

I have met and spoken to Mr Tim Parker several times. Mr Parker is the RTA's representative in charge of the NorthConnex team that has the responsibility to ensure the project is approved.

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I now refer to a major **PROBLEM** to be overcome: SKM's 'F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study – options development report – draft' October 2002.

This 139 page report sets out the structure of the final report and its conclusions. It was not released in hard copy to me but was later provided on CD at my request.

**Page 97** advises *'The Strategic Roadworks Manager program does not include tunnels, so a different approach was taken to estimate driven tunnels . . . '*

**Page 98** *'The Strategic Roadworks Manager includes a 50% contingency in the totals calculated. The costs for the tunnels and major bridges have similarly been increased by a 50% contingency over the rates quoted above. The property costs include a 30% contingency, as recommended by the RTA. These contingencies allow for:*

- *Unknowns in the project scope.*
- *Variations in the quantities ( such as increased length due to connections at either end of the link or modifications to the alignments)), and*
- *Variations in the rates.*
- *The estimates using this method can be seen as indicative only **for the purposes of comparison between options**. The cost estimates related to standard Design and Construct (D&C) method of delivery.'*

**Based on the above it appears that if the RTA did not have the ability to advise SKM informed cost estimates and advised SKM to add 50% to its construction estimates, how can the RTA prove what Transurban submitted is correct?**

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**NO ATTACHMENTS NECESSARY**

I had a the following comment before these questions;

*'The triple A4 plan sets out how NorthConnex proposes to overcome the convoluted plan at Pearces Corner SKM suggested in its 2004 report. By extending the tunnel and extra kilometre it avoids the need to widen the road bridges over the F3 as well as the rail bridge. This is a very smart solution.'*

Dear Mr Waite,

Thank you for contacting NorthConnex, and apologies for the delay in responding.

You will be aware that the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is placed on public display, planned for late May 2014, there will be further community information sessions and the opportunity to provide a formal submission.

Q1 Noting the depth that the proposed tunnel will reach, is it correct to assume that the gradient from the M1 to the M2 will be the same or nearly the same for the whole length apart from transition points to join with the M1, M2 and Pennant Hill's Road? If not, what will the grades be?

**Response: The main alignment tunnels maximum grade is 4%; minimum grade is 0.7% (which avoids flat areas and poor drainage).**

Q2 SKM's 2004 reports did not address the necessary 'evacuation plans' that will e required to be used in the event of simple, bad and disaster accidents in the proposed tunnels that are about 9kms long.

**Response: NSW Government, through Roads and Maritime Services, has managed the design, construction and operation of many tunnels in Sydney and across the state. Transurban and its technical advisors have significant experience in the safe design, maintenance and operation of tunnels. (Comment; this is at variance with SKM's 2003 statement above.)**

**As the design of the tunnel and the associated fire, life and safety systems are developed, NSW Fire and Rescue have been consulted throughout the design process and will continue to be consulted. (Comment; this is at variance with SKM's 2003 statement above.)**

**The preferred scheme includes multiple systems and equipment to deal with incidents. These include visual and audible communication systems; emergency escape passages, access for emergency vehicles to reach the incident; a water deluge system to suppress fire and a ventilation system to manage smoke.**

Q3 Whilst there may be cameras in each tunnel connected to the Control Centre near the M2, if there was serious accident and fire near the F3 that demanded the complete tunnel be evacuated, how would this be arranged especially if there were 'disabled' drivers who cannot walk more than a few metres and are unable to climb stairs?

**Response: Any incident within the tunnel would be rapidly identified by automatic systems and by the CCTV cameras which would be monitored 24 hours a day by trained operators located in at the Motorway Control Centre. In the event of an incident, Incident Management Plans would be initiated immediately to reinstate traffic movements. In the rate (rare) event of a fire, motorists may be requested to leave their vehicles and evacuate the tunnel via egress passages connecting to the non-incident tunnel whilst fire suppression systems pout out the fire, and rapid response emergency services attend the incident. The Motorway Control Centre would maintain constant communication with motorists in the tunnel via communication through vehicle radios and a Public Address system located in the tunnel. (Comment; this is at variance with SKM's 2003 statement above and does not explain what will be done about 'disabled' drivers I referred to.)**



Q3.2: If excavated material is proposed to be removed from these tunnels, has it been established that it will not clash with material being removed from the ETTT and NW rail link?

**Response:** A list of possible disposal sites for excavated materials will be identified in the EIS. NorthConnex has not yet commenced the process of assessing and seeking approval for any particular disposal facility. *(Comment; reply avoided the question.)*

Q3.3: Have there been any negotiations with Hornsby Council to dump material into Hornsby quarry?

**Response:** Please refer to Q3.2 response. *(Comment; Mr Parker advised me a meeting was to be held with Hornsby Council on 24 March.)*

Q3.4: If the answer to 3.3 is yes, how is it proposed to obtain consent to do that when as far as it is known, nobody has established how it can be safely done, and obtain consent?

**Response:** Please refer to Q3.2 response. *(Comment; I advised Mr Parker of major problems with the instability of the walls and surrounding Hornsby quarry lands that nobody had suggested could be overcome to fill the quarry and make it safe since the many dangers were known about in 1997.)*

Q4 What are the timeline projections that the tunnel and existing F3 (M1) will carry increasing capacity before a second route will need to be operating?

**Response:** The results of a detailed traffic study will be provided as part of the Environmental Impact Statement which is due for public display end of May 2014. *(Comment;*

**Further,** at the Pennant Hills Golf Club March meeting or April 2004 meeting one of the team advised that the existing timber sound barriers on the M1 (F3) were more than adequate. If this is fact, why did Transurban erect far higher coloured concrete sound barriers on the recently widened M2 that will have to be again widened for 3 kilometres if the proposed tunnel is built?

**CONCLUSION.** NorthConnex has a lot of work to do before it can submit an EIS that will satisfactorily address many issues and prove that its '*unsolicited offer*' is a better option than the 2001 Terms of Reference for the M7-F3 link sought that SKM was told not to comply with?

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### 3 Probity of how the offer was made, assessed and accepted?

In view of the issues I have raised, to prove the Ministers and the States integrity, I suggest that the State has an obligation allow public access to all of Transurban's offer, the assessment process, decision making process and subsequent negotiations that has led to the acceptance of Transurban's unsolicited offer.

Some HISTORIC SUPPORT DOCUMENTS and concerns about past issues and broken promises.

- 11 Nov 1975 Pennant Hills then Residents Association minutes attended by my wife and son. I had another commitment. Traffic was the major issue.
- Nov 1981 As a councillor elected in 1980 on the basis of promising to try to resolve traffic problems council engaged Lyle Marshall and Associates to prepare a Traffic and Parking Study for Pennant Hills Shopping Centre.
- Page 7 **correctly stated** 'Pennant Hills Road will not meet the total future traffic demand despite widening to six lanes by 1986.' 24 years later nothing has been done apart from lengthening some turning bays and more restrictions.
- 7 July 1982 Northern Standard reports 'Hornsby road system is at a standstill'. This article notes the Commonwealth Government would not fund any works unless it was shown Pennant Hills Road 'is serving the national interest'.
- 16 Sep 1992 RTA advertisement in the Hornsby Advocate showing the 'Sydney Metroad System'. The M7 is the {easy} Hornsby Heathcote link.
- 24 Jan 1994 Federal Roads Minister Brereton; 'Liverpool- Hornsby Link Road Report released'
- April 2005 NSW Auditor General's Report – Performance Audit – Managing Air Quality. Page 31 ' Cross City Tunnel Original cost estimate \$200 million 1999. Final estimate \$680 million 2002, Increased ventilation cost \$40 million.
- RTA advised the final cost estimate of; **the Cross City Tunnel increased due to a revision of the scope by the Premier . . . etc.**
- Role of Health in assessment not defined'**
- Who is responsible to ensure all relative issues are properly addressed and politicians who do not understand the technical issues are not involved?**
- 6 May 1999 Advocate letters raise serious questions about the operation of the LATC (Local Area Traffic Committee) I was Barry O'Farrell's advisor who drafted his submissions to the LATC. Since then the LATC does not appear to meet and its elected representatives rarely comment on any proposals.
- 18 Nov 1999 SMH; 'More toll roads for national network. 15 years later there has been much talk but only the Cross City and Lane Cove tunnels have been built and the projected volumes and income did not eventuate.
- 6 Jan 2003 Shadow Local Government Minister Gay advised me he was disappointed that LG Minister Harry Wood had declined to deal with my complaints about Hornsby Council. Under the FOI Act I subsequently obtained 471 documents at no cost from the DLG because the DLG did not have any evidence to support the advice given to Mr Gay.

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Shadow Minister Gay had also raised concerns that I blamed him for a 'mail-out I had made why Andrew Tink and Mr Gay had "let Minister Woods get away with this'.