

Preface

This Options Development Report presents the Stage 2 findings from a preliminary investigation of options for the F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study. The Study applied strategic analysis to the assessment of corridor types and feasible route options to determine which options should be studied in more detail in Stage 3.

A number of specific routes and associated engineering details were investigated and analysed during the course of the Stage 2 Study, for the purpose of determining feasibility and assessing the options. The specific routes and details described in this Report should be seen in this context.

The F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study is being documented in a Main Report which is supported by this Options Development Report, records of Value Management Workshops and seven Working Papers as follows:

Value Management No.1 Workshop Record (June, 2002)

Value Management No.2 Workshop Record (September, 2003)

Working Paper No 1: Community Consultation Report

Working Paper No 2 Engineering Design and Costings Report

Working Paper No 3 Urban Design, Landscape and Visual Assessment Report

Working Paper No 4 Traffic and Transportation Report

Working Paper No 5 Social and Environmental Studies Report

Working Paper No 6 Tunnel Investigations Report

Working Paper No 7 Economics and Finance Report

It may be necessary to read the Main Report and Working Papers to gain a more complete understanding of the study's overall findings.

Access to the Main report is available via the study website at:

<http://commcons.skm.com.au/f3tosydneyorbital>

Details on how to gain access to the Working Papers can be found on the study website.

If Government decides to further develop the recommended option this would involve the preparation of a concept proposal and an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), including a route alignment and other details, which would be developed for further assessment. Community consultation will continue through each stage of project development.

IN06111:Options Development Report

*This document not supplied by
SKM as part of the
complete hard copy supplied.
It wasn't until Feb 2006 that it was noticed. [Signature]*

Cost estimates have generally been prepared assuming a two lane dual carriageway standard, based on an 80 km/h to 110 km/h design speed. The cost estimates for the tunnels in the eastern options (1, 2, 3, 4 and 13) have been based on three-lane dual tunnels.

In preparing the cost estimates, a number of broad assumptions were made about the location of tunnels, including:

- Tunnels to be generally required below heavily developed areas.
- Tunnels to be generally required below National Parks/wilderness areas.
- Where the height of cuts and fills would exceed approximately 40 metres, tunnels or bridges would generally be used.

At this strategic level of analysis cost estimates for the long list options were prepared based on Benchmark Software's *Strategic Roadworks Manager* program. This program has been designed to undertake strategic cost estimates of rural roads projects. In order to adapt the results for the urban conditions relating to this project, the costing of property acquisitions and tunnels was undertaken separately.

The *Strategic Roadworks Manager* cost estimates were cross-checked using a broad estimate of \$40 million per kilometre. The estimates from the program were generally thought to be low, compared to recent urban construction examples. These estimates were adjusted to allow for urban conditions such as confinement of the work space available, increased traffic control and greater control required for possible pollutants. Discussions were held with the Estimating Group of the RTA's Project Management Office to agree on appropriate construction rates.

X The *Strategic Roadworks Manager* program does not include tunnels, so a different approach was taken to estimate driven tunnel costs. For tunnels, the following base costs were used: X

- \$120 million per km for twin three-lane inner urban tunnels
- \$100 million per km for twin two-lane inner urban tunnels, and
- \$60 million per km for twin outer urban two-lane tunnels.

The \$100 million per km for twin two-lane inner urban tunnels is based on recent road tunnel projects in Sydney. This allows for:

- Tunnelling in sandstone, suitable for both road headers and tunnel boring machines
- Entry and exit tunnels, and
- Mechanical and electrical services.

The difference in cost between the inner urban and outer urban tunnels reflects an expectation that more complex tunnel arrangements will be required for exit and entry tunnels on inner urban tunnels. The outer urban tunnels would be expected to have only simple single entry and exits points, i.e. the main tunnel portals.

X The estimated rate for major bridges was \$3,500 per square metre, in line with recent experience on some construction projects. Discussions with RTA's Estimating Group suggest this rate may be a little high, but it was adopted on the basis of the expected difficulty with construction of bridges such as the Hawkesbury River crossing, where the water depth is up to 60 metres. X

The property acquisition costs were developed as follows:

- The properties counted were those within a 100 metre wide corridor centred on the option alignment, for the surface alignments only.

- Properties were counted as full acquisitions, regardless of whether the corridor passed right through or just took a strip. This was discussed with the RTA's Estimating Group, who agreed this would be appropriate. Should the acquisition costs be developed on a square metre rate, a corridor width of 150 metres was suggested.
- For surface roads through regional park areas, an allowance of \$500 per square metre was made.

In order to develop the project cost, an allowance was included for professional costs, including planning, design, project management and administration.

An allowance for service relocations was also included in the *Strategic Roadworks Manager* estimates.

X The *Strategic Roadworks Manager* includes a 50% contingency in the totals calculated. The costs for the tunnels and major bridges have similarly been increased by a 50% contingency over the rates quoted above. The property costs include a 30% contingency, as recommended by RTA. These contingencies allow for:

- X • Unknowns in the project scope
- X • Variations in the quantities (such as increased length due to connections at either end of the link or modifications to the alignments), and
- X • Variations in the rates.

X The estimates using this method must be seen as indicative only for the purpose of comparison between options. The cost estimates related to a standard Design and Construct (D&C) method of delivery.

28 Warne Street
Pennant Hills, NSW 2120
6 June 2014

Ref: Tunnel File

Mr R Williams MP
Suite 202, Rouse Hills Town Centre
10-14 Market Lane
Rouse Hill NSW 2155

Dear Ray,

As a result of Philip Ruddock's request, thank you for allowing Joe Nagy and me to meet with you for 90 minutes this morning to learn about community concerns with some aspects of Transurban's unsolicited proposal to build the F1 – M2 Tunnel.

We were impressed with your knowledge of the offer, Pearlman Inquiry and wider planning ramifications for the Badgerys Creek Airport and greater Sydney region.

The greatest community concern is that the State must ensure the consultative process is 100% open and transparent to prove the offer is the best short and long term solution, and there is nothing untoward that could embarrass the Coalition.

If built as proposed, an F1 – M7, or similar solution should be finished by 2025. If there is any doubt, the offer should be deferred for further comment, or rejected.

Please let me know if you want to clarify any of the matters raised and or would like further comment about the project or some of the people involved.

Yours sincerely

Peter Waite 9484 3471 waitepeter@bigpond.com

Copy Hon Philip Ruddock MP
 Mr Matt Kean MP
 Mr Nagy

18 July 2014

Development Assessment Systems & Approvals

Department of Planning & Environment

GPO Box 39

SYDNEY NSW 2001

Submission 1 from

Peter Waite

28 Warne Street

Pennant Hills, NSW 2120



I regret I must identify people in this submission and know few will read it.

Why the proposed M1 tunnel is NOT the best short or long-term option

***M1TunnelVision.org* exists because some politicians, bureaucrats and lobbyists ignore historical fact for their own benefit**

How do we find out who can be trusted?

FACT

On 16 March 2006 I wrote to DOTARS (Dept Of Trans & Regional Services) Canberra/NSW Section head Ed Cory about The Hon Philip Ruddock's serious concerns he raised at a meeting of the Pennant Hills Civic Trust, Liberal Party members and Mr Cory on 10 March 2005. (11-page letter shown next) Despite requests to Minister Lloyd and many others, no replies have ever been received.

On 16 March 2006 Hornsby Advocate reported MPs Hopwood, O'Farrell, Tink 'seek tunnel inquiry' because they were informed in 2001 consultants Sinclair Knight Mertz (SKM) were awarded the contract to select the best route for an F3 – M7 link.

In 2003 the RTA directed SKM *not to recommend a western option* and Canberra directed SKM to only recommend a *short-term option*. (SKM VM Workshop No2 Record p22 – Dural 28 August Focus Group Meeting Notes p 2)

MP Judy Hopwood's 22 January 2007 Media Release 'A compelling case for a second crossing of the Hawkesbury River' because bushfires closed the railway line, F3 and Pacific Highway for three days. This proved how vulnerable what are collectively the nations most important strategic routes, and why a second Hawkesbury crossing is essential.

MP Michael Richardson's 28 June 2007 Media Release; 'Libs challenge lemma Govt to fast-track new north road' 'Mr Richardson said the new road needed to be built regardless of what decision Justice Mahla Pearlman reached in her inquiry into the proposed tunnel under Pennant Hills Road'. Richardson also stated MPs Ray Williams and Chris Hartcher also supported the F3 – M7 link at Dean Park.

SKM's 2004 Working paper 2 – Engineering Design and Costing report (p2) for a 3 lane tunnel is \$2.0 - \$2.2 billion. Can NorthConnex can do it ten years later for \$2.65 billion?

Despite these facts being provided to Minister Gay's office when the unsolicited offer was announced to establish the tunnel is the best option, my concerns were ignored.

STATEMENT

On the following pages is further compelling evidence indicating an informed decision was NOT made when Transurban's unsolicited offer was accepted.

QUESTION

Will New South Wales State and Federal NSW politicians demand Cabinet and Transurban publicly address the following evidence and allow the community to determine the best option in the national best interests?



Peter Waite, 28 Warne Street, Pennant Hills NSW 2120

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***28: SUMMATION**

Whilst I regret personalising my submission I believe it appropriate because many people have chosen to ignore or misrepresent information I supplied in good faith in the expectation that whoever they are would impartially assess the information, and then correctly process the issues.

I have voted for over sixty-one years and personally learnt many lessons about:

- 'political' corruption, trust, white-collar fraud, incompetence, shoddy work and theft in work places etc during my involvement in many community organisations. This happened when I was Hornsby councillor for seven years.

If reported, the then shire clerk immediately took action. The situation changed very quickly after he retired and few cared despite Barry O'Farrell raising issues in parliament many times. Item 2 is one example that has relevance to Transurban's unsolicited offer and how it was processed.

Many have done far more than I have. I respect their contributions to society. Regrettably, I also know of many who have been regarded as '*pillars of society*' only to find they weren't.

Complaints to some politicians and bureaucrats are rejected on the basis that you have to accept the decisions of those we elected. The law demands we all be honest. Over the last few years there has been a large number of '*politicians*' who have been breaking the law exposed by ICAC because their political party failed to have them held to account.

Whilst readers are entitled to their own assessment of my submission, those who will be determining how it should be assessed are reminded they are receiving public money to make an informed and transparent decision that can be challenged in court where they may be called to give evidence.

***29: EXPECTATION**

I expect those delegated the responsibility to assess this submission, and my later one about the EIS, will make decisions that are open and transparent. If that happens, I will respect their **conclusions** and thank them even if some of my opinions are found to be misguided.

If my submissions have not been properly assessed, I may seek an open and transparent review.

Peter Waite

***1:** After I review the **5s**, I will objectively review my submission, correct any errors I have made and draw attention to issues that appear to be missing, incorrect, deficient or require clarification.

2004 Australian Government Department of Transport and Regional Services AusLink White Paper page 11 'Table 2: Costs of Urban road traffic delays'

This shows across Australia other capital cities congestion problems will be worse than Sydney by 2015 but doesn't take into account the State's decision forcing councils to approve high rise housing around railway stations in suburbs such as Carlingford, Pennant Hills, Thornleigh, Normanhurst and Hornsby where the AM and PM peak hours on Pennant Hills Road can often be up to six hours a day, seven days a week or longer when there is a breakdown or an accident.

If the State didn't have the foresight in the late 1800s and early 1900s to extend the rail system and build the Harbor Bridge post WW2 would have been a disaster. Now that the State accepts there is a need to develop, and redevelop many roads and rail lines, it must make informed decisions.

Collectively the NSW, Federal and Local Government politicians should ensure the best option is built to meet both the short and long term National Highway in the nations best interest.

At a 250 plus people public meeting at Pennant Hills, MPs Hopwood, Tink and O'Farrell, and later other MPs supported a western route instead of a tunnel. Hornsby Advocate published their photos and supporting article on 16 March 2006. **Will they explain why they changed their minds?**

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***22:** SMH 16 July 2014 *"Traffic no faster even with \$3b tunnels"* Transport reporter Jacob Saulwick's assessment of the NorthConnex EIS supports my opinions that the tunnel will be a waste of time and resources.

What is the role and qualifications of the Roads and Maritime spokeswoman who stated: *"NorthConnex will ease traffic congestion, improve local amenity and connectivity for people living and working in the area by removing 5000 heavy vehicles from Pennant Hills Road every day."* ? I look forward to a public reply.

***23:** SMH 17 July 2014 *"Gay reverses direction on M5 toll plan for new roads"* Jacob Saulwick. Whilst Minister Gay is the messenger, it is clear other departments are desperate to source funds for projects.

The State should be building these projects and financing them. The Water Board issued debentures to fund their massive projects post WW2.

I know of many people who would rather 'invest' in such projects instead of being involved with unaccountable banks and other investment businesses where many people who trusted them have lost most of their savings and been forced onto pensions taxpayers have to fund.

Before it is too late, politicians and their bureaucrats should get rid of their "PR, spin doctors and media" agents and obtain frank and candid advice as to how to best manage the nations finances.

***24:** Request for hard copy of the EIS rejected by NorthConnex email 10 July 2014
NorthConnex advised me a decision was made not release hard copy. This is discriminatory as it makes it impossible for those who have computers and or cannot attend places where copies can be read and make notes or copy pages from a reported 3,000 page document.

It is contrary to **Section 72 of the "Government Information Public Access Act (2)"** (old FOI Act) *"The agency must provide access in the way requested by the applicant unless sections (a) (b) (c) (d) apply. None of these are relevant. Earlier sections of the Act set out public interest details where there should be no cost or a discounted charge be set.*

In 2004 Sinclair Knight Mertz gave me and others copies when requested. **NorthConnex refused. Will NorthConnex hire copies, and if so how much will it cost and be arranged?**

***25:** *"ETHICS"* segment **ABS NSW 7.30 report** (Quentin Dempster) 11 July 2014
The presenter interviewed the director of the St James Ethics Centre, opposition leader John Robertson Labor), MLCs Fred Nile (Christian Democrats), David Shoebridge (Greens) and a lady about ethics. The lady's conclusion was *"Nobody can trust any of you"*. Very sad but true.

***21: SKM March 2004 Working Paper No 2:** A1-A15 envisaged . . . the F3 should be widened to 8 lanes with an extra climbing lane for trucks on both sides of the Hawkesbury River.

How will an extra lane in each direction on the F1 be built when the tunnel has reached capacity and the third lane is operating? Who will pay?

Further, how will traffic from both directions on the Pacific Highway and Pennant Hills Road be able to merge with the 3 lane tunnels once they are at capacity in the tunnel? How long will this take?

NorthConnex claimed the SKM report was only a recommendation that would require more detailed study. If correct, the NorthConnex EIS should be a very large paper.

On 5 July 2014 I emailed the NorthConnex Director:


"Hi Tim

Attached is a simple 'table' diagram I made of the northern tunnel exit and entry to the F3 from Pennant Hills Road with an explanation of problems I believe will eventually happen when the third north bound lane is at capacity.

If the F3 is not widened, traffic leaving the F3 at Wahroonga may be such that the south third lane is not necessary.

Have these issues been taken into account in the EIS?

cc Ray Williams MP Parliamentary Secretary to Roads Minister Gay"



Whilst this 'plan' may not mean anything to some, the technical issues should be clear to NorthConnex staff that prepared the plans shown at consultative meetings in April 2014.

27 June 2014 the SMH reported on page 3 'Gay admits he may have gone 'too early' with WestConnex'. Minister Gay deserves credit for his admission.

Whilst Transurban may not be happy, Minister Gay and parliament should agree to review Transurban's unsolicited offer and the many issues the community has raised.

SKM's 2004 Forecast Traffic Volumes and costings

A NorthConnex officer stated in 2014: "SKM's traffic projections were higher than had occurred". I understand traffic counts used by SKM were supplied by the RTA or an agent. An RTA officer's name appears in several places in SKM's study. Further, the 2006 Pearlman Inquiry to validate SKM's report had the benefit of a detailed 22 March 2006 study by Masson Wilson Twiney report.

SKM working paper No. 2

Following are verbatim extracts from this extensive 100 plus page costings paper. At 8.3 p75; Pennant Hills and North Rocks Road intersection would have to be upgraded.

Page A-4: **Improvements to the existing F3 Stages 1 – 5.** Stages 1 – 3 – upgrading to 3 lanes in each direction and management systems. (These have been completed.)

Stage 4 (2021-2026) Construct climbing lanes in both directions to accommodate slow moving traffic . . .

Stage 5 (Beyond 2026) . . . Tolling the F3 could also be considered as a measure. Alternatively, widen to 8 lanes in each direction. (or) Alternatively develop a new transport corridor.

Table 3.1 F3 Capacity Considerations envisages fourth 'climbing lanes' would be required by 2011. (That was over 3 years ago. It is now often a major problem that the RTA tries to play down.)

Appendix A 1. Introduction, 2 Background, 3 Traffic Forecasts and F3 Improvement Program sets out many known facts, and issues to be addressed if some options are adopted.

4. **Opportunities and Constraints** divides the F3 into 5 sections; Wahroonga to Berowra, Berowra to Hawkesbury River, Hawkesbury River to Mt White, Mt White to Calga, Calga to Kariang. It then lists numerous problems to widen the F3 to 4 (and 5) lanes.

5. **Cost Estimates** for the above works in 6.2. are between \$2.6 and \$3.6 billion.

6. **Alternative Strategy.** 6.1 **Elevated Two Lane Tidal Flow Viaduct at Jolls Bridge.** (I do not believe this would be practical or acceptable.)

6.2 **Alternative Second Route** ' . . . A number of alternatives for a second route have been prepared as part of the F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study. These alternatives generally link to areas in western Sydney rather than to Wahroonga.

The cost estimates for the routes investigated are between \$2.6 and \$3.6 billion. The alternative routes do, however, provide a total capacity of 5 lanes in each direction between Sydney and Gosford.

Comment; It does not appear there has been any provision for second bridges across the Hawkesbury at Mooney Mooney, and or the Mooney Mooney Creek bridge to determine if it is possible to widen them. Further, there is no indication of how any of the widening works could be carried out without closing existing lanes that would be required for several years to carry out the works.

7. Further Considerations following the F3- Sydney Orbital Link Study

A fuller investigation is required to assess requirements after 2012. Furthermore, a review of widening requirements should be undertaken upon the decision on the F3 – Orbital Link and investment program on the main North rail line.

Has this fuller investigation ever been done, and if so, what did the investigation determine?

***4:** (13 July 2014; Because of computer upgrades the format and type face changed. **text correct**)

28 Warne Street
Pennant Hills NSW 2120
21st March 2005

Mr E Cory
Section Head NSW/ACT
DOTARS
PO Box 594
Canberra ACT 2600

F3 – Sydney Orbital Connection

Attn Jennie Breen

Dear Ed

As agreed at the meeting attached is the discussion paper I have prepared.

In my opinion there is little traffic engineers can resolve. Unless conclusive proof is produced I am still convinced, as usual, the consultative and assessment process was compromised by NSW bureaucrats and spin doctors.

In view of my past dealings with the NSW Government I have no doubt that the bureaucrats were acting under instructions from their political masters.

If I am right, the issue would then revolve around the relevant Minister/s and or DOTARS exposing what happened.

Please let me know what the Ministers would like to do to proceed with the resolution of this matter.

I will be back by 12th April and would like to clear this important issue up by the end of April.

Yours sincerely

Peter Waite OAM JP

Copy: The Hon P Ruddock MP
Mr A Tink MP
Mr D Jones, Concerned Citizens Group
Mr P Swalwell, Pennant Hills District Civic Trust

Waite EMAIL ADDRESS DELETED@XXX.com 9484-3471

Compare the Roads Time Services Questions and answers in its December 2011 six-page paper with 'Cheap tribunal' proposed for home compo fighters. SMH 29 June 2014. This makes it clear if your property is not resumed, the value decreases and there is no compensation.

In 1981/82 I and about 15 others property owners were involved with the then DMR that wanted to acquire part of our properties on Pennant Hills Road for widening and prevent any access to what would become valueless land. Many onsite meetings were held with intransigent officers.

I contacted the Divisional Engineer who was also a solicitor, and made suggestions to solve other major problems. This led to a successful and amicable outcome to all parties. That officer later became the RTA Deputy Director. How many executives now have the same or similar qualifications?

Why is it that the RTA and this Government will not address what appear to be serious flaws in Transurban's unsolicited offer, and why did Minister Gay or his delegates approve public money be spent to acquire property "because he may have gone too early" at 25?

***18:** DRAFT NSW FREIGHT AND PORTS STRATEGY Nov 2012; Figure 31 Page 111 shows the 'OUTER ORBITAL RAIL AND ROAD CORRIDOR' that is identical with that shown in the Australian Financial Review on 19 June 2014.

Page 81 wrongly states "The 2007 Pearlman Review into the F3 to M7 corridor selection recommended that work commence on the identification and reservation of a corridor for a new orbital link to the west of the current M7 Motorway." I drew this error to the attention of Ministers Berejuckian and Gay. On 14 November 2013 their joint Parliamentary Secretary MP Ray Williams advised "the report had been amended as Marla Pearlman recommended planning commence to set aside lands for the F3-M7 link."

That won't correct copies downloaded before I reported the error. This can then again be mistakenly used in a report or submission.

On 6 June 2014 a concerned Wahroonga resident and I met with Mr Williams for nearly 90 minutes and explained in detail our concerns about NorthConnex's proposal only being a very short term solution that is not in the nation's, NSW or all residents in Sydney's north where councils have been directed to increase housing density without roads being built to meet the increasing demand.

***19:** Which is correct? 'Its full speed ahead on big-build highway' Telegraph 17 June 2014
This shows a proposed M9 Outer western Sydney Orbital Motorway link from Casula, Penrith, Windsor to the M7 and M2 and proposed M1 tunnel.

OR

***20:** Grand designs; The NSW Government's plan for road and rail transport' Australian Financial Review 19 June 2014 showed the proposed Outer Orbital link in the C2012 'Draft NSW Freight and Ports Strategy' as a second Hawkesbury crossing for both road and rail to avoid Sydney in accordance with p48 of the article.

Parliamentary Secretary for Ministers Berejuckian for Transport and Minister Gay for Roads and Ports Ray Williams MP advised in his 14 November 2013 letter to me "The Outer Sydney orbital identified in the NSW Long Term Transport Master Plan connects the Central Coast, Western Sydney and Wollongong." I believe the 19 June article is correct.

***15: AFR 4 July 2013: "Public inquiries are not what they used to be, but we still need them"** Gary Banks, Dean of the Australia and New Zealand School of Government, in the inaugural Peter Karmel Lecture in Canberra last night at the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia.

Extracts: *"There has arguably never been a time when there is so much dispute about so many public policy issues."* . . . *They are thus an important potential source of political learning about what to do and how to get it done. In these aspects they can compensate for capability gaps in public administration. (gaps that have been increasing in my view)."*

Why has the slew of public inquiries in recent years not matched the record of an earlier era? The answer, to borrow from an advertising slogan, is that "inquiries ain't inquiries". How they are constituted and framed can vary greatly, as can the way governments handle them. Experience is instructive about the "success factors".

"The contribution of an inquiry often comes down to having the right people in the right setting. Competence without conflicts is a minimum requirement for such a role. But integrity and openness of mind are obviously important too." Nothing could be truer

***16: SMH 27 June 2014 News 3: \$13b motorway Confusion over plans Gay admits he may have gone 'too early' with WestConnex.** *"If we've made an offer to someone for their house and we change what we are doing with it, that offer stands," he said.*

"By going out early to engage the community as soon as possible, we've indicated that we might that we might have needed buildings that we may not need in the future. You've got to balance between going out as early as possible and may be going too early," he said. Public money was misused before an informed decision had been made. The same applies with Transurban.

Whilst the coalition is trying to overcome over a decade of Labor's mismanagement, fraud and corruption, as a long serving MLC, Minister Gay does not appear to have learnt from Labor's sins. Minister Gay, why did you decide to rush in and accept Transurban's offer before all the facts were made public?

As a concerned citizen interested in community affairs for over 60 years, and a former builder, developer, property investor and councillor I, along with many others, am appalled with the lack of knowledge and compliance with our State Constitution by many elected members, bureaucrats, business operators and the public.

***17: Sun-Herald 29 June 2014 p9 "Cheap tribunal proposed for home compo fighters"**

Kirsty Needham State Politics Editor *"The Baird government's plans for WestConnex, NorthConnex, the North West Rail link, new light rail in inner Sydney and Parramatta and a new raft of roads in western Sydney will displace thousands of families. . . . Negotiations already underway between Transport NSW and home owners in Surry Hills and Haberfield have become bitter. Residents claim the government has made below-market offers."*

" . . . The tactics and delays by the government negotiators were "shameful", he said. "I'm still negotiating and I'm not getting anywhere."

"Labor wants these disputes to be heard in the NSW Civil and Administrative Decisions Tribunal, which would cost \$500, and give faster remedies."

F3 – Sydney Orbital Link. (Prepared by Peter Waite for discussion purposes) 21 March 2005

Comment in this discussion paper does not necessarily reflect the views of the 'Concerned Citizens Group' (Pennant Hills Liberal Party) or the Pennant Hills District Civic Trust.

Discussion Paper: For discussion between Ed Cory DOTARs and Peter Waite ^(a former Hornsby Councillor and local resident for over 70 years) following a meeting of the Pennant Hills District Civic Trust on 10 March 2005. In attendance were Minister Ruddock, Mr Cory, Messrs Jones and Waite, ^(members of the Concerned Citizens Group and Pennant Hills District Civic Trust) and 12 members of the Trust Executive. Chair: Trust President Phil Swalwell.

Former Hornsby Council Mayor Robert Browne was to also prepare a submission for discussion.

Purpose: To establish if the selection process for the recommend route, purple Option A was compromised by:

- Inaccurate number counts and projections, and
- Partial influences by NSW Government agencies.

History: In 2002 Derek Jones and Peter Waite, members of the Pennant Hills Thornleigh Branch of the Liberal Party, and many members of the consultative groups raised concerns about the consultative processes for this project. They raised their concerns at a Branch meeting where it was informally agreed that they be the representatives of the 'Concerned Citizens Group'. Mr Jones attended the (2003) Pennant Hills meetings whilst Mr Waite attended the (2003) Dural meetings so that they could compare notes and prepare balanced submissions and reports.

After representations to the Hon P Ruddock MP he arranged for Minister Lloyd to meet with Branch President Barwick, Jones, Waite and himself.

When Minister Lloyd stated there would be openings and connections along the tunnel for intermediate access Minister Ruddock corrected him advising the government had agreed there would be NO openings.

Minister Lloyd arranged a meeting for Jones and Waite with SKM, DOTARS and the RTA for 5 November. They reported to the 'Group' no evidence was available to prove the best route was chosen. Attached are the points raised at 5th November ¹ meeting and detailed comment that was sent to Minister Ruddock on 16th November 2004 ² with copy to Minister Lloyd requesting answers on behalf of the Group' and Waite's letter ³ of the same date. AS YET, THE POINTS RAISED HAVE NOT BEEN ANSWERED.

Following representations by the Pennant Hills Civic Trust to Minister Ruddock in late 2004 a meeting was arranged for 10 March 2005 as detailed above.

Page 7 of this letter: The PURPOSE of the F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study was:

- To investigate options for a new National Highway connection between the Newcastle Freeway (F3) and the future Sydney Orbital. The new connection will replace Pennant Hills Road as the National Highway route (Newsletter No 1 – April 2002) ²².

• Page 2

(13 July 2014: SKM never included its terms of reference in any report because of intervention of State and Federal bureaucrats probably at the direction on Ministers or senior political advisers.)