

7.6.2 No Smoking Policy

A no-smoking policy shall be implemented and enforced through all internal areas of the building.

7.6.3 Housekeeping

A Fire Risk Assessment (FRA) or similar method should be adopted upon occupation to determine high risk areas, processes and fuel loads and instigate appropriate control measures. The FRA should be undertaken periodically or upon major alterations to the building layout or to the occupancy demographic or distribution.

7.6.4 Fire Drills and General Fire Safety Training

All fire wardens are to be trained in first-aid fire fighting and emergency response. All staff shall be inducted with a fire safety brief including the actions necessary on the activation of the building emergency warning system and the location of all emergency egress paths and fire exits.

In addition periodic fire drills should be undertaken and any lessons learned included in future fire safety procedures.

7.6.5 Evacuation Plan

An evacuation plan should be developed for the site in accordance with AS3745:2010.

Standard fire orders should be displayed throughout the building.

7.6.6 Assembly Area

An assembly area is to be designated in a suitably safe and open location for the site.

7.6.7 Fire Safety Manual

A fire safety manual shall be developed for the site to provide an overview of all fire safety procedures and systems within the building. Each manual should also record false alarms, outcomes from fire drills and provide details of the ongoing maintenance and inspection procedures. The manuals should be reviewed annually and a lessons learned exercise undertaken. Any conclusions drawn from this exercise should be implemented into the fire safety procedures.

7.6.8 Premises Security

Arson is a major cause of industrial fires and malicious arson attacks may be well planned to overcome specific fire safety systems. The provision of adequate levels of security is a key parameter in reducing the number or effects of malicious arson attacks in any premises.

7.6.9 Hot Works Policy

A hot works policy should be put in place and rigorously enforced to ensure that all hot works, including grinding and welding, are managed to avoid the accidental ignition of fires.

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