

28 Warne Street
Pennant Hills, NSW 2120
23 August 2014



M/s K Jones
Manager Development Assessment Systems & Approvals for **EIS SSI 6136**
Department of Planning & Environment
GPO Box 39 SYDNEY NSW 2001

APOLOGY FOR THREE ERRORS IN MY 22 AUGUST SECOND SUBMISSION

Dear M/s Jones

Today when emailing my submissions to my web provider I noticed that the second part of Attachment D was incomplete. Enclosed is a complete copy to replace the one I sent if it is incomplete. I do not expect to have anything returned.


I then noticed that the INDEX supplied was a draft and I still had the final copy I had not placed on my file. Copy attached. Please note, the website index will not include Item 8, supporting documents. Instead there will be a statement that those documents were the source of most of my submission.

The last error I noticed when re-checking all of my copies was that I didn't send the GIPA application page with my cheque attached and sent my copy in error. This page and cheque are enclosed.


I again apologise for not ensuring my submission did not need amending.

Please let me know if any clarification is required.

Yours sincerely



Peter Waite



28 Warne Street
Pennant Hills, NSW 2120
22 August 2014

EISsecondSubTunnelFile

M/s K Jones
Manager Development Assessment Systems & Approvals for **EIS SSI 6136**
Department of Planning & Environment
GPO Box 39 SYDNEY NSW 2001

Second submission

Dear M/s Jones

On 11 August 2014 I advised my submission identified political problems and supplied 14 pages of issues to be considered. Attached is a copy with your name deleted as being my first submission as my letter may eventually appear on the internet.

Due to legal advice and other circumstances beyond my control, my proposed website may not be online before the closing date for submissions.

To commence and emphasise my concerns attached are my:

- 2 August 2005 paper about the proposed tunnel meeting
- 12 March paper inviting John Howard
- 29 November 2006 Public Meeting notice at Epping RSL re several matters

At the 12 March 2006 meeting MPs Barry O'Farrell, Judy Hopwood and Andrew Tink who with nearly 300 attendees, voted unanimously for a second Hawkesbury River crossing. In 2007 three other MPs made the same decision. **What has changed?**

Also included is a brief CV I prepared to enable those assessing my submissions to understand my interest in community affairs and not just the tunnel.

I still believe that the proposed tunnel would only be a very short-term solution and create major traffic problems during the construction phase.


However to ensure your team can assess my submission I have covered many aspects that the government and Transurban may not be aware.

There are other issues I am still researching and may submit further details to be assessed.

Also attached is my undated GIPA application for a copy of the assessment of my submission once it has been made and also my undated cheque for \$30 dollars. The purpose is to establish if the assessment is flawed and I may decide to apply to the Civil and Administrative Decision Tribunal to appeal the DoP determination.

Please let me know if any clarification is required.

Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Peter Waite', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Peter Waite

**S41 APPLICATION FOR ACCESS UNDER THE
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION (PUBLIC ACCESS) ACT 2009 NO 52**

Applicant

Surname **WAITE** **Mr**
Given Names **PETER ANDREW**
(a) AGENCY **Department of Planning &
Environment**
(d) Postal Address **GPO Box 39, SYDNEY NSW 2001**
Phone Number **9484 3471**


Details of Application: I request access to documents concerning

As soon as made;

**DoP assessment of my submissions about
NorthConnex EIS for proposed M1 – M2 tunnel**

FEES AND CHARGES \$30: *N.B.* Undated \$30 Cheque attached

If extra costs apply please advise and payment will be immediately made.



Applicant's signature

Date: 22 August 2014

Agency Use Only

Received on...../...../.....

Acknowledgement sent on...../...../.....

INDEX

- 1. Letter to Department of Planning about submission**
- 2. Historical list since unsolicited offer received**
- 3. Relevant Act and '*NorthConnex*' justification**
- 4. Attachment A SKM 2001 – 2004 report**
- 5. Attachment B Pearlman 2007 Inquiry**
- 6. Attachment C history from 1968 - references to reports**
- 7. Attachment D Transurban and NSROC support**
- 8. Supporting documents in file numbered:**
 - 1. 4 – 9 in front of tab 1**
 - 2. 10 – 19 behind tab 1**
 - 3. 20 – 29 behind tab 2**
 - 4. 30 – 39 behind tab 3**
 - 5. 40 – 49 behind tab 4**
 - 6. 50 – 59 behind tab 5**
 - 7. 50 – 69 behind tab 6**
 - 8. 70- 77 behind tab 7. NB 76 is self explanatory when read**

A February 1994 RTA - Maunsel map and information about the proposed F3 western connections shows what I interpret as a 'strategic plan'. John Brewer is the RTA contact.

In 2001 tenders were called to prepare the attached report. In 2001 SKM was appointed. Canberra directed SKM to only recommend a **short-term option**. (SKM VM Workshop No2 Record p22/23)

SKM 28 August 2003 Dural 'Focus Group community meeting'. SKM's project manager Peter Prince skilfully let it be known the Premier directed SKM not to recommend any Option B or C routes to avoid it going through any National Parks despite it being known at the 2002 SKM planning meeting experts all agreed that it was inevitable an option C must be built. Brewer is mentioned in those notes.

SKM's 2004 Working paper 2 – Engineering Design and Costing report (p2) for a 3 lane tunnel is \$2.0 - \$2.2 billion. Can NorthConnex really do it for \$2.65 billion ten years later?

On 16 March 2006 I wrote to DOTARS (Dept Of Trans & Regional Services) Canberra/NSW Section head Ed Cory about The Hon Philip Ruddock's serious concerns he raised at a meeting of the Pennant Hills Civic Trust, Liberal Party members and Mr Cory on 10 March 2005. (11-page letter shown next)

Despite requests to Minister Lloyd and many others, no replies have ever been received.

On 16 March 2006 Hornsby Advocate reported **MPs Hopwood, O'Farrell, Tink seek tunnel inquiry** because they were informed in 2001 consultants Sinclair Knight Mertz (SKM) were awarded the contract to select the best route for an F3 – M7 link.

In December 2006 Federal Roads Minister the Hon Jim Lloyd MP accepted a request from the M2 operator to have the SKM preferred option to be reviewed to establish that the Lane Cove option be adopted as it would achieve a better outcome – (for the M2 operator as it would be cheaper and more profitable).

MP Judy Hopwood's 22 January 2007 Media Release 'A compelling case for a second crossing of the Hawkesbury River' because bushfires closed the railway line, F3 and Pacific Highway for three days. This proved how vulnerable what are collectively the nations most important strategic routes, and why a second Hawkesbury crossing is essential.

MP Michael Richardson's 28 June 2007 Media Release; 'Libs challenge lemma Govt to fast-track new north road' 'Mr Richardson said the new road needed to be built regardless of what decision Justice Mahla Pearlman reached in her inquiry into the proposed tunnel under Pennant Hills Road'. Richardson also stated MPs Ray Williams and Chris Hartcher also supported the F3 – M7 link at Dean Park.

14 September 2007; Minister Gay's (Pearlman) Media Release:

- preferred route for an EIS . . . , and
- a Option C (western) corridor be planned now.

'I have also asked Mr Roozendaal for an update on planning of the Option C corridor, which the NSW Government committed to undertake in its Sydney Metropolitan strategy released in 2005.'

Despite these facts being provided to Minister Gay's office when the unsolicited offer was announced to establish the tunnel is the best option, my concerns were ignored.

STATEMENT On the following pages is further compelling evidence indicating an informed decision was NOT made when Transurban's unsolicited offer was accepted.

QUESTION

Will New South Wales State and Federal NSW politicians demand Cabinet and Transurban publicly address these the following evidence and allow the community to determine the best option in the national best interests?

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3 / 26

I understand traffic counts used by SKM were supplied by the RTA or an agent. An RTA officer's name appears in several places in SKM's study. Further, the 2006 Pearlman Inquiry to validate SKM's report had the benefit of a detailed 22 March 2006 study by Masson Wilson Twiney report.

SKM working paper No. 2

Following are verbatim extracts from this extensive 100 plus page costings paper. At 8.3 p75; Pennant Hills and North Rocks Road intersection would have to be upgraded.

Page A-4: **Improvements to the existing F3 Stages 1 – 5.** Stages 1 - 3 – upgrading to 3 lanes in each direction and management systems. (These have been completed.)

Stage 4 (2021-2026) Construct climbing lanes in both directions to accommodate slow moving traffic . . .

Stage 5 (Beyond 2026) . . . Tolling the F3 could also be considered as a measure. Alternatively, widen to 8 lanes in each direction. (or) Alternatively develop a new transport corridor.

Table 3.1 F3 Capacity Considerations envisages fourth 'climbing lanes' would be required by 2011. (That was over 3 years ago. It is now often a major problem that the RTA tries to play down.)

Appendix A 1. Introduction, 2 Background, 3 Traffic Forecasts and F3 Improvement Program sets out many known facts, and issues to be addressed if some options are adopted.

4. Opportunities and Constraints divides the F3 into 5 sections; Wahroonga to Berowra, Berowra to Hawkesbury River, Hawkesbury River to Mt White, Mt White to Calga, Calga to Kariong. It then lists numerous problems to widen the F3 to 4 (and 5) lanes.

5. Cost Estimates for the above works in 6.2. are between \$2.6 and \$3.6 billion.

6. Alternative Strategy. 6.1 Elevated Two Lane Tidal Flow Viaduct at Jolls Bridge. (I do not believe this would be practical or acceptable.)

6.2 Alternative Second Route ' . . . A number of alternatives for a second route have been prepared as part of the F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study. These alternatives generally link to areas in western Sydney rather than to Wahroonga.

The cost estimates for the routes investigated are between \$2.6 and \$3.6 billion. The alternative routes do, however, provide a total capacity of 5 lanes in each direction between Sydney and Gosford.

Comment; It does not appear there has been any provision for second bridges across the Hawkesbury at Mooney Mooney, and or the Mooney Mooney Creek bridge to determine if it is possible to widen them. Further, there is no indication of how any of the widening works could be carried out without closing existing lanes that would be required for several years to carry out the works.

7. Further Considerations following the F3- Sydney Orbital Link Study

A fuller investigation is required to assess requirements after 2012. Furthermore, a review of widening requirements should be undertaken upon the decision on the F3 – Orbital Link and investment program on the main North rail line.

Has this fuller investigation ever been done, and if so, what did the investigation determine?

***4:** (13 July 2014; Because of computer upgrades the format and type face changed. Text correct)

28 Warne Street
Pennant Hills NSW 2120
21st March 2005

Mr E Cory
Section Head NSW/ACT
DOTARS
PO Box 594
Canberra ACT 2600

F3 – Sydney Orbital Connection

Attn Jennie Breen

Dear Ed

As agreed at the meeting attached is the discussion paper I have prepared.

In my opinion there is little traffic engineers can resolve. Unless conclusive proof is produced I am still convinced, as usual, the consultative and assessment process was compromised by NSW bureaucrats and spin doctors.

In view of my past dealings with the NSW Government I have no doubt that the bureaucrats were acting under instructions from their political masters.

If I am right, the issue would then revolve around the relevant Minister/s and or DOTARS exposing what happened.

Please let me know what the Ministers would like to do to proceed with the resolution of this matter.

I will be back by 12th April and would like to clear this important issue up by the end of April.

Yours sincerely

Peter Waite OAM JP

Copy: The Hon P Ruddock MP
 Mr A Tink MP
 Mr D Jones, Concerned Citizens Group
 Mr P Swalwell, Pennant Hills District Civic Trust

Waite EMAIL ADDRESS DELETED 9484-3471

F3 – Sydney Orbital Link. (Prepared by Peter Waite for discussion purposes) 21 March 2005

Comment in this discussion paper does not necessarily reflect the views of the 'Concerned Citizens Group'
(Pennant Hills Liberal Party) **or the Pennant Hills District Civic Trust.**

Discussion Paper: For discussion between Ed Cory DOTARs and Peter Waite ^(a former Hornsby Councillor and local resident for over 70 years) following a meeting of the Pennant Hills District Civic Trust on 10 March 2005. In attendance were Minister Ruddock, Mr Cory, Messrs Jones and Waite, ^(members of the Concerned Citizens Group and Pennant Hills District Civic Trust) and 12 members of the Trust Executive. Chair: Trust President Phil Swalwell.

Former Hornsby Council Mayor Robert Browne was to also prepare a submission for discussion.

Purpose: To establish if the selection process for the recommend route, purple Option A was compromised by:

- Inaccurate number counts and projections, and
- Partial influences by NSW Government agencies.

History: In 2002 Derek Jones and Peter Waite, members of the Pennant Hills Thornleigh Branch of the Liberal Party, and many members of the consultative groups raised concerns about the consultative processes for this project. They raised their concerns at a Branch meeting where it was informally agreed that they be the representatives of the 'Concerned Citizens Group'. Mr Jones attended the (2003) Pennant Hills meetings whilst Mr Waite attended the (2003) Dural meetings so that they could compare notes and prepare balanced submissions and reports.

After representations to the Hon P Ruddock MP he arranged for Minister Lloyd to meet with Branch President Barwick, Jones, Waite and himself.

When Minister Lloyd stated there would be openings and connections along the tunnel for intermediate access Minister Ruddock corrected him advising the government had agreed there would be NO openings.

Minister Lloyd arranged a meeting for Jones and Waite with SKM, DOTARS and the RTA for 5 November. They reported to the 'Group' no evidence was available to prove the best route was chosen. **Attached are the points raised at 5th November ¹ meeting and detailed comment that was sent to Minister Ruddock on 16th November 2004 ² with copy to Minister Lloyd requesting answers on behalf of the Group' and Waite's letter ³ of the same date. AS YET, THE POINTS RAISED HAVE NOT BEEN ANSWERED.**

Following representations by the Pennant Hills Civic Trust to Minister Ruddock in late 2004 a meeting was arranged for 10 March 2005 as detailed above.

Page 7 of this letter: The PURPOSE of the F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study was:

- *To investigate options for a new National Highway **connection** between the Newcastle Freeway (F3) and the future Sydney Orbital. The new connection will replace Pennant Hills Road as the National Highway route (Newsletter No 1 – April 2002) ²².*

• Page 2

(13 July 2014: SKM never included its terms of reference in any report because of intervention of State and Federal bureaucrats probably at the direction of Ministers or senior political advisers.)

Ministerial Letters

Recent letters from the Transport Minister and other Federal and State MPs indicated they and or the Government had not been correctly advised in regards to the following issues:

1. Dec 10, 2004 ⁴ *"I am advised SKM's study took into account --- as well as the opinions of residents and business community before arriving at the recommended Purple Option"* The Groups research contradicts this statement. Refer 21 Feb 2005 letter ⁵ to Minister Lloyd, and *"The Government expressed its preference for a fully tunneled link, but has NOT ruled out the possibility of an opening"* This statement is contrary to Minister Ruddock's August 2004 advice to Minister Lloyd and about 40 others present, (2004110030 & 2004110014), and
2. Dec 10, 2004 ⁶ *"Furthermore, a 'C' Option would adversely impact on the national parks and heritage areas in the north western area of Sydney"*. Such statements as this that are taken from the SKM report are of deep concern because they are seen as attempts to justify putting off making a decision on Option C. These challenges will have to be eventually addressed. *"Building a 'C' Option would not remove the need for a major upgrade of the Pennant Hills Road"* (2004110517). This is an admission that the tunnel is simply an upgrade of Pennant Hills Road and not an alternative route for the National Highway. refer 13 Jan 2005 letter ⁷ to Minister, no reply,
3. Dec 23, 2004 ⁸ *"par 3(c) "Preliminary investigations show that a 'C' Option will have parts of the route on surface with substantial tunnels and extensive bridge structures around Berowra Waters"* January 6, 2005 Mr Jones again wrote another (unanswered) letter ⁹ direct to Minister Lloyd. Waite also wrote to Minister Ruddock. Option C did NOT impinge on Berowra Waters as the Minister claimed by the Minister who formerly worked the Hawkesbury as a Ferry Master ¹⁰, (refer to attached detailed 6 January letter ¹¹ to Minister Ruddock refuting much of Minister Lloyd's letter). The SKM report clearly indicates and the Minister states *"a possible need for a second crossing"* thereby passing the responsibility to the NSW Government (2004110635, 23 Dec 2004), and
4. Jan 28, 2005 ¹² *"The Type C option would not remove the need for an immediate costly upgrading of Pennant Hills Road"* and other misleading statements made in previous letters (2005010150). (This proposal relies on up to \$10 billion of unfunded assumptions that are not necessary for Option C. Furthermore this discussion paper shows serious inconsistencies in the reports that have compromised the Study to the extent that it cannot be relied on.)

State MP Michael Richardson railed at Waite's circulating a copy of Richardson's 25 November 2004 letter ¹³ to a resident and Waite's 4 December response ¹⁴ to Minister Ruddock with copies to 12 Liberal MPs. Some of the replies have been very interesting. However, as yet not one MP has supplied any information that proves the best route has been selected.

The Liberal Party, Pennant Hills Thornleigh Branch (Concerned Citizens Group), after receiving a copy of the 1994 report on 14th February 1994 Final Community Bulletin 3¹⁵ : Liverpool – Hornsby Highway Study' that recommended a western (C type Option) and the 14th February 2005¹⁶ discussion critique' unanimously passed the attached resolution on 14th February¹⁷. It also agreed to go public if the Federal Government did not provide 100% proof that the study AND the Coalition had not been compromised.

To prove the point on environmental issues attached is a report on the avoidance of an EIS by the NSW government when building a bridge to replace the collapsed Lawrence Hargrave Drive near Wollongong.¹⁸

Another example is how the NSW government passed legislation after residents successfully challenged DIPNRs consent given to Collex for a waste transfer station at Clyde. This matter is again before the Courts. A major factor to be considered by DOTARS in responding to this Discussion Paper is that two residents without any legal experience or training have twice successfully defeated a multi national company and the State once.

The implications of this are particularly relevant to item 1 in the letters from the Minister. The Minister appears to be indicating that - the "opinions of the residents and business community do not have sufficient merit to outweigh the opinions and intellectual capacity of professionals and bureaucrats.

At no stage has the Minister, SKM, DOTARS, RTA or any other politician provided any meaningful answers to the technical questions and documents produced. Many emails and letters have simply been ignored or answers supplied that avoided issues raised.

On 10 June 1999 Ted Mack spoke at Pennant Hills about 'Australia's Sham Democracy'. At one point Ted said "Community values are not a matter of expertise – only the community has a right to determine values – not the bureaucracy. Not the politicians. Not the lawyers or academics"¹⁹.

Discussions revealed that the Sydney Orbital was fully financed by the Commonwealth based on State planning decisions. The Commonwealth should change its policies and adopt the "He who pays the piper calls the tune" approach when dealing with F3 connection and base the funding on Commonwealth policy. It is absurd that the Commonwealth is prepared to allow taxpayers funds to be used for projects that cannot be supported on basis planning principles.

Hornsby Council prepared a comprehensive report²⁰ supporting the Lane Cove Valley route that would reduce the traffic and accident rate on the Pacific Highway together with a submission supporting a C option westerly route. Is it to be assumed that Hornsby Council traffic planners and Councillors opinions do not matter?

A similar situation applied at Berowra Waters where Planning Minister Refshauge called in for determination applications Hornsby Council staff recommended be refused. Residents successfully challenged Refshauge's approvals. Two S/Cs and two barristers appeared for the Minister and applicant. A junior barrister represented the appellants. The Ministers team claimed the Act provided that the Court did not have the power to overturn his decision. In other words the Minister claimed he was above the law. The Court changed Refshauge's decision but not his arrogance and contempt for the law and the community.

Waite's 8 page presentation titled '*Has the community been deceived*' (circa June 2004) was based on the April/ May 2004 Joint Media Release by Ministers Anderson and Campbell. There has been no meaningful response to that and many other submissions or the report on the outcome of the 5th November 2004 meeting with SKM, DOTARS and the RTA.

It is attitudes and arrogance like these examples that bring politicians and bureaucrats into disrepute.

North and South Tunnel Intersections: Figures 11-2, 11-3 ²¹ Historically proposed works such as these will involve lengthy delays for many months. This has not been addressed in the study. It is only 10 years since through traffic, residents and businesses in the area were subjected to inordinate delays and loss of amenity.

An argument has been advanced that traffic counts provided have only been for the western side of Pennant Hills Road. This is seen as spurious as most of Hornsby Shire residents have to access or cross Pennant Hills Road. The exceptions being Epping and Eastwood residents who will use or cross Pennant Hills Road to travel to the northwest and the F3.

North: Two lanes from the F3 widen into 3 lanes at Mt Colah to become a 3k parking lot in AM peak. Vehicles then crawl when lights go green at the Pacific Highway and Pennant Hills Road. These 3 lanes become 3 lanes on Pennant Hills Road and effectively 2 lanes on Pacific Highway that are already carrying heavy local traffic at capacity.

No meaningful counts of the F3 and local traffic at these intersection are provided to give an accurate count or %age using each route.

South: The proposed layout will cause confusion for those who do not know the area. The merging of traffic will increase the existing serious accident rate and delays.

M2 – F3 widening: This would not be necessary with Option C. If in the future it was found necessary the impact and delays and safety on the F3 in particular would be reduced because traffic could be rerouted onto Option C.

The **PURPOSE** of the F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study was:

- To investigate options for a new National Highway **connection** between the Newcastle Freeway (F3) and the future Sydney Orbital. **The new connection will replace Pennant Hills Road as the National Highway route** (Newsletter No 1 – April 2002) ²².

The chosen route does not replace Pennant Hills Road as the National Highway.

In 1994 the RTA 'Liverpool to Hornsby Highway Study Workshop 3' reported "*the tunnel under Pennant Hills Road offers poor connectivity*" ^{15/3} and "*overall the participants voiced a preference for the Wallgrove Expressway Strategy*". It also states "*options include the new route via Dural in serving present industrial and future residential areas have high economic returns despite their high cost*" ^{15/3}. **What has changed since then?**

In several places and the concluding paragraphs on page of the 20.2 SKM 'Main Report – April 2004' acknowledges the tunnel is a short term solution. It also made recommendations to have access to solve local traffic problems. That is not the purpose of a National Highway.

The 1994 report ^{15/3} states "A Preferred Strategy ----- 4: Review and develop a new northern link". After 10 years the time is long past for short term solutions, it is time to deal with the solution properly.

Despite several substantive submissions raising serious doubts over the consultative process as well as a meeting with the consultants, DIPNR and RTA, and also meetings with Ministers no substantive evidence has been produced to prove the best route was chosen.

The study, Minister Lloyd and many members of the community agree a second crossing of the Hawkesbury will be necessary before 2020 and also has a high strategic value. This being the case the environment, cost and other red herrings thrown up to justify an inferior solution are irrelevant. Eventually these issues will have to be faced because there is no other alternative to Option C.

The longer an Option C decision is avoided, the harder it will be to find a new corridor. It is a stand alone solution that does not rely on billions of dollars of uncoded assumptions for the selected route.

The time is past to go through the report to try to identify every individual issue when so many fundamental planning principles have been avoided. Explanations must be given as to why all the basic issues that have been previously raised have not been proven incorrect by producing the references in the report that proves or disproves the assumptions made.

Historical – recent documents and newspaper articles

June 7, 1971.²³ 'The Sun reports on *"The shape of things to come on Sydney Highways over the next 30 years"*. June 12?, 1971²⁴ shows the 'M2' and part of the link to the F3. SKM's report²⁵ details the 'Serious and fatal crash rate (per km of route per year) for the Pacific Hwy north of Ryde Road as 23'. The selected route will do nothing to address this most serious issue. The Lane Cove route as originally planned and supported by Hornsby Council²⁰ would dramatically reduce the traffic and accidents on the Pacific Highway. ***This is a State funding matter that has been ignored.***

Informed community comment p19 'Working Paper 1 – Community Consultation'²⁶ questioned in par 2 problems in the NE had not been sufficiently addressed. Under 4.2.3 concern was expressed at the long term needs for option 'C'.

Apparent inappropriate input to study by NSW Department of Infrastructure Planning and Natural Resources (DIPNR). SMH 24/8/2004²⁷ – "Motorway designers must learn from past mistakes". This article promotes widening of Parramatta Road footpaths and bus lanes after the proposed Strathfield to Haberfield tunnel is built. Similar comments have been made in regards to the M4 East tunnel under William Street. Page 12 of the July 2003 'SKM Background Report'²⁸ example Pennant Hills Road as having similar treatment. Also refer to p90 'Working Paper 4 – Traffic & Transportation'.
29

The SMH 12 March 2005³⁰ examples how Traffic levels have been grossly underestimated for many years whilst on 14 March two examples^{31, 32} are given showing the next 30 year strategy is overdue. Based on the 1971 report it is absurd and grossly irresponsible of governments to not have rolling plans that have a continual 25 to 50 year lead time.

Two articles in the 18 March 2005 Herald³³ highlight the 'crises management' of the State Government that is being propped up by a Federal Government that does not appear to care about the outcomes.

Main Report – April 2004 – Introduction

Page 3 Figure 3³⁴ details existing traffic volumes at strategic locations. **Are these accurate?** In 1975 the Hornsby Police Traffic Sergeant, ^{who still lives in Pennant Hills,} advised the Pennant Hills Residents Association ^(now Civic Trust) Pennant Hills Road will never be a 24 hour 'clearway'³⁵. Just prior to the M2 opening then A. Police Commissioner Lola Scott ^(Beecroft resident) advised a large meeting at Pennant Hills Bowling Club *"when the M2 is opened there will be no more traffic problems"*. Newspaper reports claim vehicle sales in 2004 dramatically increased to nearly 1 million. **On a population basis it is reasonable to suggest over 250,000 would be in the Sydney region.**

Page 6³⁶ sets out Transport Network Improvement Assumptions. These assumptions are uncoded and could amount to \$10 billion. Option C is a stand alone Option that will be shown to have a far greater reduction on Pennant Hills Road traffic than the proposed tunnel.

Working Paper 4 – Traffic & Transportation.

Page 20 ³⁷ splits 'Sydney' into 5 regions by Local Government Boundaries. The demographic centre of Sydney is located around Silverwater Bridge. This is in the studies 'Western Region'.

Page 21 ³⁸ shows the concentration and disparity in size of the various Local Government Areas.

Page 22 ³⁹ uses a table and 'star' diagram 'number plate survey' Figure 2.9 to show that 60% of traffic comes from the Northwest, North, West and Southwest-South areas of Sydney. (Being about 20km shorter Option C would be the preferred route for most of this traffic and a higher %age of trucks. Every attempt should be made to ensure there are no tunnels so that dangerous goods and oversize loads can use Option C.)

Page 40 ⁴⁰ uses a 'pie chart' to show truck trips 6am to 6pm. This is misleading in that the NW sector is shown between the NE and 'east – city' sector.

Page 43 ⁴¹ has the 'pie chart' correctly divided but incorrectly oriented. (57% trucks would use Option C) Table 3-4 indicates the 71,200 vehicles crossing the Hawkesbury is only half of the total vehicles using the Pacific Highway South of Telegraph Road and Pennant Hills Road North of Boundary Road. Figure 3.6 indicates 57% of trucks Southern origins/destinations are to the western sectors whilst only 51% of origins/destinations are to the western sectors. **No explanations are offered for this discrepancy.**

Page 73 ⁴² Figure 6.2 refers to zones used in this study and suggest the annual traffic growth would drop to 1.5%pa over the next 20 years. This diagram does not include meaningful traffic counts for 10 zones as against the 5 regions previously used as a basis for comparison.

Page 75 ⁴³ Figure 6.3 also uses the zone system. This has severely compromised the study. **No explanation for the different methodology is given.**

Page 118 ⁴⁴ Figure 14.1 suggests a convoluted route for 'C Option 10' without any explanation. Such a route would cut about 20kms off the trip for the 60% of the traffic that would use the existing route and/or proposed tunnel or Pacific Highway.

Page 122 ⁴⁵ suggests that by 2021 only 20% of the total traffic volumes would use the 'C Option 10'. Noting the 12 March Herald Article regarding traffic projections it is submitted that a 3%pa traffic increase is more realistic than the 1.5% suggested in the SKM report (figure 6.2). This would increase the traffic volumes by 125,000 or 25% by 2021. This is 26,000 over the 99,000 quoted in table 15.1 ⁴⁵.

Page 182.⁴⁶ " ²⁹ *The reallocation of road space on the existing Pennant Hills Road would be an essential part of the project. These works have not been fully investigated and therefore not costed in the estimate of costs given in Working Paper 2'.* This question was raised at the 5th November meeting. The RTA advised this cost would not be borne by the RTA. This is further evidence of DIPNR's input.

Page 25 ⁴⁷ diagram 2.13 refers to a number plate survey. Assuming 4% of the 54% from the Pacific Highway and F3 has destinations south of Ryde and Boundary Roads where does the remaining 50% of traffic from the F3 go? It is inconceivable that it is all going to Hornsby and the NE Region.

Page 70 ⁴⁸ Diagram 6.1 uses estimated numbers as against %ages in diagram 2.13. Figures and %ages for the Pacific Highway and Ryde Road in these two diagrams appear to conflict with each other. Figure 2.13 shows Ryde Road as having 11% against the 20% using the Pacific Highway whilst figure 6.1 shows 84,300 using Ryde Road as against 56,000 using the Pacific Highway. **Both cannot be correct.**

Working Paper 1 - Community Consultation

Page 20. ⁴⁹ *"there was strong support for further investigation of a Type C option, on the basis a long term solution was needed".*

Several other reasons to justify Option C were also listed.

Page 36: ⁵⁰ 5.1 Key Outcomes Par 2: *"Type C options would be further investigated to provide a long term western route and potential second crossing of the Hawkesbury. Making provision for such a route through the planning process was important to many members of the community and key stakeholders".*

Value Management Workshop No2 Record – SEPTEMBER 2003

Page 7 ⁵¹ reports that approximately 3 vehicles in 5 from the F3 travel down the Pacific Highway whilst the %ages quoted indicate only 40% travel to the City and North East. **Refer to fig 2.13 ⁴⁷. Which is right?**

The same page indicates 57% of heavy vehicles have origins/destinations that would use Pennant Hills Road. This coincides with the figures given out at the Community Consultative meeting at Galston in August 2003.

Page 5.⁵² RTA's Dr Kishan reports *"there are not many examples in the world of tunnels 6-8 km long and certainly none in Australia. Therefore, if the project proceeds there will be a multitude of technical challenges to be addressed, not to mention the social challenges that would arise"*. This statement is cause for deep concern and should have been seriously addressed by the Ministers before they agreed to accept the Purple A Option.

Professional commentators at this workshop raised some serious concerns over the proposed tunnel option. P10⁵³ : *"By building this new link there would be a redistribution of up to 20% of traffic in the corridor that would provide benefits throughout the rest of the northern network"*. This is misleading because the chosen route will not greatly alter the traffic on the Pacific Highway south of the F3.

Pages 11 and 12⁵⁴ also raise issues that have not been answered in the study. In particular the last two on Page 11⁵⁵ . *"Project justification is essential. Type C needs to be convincingly rejected before any of the type A Options can be seriously addressed. In considering the Type C scenario in comparison to type A, the following needs to be addressed: - what value is placed on another (strategic) crossing of the Hawkesbury River?"*.

Page 12⁵⁴ concludes long term planning needs to be made for Option C.

Page 22⁵⁶ refers to DOTARS advice that the Australian Government wanted Option A as a short term solution thereby avoiding the need to confront the State Government over its lack of planning.

Newsletter 2, July 2003⁵⁷

By comparison, Corridor Types B and C would Remove less traffic from Pennant Hills Road (fewer than 10,000 vehicles per day in 2021⁵⁷).

Summation of SKM's F3 to Sydney Orbital Report

No reference or provision is made for the diversion of traffic when the tunnel is closed as it will be from time to time due to computer and power failures, fire, breakdowns, accidents and maintenance. **The only reasonable explanation is because there is no alternate route.**

The report indicates two lanes each way will be required if there is a toll and three lanes each way without a toll. How will this affect the traffic if Pennant Hills Road is narrowed to 2 lanes in each direction as suggested?

Newsletter 2 suggests Option C would only reduce traffic on Pennant Hills Road by up to 10,000 vehicles per day by 2021 (about 10%⁵⁷). Page 10⁵³ of the VM Workshop suggests a 20% redistribution of traffic by building the tunnel. What does this mean? 'Working paper 4' page 122⁴⁵ suggests only 19,000 or 20% vehicles per day would use option C by 2021.

As against the above, estimates in the 'Working Papers 4 – Traffic & Transportation' on pages 22, 40 and 43 and the 'Value Management Workshop' page 7 all indicate 57 to 60% of the F3 traffic could use Option C. Even if the 57 to 60% was reduced to 40% this is a 100% improvement on the Working paper 4 20 percent estimates⁴⁵ and 200% percent better than Newsletter 2 estimates⁵⁷.

The selected route DOES NOT meet the: The PURPOSE of the F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study:

- *To investigate options for a new National Highway 'ROUTE' ('CONNECTION' in Newsletter 1²²) between the Newcastle Freeway (F3) and the future Sydney Orbital. **The new route will replace Pennant Hills Road as the National Highway.** (Newsletter No 2 – July 2003⁵⁸)*
- *May 7, 2004 SMH Herald⁵⁹ "The aim of the study was to identify a high standard transport link (not route or connection) between the F3 and the Sydney Orbital. **The new link (not connection or route) would replace Pennant Hills Road as the National Highway**".*

Conclusion

P 5 16

The only conclusion that can be arrived at from available information is:

- *the Commonwealth Government has allowed the NSW Government to hijack their study to overcome local traffic problems without any serious thought for the future,*

PS Comments attributed to Minister Anderson (SMH 21/3/05 Safer Pacific Highway just got closer⁶⁰) further detract from the credibility of the SKM report

July 2014: I believe my comments on page 11 of my letter are sufficient justification to show the SKM study lacks credibility and cannot be relied on because SKM was directed not to comply with the 2001 Terms of Reference. I do not suggest SKM's study prepared in accordance with the 2003 directions, or the 2007 Pearlman findings were wrong.

Peter Waite

Transurban) request for a review of SKM's findings. Hills claimed discrepancies in the SKM report and the tunnel should join the M2 further East. That was one of the four Type A (Eastern) options.

My submission had a large map that compared an F3 – M7 link with the F3 – M2 link and SKM costings. These indicated the 2004 costs were both about \$3 billion. **M/s Pearlman chose to use my map instead of DOTARS.** In my opinion this is why she included *“3. (b) a type C corridor be planned now”* in her letter despite it not being in the Terms of Reference.

DOTARS engaged Masson Wilson Twiney (MWT) to review SKM's calculations. **MWT's 22 March 2007 Executive Summary concluded:**

“Beyond 2021, when capacity of a six lane F3 is likely to be exceed in peak periods, a type C (western F3-M7) option may become a justifiable project, depending upon the manner in which Sydney, the Central Coast and Lower Hunter develop. Consequently, a decision will be required about a long term solution to traffic capacity in the Sydney Orbital to Central Coast corridor. This will revolve around:

- **An eight-lane F3**
- **A Type C option**

Both will require capacity augmentation in the Sydney road network.

Measures to improve train accessibility from the Central Coast to Sydney and land use measures, among others, may defer the need for a long term option, depending on their success. Conversely, faster than forecast travel demand may require a long term option sooner than 2012.”

Verbatim: The Hon Mahla Pearlman's 31 August 2007 letter to:

“The Hon Jim Lloyd MP, Minister for . . . and Roads, Parliament House, CANBERRA ACT 2600

I am pleased to present the Review report for your consideration.

I have given due consideration to the MWT “interim report – F3 to Sydney Orbital Corridor Review (March 2006)” and concluded the following:

1. *That the assumptions and data used in the SKM ‘F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study 2004’ were valid and reasonable at that time of the study;*
2. *that there have been changes affecting land use and traffic flows since the SKM Study’s publication, but that these changes reinforce the selection of the preferred route; and*
3. *that the SKM Study recommendations progress as follows:*
 - (a) *the preferred route follow a Type A corridor Purple option and that this be progressed to the next stages of investigation including detailed concept design and financial assessment and environmental impact assessment; and*
 - (b) *a type C corridor be planned now.*

The NSW Government indicated in its submission to the Review its intention to develop a discussion paper on the connection of the F3 to the M2 and or M7. I am confident that my Review has undertaken a sufficiently rigorous and detailed analysis on the proposed connect to both inform and direct any future Government investigations. I would encourage both the Australian and NSW Government to proceed directly with the next stages of a Type A Purple option link connection the F3 to M2.

Yours sincerely

THE HON MAHLA PEARLMAN AO”

The Review was a 106 page A4 paper that included a list of those who addressed the Inquiry. This included an RTA officer's reply to a question at the Dural Focus Group Meeting on **28 August 2003: Citizen's statement:** *“Need for change in attitude by government”* **Reply:** *“JB (RTA) commented that this is a transport study and RTA/DoTARS cannot dictate policy to DIPNR.”*

At the Pearlman hearing I incorrectly stated “*The terms of reference were changed*”. M/s Riggs, head of DOTARS rejected my allegation and stated “*The terms of reference were not changed*”.

I should have stated “*SKM was directed not to comply with the Terms of Reference.*”
My simple error meant DOTARS and the RTA were not held to account (Transcript held).

However this does not alter the fact SKM was directed not to comply with its Terms of Reference.

***6: Minister Lloyd’s Chief of staff** 20 September 2007 letter re Administrative Decisions Tribunal Planning meeting on 21 August 2007: “*Waite v NSW Roads and Traffic Authority*”

Extracts: Hon Marla Pearlman’s findings ‘*The Review report confirmed the original decision by the Australian Government to provide a link between the F3 and M2, broadly along the alignment of Pennant Hill’s Road. It recommended that:*

The preferred route follow the Purple Option and that this now be progressed to the next stages of investigation including; detailed design, economic and financial assessment and environmental impact assessment; and

An Option C (western) corridor be planned now.

Minister Lloyd said the report had identified a small number of issues that would require consideration in the preparation of an environmental impact statement and that further public consultation would be a key element in taking the project forward and determining the precise route for the link.

Mr Lloyd has also written to the Hon Eric Roozendaal MLC, NSW Government Roads Minister, to advise him of the outcome of the Review and to seek from him an update on planning of the Option C corridor, which the NSW Government committed to undertake in its Sydney Metropolitan Strategy released in 2005.

I have enclosed for your information a copy of the Review final report.

Thank you for your participation in the Review process.

Yours sincerely

John Abel

Chief of Staff.

[REDACTED] (Also at 14)
Refer to page 2 of my 21 March 2005 letter to DOTARS Ed Cory about his meeting at the Pennant Hills Civic Trust organised by The Hon Phillip Ruddock MP. refer item 4 pages 5/16

After that meeting Ruddock invited Lloyd to attend his Federal Electorate Committee to explain to what occurred with the SKM study and why it was compromised. When the meeting was held, Lloyd couldn’t explain what happened, admitted he didn’t know, and left the meeting after Ruddock decided it was best he didn’t remain to answer any more questions from the floor.(Not sure of date.)

I then helped Lloyd and his secretary leave the locked office returned to the meeting.

***7: SMH 26 September 2007 'lemma must stop Costa in his tracks – Off the rails: how the west was stung'** These articles state the NW sector population will top 475,000 in the next 25 years and 18 percent of Sydney's future housing is planned for the area. This means in 18 years - by 2032 a second Hawkesbury River highway should be operating as part of the National Highway as well as Transurban's proposed tunnel if it is approved.

RTA's former Chief Executive Bruce Loader's 10 April 2008 SMH article (***12**) commenced; **'In NSW, until about 1980, there was a clear separation of government and the management and administration of public works and services'**.

If politicians, their advisers and the community no longer have the benefit of impartial advice. The Premier, Ministers, MPs or councillor cannot prove they have made informed decisions?

██████████ Epping to Thornleigh Third (rail) Track was ██████████
██████████ the Department of Planning approved the EIS despite serious
flaws, how can anyone know if the NorthConnex EIS for Transurban's unsolicited offer is the
best solution when the government has refused to release details of the offer?

***8: SMH 25 September 2007 "The liquor industry is truly ugly and politicians are puppets"**
FIRST WORD "Brad Pederson Manly – President of Democracy Watch – Australians for Political Funding Reforms." ". . . . The truth is our politicians have become puppets of the alcohol industry. The alcohol industry is the second biggest donor group after the development lobby. It buys governments and, just as importantly it buys the silence of the Opposition. These donations are bribes, to think anything else is naïve. . . ."

Seven years later the situation is far worse. Nearly every day there are reports of alcohol related deaths for many reasons. The greater number appear to be drink driving and teenagers under the influence. Whilst many politicians have suggested solutions, they are swept under the carpet with PR campaigns about the latest idea to divert attention from a national problem.

It is time politicians stopped being puppets and impartially represented the community. Whilst there is nothing wrong with anyone lobbying politicians, **everyone should have the same rights.**

***9: SMH 26 September 2007 "Warning – money blinds us to broader needs" POLICIES**
Matt Wade Economics Writer. "GOVERNMENTS have become obsessed by economic success they are discounting the environmental and social effects of many policies and alienating voters in the process, a report to be released in Australia and Britain today says.

It calls for all government policies to be assessed according to their contribution to "true national wealth" – a measure that recognises the need for social and environmental progress as well as economic wealth.

***10: SMH 26 September 2007 page 4 "COMMUTING Off the rails: how the west was stung"**
Seven years ago Sunanda Creagh Urban Affairs Reporter wrote ". . . North-western Sydney's population is expected to top 475,000 in the next 25 years and 18 percent of Sydney's future housing is planned for the area. . . . News that the NSW Treasury might put a stop to the planned North-West Rail Link has residents seething. . . . Buses just were not good enough. . ."

***11: SMH 10 April 2008 “Poor vision for the state in blurring of the divide”** (Bruce Loader a former NSW commissioner for Main Roads) His article explains how a non political public service delivered some extraordinary achievements such as the metropolitan rail system, Harbour Bridge, water storage dams and water reticulation circa late 1800s and 1900's up to about 1980.

Loader also explains how changes that started around 1980, with a move by the public service to replace eminently qualified heads and department officers with ill-equipped staff unable to provide ministers with sound advice and guidance they require to administer their portfolio. A few extracts:

“These are circumstances in which the economically and financial disastrous Cross City and Lane Cove tunnels were conceived and built

The government, which allowed the work to be built (and even boasted the achievement), assured us no government money was involved. Lucky for them no government money was involved.

Lucky for them Governments do not have any money; they only direct how the public's money is spent.. . (Bad luck for the community) *The deterioration in management skills in the public service exemplified in the Roads and Traffic Authority extends throughout the service and explains in part about the problems being experienced in health, transport and public works. . . .*

It will not be easy to restore the public service to an effective provider of works and services and guardian of the public interest, but until then and until the roles of government and public service are once more clearly defined, we can expect the standard of government in NS to continue to fall relative to other states.

When Loader's concerns are considered the State Parliament should determine if the State Constitution is being complied with, and if not, how it will ensure it is complied with.

***12: 3 December 2009** Hornsby MP Judy Hopwood address to Parliament in part refers to my concerns about hospital budget cuts in mid 1990's and the **Save Hornsby Hospital** team of doctors and staff who targeted me to takeover their committee to avoid them being disciplined.

Apart from me, 'that Team' was only Labor. I was the only Liberal. The many Liberals I asked said they were too busy. So was I. But the hospital was far more important as far as I was concerned.

In less than six months we had evidence to prove the NS Area Health Service had the lowest per capita budget in the Sydney Region. It was half of the SE Sydney Area Health Service. The 'stupid' Health department threatened staff for leaking the figures to the Team. The 'stupid' Health department published them in positions vacant. It proved how dumb they were.

Mayors in the Northern Sydney region and the Minister were invited to explain why Hornsby, Manly, Mona Vale and Ryde Hospitals should be closed and two super hospitals built to serve the region. When the Minister received his invitation, he had a letter couriered to me advising closures would not proceed. Despite this another incompetent Minister remained. In 2014 nothing has changed.

***13: 20 July 2010** *"Getting it right on development projects"* – Sam Haddad, director general of the Department of Planning. *"Giving the Department of Planning a role in assessing larger, more complex development applications ensures that all concerned parties have their voices heard, writes Sam Haddad."*

"The part 3A system has more stringent assessment tests which do not exist in the council assessment system."

Par 7: *"The department continues to strengthen its checks and balances to ensure probity and transparency of process and outcomes."*

This is why the EIS should be deferred to establish why Minister Gay or his minders who refuse to prove the *'probity and transparency of process and outcomes'* and issues I raised in this submission have been resolved. Until then, the *'exhibition'* should be deferred.

***14: Spin doctors** In October 2012 I applied under the GIPA Act (old FOI Act) to Minister Gay for copies of Transurban's unsolicited offer. On 22 November 2012 [REDACTED] stated *"In my 7 November letter to you, I suggested you could call and I would assist you to make your (GIPA) application valid. I note you have lodged a review of the original decision with the Information Commissioner."*

On 6 December 2012 I confirmed my appointment and questioned the credibility of the process and how the community had been misled because SKM was advised in 2003 not to comply with the 2001 Terms of Reference. This has still not been addressed.

[REDACTED] promised to arrange for the *"independent' committee"* reviewing Transurban offer, to address my concerns. Despite several requests, nothing happened.

In 2013 I again applied under GIPA to Minister Gay for all of Transurban's documents. On 2 September 2013 the Premier & Cabinet General Counsel released a list of 532 documents set out on 59 pages and a refund of my \$30 fee and \$370 costs to avoid complying with the Act.

More 'Spin doctors'; Item 2 is about PriceWaterhouseCoopers disclaimer for the glossy A4 booklet produced for NSROC (Northern Sydney Region of Councils) support for the tunnel that was initiated about 2 years before Transurban's offer. Despite reporting my concerns that there may have been collusion with Transurban, nobody has responded. Who knows what actually happened?

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The community is fed up with not being told the truth. Why employ *"spin doctors"* to avoid the public knowing the facts?

***15: AFR 4 July 2013: “Public inquiries are not what they used to be, but we still need them”** Gary Banks, Dean of the Australia and New Zealand School of Government in the inaugural Peter Karmel Lecture in Canberra last night at the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia.

Extracts: **“There has arguably never been a time when there is so much dispute about so many public policy issues.”** “. . . They are thus an important potential source of political learning about what to do and how to get it done. In these aspects they can compensate for capability gaps in public administration. (gaps that have been increasing in my view).”

Why has the slew of public inquiries in recent years not matched the record of an earlier era? The answer, to borrow from an advertising slogan, is that “inquiries ain’t inquiries”. How they are constituted and framed can vary greatly, as can the way governments handle them. Experience is instructive about the “success factors”.

“The contribution of an inquiry often comes down to having the right people in the right setting. Competence without conflicts is a minimum requirement for such a role. But integrity and openness of mind are obviously important too.” Nothing could be truer

***16: SMH 27 June 2014 News 3: \$13b motorway Confusion over plans Gay admits he may have gone ‘too early’ with WestConnex.** **“If we’ve made an offer to someone for their house and we change what we are doing with it, that offer stands,”** he said.

“By going out early to engage the community as soon as possible, we’ve indicated that we might have indicated that we might have needed buildings that we may not need in the future. You’ve got to balance between going out as early as possible and may be going too early,” he said. This was public money being misused.

Whilst the coalition is trying to overcome over a decade of Labor’s mismanagement, fraud and corruption, as along serving MLC, Minister Gay does not appear to have learnt from Labor’s sins. Minister Gay, why did you decide to rush in and accept Transurban’s offer before all the facts were made public?

As a concerned citizen interested in community affairs for over 60 years, and a former builder, developer, property investor and councillor I, along with many others, am appalled with the lack of knowledge and compliance with our State Constitution by many elected, members, bureaucrats, business operators and the public.

***17: Sun-Herald 29 June 2014 p9 “Cheap tribunal proposed for home compo fighters”**

Kirsty Needham State Politics Editor *“The Baird government’s plans for WestConnex, NorthConnex, the North West Rail link, new light rail in inner Sydney and Parramatta and a new raft of roads in western Sydney will displace thousands of families. . . . Negotiations already underway between Transport NSW and home owners in Surry Hills and Haberfield have become bitter. Residents claim the government has made below-market offers.”*

“. . . The tactics and delays by the government negotiators were “shameful”, he said. **“I’m still negotiating and I’m not getting anywhere.”**

“Labor wants these disputes to be heard in the NSW Civil and Administrative Decisions Tribunal, which would cost \$500, and give fasted remedies.”

My personal experience in 1981/2 when the then DMR was acquiring an investment property on Pennant Hills Road for widening, the then DMR engineer intervened and had an acceptable solution agreed on by over ten property owners. That engineer also had a law degree and later became an RTA Assistant Director General. How many executives now have the same or similar qualifications?

The most important question is, who can prove that this parliament can be trusted by the wider electorate regardless of their political opinions?

***18:** DRAFT NSW FREIGHT AND PORTS STRATEGY Nov 2012; Figure 31 Page 111 shows the 'OUTER ORBITAL RAIL AND ROAD CORRIDOR' that is identical with that shown in the Australian Financial Review on 19 June 2014.

Page 81 wrongly states "*The 2007 Pearlman Review into the F3 to M7 corridor selection recommended that work commence on the identification and reservation of a corridor for a new orbital link to the west of the current M7 Motorway.*" I drew this error to the attention of Ministers Berejuckian and Gay. On 14 November 2013 their joint Parliamentary Secretary MP Ray Williams advised "*the report had been amended as Marla Pearlman recommended planning commence to set aside lands for the F3-M7 link.*"

That won't correct copies downloaded before I reported the error. This can then again be mistakenly used in a report or submission.

On 6 June 2014 a concerned Wahroonga resident and I met with Mr Williams for nearly 90 minutes and explained in detail our concerns about NorthConnex's proposal only being a very short term solution that is not in the nation's, NSW or all residents in Sydney's north where councils have been directed to increase housing density without roads being built to meet the increasing demand.

This is an example of some of the many political problems NorthConnex cannot answer.

***19:** Which is correct? '*Its full speed ahead on big-build highway*' Telegraph 17 June 2014 This shows a proposed M9 Outer western Sydney Orbital Motorway link from Casula, Penrith, Windsor to the M7 and M2 and proposed M1 tunnel.

OR

***20:** *Grand designs; The NSW Government's plan for road and rail transport* Australian Financial Review 19 June 2014 showed the proposed Outer Orbital link in the C2012 'Draft NSW Freight and Ports Strategy' as a second Hawkesbury crossing for both road and rail to avoid Sydney in accordance with p48 of the article.

Parliamentary Secretary for Ministers Berejuckian for Transport and Minister Gay for Roads and Ports Ray Williams MP advised in his 14 November 2013 letter to me "*The Outer Sydney orbital identified in the NSW Long Term Transport Master Plan connects the Central Coast, Western Sydney and Wollongong.*" I believe the 19 June article is correct.

On 6 June 2014 a concerned Wahroonga resident and I met with Mr Williams for nearly 90 minutes and explained in detail our concerns about NorthConnex's proposal only being a very short term solution that is not in the nation's, NSW or all residents in Sydney's north where councils have been directed to increase housing density without providing roads to meet the increasing demand.

***21: SKM March 2004 Working Paper No 2:** A1-A15 envisaged . . . the F3 should be widened to 8 lanes with an extra climbing lane for trucks on both sides of the Hawkesbury River.

How will an extra lane in each direction on the F1 be built when the tunnel has reached capacity and the third lane is operating? Who will pay?

Further, how will traffic from both directions on the Pacific Highway and Pennant Hills Road be able to merge with the 3 lane tunnels once they are at capacity in the tunnel? How long will this take?

NorthConnex claimed the SKM report was only a recommendation that would require more detailed study. If correct, the NorthConnex EIS should be a very large paper.

On 5 July 2014 I emailed the NorthConnex Director:


"Hi Tim

Attached is a simple 'table' diagram I made of the northern tunnel exit and entry to the F3 from Pennant Hills Road with an explanation of problems I believe will eventually happen when the third north bound lane is at capacity.

If the F3 is not widened, traffic leaving the F3 at Wahroonga may be such that the south third lane is not necessary.

Will these issues be taken into account in the EIS?

cc Ray Williams MP Parliamentary Secretary to Roads Minister Gay"



Whilst this '**plan**' may not mean anything to some, the technical issues should be clear to NorthConnex staff that prepared the plans shown at consultative meetings in April 2014.

27 June 2014 the SMH reported on page 3 '**Gay admits he may have gone 'too early' with WestConnex**'. Minister Gay deserves credit for his admission.

Whilst Transurban may not be happy, Minister Gay and parliament should agree to review Transurban's unsolicited offer and the many issues the community has raised.

***22: Compensation:** Compare the Roads Maritime Services Questions and answers in its December 2011 six page paper. It makes it clear if your property is not resumed and the value decreases **there is no compensation** – with 'Cheap tribunal' proposed for home compo fighters. SMH 29 June 2014.

In 1981/82 I and about 15 others property owners were involved with the then DMR that wanted to acquire part of our properties on Pennant Hills Road for widening and prevent any access to what would become valueless land. Many onsite meetings were held with intransigent officers.

I contacted the Divisional Engineer who was also a solicitor, and made suggestions to solve other major problems. This led to a successful and amicable outcome to all parties. That officer later became the RTA Deputy Director.

Why is it that the RTA and this Government will not address what appear to be serious flaws in Transurban's unsolicited offer. Why did Minister Gay approve public money be spent to acquire property he *indicates* was resumed "because he may have gone too early" at 25?

Governments do not have any money. They only use money raised from the community. Noting the Australian Water port where Sydney Water was paying \$millions of public money to entrepreneurs to use for their personal gain, **as custodians of our money how is parliament, councils and public instrumentalities held to account?**

Bruce Loader's 10 April 2008 observations (at *11) makes it very clear that governments are out of control because most, if not all of their staff **do not have** the technical knowledge to provide **"frank and candid advice"** instead of replying on consultants supply advice that they can misuse to justify an outcome they or a lobbyist wants. Also refer to the TV comedy (documentary) **"Yes minister"**.

This \$3 billion plus project should not be approved until it is shown to be in the wider community and national best interests.

***23:** SMH 16 July 2014 **"Traffic no faster even with \$3b tunnels"** Transport reporter Jacob Saulwick's assessment of the NorthConnex EIS supports my opinions that the tunnel will be a waste of time and resources.

What is the role and qualifications of the Roads and Maritime spokeswoman who stated:
"NorthConnex will ease traffic congestion, improve local amenity and connectivity for people living and working in the area by removing 5000 heavy vehicles from Pennant Hills Road every day." ? I look forward to a public reply.

***24:** SMH 17 July 2014 **"Gay reverses direction on M5 toll plan for new roads"** Jacob Saulwick. Whilst Minister Gay is the messenger, it is clear other departments are desperate to source funds for projects.

The State should be building these projects and financing them. The Water Board issued debentures to fund their massive projects post WW2.

I know of many people who would rather *'invest'* in such projects instead of being involved with unaccountable banks and other investment businesses where many people who trusted them have lost most of their savings and been forced onto pensions taxpayers have to fund.

Before it is too late, politicians and their bureaucrats should get rid of their *"PR, spin doctors and media"* agents and obtain frank and candid advice as to how to best manage the nations finances.

***25: Request for hard copy of the EIS rejected by NorthConnex** email 10 July 2014

NorthConnex advised me a decision was made not release hard copy. This is discriminatory as it makes it impossible for those who have computers and or cannot attend places where copies can be read and make notes or copy pages from a reported 3,000 page document.

It is contrary to **Section 72 of the "Government Information Public Access Act (2)"** (old FOI Act) **"The agency must provide access in the way requested by the applicant unless sections (a) (b) (c) (d) apply. None of these are relevant.** Earlier sections of the Act set out public interest details where there should be no cost or a discounted charge be set.

In 2004 Sinclair Knight Mertz gave me and others copies when requested. **NorthConnex refused. Will NorthConnex hire copies, and if so how much will it cost and be arranged?**

***26: "ETHICS" segment ABS NSW 7.30 report (Quentin Dempster) 11 July 2014**

The presenter interviewed the director of the St James Ethics Centre, opposition leader John Robertson Labor), MLCs Fred Nile (Christian Democrats), David Shoebridge (Greens) and a lady about ethics. The lady's conclusion was **"Nobody can trust any of you"**. Very sad but true.

***27: Option for Transurban and the Government**

Transurban withdraw its unsolicited offer and submit an offer to build an M7 – F3 route in accordance with the 2001 Terms of Reference SKM was directed to ignore by the RTA that was confirmed by an RTA officer at the Dural community meeting on 28 August 2003 and SKM that was only partly recorded in the minutes. Refer other comments in minutes to better understand concerns raised at that meeting.

2004 Australian Government Department of Transport and Regional Services AusLink White Paper page 11 **'Table 2: Costs of Urban road traffic delays'**

1995 congestion

cost estimate (\$ billion)	<i>Sydney</i>	<i>Melbourne</i>	<i>Brisbane</i>	<i>Adelaide</i>	<i>Perth</i>	<i>Canberra</i>	Total
	6.0	2.7	2.6	0.8	0.6	0.05	12.8

2015 estimate	8.8	8.0	9.3	1.5	1.9	0.2	29.7
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This shows across Australia other capital cities congestion problems will be worse than Sydney by 2015 but doesn't take into account the State's decision forcing councils to approve high rise housing around railway stations in suburbs such as Carlingford, Pennant Hills, Thornleigh, Normanhurst and Hornsby where the AM and PM peak hours on Pennant Hills Road can often be up to six hours a day, seven days a week or longer when there is a breakdown or an accident.

Sydney's problems are different to other states because Port Jackson and rock coast from Botany to the Hawkesbury developed as a convict colony where tracks eventually became roads. Many of these roads being unsuitable for the traffic now using them. That is what forced Gov. Macquarie to shift to Parramatta and establish five towns along the Hawkesbury River. It was to produce food for a starving colony. Sydney is now facing a very different problem. Lack of building suitable roads.

If the State didn't have the foresight in the late 1800s and early 1900s to extend the rail system and build the Harbor Bridge post WW2 would have been a disaster. Now that the State accepts there is a need to develop, and redevelop many roads and rail lines, **it must make informed decisions.**

***28: Political issues – contacts and addresses**

Collectively the NSW, Federal and Local Government politicians should ensure the best option is built to meet both the short and long term National Highway in the nations best interest.

Elected members are there to represent their resident's best interests. Over the last four years ICAC has exposed many politicians, union organisers and '*business operators*' who have broken the law. The onus is clearly on the honest ones to immediately publicly prove they understand the importance of why having the right project approved and built in the nation's best interest.

At a 250 plus people public meeting at Pennant Hills, MPs Hopwood, Tink and O'Farrell, and later other MPs supported a western route instead of a tunnel. Hornsby Advocate published their photos and supporting article on 16 March 2006. **Will they explain why they changed their minds?**

After the F3, Pacific Highway and northern rail line was closed for three days by a bushfire, **Hornsby MP Judy Hopwood called for a second Hawkesbury River crossing in the national interest.** Whilst we have the Coast Road, Hume, Great Western Highways and Bells Line of Road, and rail to Bombala, Melbourne and Broken Hill to the South and West of the State, the Putty Road is not a practical alternative route to the Central Coast and Brisbane.

***29: SUMMATION**

Whilst I regret personalising my submission I believe it appropriate because many people have chosen to ignore or misrepresent information I supplied in good faith in the expectation that whoever they are would impartially assess the information, and then correctly process the issues.

I have voted for over sixty-one years and personally learnt many lessons about:

- '*political*' corruption, trust, white-collar fraud, incompetence, shoddy work and theft in work places etc during my involvement in many community organisations. This happened when I was Hornsby councillor for seven years.

If reported, the then shire clerk immediately took action. The situation changed very quickly after he retired and few cared despite Barry O'Farrell raising issues in parliament many times. Item 2 is one example that has relevance to Transurban's unsolicited offer and how it was processed.

Many have done far more than I have. I respect their contributions to society. Regrettably, I also know of many who have been regarded as '*pillars of society*' only to find they weren't.

Complaints to some politicians and bureaucrats are rejected on the basis that you have to accept the decisions of those we elected. The law demands we all be honest. Over the last few years there has been a large number of '*politicians*' who have been breaking the law exposed by ICAC because their political party failed to have them held to account.

Whilst readers are entitled to their own assessment of my submission, those who will be determining how it should be assessed are reminded they are receiving public money to make an informed and transparent decision that can be challenged in court where they may be called to give evidence.

***30: EXPECTATION**

I expect those delegated the responsibility to assess this submission, and my later one about the EIS, will make decisions that are open and transparent. If that happens, I will respect their **conclusions** and thank them even if some of my opinions are found to be misguided.

If my submissions have not been properly assessed, I may seek an open and transparent review.

INDEX

1. Letter to Department of Planning about submission
2. Historical list since unsolicited offer received
3. Relevant Act and '*NorthConnex*' justification
4. Attachment A SKM 2001 – 2004 report
5. Attachment B Pearlman 2007 Inquiry
6. Attachment C history from 1968 - references to reports
7. Transurban and NSROC support

8. Supporting documents in file numbered;

1 Attachment A

2 Attachment B

3 Attachment C

4 4 – 9 in front of tab 1

5 10 – 19 behind tab 1

6 20 -29 behind tab 2

7 30 – 39 behind tab 3

8 40 – 49 behind tab 4

9 50 -59 behind tab 5

10 50 – 69 behind tab 6

11 70- 77 behind tab 7. NB 76 is self explanatory when read

28 Warne Street
Pennant Hills, NSW 2120
22 August 2014

EISsecondSubTunnelFile

M/s K Jones
Manager Development Assessment Systems & Approvals for **EIS SSI 6136**
Department of Planning & Environment
GPO Box 39 SYDNEY NSW 2001

Second submission

Dear M/s Jones

On 11 August 2014 I advised my submission identified political problems and supplied 14 pages of issues to be considered. Attached is a copy with your name deleted as being my first submission as my letter may eventually appear on the internet.

Due to legal advice and other circumstances beyond my control, my proposed website may not be online before the closing date for submissions.

To commence and emphasise my concerns attached are my:

- 2 August 2005 paper about the proposed tunnel meeting
- 12 March paper inviting John Howard
- 29 November 2006 Public Meeting notice at Epping RSL re several matters

At the 12 March 2006 meeting MPs Barry O'Farrell, Judy Hopwood and Andrew Tink who with nearly 300 attendees, voted unanimously for a second Hawkesbury River crossing. In 2007 three other MPs made the same decision. **What has changed?**

Also included is a brief CV I prepared to enable those assessing my submissions to understand my interest in community affairs and not just the tunnel.

I still believe that the proposed tunnel would only be a very short-term solution and create major traffic problems during the construction phase.

However to ensure your team can assess my submission I have covered many aspects that the government and Transurban may not be aware.

There are other issues I am still researching and may submit further details to be assessed.

Also attached is my undated GIPA application for a copy of the assessment of my submission once it has been made and also my undated cheque for \$30 dollars. The purpose is to establish if the assessment is flawed and I may decide to apply to the Civil and Administrative Decision Tribunal to appeal the DoP determination.

Please let me know if any clarification is required.

Yours sincerely

Peter Waite

**S41 APPLICATION FOR ACCESS UNDER THE
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION (PUBLIC ACCESS) ACT 2009 NO 52**

Applicant

Surname **WAITE** **Mr**
Given Names **PETER ANDREW**
(a) AGENCY **Department of Planning &
Environment**
(d) Postal Address **GPO Box 39, SYDNEY NSW 2001**
Phone Number **9484 3471**

Details of Application: I request access to documents concerning


As soon as made;

**DoP assessment of my submissions about
NorthConnex EIS for proposed M1 – M2 tunnel**

FEES AND CHARGES \$30:

Undated \$30 Cheque attached

If extra costs apply please advise and payment will be immediately made.



Applicant's signature

Date: 22 August 2014

Agency Use Only

Received on...../...../.....

Acknowledgement sent on...../...../.....

28 Warne Street
Pennant Hills, NSW 2120
11 August 2014

M/s XXXXXXX
Manager Development Assessment Systems & Approvals for **EIS SSI 6136**
Department of Planning & Environment
GPO Box 39 SYDNEY NSW 2001

Dear M/s XXXX

When completed my submission will be on my website that is yet to be activated:

M1tunnelVision.org – Better now than later – Scrap the M1-M2 tunnel

The tunnel is a political problem, not a planning issue.

I agreed when former Premier Barry O'Farrell and Hornsby MP Matt Kean asked if they could sit next to me at the Hornsby RSL air pollution meeting where you were the last speaker.

My concerns are that the EIS is primarily based on selected extracts from the:

1. Sinclair Knight Mertz (SKM) 2004 report recommending a tunnel from the F3 to the M2 at West Pennant Hills;
2. 2007 Pearlman Inquiry that '*revalidated*' the SKM report.
3. And most of NorthConnex consultative staff and other officers do not know the detailed history of the selected references misused in the EIS to arrive at a favourable outcome to increase their profit on a very short term solution at taxpayers expense.
4. Transurban staff are heavily involved in NorthConnex despite having a very clear vested interest. The process is not transparent.

My enclosed 8 August 2014 leaflet with 8 pages of history and support documents states Canberra directed SKM to recommend a short term option, and SKM was directed not to recommend a western option.

I am copying this submission to Minister Gay to determine if he will withdraw the EIS.

This letter will be part of my detailed submission to be sent after NorthConnex has replied to the issues in my 8 August leaflet.

Please let me know if any clarification is required.

Yours sincerely

Peter Waite

By accepting 'Transurban's unsolicited offer' the Minister ignored:

1. Canberra directed SKM to recommend a short-term option
"SKM 2002 VM Workshop No2 Record p22"
2. RTA directed SKM not to recommend a western option
SKM Dural 28 August 2003 "Focus Group Meeting Notes"
3. Executive Summary 'What is proposed?' 'Roads and Maritime Services (RMS) is proposing to construct and operate a tolled motorway linking the M1 Pacific Highway at Wahroonga to the Hills Motorway at West Pennant Hills. (EIS vol.1A xxi4. Who is 'NorthConnex' and what legal authority does it actually have? At the Pennant Hills 8 August 2014 Community drop in session, a Transurban and NorthConnex officer both admitted 'NorthConnex' is only a name with no legal rights.

The Pearlman report was based on **DOTARS engaged Masson Wilson Twiney (MWT) to review SKM's calculations. MWT's 22 March 2007 Executive Summary "page vii" concluded:**

"Beyond 2021, when capacity of a six lane F3 is likely to be exceeded in peak periods, a type C (western F3-M7) option may become a justifiable project, depending upon the manner in which Sydney, the Central Coast and Lower Hunter develop. Consequently, a decision will be required about a long-term solution to traffic capacity in the Sydney Orbital to Central Coast corridor. This will revolve around':

- An eight-lane F3.'
- A Type C option (western)'

Both will require augmentation in the Sydney road network."

The Minister made a wise decision not to approve the project 'without development consent. Clause 94 of State Environmental Planning Policy (Infrastructure) 2007.'

On the 25 October 2013 the project was declared by Ministerial Order to be State significant infrastructure and critical State significant infrastructure under sections 115U (4) and 115V of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979. As such, Roads and Maritime is seeking approval for the project under Part 5.1 of that Act. (EIS volume 1A xxiii)

For the NorthConnex 8 August 2014 'drop in session' at Pennant Hills, in part of my leaflet stated A 'costly farce' questioning our government's credibility BY letters, emails, phone discussions, and an amicable meeting in the Minister's office on 13 December 2012. I warned the [REDACTED] why Transurban's offer should be rejected. His office has all the documents I am referring to. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The *'Review of Future Provision of Motor ways in NSW December 2005 Infrastructure Implementation Group, The Premier's Department'* 64 page booklet states on page 51 **"Commercial-in-Confidence material"** at point 4 *'In the event of disagreement between an agency and the "preferred tenderer" or a member of the public as to what should be disclosed (for example) there may be some disagreement as to what constitutes intellectual property or commercial-in-confidence material) the agency must seek the advice of : The Chairman State Contract Control Board.'*

Why did the Minister for Roads and Ports office fail to release details that should be in the public arena? Under the Government Information Public Access Act (old FOI) I twice applied for details of Transurban's unsolicited offer and was thwarted each time. As yet few know what transpired.

If the government ignores my request to abandon the tunnel, it should be rejected by the Department of Planning as it would not meet their guidelines. Sam Haddad director general of Planning & Environment. SMH 20 July 2010

- ***"Getting it right on development projects . . . Giving the Department of Planning a role in assessing larger, more complex development applications ensures that all concerned parties have their voices heard . . ."***
- ***The department continues to strengthen its checks and balances to ensure probity and transparency of process and outcomes. . . . "***

Will NorthConnex advise the Minister to scrap the project?

I was not applying for the Transurban's commercial in confidence tender. Noting how many Labor and Liberal politicians, including Barry O'Farrell, have been caught out by ICAC, it is in the public interest that the State prove to the electorate at large that the process is open and transparent now to save wasting the Department of Planning's time and resources.

Read on for more flaws; NorthConnex EIS; "What alternatives were considered:
"The project has a long history of identification and evaluation of alternatives and options commencing with the F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study (SKM 2004) (the 2004 report) through to the recent design and construct tender process" (xxiii) and is misrepresented!

Another misrepresentation: 'Sinclair Knight Mertz (SKM) 2004 Main Report p1 par 1 . . . report on a study to identify preferred options for a new National Highway link through northern Sydney between the F3 Sydney to Newcastle Freeway and the Sydney Orbital.'

Not convinced? I have nine more pages of hard evidence as to why the tunnel should be scrapped." This submission has another XXX pages

Questions for 8 Aug Pennant Hills last "NorthConnex Community drop in session"

GIPA (FOI) 5 August application (list) for documents about the EIS; 1-7, New 8-15

- 1. Copy of authorisation for completed EIS to be printed?**
- 2. Copy of authorisation for EIS to be released?**
- 3. Date EIS publicly released?**
- 4. What space is made for the third north lane tunnel to M1 when required?**

RTA/DoTARS cannot dictate policy to DIPNR.”) P3 “4 Summary comments from community group representatives . . . “. SKM meeting notes made it very clear the majority opinion at Dural was that type C routes were the best option. Obviously this could not be in the EIS unless the meeting notes were available. PP is now retired.

What right do public servants have to dictate federal and state policy? **This became a political matter in 2003, again in 2012 and still continues.** Refer pages 9/10.

“Feedback received from the community and stakeholders was summarised and addressed in the 2004 report. The outcomes and recommendations of the 2004 report were informed by the community and stakeholders views on alternatives and corridor alignment options.”

In 2006 a public meeting at Pennant Hills attended by about 250 people including then MPs Hopwood, **O’Farrell**, Tink, councillors present and the public unanimously voted for a western option. Days later Hopwood, O’Farrell and Tink called for an inquiry after they realised SKM had been directed to recommend one “short-term option A” route.

Hopwood 2007 media release: “A compelling case for a second crossing of the Hawkesbury River” because bushfires closed the railway line, F3 and Pacific Highway for three days in January.

Then MPs Richardson, Williams and Hartcher supported the F3 – M7 link in August 2007. Collectively, this shows six MPs, some councillors and about 245 people supported a western option instead of a tunnel. How many more did who didn’t attend?

Pearlman Inquiry; The community did not know that in January 2007 Minister Lloyd agreed with Hills Motorway request for a review of SKM’s findings claiming there were discrepancies in the SKM report and the “link” should join the M2 further east.

DOTARS engaged **Masson Wilson Twiney (MWT)** to review SKM’s calculations. **MWT’s** 22 March 2006 Executive Summary concluded:

“Beyond 2021, when capacity of a six lane F3 is likely to be exceeded in peak periods, a type C (western F3-M7) option may become a justifiable project, depending upon the manner in which Sydney, the Central Coast and Lower Hunter develop. Consequently, a decision will be required about a long-term solution to traffic capacity in the Sydney Orbital to Central Coast corridor. This will revolve around:

- *An eight-lane F3*
- *A Type C option (western)*

Both will require augmentation in the Sydney road network.” What plans have been made for these ‘augmentation works’ and when will they be identified and done?

“Measures to improve train accessibility from the Central Coast to Sydney and land use measures, among others, may defer the need for a long-term option, depending on their success. Conversely, faster than forecast travel demand may require a long-term option sooner.” **What measures have been taken to address these issues”**

Did NorthConnex know the MWT study existed and review it?

2 day Value Management Workshop No2 Record – 17/18 SEPTEMBER 2003 is selectively referred to in the EIS. Someone chose not to refer to the following extracts:

PRECIS: Participants (pA-2): DOTARS 3, RTA 7, RailCorp 3 Dept Infrastructure, Planning, Natural Resources 2, State Rail 1 NSW EPA 2, NSW National Parks 1, DEM(Aust) PL 1, SKM 10, Tierney Pike Kirkland 2, Total 32 (part time 4)

P1 "Key outcome Type A superior to Type B or C. Purple 'A' best tolled or untolled."

Page 5. Dr Kishan reports **"there are not many examples in the world of tunnels 6-8 km long and certainly none in Australia. Therefore, if the project proceeds there will be a multitude of technical challenges to be addressed, not to mention the social challenges that would arise"**. This statement is cause for deep concern and should have been addressed by the Minister before he accepted Purple A Option.

Page 7 indicates about 3 vehicles in 5 (60%) from the F3 travel down the Pacific Highway whilst the percentages indicate only 40% travel to the City and North East.

The same page indicates 57% of heavy vehicles have origins/destinations that would use Pennant Hills Road. (I.E. about 43% use Pacific Highway) This coincides with the figures given out at the Community Consultative meeting at Galston in August 2003.

Page 10/12 Six extracts from 30 questions/statements:

1. "20 year study too short for scale of project" "
2. "Do both options A& C need to be looked at for short/ling term option?"
3. "Type C needs to be convincingly rejected before any Type A Options can be seriously addressed."
4. "What value is placed on a second (strategic) Hawkesbury crossing?"
5. **"Peak hour congestion is predicted on Type A in as little as 10 years."**

Page 22; 3.13.1: **"Following lengthy discussion, the instruction from DOTARS was that the Australian Government felt that examination of longer terms options was out side the scope of the Link study . . . "** This was contrary to SKM's instructions for a National Highway. Refer SKM Main report par 1.

This workshop raised some serious concerns over the proposed tunnel option. P10 53: *"By building this new link there would be a redistribution of up to 20% of traffic in the corridor that would provide benefits throughout the rest of the northern network"*. This is misleading because the chosen route will have little if any affect on traffic on the Pacific Highway north or south of the F3.

Pages 11, 12 also raise traffic issues that have not been addressed in the study. In particular the last two on page 11. *"Project justification is essential. Type C needs to be convincingly rejected before any of the type A Options can be seriously addressed. In considering the Type C scenario in comparison to type A, the following needs to be addressed - what value is placed on another crossing of the Hawkesbury River?"*

That was nearly 11 years ago. **Where did NorthConnex address this in the EIS?** Selective editing to justify Transurban's offer indicates bias or lack of knowledge on the author/s and also those who checked the validity of the EIS for a \$3 plus billion project before it was published.

February 1994: "Community Bulletin Liverpool-Hornsby Highway Study" suggested a western (C type route). In 2002 SKM appointed. Pennant Hills Thornleigh Liberal Party Branch decided its concerns be known via as coming from the **'Concerned Citizens Group'**.

"In October and November 2013, four community information sessions were held to provide up to date information about the status of the project and the design and construct tender process . . . "

NorthConnex EIS extracts from the Pearlman report (concluded at iii):

"I have given due consideration to the MWT "interim report – F3 to Sydney Orbital Corridor Review (March 2006)" and concluded the following:"

1. "That the assumptions and data used in the SKM 'F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study 2004' were valid and reasonable at that time of the study;"
2. "that there have been changes affecting land use and traffic flows since the SKM Study's publication, but that these changes reinforce the selection of the preferred route; and"
3. "that the SKM Study recommendations progress as follows"
 - "a) the preferred route follow a Type A corridor Purple option be progressed to the next stages of investigation including detailed concept design and financial assessment and environmental impact assessment; and"
 - "(b) a type C corridor be planned now."

And why did NorthConnex omit this paragraph from its page iii references?:

"The NSW Government indicated in its submission to Review its intention to develop a discussion paper on the connect of the F3 to M2 and/or M7. I am confident that my Review has undertaken a sufficiently rigorous analysis of the proposed connect to both inform and direct any future NSW Government investigations. I would encourage both the Australian and NSW Governments to proceed directly with the next stages of a Type A Purple option link connecting the F3 to M2." Has this discussion paper been produced and public comment sought?

5 Public Input 5.1 Introduction page 75. *"I deal here with issues raised in the public submissions and at the meeting in public."*

NB: *"From the submissions it is apparent that the community is concerned about effective transport planning in Sydney, and has made informed and knowledgeable comment about the planning process." The time is long past for informed public being ignored and treated with contempt by politicians and bureaucrats.*

*"Many of the issues raised in submissions were also raised during the community consultation process undertaken by SKM and SKM did in fact consider these concerns. But it is important to note that the SKM Study was a strategic study, designed to select a preferred route. The detailed assessment and design of the preferred route was a matter for a later stage. SKM envisages further refinement at stages extending beyond the SKM study and, as SKM said, members of the public will have further opportunity to express their concerns at these stages." P75 **NorthConnex; when was this done?** "Like SKM, I recommend that, if the preferred route is to proceed, the issues that I outline below should be carried through for consideration during the development of a concept proposal and the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)."*

"By way of introduction, it should be noted that, of the 53 submissions received, the largest number came from persons in the Pennant Hills area. Figure 18 shows the location of those persons and organisations making submissions."

"Also by way of introduction, it is useful to note the preferences expressed by those persons and organisations making submissions for a preferred route. As figure 19 shows, most of the persons and organisations favoured a Type C corridor. Of these that accepted a Type A corridor, most preferred the purple option. However, the preferences varied." Correct but misleading. SKM directed not to recommend "C"

*"Figure 18 – Number of submissions received by suburb;" (Précis table totals)
Pennant Hills 10, Chatswood 8. Sydney 5, Glenorie 4 five, two and sixteen at 1. (p76)*

"Figure 19 – Preferred options indicated in the submissions;"

Type C 19, Type A Purple 8, Type A Yellow 7, Type A now and then type C 2, Type A all 1, Type B or C 1, Rail option 2, Not specified" 9. p76

*"Appendix 2 - Individuals and Organisations that appeared Before the Chair at the Meetings in Public **Monday 18 (19 & 20) June**" p93/94 **"Mr Peter A Waite OAM JP, Organisation name N/A"** as I believed it would be inappropriate to disclose the "Concerned Citizens Group" was the "Liberal Party Pennant Hills Thornleigh branch".*

Pearlman hearing transcript DOTARS representative at the hearing; *"MS RIGGS: I did hear **Mr Waite** say in his remarks to you that **the terms of reference for the SKM study were changed halfway through the study** and I simply have to refute that. The terms of reference for that SKM study were embodied as an appendix to the contract between the RTA and SKM at the time SKM took on that work. **They were not changed during the course of that study.**"*

The fact is **"SKM was directed not to comply with the Terms of Reference."** My simple error meant DOTARS and the RTA were not held to account. **This did not alter the fact SKM that was directed not to comply with the Terms of Reference.**

"We have, as a result of a request from Ms Armitage during the course of last week, provided you with a copy of the terms of reference."

*"MS PEARLMAN: Yes. I knew that we had asked for it. **I haven't yet seen those terms of reference, but that is important,** because that submission has **been raised by Mr Waite** and at least one other person, so it is important that I look at that."*

By the end of day one MS Pearlman realised **no one** including herself, knew the real purpose of the inquiry was Hills Motorway's attempt to gain more profit at less cost.

Pearlman Appendix 4: F3-M7 Corridor Selection – History p97/98 has a "Time Frame and Decision or Process" lists 17 references from 1980s to 19 February 2007.

December 2000 and two 4 January 2001 references include a similar phrases that show in a space of six weeks how terminology varies and disputes can be created:

"1999 . . . National . . . Standard Highway between WSO or M2 and the "F3 Freeway",

"2001 . . . interim National Highway from the F3 to the WSO or M2" and

"2001 . . . link from the F3 to the WSO or M2 to relieve pressure on Pennant Hills Road and to complete the National Highway through Sydney."

Why didn't NorthConnex quote from the MWT report?

Was community input sought after Transurban's unsolicited proposal was received, NorthConnex was created, an agreement made to accept the offer or the EIS was planned?

OR were sham 'spin doctor' meetings orchestrated in 2013 and 2014 to enable NorthConnex to claim there was "genuine community consultation"?

SKM's 2004 Working paper 2 – *"Engineering Design and Costing report (p2) for a 3-lane tunnel was \$2.0 - \$2.2 billion."* **Can NorthConnex can do it ten years later for \$2.65 billion? Or are there loopholes to gouge out more money?**

MP Judy Hopwood's 22 January 2007 Media Release *"A compelling case for a second crossing of the Hawkesbury River"* when bushfires closed the rail line, F3 and Pacific Highway for three days proved how vulnerable what are collectively the nations most important strategic routes, and why a second Hawkesbury crossing is essential.

NorthConnex: p25 (xxiii) *"What alternatives were considered? "The project has a long history of identification and evaluation of alternatives and options commencing with the F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study (SKM) (the 2004 report) through to the recent design and construct tender process for the project", still has to be proved.*

How can this be correct? *"Analysis conducted as part of the 2004 report determined that broad corridor type A best satisfied the planning and project objectives."*

"Options review" *"A review of the options analysis presented in the 2004 report was undertaken in 2007 by the Honourable Marla Pearlman AO (Chief Judge of the NSW Land and Environment Court) at the request of the Australian Government."*

The 2007 review concluded that the purple corridor alignment option should be the preferred route and should progress to the next stage of design and development.

"Tender process" *"A competitive design and construct tender process was undertaken in order to identify an innovative, cost effective and environmentally-responsive design within the purple corridor as identified and endorsed by the 2004 report and the 2007 Pearlman Review respectively" based on flawed assumptions.*

"The preferred tenderer was chosen after a thorough evaluation of the three tender submissions. The tender evaluation process provided a balanced consideration of engineering design requirements, project costs (including upfront capital expenditures and ongoing operational expenditure), and environmental and social impacts."

SKM's 2004 Forecast Traffic Volumes and costings

A NorthConnex officer stated at a Hornsby meeting: *"SKM's traffic projections were higher than had occurred". Where is the evidence?*

I understand the RTA or agent supplied SKM traffic counts. An RTA officer's name appears in several places in the SKM study. Further, the 2007 Pearlman Inquiry to validate SKM's report had the benefit of a detailed 22 March 2007 study by Masson Wilson Twiney. **Why wasn't this disclosed in the EIS?**

SKM working paper No. 2

Following are extracts from an extensive 100 page costings paper. At 8.3 p75 *"Pennant Hills and North Rocks Road intersection would have to be upgraded."*

Stage 4 (2021-2026) *"Construct climbing lanes in both directions to accommodate slow moving traffic . . ."*

Stage 5 (Beyond 2026) *" . . . Tolling the F3 could also be considered as a measure (on then F3). **Alternatively, widen to 8 lanes in each direction. (or) Alternatively develop a new transport corridor.**"*

Table 3.1 F3 Capacity Considerations suggests *"fourth 'climbing lanes' would be required by 2011". That was over 3 years ago. Now this is often a major problem.*

5. Cost Estimates for the above works in 6.2. *"between \$2.6 and \$3.6 billion."*

6.2 Alternative Second Route *" . . . **A number of alternatives for a second route have been prepared as part of the F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study. These alternatives generally link to areas in western Sydney rather than to Wahroonga.**"*

*"The cost estimates **for the routes investigated** are between \$2.6 and \$3.6 billion. The alternative routes do, however, provide a total capacity of 5 lanes in each direction between Sydney and Gosford."* How does the NC tunnel increase M1(F3) capacity?

It does not appear any investigations have been made to establish if bridges across the Hawkesbury at Mooney Mooney, and or the Mooney Mooney Creek can be widened, or if new bridges would be required. Further, there is no indication of how widening of the M1 could be carried out without closing one existing lane in each direction for several years to carry out the works. This won't happen. Another solution is required.

7. Further Considerations following the F3- Sydney Orbital Link Study

"A fuller investigation is required to assess requirements after 2012. Furthermore, a review of widening requirements should be undertaken upon the decision on the F3 – Orbital Link and investment program on the main North rail line."

Has this been done, and if so, what did the investigation determine?

Parliamentary Secretary for Ministers Berejuckian, Transport and Minister Gay, Roads and Ports; MP Ray Williams wrote on 14 November 2013, ***"an Outer Sydney orbital west of St Marys is listed in the Draft 2012 NSW Long Term Transport Master Plan to connect the Central Coast, Western Sydney and Wollongong."*** Did the government or NorthConnex ever consider that? If not, why?

Is there an AM peak-hour southbound traffic problem be overcome?

NorthConnex FactSheet - July 2014; ARTISTS IMPRESSION:

- Northern ventilation outlet Permanent features p2; lists items 2 -8 for northbound traffic.

South bound twin lanes at Burns Road, item 1, shows a 'Maintenance bay' lane commencing left off the tunnel lane where there is a 'light green nature strip' between the tunnel and Pennant Hill Rd lanes, then over or under the open tunnel lanes to the Pacific Hwy Pennant Hills Rd twin lanes becoming third lanes for un-identified distance.

There is no indication of where the two sets of twin lanes commence before the vegetation shown on the tip of the diagram which does not have any identification shown.

How will the lead into the tunnel from the F1 be built, that is not shown on any of the EIS documents staff at the Pennant Hills shop front could find, and still allow the four south bound lanes to the Pacific Highway and Pennant Hills Road operate 24/7?

After the 28 July 2014 meeting at Hornby RSL and my visit to the Pennant Hills shop front on 31 July I make some précised observations:

Until resolved, I do not want the following taken as being a complaint against any person or persons including the Minister, Transurban, NorthConnex, contractors, person or persons.

***1.** Email replies to questions about issues do not identify the date or time the issue was received. This means if there are more than one email recipients may not know to which matter it referred. This happened to me on 31 July and is part of the reason for this letter/email.

***2.** Staff indicated Lend Lease prepared, and is still preparing NorthConnex plans and Lend Lease should accept responsibility for any errors. I do not accept that.

- *3. My concerns with "South bound AM peak traffic problems" are not addressed, and
- *4. All adequate design works for the EIS have not been completed, and
- *5. All land required for acquisition has not been identified, and
- *6. NorthConnex can still make changes to the EIS, and
- *7. NorthConnex **FactSheet**- July 2014; ARTISTS IMPRESSION: Northern ventilation outlet Permanent features p2; lists items 2 -8 for northbound traffic incorrectly shows the intersections of 'Bareena Avenue/Fern Avenue Hornsby' and Woonona Avenue Hornsby. These should be shown as being nearly opposite each other. What is shown as Fern Avenue is probably Lochville Streets Hornsby and Wahroonga that was divided when the F3 was built.

Fact Sheet **Item 1**, South bound lanes at Burns Road shows a 'Maintenance bay' lane commencing left off the tunnel lane where there is a 'light green nature strip' between the tunnel and Pennant Hill Rd lanes, then over or under the open tunnel lanes to the Pacific Hwy Pennant Hills Rd two lanes and 3rd lane for an un-identified distance.

There is no indication of where the two sets of lanes commence before the vegetation shown on the tip of the diagram that does not have enough detail shown.

- *8. How will the lead into the tunnel from the F1 be built? Staff at the Pennant Hills shop front could not find this on any of the EIS documents suggesting I ask for an answer at the 9 August Pennant Hills consultative meeting. Please arrange for this to be done in the opening presentation.
- *9. How will the tunnel open section be built and still allow the existing four south bound lanes to the Pacific Highway and Pennant Hills Road operate 24/7?
- *10. The DoP will determine the application including additions and amendments. How can the EIS be modified after it has been published and not start the process again?

*11. EIS page i: *"Prepared by AECOM Australia Pty Ltd (Phone 8934 0000 PO Box QVB PO Box Q410, QVB PO NSW, 1230) © AECOM Australia Pty Ltd (AECOM). All rights reserved.*

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How then can anyone "rely on what is AECOM's EIS" without AECOM's permission?

COMMENT AECOM's statement makes it clear the only material used is what "Roads and Maritime Services" provided.

I do not know if any third party such as myself has applied to AECOM to refer to its EIS, and I do not intend to apply.

Whilst accepting AECOM is protecting itself against any claims that may be made, it does not exonerate "Roads and Maritime Services".

In my opinion the EIS should be withdrawn for "Roads and Maritime" and Transurban to make public all of their papers for the community to know all of the "FACTs" and then republish the EIS with relevant amendments and additions including *Transurban's negotiations with Roads and Ports*, assuming they would still want to continue.

When website M1TunnelVision.org goes online it will show how AECOM had been misled by "Roads and Maritime" and probably others with vested interests.

CONCLUSION On 15 July I received the North Connex EIS CD by post and immediately downloaded it and read Vol 1A pages 1 and 23 to 33. They contained sufficient evidence to consider with documents I have held up from the 1990's to 2007, that indicates the tunnel should be scrapped as it will not solve many major problems that already exist and can only get worse until a second Hawkesbury River crossing is built to national highway standards as was intended 11 years ago to relieve some of the major problems technical experts had clearly identified.

Air pollution. Apart from tunnel estimates, have vehicle emission estimates been made for increased traffic, and stationary traffic by 2025 for the Pearces Corner, Pacific Highway, Hornsby Hospital and M1 precinct? If not, will it be done, or explain why will not be done, or this is irrelevant to an impact on this environment.

Issues discussion paper about SKM study and other matters I prepared for a **10 March 2005** meeting of Pennant Hills District Civic Trust and 'Concerned Citizens Group' (Pennant Hills Thornleigh Liberal Party). Philip Ruddock MP, Mr Cory (DOTARS), Jones, Waite and 12 Trust Executives attended it. My paper set out issues.

My 21st March 2005 10 page letter to DOTARS Ed Cory, Attn Jennie Breen re F3 – Sydney Orbital Connection sets out many disputed issues. Then further discussions between DOTARS Ed Cory and Waite were held in Canberra when I went there in May 2005 in a further attempt to establish if the selection process for the recommend route, purple Option A was compromised by inaccurate number counts and projections, and partial influences by officers of NSW and Federal Government agencies.

Following the 10 March 2005 meeting and further representations to Ruddock, he 'arranged' for Minister Lloyd to meet with Liberal Party Branch President Barwick, Jones, Waite and himself in his Hornsby office in May or June.

Later at Ruddock's direction, Lloyd arranged a meeting for Jones, Waite and Swalwell with SKM, DOTARS and the RTA for 5 November 2005. DOTARS and the RTA advised no evidence was available to prove the best route was chosen. Some the many issues at that meeting were;

1. Meeting notes and ten-page 21 March 2005 letter to DOTARS Cory's assistant.

2. Letter to Lloyd requesting answers to 'Concerned Citizens Group' requests.
3. 16 Nov 2004 letter to Hon P Ruddock MP.
- 4.

[REDACTED]

CONCLUSION

The State should take notice of this submission and:

1. reject Transurban's tunnel,
2. prepare a study for a second Hawkesbury River crossing six lane National Highway without any tunnels to link with the M7, with
3. provision for the National Highway to be part of the "*an Outer Sydney orbital west of St Marys*" as outlined in the "*Draft 2012 NSW Long Term Transport Master Plan to connect the Central Coast, Western Sydney and Wollongong*"
4. that will provide the basis of a more practical route to the future Badgerys Creek airport, for Sydney, central, south coast and western regions.

OR

maybe go back as the opposition next year

I have reported some of these issues with evidence for over 10 years.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Taxi driver 26 July 2014. "*A new tunnel won't solve the truck problem. The M4 problems in particular are because a few motorists that are very scared of big trucks in tunnels often slow down or swerve. That is what disrupts and slows traffic.*" Is this fact?

Please advise if any clarification or documents are required.

Peter Waite, Pennant Hills

Hornsby Councillor 1980 to 1987, Pennant Hills resident 57 years, Epping 25 years.

The H. I. T. Group®

Seeking from government: Honesty in representation, Integrity of reporting and Transparency of process for the proposed M2 – F3 tunnel Link.

*meeting at Pennant Hills Community Centre on 2nd August 2005 to: **"HELP people express their concerns about the proposed F3 – M2 tunnel being a suitable solution for a new north south National Highway"***

HIT evolved from like minded people forming a 'focused umbrella group' to bring together community organisations and residents who have concerns about the proposed short term solution to overcome a long term problem of National significance and importance. The study needs urgent review.

Do you know these FACTS?

- Court appeals against Environmental Impact Statements for NSW Government major infrastructure developments are prohibited? The State can do as it likes!
- It was belatedly claimed by DOTARS Option C was not within the study brief?
- Option C – the western option, was rejected without explanation?
- Option C stands-alone. It does not rely on \$10 billion extra assumptions?
- Option C is a vital strategic alternative route in emergencies and accommodate Sydney's expansion needs for decades? (It is a shorter route for many trucks!)
- Option C does not need ineffective and expensive exhaust stacks to build and maintain?
- No tunnels of this length exist in Australia, few exist in the world? (RTA)
- There may be no tunnel filtration at all?
- Negotiations in process to widen the M2 to 3 lanes, including the Epping tunnels?
- The RTA 1994 Liverpool Highway Study (*Sydney Orbital connection to M2*) stated *"The tunnel under Pennant Hills Road offers poor connectivity. A preferred strategy was to review and develop a new northern link (from the west)"*?
- Oversize and dangerous goods vehicles **MUST** still use Pennant Hills Road?
- Where would traffic go if the tunnel closed due to accidents or power failures?
- The Australian Government (AG) will only help fund this route?
- Federal funding will not be available until at least 2010? – Therefore:
- If it is ever built - the tunnel could not be finished before 2012 or 2013?
- A report indicates tunnel capacity may be reached by 2017? A 5 year useful life!
- The proposed tunnel does not meet the Australian Governments 2004 guidelines?
- The Hon P Ruddock has been frustrated in attempts to help H. I. T. obtain road count figures and assumptions from the Department of Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS) and the NSW Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA) for the last three years? (*H. I. T's last frustrating meeting took 4½ hours on July 5, 2005*)

Have our elected representatives misled the community OR has the so called 'community consultation' process been yet another bureaucratic sham OR is the community wrong to question the study's Honesty, Integrity and Transparency?

This is your opportunity to listen, express your views and vote !

Meeting agenda: to consider the following 12 point motion:

The resolution of this meeting is: all members of the Australian and NSW Parliaments to demand their Transport Ministers to urgently liaise and provide a detailed joint response by 30th November 2005 to these issues arising from implications of the proposed tunnel under Pennant Hills Road which has been acknowledged to only be a short term solution for the eventual National Highway between Liverpool and beyond the 'Central Coast':

- 1 The Australian Government (AG) AusLink White Paper "Building our National Transport Future" claims "it will revolutionise the planning and funding of Australia's national roads and railways by taking a long-term, strategic approach for our long term future. It represents the most significant change since **Federation** in the way we tackle the national transport task".

If our former political leaders did not have the long term vision to build the Harbour Bridge and metropolitan rail system in the 1920s and set aside land in the Cumberland Planning Scheme after WW2 what would Sydney's road 'network' look like now?

2. Noting AustLink's claims in 1:

Does the proposed short term tunnel option reflect AustLink's "long term vision"?

3. The **AG AustRoads** 1996 publication "**Australia at the Crossroads**" concludes "It is important to build the "right" projects than "bad" projects. Road and traffic authorities should make decisions using improved, more rigorous techniques in their attempts to meet community goals in the most efficient and businesslike manner". HITs emphasis

How does the proposed tunnel comply with AustRoads statement?

4. Noting **AustRoads** statement in 3:

Why is the selected option better than a Type C option?


5. **AustRoads:** "Several authors argue that the institutional structure in which the road and traffic authorities have to perform segregates responsibility for parts of the road system, impedes identification and achievement of appropriate objectives, and hinders attempts by the road and traffic authorities to relate the value people place on roads and the level of service provided". HITs emphasis

Has this occurred?


6. The RTA advised inter alia "Pennant Hills Road would be reduced to four lanes to force through traffic to use the tolled tunnel and improve the ambiance along Pennant Hills Road for residents - users".

When asked where traffic would go if the tunnel was closed because of repairs, accidents or power failures (and now bombs)? (eight lanes into four lanes)

The RTA replied inter alia "that would be up to the drivers".



Typical Plan



Should the RTA tunnel proposal and road narrowing be challenged?

7. DOTARS 'July 12, 2005
"The AG is not responsible for Sydney's urban transport problems.

Nor is it the responsibility for the AG to fund relief routes for those roads for which it is contributing some funding. These matters are matters we suggest be pursued with the relevant NSW G authorities".

Why then were interchanges and roundabout links proposed for Pennant Hills Road?

SKM

4.5.2 Purple Option: Alternative 2: Two Tunnels with Central Access

This concept breaks the long tunnel into two tunnels each about 4km long, daylighting in an open trench in commercial land adjacent to the east of the railway line between Pennant Hills and Thornleigh stations. The open trench would be about 800 metres long.

Central Access Interchange

A Central Interchange of the Central Access Alternative would be located opposite Pomona Street and over the new Expressway trench. Pomona Street is located approximately 400m north of Pennant Hills railway station.

4.5.3 Purple Option: Alternative 3: Two Tunnels with Intermediate Southern Access

This concept would daylight the Purple tunnel in a trench of about 400 metres long between Boundary Road and Beecroft Road intersections. The proposed trench could be located to the north western side of the existing Pennant Hills Road.

A Southern Access Interchange would comprise a southern portal within Pennant Hills Road and north-bound exit to Pennant Hills Road and Boundary Road. A northern portal located on Pennant Hills Road would allow a south bound exit to Boundary Road and a north-bound entry from Bandy Road via Pennant Hills Road. Preliminary investigation would suggest that entry and exit ramps could be constructed between 4-6% grades from a 12 metre deep trench.

8. Option C is a stand-alone option that does not rely on \$10 billion extra assumptions.

Why weren't these issues taken into account in the calculations?

9. If the tunnel is to be built, the time is long past to identify an Option C type route and redesign the M7 to allow for a future connection. There is no reason why the AG should not advise the NSW G funding will be withheld until NSW co-operates with the AG in long term planning. *(Dr Nelson has set this precedent with education.)*

Why hasn't AustLink already done this according to its stated objectives?

- 10 **RTA:** *"there are not many examples in the world of tunnels 6-8 km long and certainly none in Australia. Therefore, if the project proceeds there will be a multitude of technical challenges to be addressed, not to mention the social challenges that would arise".*

The AG May 6, 2004 media release stated *"it will ensure the **ventilation stacks** use the world's best practice filtration suitable to Australian conditions".* On July 5, 2005 an Australian Government representative stated inter alia *"the Australian Government cannot force the State to do anything and world's best practice for Australian conditions may be no filtration".* The **RTA** declined to comment.

The 2005 NSW Auditor-General's report 'Performance Audit Managing Air Quality: Dept. of Environment and Conservation' highlights the RTA's failure to comply with air quality conditions on its tunnels and also refers to cost estimate overrun of **over 300%** on the Cross City Tunnel and **100%** on the Lane Cove Tunnel. ^{Page 31}

This damning report ^{p35} suggests *"tunnels have some advantages to local residents but lists some major disadvantages as being: expensive to build; **difficult to ventilate efficiently**, and technical developments and improved understandings of the **adverse health impacts** of vehicle pollutants can overtake decisions made about appropriate ventilation technologies."* (NSW Audit Office Website www.audit.nsw.gov.au)

Is this acceptable? Is this in accordance with the AG's 2004 White Paper?

- 11 Federal funding will not be available until at least 2010 (AustLink White Paper) – The tunnel could not be finished before 2013. Parts of the report indicates tunnel and Pennant Hills Road capacity may be reached by 2021 – (according to some professionals as early as 2017).

Noting the historically low RTA traffic projections and cost estimates reported in the Auditor General's 2005 Report *"Managing Air Quality"*:

How long will it be before a second route is planned to be completed?

Initially there were 5 type A options, 6 - B, and 6 - C considered.

12. Newsletter 1 "the study is to investigate options for a new National Highway **connection** between the Sydney to Newcastle Freeway (F3) and the future Sydney Orbital (M2 section). The new **connection** will replace Pennant Hills Road as the National Highway **route**". (This is nonsense: Trucks cannot be forced to use this route)

Newsletter 2 "a study into options for a new National Highway **route** between the Sydney to Newcastle Freeway (F3) and the Sydney Orbital. The new **route** would replace Pennant Hills Road as the National Highway". (Map below from Newsletter 2)

DOTARS July 4, 2005 Study Objectives: It was clear from the above that the main purpose of the Study was to find a route that would effectively solve problems of traffic congestion, road safety and amenity on Pennant Hills Road.

Confused? H. I. T. is! What was the purpose of the Study? Which statement is correct? And, noting the recent bombings in London Rail Tunnels what is the "strategic" justification in building a tunnel under Pennant Hills Road? And, is this really a new connection or in reality just 2 additional lanes?

ONE POSSIBLE "Type C Option" Source: SKM Newsletter 2

The aim of this study is to identify a new route that would:

- Alleviate traffic congestion and improve travel reliability on the National Highway.
- Reduce the operating costs of long-distance commercial and freight transport.
- Improve road safety on the National Highway.
- Improve local amenity (reduce traffic, air and noise emissions and severance) for people living and working along Pennant Hills Road.
- Minimise social and environmental impacts during construction and operation.
- Provide opportunities for improved public transport.
- Integrate with the regional transport network.
- Serve the future growth needs of long-distance transport.
- Be economically justifiable and affordable to government.

Pennant Hills Road currently has poor roadside and travelling conditions, with traffic congestion and low traffic speed for long periods of the day. There are large numbers of vehicles on this road, including a high proportion of heavy vehicles, resulting in high noise levels, poor road safety and a general loss of amenity for the local community and road users.




Figure 1 - Study Area. The study area extends from the Sydney to Newcastle Freeway (F3) at Kariong, on the Central Coast, to the northern section of the Sydney Orbital, from Dean Park in the west to the M2 Motorway at Macquarie Park in the east.

Abbreviations:

AG:	Australian, Commonwealth or Federal Government
AR:	AustRoads – AG, all States and NZ.
DIPNR	NSW Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources
DOTARS:	AG Department of Transport and Regional Services.
H. I. T. ®	HONESTY, INTEGRITY, TRANSPARENCY
Link:	F3 too Sydney Orbital Link. Refer to map above
M7 and or M2:	Sydney Orbital Link. Refer to map above
NSWG:	New South Wales Government
RTA:	NSW Roads and Traffic Authority
SKM:	Consultants Sinclair Knight Merz

H.I.T the LINK!

On Sunday, March 12 at 2.30pm

in

Pennant Hills Community Centre

Yarrara Road, Pennant Hills

(Behind Library, opp. Station)

H.I.T.

(Honesty Integrity & Transparency)

Has invited

Rt. Hon John Howard M.P.

Prime Minister of Australia

State, Federal and Local Representatives,
including both State and Federal Ministers
for Roads & Transport, Union representatives
and transport experts

to a

PUBLIC MEETING

**TO DEMAND A REVIEW OF THE
PROPOSED TUNNEL LINK BETWEEN
THE M2 AND F3 AND A PROPER
RE-EVALUATION OF 'OPTION C' -**

An above ground alternative north-south route
linking with the M7 and providing a second
crossing of the Hawkesbury River.

PUBLIC MEETING to challenge suitability of proposed Pennant Hills Community Centre, cnr Yarrara

COMPARE THESE PROMISES...

Announcing the chosen tunnel route in May 2004 Deputy Prime Minister Anderson and Roads Minister Senator Campbell stated:

- "The Australian Government will deliver the project under the new AusLink framework".

In their MINISTERIAL FOREWORD to the AusLink White Paper, Ministers Anderson and Campbell stated:

- "AusLink will revolutionise the planning and funding of Australia's national roads and railways by taking a LONG-TERM, strategic approach for our LONG-TERM future. It represents the most significant change since Federation in the way we tackle the national transport task".
- "The Australian Government will fund projects which have the greatest effect on Australia's LONG-TERM future, whatever the mode."
- We look forward to working together with other levels of government, THE PRIVATE SECTOR and THE COMMUNITY to achieve a better transport system for Australia".

It is obvious that the Ministers' decision to select a tunnel under Pennant Hills Road is contrary to both AusLink's policy and the Study 'purpose' in Newsletter 1 - April 2002 which was:

- To investigate options for a new National Highway connection between the Newcastle Freeway (F3) and the future Sydney Orbital. The new connection will replace Pennant Hills Road as the new National Highway route.
- The study is being funded by the Federal Government and coordinated by the New South Wales Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA). Sinclair Knight Mertz (SKM) has been commissioned to undertake the study.
- Community consultation is an important part of the study. This newsletter provides information on the project and how you can have your say during this important investigation.

Why the study is needed?

- As Sydney grows there is expected to be a large increase in travel demand, particularly in north and western Sydney where more than half of Sydney's population is forecast to live by 2020 and where the majority of new residential developments will take place.
- The Western Sydney Orbital from the M5 Motorway at Prestons to the M2 at West Baulkham Hills has already been approved. This road, when completed in 2007, will replace the Cumberland Highway as the current National Highway route.
- The aim of this study is to identify a new route to meet current and future demands on the National Highway north of the Sydney Orbital.

Roads Ministers Lloyd and Tripodi have failed to respond in a meaningful way to unanimous motions passed at H. I. Ts. 2nd August 2005 Public meeting at Pennant Hills. Briefly the motions were:
The Australian and NSW Governments to:

- Review the flawed Study 'options for a new National Highway route between the F3 and Sydney Orbital', and
- Adopt Option C for a new route to connect with the M7 near Dean Park.

WITH THESE BRO

The new route would:

- Provide an improved north-south National Highway
- Reduce traffic, including heavy vehicles, on the international Road; and
- Improve access for freight and other traffic from the industrial centres, markets and ports.

The Australian Government must explain why the Study Value Management Workshop, 17/18 September 200

The report at 3.13.1 Regional transport needs beyond

"The consultant team sought guidance from its clients transport needs on a timescale of 20 to 50 years. During consultation process this issue was raised time and again. The concern expressed by the community was that if it commenced now, the opportunity will be lost forever.

Forecast of population and urban development predicted the north and west of the city, the very area where it Central Coast and beyond. The concern is that if a long term, issues such as land acquisition and environment to the provision of such a link

Following lengthy discussion, the INSTRUCTION FROM examination of longer term options was outside the scope addressed in another forum. Such analysis should be a study for the Sydney region, considering both land-use responsibility of the NSW Department of Infrastructure advised that they were preparing a Sydney Metropolitan It was however agreed, that the Link Study Report should concerns regarding the development of longer term tr

The following questions demand answers:

- Why was a decision made to disregard both the Study 'purpose' Government's AusLink guidelines?
- Was the 'community consultative process' genuine? Not prior to the September 2003 Value Management Workshop
- What evidence exists to justify abandoning a western alignment for completion before 2010, in favour of the proposed tunnel

By uniting our politicians and community w

F3 - Orbital Link, Sunday 12th March 2006 - 2.30pm and Ramsay Roads opposite railway station.

TEN PROMISES...

rough northern Sydney;
m Highway corridor along Pennant Hills

Hunter Region and Central Coast to Sydney's

'purpose' was changed BEFORE the consultant's

20 states:

garding the need to address longer-term regional
ication was sought because during the community
by community members.

ning for a regional transport solution is not

at some of Sydney's future growth would occur to
y be logical to construct a second road link to the
corridor is not reserved in the relatively short
impacts could become insurmountable constraints

ITARS was that the Australian Government felt that
e of the Link Study and the issue should be
properly occur as part of the strategic planning
and transport. This is now the portfolio
Planning and Natural Resources (DIPNR). DIPNR
Strategy.

d make reference to the community's expressed
sport options to the north of Sydney".

ose' as defined in Newsletter 1 and the Australian

fter No. 2 - July 2003 clearly indicates that months
a decision had been made to select a short term option.

ground connection from the F3 to the Sydney Orbital
rel under Pennant Hills Road?

AND THIS REALITY CHECKLIST

While supportive of PPPs *Review of Future Provision of Motorways in NSW December 2005*, a report initiated by Premier Iemma, found:

- Public domain assets (such as William Street) should clearly remain 'public' and not be fettered by contractual arrangements with private parties.
- The policy of motorway procurement at no cost to government should be abandoned.
- Possible future enhancements of the motorway network include the F3-M2 link.
- Public Consultation: 'On the basis of the current community debate about the Cross City Tunnel, it is a reasonable working assumption that, at least at this stage, there are deficiencies in these processes'.

At the 2005 NATIONAL LOCAL ROADS AND TRANSPORT CONGRESS - Professor Hensher said "Treat PPPs with care as they may come back to haunt you. There's evidence from Britain that if you involve PPPs you may as well double the cost. But you get it earlier. The true costs of PPPs were a lot higher than we were led to believe".

January 2006: Sydney Ports study released for an Intermodal Logistics Centre at Enfield to reduce road congestion by moving 40% of containers from Port Botany by rail to Enfield by 2025.

Sydney Ports advised apart from reducing truck movements to and from Port Botany there would be little change to the number of trucks particularly in the western and northern sectors. Based on Sydney Ports figures the number of trucks from Port Botany that will use Pennant Hills Road or the proposed tunnel will increase by over 230% within 20 years.

- For three years The Hon Philip Ruddock has attempted to obtain information that would prove or disprove issues raised in this publication.
- Epping State MP Andrew Tink reaffirmed his position the study be reviewed to establish if Option C - a second Hawkesbury crossing - should replace Purple Option (A) (tunnel).
- The Hon Alan Cadman: "I will be examining these matters with the help of the Federal Government and I wish to assure you it is not the intention of the Howard Government to follow the flawed processes adopted in the cross city tunnel."
- Hornsby State MP Judy Hopwood calls for a second Hawkesbury crossing.
- Hornsby Mayor Nick Berman agreed for Council to review its 2003 policy supporting a tunnel.

THE WARREN CENTRE - 2006 study - Sydney - Hunter Connection.

"We need strategic integrated transport solutions for Greater Sydney, not isolated road projects. The Warren Centre is most concerned at the narrowness of the State and Federal Governments' current proposal (a tunnel) for linking the Sydney Orbital with the F3.

"The Sydney Orbital/F3 freeway link as currently proposed by the Federal Department of Transport and Regional Services (DoTaRS) fails to meet the need for effective transport linkages between Sydney, the Central Coast and Hunter regions over time. It condemns the Hills region of Sydney to insufferable heavy traffic intrusions for the foreseeable future and denies the North Shore region relief from severe traffic congestion for an indeterminate period. It fails to address the need for future people and freight movement through these regions. It brings into question therefore the longer term economic soundness of the investment.

"We call for a review of the proposal with a view to developing a long term solution for linkages, of which the link between the Sydney Orbital and the F3 would be the first stage. In our view, the current proposal will then be found to be wrong."

(The Warren Centre is a Sydney University Institute that has a team of 200 expert practitioners in transport, planning and urban development)

we should be able to resolve this conundrum

THE NATION NEEDS OPTION C

If you cannot attend the HJT NO TUNNEL public meeting at the Pennant Hills Community Centre at 2.30pm on 12th March 2006, or are concerned with the decision for a tunnel link write to the Prime Minister with copies to your Federal and State MP. (This link is of National importance)

The Rt. Hon John Howard M.P.
Prime Minister of Australia,
Parliament House
Canberra, ACT 2600

The Hon A Cadman MP (Mitchell)
PO Box 1173
Castile Hill, NSW 1765

Mr M Richardson MP (The Hills)
PO Box 298
Castile Hill, NSW 1765

Mr A Tink MP (Epping)
PO Box 33
Epping, NSW 1710

The Hon P Ruddock MP (Berowra)
PO Box 1866
Hornsby Westfield, NSW 1635

The Hon Maurice Iemma M.P.
Premier of New South Wales,
Parliament House
Macquarie Street, Sydney 2000

Mrs J Hopwood MP (Hornsby)
PO Box 1687
Hornsby Westfield, NSW 1635

Mr S Pringle MP (Hawkesbury)
21 Bridge Street
Windsor, NSW 2756

OVER 30% OF AUSTRALIA'S 20 MILLION POPULATION IS SERVED BY:

Newcastle

Sydney

Wollongong

WHY IS IT THAT:

- The governments cannot agree on a long term transportation strategy for the Sydney Region?
- The State Government subsidises public transport particularly in the SE sector of Sydney and expects the public to pay tolls for road construction in developing areas where there is no public transport?
- The legislature was not told about secret decisions by Premier Carr with the 'Cross City Tunnel' operators?
- The State government does not have one authority to OPENLY create and enforce regulations to protect users and residents from harmful vehicle exhaust emissions?

HEALTH HAZARD - NO TUNNEL Can we afford not to have Option C

FAMOUS LAST WORDS

1932: SA Premier Hill 'The people of today care more about good Government than they do about party politics'.

1975: Hornsby Traffic Sergeant to Pennant Hills Residents Association (now Civic Trust) 'There will be no clearway restrictions on Pennant Hills Road'. 1981: AM - PM Clearway restrictions. 1984 24 hour Clearway.

1979: Cherrybrook rezoning places pressures on Pennant Hills, Castile Hill and New Line Roads. 1981 Lyle Marshall draft report for Hornsby Council recommends Pennant Hills Road be widened to eight lanes and Boundary Road to six lanes. Final report omits these recommendations at request of the DMR.

1979: NSW Transport Minister: 'It is planned to widen this section of Pennant Hills Road (The Crescent to Boundary Road) in approximately two years'. 1981 Telecom writes: for five years the DMR had failed to advise Telecom about road widening proposals consequently widening could not commence through Pennant Hills until mid-1986. (If the DMR advised TELECOM earlier the 'new exchange' could have been built further back and allowed additional lanes and more turning bays.)

1984: DMR advises widening of Pennant Hills Road from Peaces Corner to Beecroft Road will take from 1984 to 1996.

1995: Road widening completed through Pennant Hills.

1996: Road works again disrupt traffic to put extra turning lanes at Boundary Road. (Identified as being needed in Lyle Marshall 1981 draft report to Hornsby Council)

1995: Assistant Police Commissioner advises: when the M2 is opened there will be no more traffic problems on Pennant Hills Road'.

1999: Regular traffic delays and accidents with tunnel from Castile Hill Road to Pennant Hills Road and the M2 tunnel.

1986: NSW Roads Minister Laurie Brereton announces Roads 2000 for the Sydney Region including the M7.

1986: Roads 2000 announces Berowra to Liverpool link.

1993: Liverpool - Hornsby Link study announced. 1994 Report: 'The tunnel under Pennant Hills Road creates little negative impact, but at a cost of over \$500 million it

does not deliver substantial economic returns. Being underground, it offers poor connectivity to the existing road network. Recommends "Review and develop new northern link."

1995: Federal Minister Laurie Brereton announces the Western Sydney Orbital and Badgery's Creek Airport to be opened in - 1999. (\$480M will be made available for the WSO (M7) links to the M5 and M4).

2005: M7 opened funded by a PPP 'deal'.

2004: Parramatta to Chatswood rail link to be completed by 2006.

2004: AustLink White Paper: Funding for the connection will not be made until the 2009 - 2014 budget period.

2004: SKM Weekday Travel Destinations/Origins on F3 at Peaces Corner, Cars (2003) Southerly: 30% North-west, Baulkham Hills, Hornsby; 20% South and South West; 10% West; (60%) 35% City, Inner, North Sydney; 5% North East (40%). COMMENT SKM's projections that only 10 to 20% of traffic would use a western option demand immediate answers.

2005: NSW Auditor General Performance Audit - Managing Air Quality;

- 'No single agency has responsibility and accountability for improving air quality'. It is not possible to assess overall progress as many strategies have no targets or timeframe'.
- 'Final cost estimates for some key projects (Cross City and Lane Cove Tunnels) have doubled and tripled original estimates'.
- 'RTA advised that the final cost estimate for the Cross City tunnel increased due to a revision of the project scope by the Premier'.

2006: For three years many (including the Hon Philip Ruddock MP) have unsuccessfully sought explanations as to why a second Hawkesbury River crossing was rejected. MPs and the community are entitled to Honesty, Integrity and Transparency from OUR advisors. Hon asking our selected representatives to establish and explain to not only me but also the community at large why the tunnel was chosen in preference and second Hawkesbury crossing.

CASE STUDY: HORNSBY COUNCIL'S ACQUISITION OF HORNSBY QUARRY

In the media and at Hornsby Council meetings there is an ever increasing number of letters, articles and complaints from residents and community groups.

Many of these issues have also been raised with our elected Federal, State and Local Government representatives. Despite changes in governments and also our elected representatives at every level, problems have worsened over the last 5 years.

This is despite residents and community groups in recent times obtaining advice from acknowledged experts in many disciplines. A few of many examples are:

- 1 "No 'urban development' can occur in Hornsby Valley". 1998 Draft Plan of Management.
- 2 "Rural Fire Service verbally advised it would not issue a Bushfire Safety Authority for Urban Development (in Hornsby Valley)". June 18, 2003.
- 3 "As the only access to the site is via a private right of way the quarry lands cannot be developed or the quarry remediated". Brian Preston SC November 4, 2003.
- 4 "If development occurred in the Valley it should be on council's 'community lands' If 500 dwellings built and sold it would increase council's debt to \$44 million". Cardno Young.
- 5 "The quarry is an accident waiting to happen". GEOPLAN Services May 28, 1999.
- 6 Dr Gerrard was CSR's geotechnical consultant for Hornsby quarry for many years. Why wasn't his March 20, 2002 expert advice included in documents given to the Valuer?
- 7 "I have considered but neither pursued or enquired into the value aspects related to the continued use of the quarry or potential future landfill for the purposes of my compensation valuation". The Valuer General's agent. WAS THIS GROSS NEGLIGENCE?
- 8 "Consent orders were entered into to acquire the quarry on February 28, 2002". This was contrary to the provisions of the Local Government and 'Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation)' (LATJCA) Acts.
- 9 "The acquisition will be carried out under the provisions of the (LATJCA)". Abbott Tout.
- 10 "Remediation of the land, and development, would also involve the constant flow of trucks along Dural St. The council had considered buying the worst affected properties and letting them cheaply to minimise complaints". Former Mayor Muirhead Sept 14, 2006. [REDACTED]
- 11 "Residents stopped council placing much needed fill on council's land to build playing fields". Cr Horne August 7, 2006. "Council is committed to replace the irrigation equipment and turfing paid for under a government grant (destroyed by illegal fill placed on the playing fields) May 14, 1991". When will these fields be restored and the million dollar plus cost be disclosed in council's annual accounts? "Farley and Lewers 1966 offer was to give council approximately 1.5 acres of their site". Mr Tim Robertson SC's advice to Council about that 1966 offer was "to give council the entire site of over 50 acres and council's acceptance of that offer". [REDACTED].
- 12 MP's and MLC's Chesterfield-Evans, Cohen, Hale, Hopwood, O'Farrell, Rhiannon, Richardson and Turner all agree there must be a judicial Inquiry into the acquisition of the Hornsby Quarry. Most people believe that serious errors were made.

Councillors; please explain your reasons why there shouldn't be an Inquiry?

PUBLIC MEETING

Our local communities have critical transportation and development problems caused by lack of governance.

This meeting will be at

THE EPPING CLUB

Rawson Street (near the Coles carpark)

at 7.30 PM - Wednesday November 29, 2006

This 'NON Political Party' meeting will address the following urgent topics:

- **Ever increasing Community debt** — \$60 million plus for purchase, rehabilitation, and loan funding of the Hornsby Quarry by Hornsby Council – supported by a DVD presentation.
- **Deteriorating Rail Services** — increasing noise, proposed North West Rail Corridor as well as duplication of the Northern Line to Beecroft and beyond.
- **Proposed 8.5 km Pennant Hills Road (toll) Tunnel** — Longest in Australia — linking the M2/7 to the F3. Serious pollution, health and traffic issues are being brushed aside by politicians and bureaucrats.
- **Traffic Congestion** and lack of parking particularly in Epping. Unaddressed for over 20 years despite funds being available.

The community is being taken for granted by Politicians, bureaucrats and others with vested interests. So that the community may better understand, presentations will be made with supporting evidence.

Come and learn about some facts that Politicians, Councillors and bureaucrats don't want you to know.

The H.I.T. Group®

seeking from Governments — MPs, Councillors and the bureaucracy

Honesty in Representation – **I**ntegrity of Reporting – **T**ransparency of Process

Clive Troy 9868 2123
PO Box 23, Thornleigh NSW 2120

Peter Waite 9484 3471
28 Warne Street, Pennant Hills NSW 2120

See over for 'case study' about Hornsby Council's acquisition of Hornsby quarry.



CV: I am 82, grew up in the depression and WW2, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and left-handed. My fifth class teacher forced me to write right handed and caned me every time I used my left hand. My mother told me to try, as he was a WW1 soldier who had suffered greatly and came back to teaching because there were not enough as many had gone to WW2. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] had to try to write left handed again, but wasn't able to keep up with making notes about what the teachers said.

I started working when the 44-hour week was law. Because of learning problems I studied accountancy at Sydney Tech two nights a week for four years to learn how to keep correct records.

People asked me to do the following because they knew I was honest.

My father suggested I become a JP. I did that on 18 December 1953 61 years ago. After various jobs, in 1955 I worked for National Cash Register as a technician. I was trained to service and repair accounting machines. Months later I specialised in detecting how machine operators were manipulating the records to make unauthorised payments to fictional bank accounts. I left National in 1959 because new machines were electronic and I did not understand how they operated.

I then worked as a builders labourer and became a successful builder, developer and property investor by 1966, Hornsby councillor from 1980 to 1987, chairman of the Hornsby Ku-ring-gai District Bushfire Committee from 1983 to 1987 as well as the chairman of the then Sydney Region Bushfire Association from 1986 to 1987. I was also instrumental in stopping the NSW Fire Brigade taking over Rural Fire Service at a 15-minute meeting of the NSW Rural Fire Service and Minister.

Without my accounting knowledge I couldn't have done this. C 1967 I was invited to join the NSW Scouts Trading Committee as there were supply problems with uniforms. I also took on the role to countersign payment cheques. The first time I was given the chequebook with no supporting documents. The next time I demanded the invoices and statements. I then found suppliers were refusing to meet orders, as their accounts were three or four months overdue. However suppliers of nonessential items were supplied on a seven-day basis to receive a 5% discount. By chance I found out the manager and purchasing officer were receiving secrete commissions. I reported what had happened. The manager moved to Western Australia and purchasing officer disappeared.

C1995 I agreed to form a committee to stop Hornsby Hospital being closed and property to be sold to held fund a super hospital at North Ryde. After about six months the Minister withdrew his direction when given my accounting evidence the per-capitia cost for the Northern Sydney Area Health Service was about half of the SE Sydney Area Health Service.

A member of the Scout Association since 1940 I was voluntarily site supervisor building the temporary Leppington Jamboree site. Initiated and built a 12 bedroom conference centre and office at the Northmead Cumberland Area Scout camp (Bundilla) supervising, teaching and working with periodic detainees from Parramatta, Silverwater, Campbelltown and Richmond Periodic Detention Centres. I also picked them up for other Scout projects. I voluntarily worked at Cataract Scout Park Jamboree site three day a week for five years. Built and donated a two bedroom cottage at Lower Portland Camp. As District Commissioner formed 1st Cherrybrook Scout Group and at no cost then helped build they're Scout Hall seven days a week for about a year. This included splitting all the rock used for the outside walls and labouring for the stonemasons. Awarded OAM in 1996.

President of Pennant Hills Primary P&C, member of many committees and former Rotarian.

This submission: As a one finger typist I prepared my submissions without help. I hold historic reports about Sydney traffic issues back to the 1950's, and in particular what led to this EIS since the early 1990's. I accept there are grammatical errors that should not negate issues being impartially assessed. If not clear, I can clarify them by email to waitepeter@bigpond.com.

NorthConnex EIS:- historical list with brief comment on attachments to enable the Department of Planning to make an informed assessment.

(On legal advice attachments will not be included on
'TunnelVisionM1M2.org' web site when it goes on line)

[REDACTED]

Onus of proof to substantiate credibility rests with NSW government, not Transurban.

The EIS identified the 2012/2014 State Policy for Unsolicited Offers that demands **Probity** by all parties.

SMH 12 August 2014 reports on \$144 million court case for misrepresentation of the traffic counts for proposed Lane Cove Tunnel that went into bankruptcy.

State 2012/2014 Unsolicited Proposals Guidelines (pages 1, 6 & 7 next 3 pages) :

- **Assessment Criteria 3.3 (2) Value for money.** Where is this addressed? Is it the users, State or Transurban?
- **Risk Allocation (7)** where are they quantified?
- **Probity 3. 5 Maintaining confidentiality.** The time is passed for confidentiality. Now is the time to disclose the contractual arrangements, before the EIS is assessed.

If needed, the closure date should be extended to allow further submissions that take into account the State policy the Minister infers has been complied with. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED], I am determined this will not happen with the NorthConnex EIS. To ensure that will not happen, I am including an undated GIPA application and \$30 cheque for a copy of the DOP planning assessment of my submissions.

In doing this it should be noted, my submission is about my personal affairs – knowledge – within the meaning of the Act. If I believe that the assessment is not correct I may apply to the Civil and Administrative Decisions tribunal for a review.

Peter Waite



UNSOLICITED PROPOSALS

GUIDE FOR SUBMISSION AND ASSESSMENT

February 2014

	objectives.
Whole of Government Impact	<p>What is the opportunity cost for Government if it were to proceed with the proposal?</p> <p>Is the proposal consistent with the Government's plans and priorities?</p> <p>Consideration will be given to whether the proposal would require Government to re-prioritise and re-allocate funding.</p>
Return on Investment	Is the proposed return on Investment to the proponent proportionate to the proponent's risks, and industry standards?
Capability and Capacity	Does the proponent have the experience, capability and capacity to carry out the proposal? What reliance is there on third parties?
Affordability	Does the proposal require Government funding, or for the Government to purchase proposed services? Does the Government have these funds available or budgeted and if not what source would be proposed?
Risk Allocation	What risks are to be borne by the proponent and by the Government? Where risks can be quantified and valued they may also be considered under the value for money criteria.

3.4 INTERACTIVE PROCESS

The Government will manage an interactive process with the proponent at all formal stages of assessment, commencing with the formal pre-lodgement meeting set out in Section 5. During both the pre-lodgement meeting and the Stage 1 Assessment this interaction will be limited to clarification of the proposal by Government in order to effectively carry out the assessment. It will not be an opportunity to negotiate the details of the proposal. This opportunity will arise in later stages if the proposal proceeds past the Stage 1 Assessment.

3.5 PROBITY

Government seeks to conduct its commercial dealings with integrity. The assessment of Unsolicited Proposals must be fair, open and demonstrate the highest levels of probity consistent with the public interest. The assessment of Unsolicited Proposals will be conducted through the application of established probity principles that aim to assure all parties of the integrity of the decision making processes. These principles are outlined below.

Maintaining impartiality

Fair and impartial treatment will be a feature of each stage of the assessment process. The process will feature a clearly defined separation of duties and personnel between the assessment and approval functions.

Maintaining accountability and transparency

Accountability and transparency are related concepts. The demonstration of both is crucial to the integrity of the assessment.

Accountability requires that all participants be held accountable for their actions. The assessment process will identify responsibilities, provide feedback mechanisms and require that all activities and decision making be appropriately documented.

Transparency refers to the preparedness to open a project and its processes to scrutiny, debate and possible criticism. This also involves providing reasons for all decisions taken and the provision of appropriate information to relevant stakeholders. Relevant information regarding proposals under consideration at Stage 2 should be publicly available (note in some cases Government may agree to not disclose a proposal at Stage 2 of the assessment process, if requested by a Proponent).

Managing conflicts of interest

In support of the public interest, transparency and accountability, the Government requires the identification, management and monitoring of conflicts of interest. Participants will be required to disclose any current or past relationships or connections that may unfairly influence or be seen to unfairly influence the integrity of the assessment process.

Maintaining confidentiality

In the assessment of Unsolicited Proposals there is need for high levels of accountability and transparency. However, there is also a need for some information to be kept confidential, at least for a specified period of time. This is important to provide participants with confidence in the integrity of the process. All proposals submitted will be kept confidential at Stage 1 of the assessment process.

Obtaining value for money

Obtaining optimal value for money is a fundamental principle of public sector work. This is achieved by fostering an environment in which Proponents can make attractive, innovative proposals with the confidence that they will be assessed on their merits and where Government appropriately considers value.

3.6 RESOURCE COMMITMENTS

In order for an Unsolicited Proposal to progress, Government (both central Government and relevant agencies) and the Proponent will be required to commit resources. The staged approach to assessment as detailed in section 5 of this Guide seeks to balance resource input at each stage in order to reduce the potential for unnecessary expenditure.

While this Guide sets out information and processes to minimise costs for Proponents, Government will not normally reimburse costs associated with Unsolicited Proposals.

3.7 GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS

Governance arrangements will include whole of Government oversight and co-ordination through DPC, a single, overarching Unsolicited Proposals Steering Committee, proposal specific Steering Committees where required, proposal specific assessment committees, and a staged approach to assessment, negotiation and contracting.

Once a proposal reaches Stage 2 of the assessment process, Government will establish appropriate governance arrangements that will detail the make-up and responsibilities of the Steering Committee and assessment/technical panels, management of confidentiality and conflict of interest, and provide details of the appointed Proposal Manager and probity advisor.

In preparing the governance arrangements, Government will have regard to relevant processes and approval requirements in related procurement policy documents. This may include:

- NSW Public Private Partnerships Guidelines (August 2012)
- National PPP Guidelines

1. **2014
15 July** Extracts from planning Act EIS identified as relevant by NorthConnex and EIS justification p19 (Key extracts 26 pages included)
2. **2001 -
2005** (Attachment A) Extracts from SKM report [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
(Attachment B **2007**) 27 page submission to Pearlman report explains in detail how NorthConnex references to it are misrepresented.
3. **2007 –
2014** (Attachment C) list **explains subsequent events**. It wasn't until I read NorthConnex EIS I understood the significance that the Pearlman Inquiry wasn't to review all of the SKM 2004 report.

These destroy the EIS reliance on the SKM and Pearlman reports.
4. **2008
10 April** SMH article by Bruce Loader former NSW Commissioner for Main Roads. ***'Poor vision for the state in blurring of the divide – Ministers have assumed a greater role in the functioning of the individual departments, for which they are ill-equipped'.***

Loader explains how about 1980 there was a move in the public service to promote the re-election of government. This is why there are Ministers making decisions about matters they do not have the knowledge or impartial advisers to advise them. Loader's article reinforces my observations and conclusion.
5. **2012
3 March** Waite to Premier O'Farrell re Bob Carr's appointment as Senator/Foreign Affairs Minister and the Cross City tunnel costs.
6. **2012
27 Mar** O'Farrell, Dear Peter – sets out Coalition 20 year targets.
7. **2012
17 May** Waite to Gay re Northern Sydney Region of Council's (NSROC new President) releasing Price Waterhouse Coopers' (PWC) **8 July 2011 \$29,445 offer to prepare a report supporting the F3-M2 tunnel. 13 months before Minister Gay announced Transurban's unsolicited offer.**

My letter to Hunters Hill Council's GM thanked him for his assistance in sending me PWC offer Hornsby Council incorrectly advised it did not have. Council now claims a mistake was made!
8. **2012
17 June** FOI (GIPA) application to Hornsby Council for NSROC PWC details.
9. **2012
25 June** Waite to MP Ruddock re his community survey. I list 5 issues. One as a councilor on 7 July 1982 re Pennant Hills traffic problems.

Others are about the Pearlman report Hornsby Mayor Berman and the PWC report
10. **2012
28 June** Waite to LG Minister Page re **Local Government Taskforce with two pages of observations and unregistered entities not complying with the law. EG NSROC. (And NorthConnex)**
11. **2012
14 July** Waite to Ruddock re his 3 July 2012 reply to my 25 June letter and reasons for a meeting.
12. **2012
19 July** **Gay and ASX media releases about Transurban's unsolicited offer.**

13. **2012** SMH article about Transurban's offer.
 20 July

14. **2012** SMH article about Transurban's new GM Scott Charlton.
 21/2 July

15. **2012** [REDACTED]
 23 July [REDACTED]

16. **2012** **Issues for meeting with Hornsby MP Matt Kean and former Mayor**
 31 July **Nick Berman in particular.**

17. **2012** Waite to Transurban's Chairman re offer and many problems. **No**
 8 Aug **reply received.**

18. **2012** Epping MP Smith newspaper article re danger with unfiltered tunnels.
 22 Aug

19. **2012** SMH *City in a jam. Jacob Saulwick* 2 part extracts of 5 pages.
 8/9 Sept This article sums up the lack of commitment by many
 governments. *"Sir Humphrey alone would be at ease in this
 mire"*

20. **2012** Waite emailed letter to MPs O'Farrell, Gay and Kean, and Hornsby
 24 Sept Mayor Russell re my ***poison chalice*** application before the ADT.

 This sets out extra costs to widen the F3 if tunnel approved.

21. **2012** FOI to Gay re problems with F3 – M2 tunnel.
 11 Oct

22. **2012** [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

23. **2012** [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

24. **2012** [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

25. **2012** [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

26. **2012** [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

27. **2012** [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

28. **2013** FOI for all documents relating to unsolicited offer in public interest.
 24 June

29. **2013** Premier & Cabinet acknowledges receipt of FOI application.
 26 June

30. **2013
4 July** SMH *'Public inquiries are not what they used to be, but we still need them* Garry Banks, Dean of the Australia and NZ School of Government.
31. **2013
Jul/Aug** Open Road PM Abbott; re F3 missing link commitment.
32. **2013
6 Aug** FOI internal review appn email
- 2013
8 Aug** Premier & Cabinet; FOI note p2: ***"has there been any fraud, negligence, incompetence, favoritism or other issue . . . widening of F3."***
33. **2013
13 Aug** Gay's office automated reply to my internal review email is dated **12 August 2013 @ 23: 18; 29** – this was probably a technical glitch near midnight.
34. **2013
19 Aug** Dep P & C advises late decision will be made by 2 September 2013
35. **2013
2 Sep** FOI decision releases list of 532 documents on 59 pages, returns payment and determines too hard.
36. **2013
Sept** **Aust & NSW Gov Community update No 1 on Transurban's offer indicating EIS will be available in late 2013.**
37. **2013
Sept** **Aust & NSW State Significant Infrastructure Application Report.**

NB: Pages 12 & 14 rely on the SKM 2004 report & 2007 Pearlman Inquiry revalidation report. These statements cannot be relied on in the context being used in the EIS.
38. **2013
Sept 9** ADT application 133265 because Dep Premier & Cabinet failed to determine my amended FOI application.
39. **2013
10 Oct** Waite to Gay re Transurban's offer, my ADT application and Minister Berejiklian re draft Freight & Ports Strategy.
40. **2013
October** **Aust & NSW Gov Community F3-M2 invitation to 3 community meetings at Turramurra, Muirfield and Hornsby.**
41. **2013
15 Oct** Transport NSW notes receipt of my 10 October letter.
42. **2013
Oct 17** Emailed my 8 August 2012 letter to Transurban to the F3 – M2 enquiries team to give them the opportunity to answer my question at the three meetings. The meeting formats were orchestrated so that staff only answered questions on a 1 to 1 or more basis.

These meeting only added weight to community opinion that the outcomes were pre-determined.
43. **2013
12 Nov** Waite to Gay re ADT 10 December Planning Meeting.
44. **2013
14 Nov** **An example of how errors become fact if not corrected.** Parliamentary Sec. MP Williams for Ministers Gay and Berejuklian advised my 10 October 2013 letters to them was correct and **the Draft NSW Freight & Ports Strategy had been amended because the Pearlman Inquiry recommended and F3 – M7 link, not as their Draft Strategy reported.**

45. **2013**
 15 Nov Crown Solicitor seeks my agreement to have my application set aside on technical grounds as against merit.

46. **2013**
 20 Nov Waite to [REDACTED] re Channel 10 reported tenders will be called and list reasons I should not withdraw my ADT application.

47. **2013**
 10 Dec Waite 10 Page submission to ADT Planning Meeting NSROC and other valid issues.

48. **2013**
 10 Dec Waite letter top Gay re Transurban's unsolicited bid. 2 pages explaining I withdrew my ADT application because the Crown Solicitor claimed the ADT didn't have the power to deal with it.

 That didn't alter the merit of the issues I raised

49. **2014**
 21 March Waite to Gay re meeting with RTA officers, and political issues about the NSROC stunt to support the tunnel, Australian Water Holdings and other issues that will come up before the State elections.

 At this time several ministers have lost their portfolios, two Liberal members have resigned as has the Newcastle Mayor.

 ICAC has indicated that this is not the end of it and there are more Labor party issues to be considered along with the coalition.

50. **2014**
 6 April Waite to Ruddock with 18 questions to NorthConnex to address as set out in next item.

51. **2014**
 6 Apr Email to NorthConnex re residents suspicions about EIS repeating the ETTT EIS. At that time we didn't know AECOM would also do the tunnel EIS. 14 issues were raised.

52. **2014**
 16 June Dr Simon Longstaff from the St James Ethics Centre seeking donations to help explain what Ethics means. It appears to the community that many politicians should examine the way they handle the truth and determine if it is ethical.

53. **2014**
 17 June SMH **Full speed ahead on big build highways. New outer Sydney orbital M9 to link with M7 and M2.**

54. **2014**
 19 June Financial Review **Outer Sydney Orbital to what appears to be a second Hawkesbury River crossing as envisaged by SKM with option C in 2004.**

55. **2014**
 ? June SMH **Traffic no faster with \$3 billion tunnels. This article is based on extracts from the NorthConnex EIS. Another opinion that the tunnel will be a waste of time and money.**

56. **2014**
 25 June Discussion paper for informal meeting of eight residents from Beecroft, Pennant Hills, Wahroonga and West Pennant Hills concerned about the proposed tunnel.

 Since then they have all raised further issues I understand they will raise in their submissions.

57. **2014**
 27 June ***Gay admits he may have gone 'too early' with WestConnex. I assume taxpayers will pay for resumed properties no longer needed. The same applies to the M1 – M2.***

58. 2014 29 June *Cheap tribunal proposed for home compo fighters SMH. C 2002 I and about 16 others negotiated with the DMR Project Engineer and their valuer to acquire our properties on Pennant Hills Road for a fair price. A tribunal wasn't needed as everyone knew what each other were receiving.*
59. 2014 July *Gay reverses direction on M5 toll plan for new roads. SMH. Revealed: M5 tolls to stay 50 years'.*
- Who is employing political advisers to dream up and float ideas to see what reactions they create instead of a sound plan?
60. 2014 10 July Waite email seeking hard copy of EIS. NorthConnex advises they will not be made available. If I applied under the GIPA Act (FOI) I am entitled to a copy. Another example of lack of knowledge.
61. 2014 13 July (Attachment C) Records of NSROC's timing support for the F3-M2 Tunnel in regards to Transurban's unsolicited offer.
62. 2014 15 July **NorthConnex EIS released**
Issues I believe relevant in 24 page paper
63. 2014 Undated *NorthConnex 12 page 'Air Quality Information' booklet.*
- P5 Figure 6 *'Human made particulate matter PM 2.5 sources in Sydney 50.6% Solid Fuel Burning 50.6%'.*
- Whilst this may be correct, I have lived in Pennant Hills for over 56 years and from personal observation from a large area from my home and driving around for about the last 10 years there would be very few *Solid Fuel Burning (Domestic)* fires in the tunnel area. *Solid Fuel Burning* in western Sydney and Blue Mountains MAY affect the West Pennant Hills area.
- This is another opportunistic paper prepared [REDACTED] from vehicle emissions at both ends of the proposed tunnel.
-
64. 2014 30 July Two page paper given to NorthConnex manager Tim Parker (RTA) before the meeting. Copy also given to facilitator. Because of time I only asked about question 3 in relation to possible gridlock emissions and was bluntly told it wouldn't happen.
65. 2014 6 Aug Barry O'Farrell wrote to me about my 2 August 2014 email advising he had written to Minister Goward for her advice on the issues I had raised.
66. 2014 8 Aug Waite paper distributed to attendees at Pennant Hills 2-5pm community meeting. NorthConnex to answer questions 1- 15.
67. 2014 11 Aug Waite one page paper emailed for NorthConnex to resolve about the unsolicited tunnel proposal. No reply as yet.
- Also similar one page paper sent to the Premier. No replies as yet.
68. 2014 11 Aug Waite to DoP project manager for EIS assessment [REDACTED] 14 page paper why the tunnel should be scrapped.

69. 2014
12 Aug FOI (GIPA) to Gay for seven matters.
70. 2014
13 Aug Dick Smith and Graham Turner National Press Club address about *'Sustainable development'*.
71. 2014
18 Aug SMH article about the Lane Cove tunnel and lack of expert advice to MPs and the community.
- Those who assess my submission should ensure they have impartial expert advice.
72. 2014
18 Aug NorthConnex acknowledged 4 emailed issues.
14:31:58 ; Procedural complaint about AECOM EIS for NorthConnex
14:39:02 Copy of GIPA application to Gay because it is his EIS.
14:39:35 2 page paper for Pennant Hills drop in session form 2 – 5pm
14:50:01 re Pennant Hills Thornleigh Uniting Church 6pm NorthConnex presentation where I gave NorthConnex (Transurban's Richard Merrit paper about my concerns.
73. 2014
[REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
74. 2014
20 Aug SMH Alex Mitchell *'Clover Moore is only half the story; shadowy panel devouring Sydney land'*
- This article explains how the coalition has set up an entity known as *'UrbanGrowth'* has its hands on prime Sydney Harbor land near Balmain, Parramatta and Newcastle.
- Some people never learn what integrity means.
75. 2014
20 Aug I received the attached paper *'Outline of Representation Crisis in NSW'* from a concerned resident yesterday and decided to include it in this submission as it reveals and summarises the concerns about the administration of the NSW Constitution
76. 2014
22 Aug No support documents: Circa mid 1960's to mid 1970's the Public Works Commissioner was also Chief Commissioner of the NSW Scout Association. As site manager for the 1970 Leppington Jamboree I reported to him through two geotechnical experts Drs D and M. The ex commissioner now lives at Running Stream as does D.
- After he retirement I did alterations and repairs to his Mosman home.

I refer readers back to Bruce Loader's 2010 expert advice at 3. **Politicians are making decisions ‘. . . for which they are ill equipped.’**

I do not claim to have all the answers. The EIS should have clearly identified them.

Once again I ask, does the State have staff with the technical experience to impartially advise them on every matter that has to be processed, or do they rely on public relation staff to convince the community they know more than the people they represent?

The Premier should explain to the electorate how he proposes to resolve this matter and not leave it to Department of Planning staff to assess.

- | | | |
|-----|-----------------|---|
| 77. | 2014
22 Aug | Waite example of proponents and objectors exaggerating submissions in their attempts to justify opposing positions. |
| 78. | 2014
Aug/Sep | In the Public Interest add in the Monthly Chronicle: <i>Reasons to Scrap the M1 – M2 tunnel</i> ” |

Peter Waite

115U Development that is State significant infrastructure

- (1) For the purposes of this Act, *State significant infrastructure* is development that is declared under this section to be State significant infrastructure.
- (2) A State environmental planning policy may declare any development, or any class or description of development, to be State significant infrastructure.
- (3) Development that may be so declared to be State significant infrastructure is development of the following kind that a State environmental planning policy permits to be carried out without development consent under Part 4:
 - (a) infrastructure,
 - (b) other development that (but for this Part and within the meaning of Part 5) would be an activity for which the proponent is also the determining authority and would, in the opinion of the proponent, require an environmental impact statement to be obtained under Part 5.

Paragraph (b) does not apply where the proponent is a council or county council.

- (4) Specified development on specified land is State significant infrastructure despite anything to the contrary in this section if it is specifically declared to be State significant infrastructure. Any such declaration may be made by a State environmental planning policy or by an order of the Minister (published on the NSW legislation website) that amends a State environmental planning policy for that purpose.
- (5) The Planning Assessment Commission or Infrastructure NSW may recommend to the Minister that a declaration be made under subsection (4) in respect of particular development.
- (6) If, but for this subsection, development is both State significant infrastructure because of a declaration under subsection (2) and State significant development, it is not State significant infrastructure despite any such declaration.
- (7) If, but for this subsection, development is both State significant infrastructure because of a declaration under subsection (4) and State significant development, it is not State significant development despite any declaration under Division 4.1 of Part 4.

<http://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/fragview/inforce/act+203+1979+pt.5.1-div.1-sec.115u+0+N?tocnav=y>

115U Development that is State significant infrastructure

- (1) For the purposes of this Act, *State significant infrastructure* is development that is declared under this section to be State significant infrastructure.
- (2) A State environmental planning policy may declare any development, or any class or description of development, to be State significant infrastructure.
- (3) Development that may be so declared to be State significant infrastructure is development of the following kind that a State environmental planning policy permits to be carried out without development consent under Part 4:
 - (a) infrastructure,
 - (b) other development that (but for this Part and within the meaning of Part 5) would be an activity for which the proponent is also the determining authority and would, in the opinion of the proponent, require an environmental impact statement to be obtained under Part 5.

Paragraph (b) does not apply where the proponent is a council or county council.

- (4) Specified development on specified land is State significant infrastructure despite anything to the contrary in this section if it is specifically declared to be State significant infrastructure. Any such declaration may be made by a State environmental planning policy or by an order of the Minister (published on the NSW legislation website) that amends a State environmental planning policy for that purpose.
- (5) The Planning Assessment Commission or Infrastructure NSW may recommend to the Minister that a declaration be made under subsection (4) in respect of particular development.
- (6) If, but for this subsection, development is both State significant infrastructure because of a declaration under subsection (2) and State significant development, it is not State significant infrastructure despite any such declaration.
- (7) If, but for this subsection, development is both State significant infrastructure because of a declaration under subsection (4) and State significant development, it is not State significant development despite any declaration under Division 4.1 of Part 4.

3 Strategic justification and project need

This chapter outlines the relationship of the project to the State and national strategic planning and policy framework and relevant specific planning and policy documents. It also identifies the need for the project within the context of existing transport networks, and presents the project objectives. The project objectives have been developed to align with the strategic objectives of relevant planning and policy documents, and relate directly to the key issues that demonstrate the need for the project. A statement of strategic need concludes this chapter.

Table 3-1 sets out the Director-General's Requirements as they relate to the strategic justification and project need, and where in the environmental impact statement these have been addressed.

Table 3-1 Director-General's Requirements – strategic justification and project need

Director-General's Requirement	Where addressed
A statement of the objectives of the project, including a description of the strategic need, justification, objectives and outcomes for the project, taking into account existing and proposed transport infrastructure and services within the adjoining subregions, and as relevant the outcomes and objectives of relevant strategic planning and transport policies, including, but not limited to, NSW 2021, NSW Government State Infrastructure Strategy, NSW Long Term Transport Master Plan (December 2012), draft Metropolitan Plan for Sydney (March 2013) and any other relevant plans;	Objectives of the project are identified in Section 3.4 . The project need is provided in Section 3.3 and a statement of strategic need is provided in Section 3.5 . Consideration of the project against the outcome and objectives of strategic planning and transport policies is provided in Section 3.1 and Section 3.2 .
Justification for the preferred project taking into consideration the objects of the <i>Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979</i> .	The project justification is provided in Section 3.3 and Section 3.5 . Further justification is provided in Chapter 11 .

3.1 NSW strategic planning and policy framework

In 2011, the NSW Government presented a broad strategic plan for development of the State in the form of NSW 2021 – A Plan to Make NSW Number One (NSW 2021) (NSW Department of Premier and Cabinet, 2011). In order to achieve key objectives of NSW 2021 relating to the provision of infrastructure the NSW Government formed Infrastructure NSW, an independent statutory agency. The primary task of Infrastructure NSW was to prepare the 20 year State Infrastructure Strategy 2012-2032 (Infrastructure NSW, 2012), which was used to inform the NSW Government's State Infrastructure Strategy (SIS) (NSW Department of Premier and Cabinet, 2012). The SIS is implemented through annual five year State Infrastructure Plans (refer to **Section 3.1.2**).

'NorthConnex' ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (EIS)

Comment on extracts from Volume 1A and all of "Table 6.5 Overview of consultation activities during the tender and environmental impact statement process."

xxiii	<i>What alternatives were considered' - ' , , , commencing with the F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study (SKM, 2004) (the 2004 report) through to the recent design and construct tender"</i>
xxiv	<p>Virtually all of this page refers to the SKM 2004 report. Corridor options correctly describe the three variable options. There were 10 for option C.</p> <p>What follows is correct except SKM was directed not to recommend types A or B.</p>
xxv	<p>Options review At the request of Hills Motorways the Federal Minister agreed to a review of the best option A and nothing else. Therefore any reliance on the Pearlman report cannot be justified.</p> <p>Community participation bullet point 2 refers to 2002 Focus Groups meeting in 2002. They were in 2003. Attached are the SKM Dural meeting noted where I was present.</p> <p>NorthConnex again refers to the SKM report that did not comply with its Terms of Reference because of State and Federal government direction.</p>
xxvi	<p>Pearlman Review Par 1, Attached is a transcript of the hearing where I incorrectly stated the terms of reference were altered and corrected by DoTaRs who advised I was wrong. I should have stated SKM was directed not to comply with the TOR.</p> <p>The transcript also noted M/s Pearlman, myself and another person had asked for a copy of the TOR. At that stage M/s Pearlman did not know what the TOR were.</p> <p>If the community knew what the reason for the Pearlman Inquiry and what the actual TOR were when submissions were called for, at least my submission would have been very different and included Barry O'Farrell's and five other state politicians in the affected area support for option C.</p>
xxix	Social and economic would still be relevant if Option C is built. The important issue that the EIS does not disclose that an independent 'cost benefit analysis' on the two options has not been shown in the EIS even for the current proposal.
xxxi	<p>Making comment; bullet point 4. 'Various staffed displays in the region.' The only staffed display is a Pennant Hills where staff are unable to answer many questions.</p> <p>Roads and Maritime (last) Drop In session was staffed by at least one Transurban officer. Apart from the RTA's Mr Parker it is not know who employed any of the other advisers.</p> <p>For nearly an hour a police officer was standing near the stage observing the people. I asked him why he was there, He turned his head and didn't answer. After a while he moved around the displays and then left. None of the staff I asked knew why he was there.</p>
19	Strategic Justification. 3.1 NSW strategic planning key objectives for NSW 2021. In 2012 a draft joint plan by the Roads and Rail ministers for a new rail and road route west of St Marys to link Wollongong and the Central Coast noted that it was recommended in the Pearlman inquiry. I pointed out to them this was wrong and Pearlman recommended the F3 M7 link be planned. Their parliamentary secretary MP Ray Williams wrote to me advising I was correct and the daft was amended.

33	<p>Table 4-1 DG's requirements. <i>'An analysis of alternatives/options considered having regard to the project objectives (including an assessment of the environmental costs and benefits of the project relative to alternatives and the consequences of not carrying out the project), and the provision of a clear discussion of the route development and selection process, the suitability of the chosen alignment and whether or not the project is in the public interest.</i></p> <p>Figure 4-1 shows the alternatives and options development process undertaken for the project.</p>
F 4-1	<p>This date table refers to the 2002 – 2004 SKM report, then the 2007 Pearlman Review, unsolicited 2012 proposal and preferred tenderer to build the tunnel, EIS as being current, and concludes Submissions report.</p> <p>Based on the fact that the SKM report recommended option A, as a short term option up to 2012, and the Pearlman report is irrelevant, the EIS has little if any credibility and should be immediately withdrawn.</p>
37	F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study (SKM) This pages sets out options including do nothing. It is of little value to the EIS.
43	Evaluation of the broad corridor types. Again SKM report is of little value. Whilst Table 4-2 does identify valid problems, they are also relevant to the F3-M7 option and the 2012 draft option for a road and rail link. One of which must be built. <u>Ignoring the ultimate need to justify a short term option cannot be justified.</u>
44	Figure 4.3 are only more about the SKM report that does not contribute to making and informed decision.
47 49	These three pages again rely on the SKM and Pearlman reports.
50	<p>4.3 <i>Unsolicited proposal design subject to EPA Act 1979</i></p> <p>Figure 4-4 NSW Govt unsolicited proposal process; <i>Stage 3 Approval – target late 2014*</i></p> <p><i>*subject to EP&A Act 1979</i></p>
54	Pearlman Review re access ramps may be relevant if tunnel approved.
55	<p>4.3.3 Progression to Stage 3 cross-agency committee to work with Transurban and Westlink Shareholders. All of these records should be made public.</p> <p>4.4 again quotes SKM and Pearlman reports.</p>
57 59	4.4.1 Design refinements Refer to 4.4 above SKM and Pearlman reports
219/221	6.3.3 Consultation to date '...commenced in 2002 to April 2014' What occurred from 2002 until 2013 has been shown to be totally irrelevant.
222 1	<p>Table 6-5 Overview of consultation activities during the tender and environmental impact statement processes This 5 page paper lists four Interagency meetings from 26 June 2013 to 21 November 2013.</p> <p>30 July 2013 Interagency regulatory meeting No.2 was held with the Environment Protection Authority, the Department of Planning and Infrastructure (now the Department of Planning and Environment) and NSW Health. The purposed of the meeting was to review to the progress of the project and strategy to date and discuss the approach to assessment of environmental impacts.</p>
222 2	Fire life saving meetings 18 July 2013, 3 October , 30 October, 20 February 2014. All; Fire life safety meeting No.1 was held with Fire and Rescue NSW to discuss the requirements for the fire strategy and the fire and life safety design.

<p>222 3</p>	<p>Community updates September 2013, Community update No.1 was sent to around 14,000 property addresses along the project corridor. The community update introduced the project, provided a map of the project corridor, advised of next steps and provided details on how residents could register to receive future updates. The community update was also published on the project website.</p> <p>December 2013. Community update No.2 was sent to around 14,000 property addresses along the project corridor. The community update advised the availability of the NorthConnex community involvement issues report, detailed early field investigations and advised next steps including tender assessment and environmental impact statement processes. The community update was also published on the project website with email notifications sent to over 200 registered stakeholders.</p>
<p>222 1</p>	<p>Week commencing 16 March 2014 16 March 2014 Community update No.3 was sent to around 14,400 property addresses within the project area. The community update announced the preferred design, introduced the Hills M2 Motorway integration works, outlined the key features of the project and invited community members to attend community information sessions held in March – April 2014.</p> <p>Stakeholders were encouraged to provide feedback on the preferred design which would be addressed in the environmental impact statement. The community update was also published on the project website with email notification sent to over 789 registered stakeholders.</p>
<p>223 2</p>	<p>Planning focus meeting 27 September 2013 A planning focus meeting was held at Hornsby Shire Council, from 10 am to 4 pm. Presentations at the meeting introduced the project, described the unsolicited proposal process, outlined the environmental assessment process and provided the expected project delivery program. The meeting was attended by representatives from the Department of Planning and Environment, NSW Health, Hornsby Shire Council, The Hills Shire Council and Ku-ring-gai Council.</p>
<p>223 3</p>	<p>Tender stage exhibition 22 Oct 2014 A community engagement event was held at Turramurra Masonic Hall and Function Centre, from 6.30 pm to 8 pm, to introduce the NorthConnex project, give stakeholders an opportunity to meet the project team, provide feedback, ask questions and identify areas of concern. A total of 73 stakeholders registered in attendance during the development of their respective tender submissions.</p>
<p>223 4</p>	<p>23 October 2013 A community engagement event was held at Muirfield Golf Course, from 6.30 pm to 8 pm, to introduce the NorthConnex project, give stakeholders an opportunity to meet the project team, provide feedback, ask questions and identify areas of concern. A total of 101 stakeholders registered in attendance. Feedback received was provided to the three tenderers for consideration during the development of their respective tender submissions.</p>
<p>223 5</p>	<p>A community engagement event was held at Hornsby War Memorial Hall, from 6.30 pm to 8 pm, to introduce the NorthConnex project, give stakeholders an opportunity to meet the project team, provide feedback, ask questions and identify areas of concern. A total of 135 stakeholders registered in attendance. Feedback received was provided to the three tenderers for consideration during the development of their respective tender submissions.</p>
<p>223 6</p>	<p>A community engagement event was held at Cheltenham Recreation Club, from 7 pm to 8.30 pm, to introduce the NorthConnex project, give stakeholders an opportunity to meet the project team, provide feedback, ask questions and identify areas of concern. A total of 37 stakeholders registered in attendance.</p>

224 1	Preferred tender design exhibition 26 March 2014 A community information session was held at Pennant Hills Golf Club, from 7 pm to 9 pm. The event gave stakeholders an opportunity to view and discuss with members of the project team the preferred tender design and the Hills M2 Motorway integration works via an interactive model and display material detailing key project features. Attendees were encouraged to ask questions, provide feedback and identify areas of concern which would be addressed in the environmental impact statement. The event was advertised through a community update, the project website and notifications printed in local newspapers. Issues raised during the meetings were recorded and considered in the environmental impact statement. (over 200)
224 2	A community information session was held at Hornsby RSL, from 7 pm to 9 pm. The event gave stakeholders an opportunity to view and discuss with members of the project team the preferred tender design and the Hills M2 Motorway integration works via an interactive model and display material detailing key project features. Attendees were encouraged to ask questions, provide feedback and identify areas of concern which would be addressed in the environmental impact statement. The event was advertised through a community update, the project website and notifications printed in local newspapers. Issues raised during the meetings were recorded and considered in the environmental impact statement. (No date or numbers attending disclosed)
224 3	A community information session was held at Pennant Hills Golf Club, from 7 pm to 8 pm. The event gave stakeholders an opportunity to view and discuss with members of the project team the preferred tender design and the Hills M2 Motorway integration works via an interactive model and display material detailing key project features. Attendees were encouraged to ask questions, provide feedback and identify areas of concern which would be addressed in the environmental impact statement. The event was advertised through a community update, the project website and notifications printed in local newspapers. Issues raised during the meetings were recorded and considered in the environmental impact statement. (No date or numbers attending disclosed)
224 4	A community information session was held at Pennant Hills Community Centre, from 2 pm to 4 pm. The event gave stakeholders an opportunity to view and discuss with members of the project team the preferred tender design and the Hills M2 Motorway integration works via an interactive model and display material detailing key project features. Attendees were encouraged to ask questions, provide feedback and identify areas of concern which would be addressed in the environmental impact statement. The event was advertised through a community update, the project website and notifications printed in local newspapers. Issues raised during the meetings were recorded and considered in the environmental impact statement. (No date or numbers attending disclosed)
224 5	Utility providers meeting 25 October 2012 A utility providers meeting was held with Endeavour Energy to discuss potential utility impacts, power supply, utility adjustments and project timing.
224 6	25 October 2013 A utility providers meeting was held with Telstra to discuss potential utility impacts, telecommunications, utility adjustments and project timing.
224 7	7 November 2013 A utility providers meeting was held with Ausgrid to discuss potential utility impacts, power supply, utility adjustments and project timing.
225 1	Interest group meetings 28 March 2014 An environmental and community interest group meeting was held at Pennant Hills Golf Club. A total of 14 attendees representing environmental organisations and interest groups, and community groups discussed potential impacts from the preferred tender design and key features of the project. Additional information was provided to meeting participants as applicable.
225 2	2 April 2014 A business and industry interest group meeting was held at Pennant Hills Road. A total of 17 attendees from organisations representing business and industry groups discussed potential business impacts from the preferred tender design and key features of the project. Additional information was provided to meeting participants as applicable. (Who were they from?)

225 3	3 April 2014 A traffic and transport interest group meeting was held at Pennant Hills. A total of ten attendees from organisations representing traffic and transport groups discussed potential traffic and transport issues from the preferred tender design and key features of the project. Additional information was provided to meeting participants as applicable.
225 4	Briefing sessions 16 October 2013 A briefing session was held with The Hills Shire Council General Manager and Councillors to describe the project and to answer questions. The presentation introduced the project, described the unsolicited proposal process, outlined the environmental impact statement process, outlined potential key issues and provided the expected project delivery program.
225 5	24 October 2013 An update meeting was held with the Department of Planning and Infrastructure (now Department of Planning and Environment) to discuss planning approval processes and timing.
225 6	21 November 2013 A meeting was held with Normanhurst Boys High School and Abbotsleigh School for Girls to introduce the project, establish methods of contact for the schools, parents and students and to answer initial questions.
225 7	12 December 2013 A project briefing session was held with the Member for Parramatta to describe the project and to answer questions.
225 8	19 December 2013 A project briefing session was held with the Member for Epping and his staff to describe the project and to answer questions.
225 9	19 December 2013 A briefing session was held with Ku-ring-gai Council staff to describe the project and to answer questions. The presentation introduced the project, described the unsolicited proposal process, outlined the environmental impact statement process, outlined potential key issues and provided the expected project delivery program.
225 10	27 February 2014 A presentation was made to the Independent Advisory Committee on Tunnel Air Quality regarding the air quality modelling approach for the project.
226 1	20 March 2014 A briefing session was held with State and Federal Members of Parliament. The purpose of the briefing sessions was to present the preferred tender design and seek feedback. Who? When? Where?
226 2	21 March 2014 A presentation was made to the Roads Freight Industry Council with representatives from the Australian Trucking Association, the Livestock and Bulk Association, Transport Workers Union, Toll and Linfox.
226 3	17 April 2014 A presentation was made to the NRMA. The purpose of the meeting was to present the preferred tender design and seek feedback.
226 4	8 April 2014 A meeting was held with Ku-ring-gai Council. The purpose of the meeting was to present the preferred tender design and seek council feedback.
226 5	9 April 2014 A meeting was held with Hornsby Shire Council. The purpose of the meeting was to present the preferred tender design and seek council feedback.
226 6	20 May 2014 A meeting was held with The Hills Shire Council. The purpose of the meeting was to present the preferred tender design and seek council feedback.
226 7	Interviews and surveys December 2013
226 8	Communications July 2013 Interviews and surveys were conducted with potentially affected business owners.
226 9	October 2013 A 'Letter to the householder' was sent to around 14,000 property addresses along the project corridor detailing community engagement events to local newspapers.

226 10	October 2013 Letters were sent to around 200 interest groups inviting them to attend the community engagement events in October 2013 and to provide feedback on the project. Feedback received from interested parties was provided to the three tenderers for consideration during the development of their respective tender designs.
226 11	November to December 2013 Property owners were notified of air quality monitoring, noise and heritage field studies, including telephone calls and letterbox drops to targeted residents notifying them of the start of environmental field work.
226 12	December 2013 The NorthConnex community involvement issues report was published on the project website. The report provided a summary of the community feedback received to date including issues raised at community engagement events. Over 200 registered stakeholders were informed by email about the publication of the report.
227 1	Week commencing 16 March 2014 Postcards were sent to around 7,000 properties within the preferred project corridor (along the proposed tunnel alignment) encouraging residents to attend upcoming community information sessions and to visit the interactive web mapping site for more project information.
227 2	Week commencing 16 March 2014. A 'Letter to the householder' was sent accompanied by community update No. 3 distributed to over 3,000 along the corridor potentially affected by the Hills M2 Motorway integration work.
227 3	Week commencing 16 March 2014 Letters were sent to over 658 interest groups and local organisations, including schools, places of worship, aged care facilities and clubs. Follow up calls to 79 schools providing project information and eight briefings were held.
227 4	Week commencing 16 March 2014 Invitations were sent to around 202 interest groups to attend targeted interest group briefings. Three interest group briefings were held covering: traffic and transport; business and industry; and environment and community.
227 5	16 March 2014 The preferred tender design and tenderer was publicly announced by the Prime Minister and Premier for NSW.
227 6	Week commencing 16 March 2014 door knocks and letters of acquisition notification were delivered to potentially directly impacted property owners along the preferred project corridor outlining property impacts, the property acquisition process and timing.
227 7	Week commencing 28 April 2014 Phone calls to 25 aged care and medical facilities in the project area and 55 places of worship, providing project information and briefing invitation
228/247	Primarily these pages address technical issues raised by other agencies.
248 1	<p>Table 6-8 Issues raised by the community Strategic justification and project need</p> <p>Q Appropriateness of the unsolicited proposal process with NSW Government and Transurban.</p> <p>A The unsolicited proposals process in NSW, as outlined in Unsolicited Proposals: Guide for Submission and Assessment (NSW Government, 2014) (revised and updated since its original publication in 2012), is a consistent, transparent and streamlined approach for the receipt, assessment and determination of unsolicited proposals that may be developed and submitted by the private sector for works and/ or activities that would have historically been conducted by Government. Unsolicited proposals and the guidelines that govern their assessment and published on the NSW Government website (http://www.nsw.gov.au/your-government/unsolicited-proposals).</p> <p>The unsolicited proposal received by Government from Transurban and the Westlink M7 Motorway Sponsors in relation to the NorthConnex project has been conducted strictly in accordance with published guidelines that govern unsolicited proposals.</p>

248 2	<p>Q Selection criteria and process for appointing the preferred tenderer and design.</p> <p>A An outline of the tender evaluation process is provided in Chapter 4. A key input into the assessment of tenders was an analysis of potential environmental, social and land use impacts associated with each tender design.</p>
248 3	<p>Q Evidence that the preferred scheme was the 'best' option.</p> <p>A An overview of the options development process and the tender evaluation process is provided in Chapter 4.</p>
248 4	<p>Q Government investment should focus on public transport initiatives and improvements as well as cycling infrastructure.</p> <p>A The NSW Government recognises the need to provide balanced planning, funding and implementation of transport infrastructure that responds to the needs of New South Wales, including Sydney. The NSW Long Term Transport Master Plan (Transport for NSW, December 2012a) responds to this need with a clear and transparent framework of transport infrastructure priorities, including investments in road, rail and other public transport infrastructure. The Master Plan includes arrangements for funding new and upgrade transport infrastructure, including public transport infrastructure, and a prioritised program for delivery of this infrastructure.</p>
248 5	<p>Q Support for project as a solution to improve existing traffic congestion and noise impacts along Pennant Hills Road.</p> <p>A The support for the project is acknowledged.</p>
249 1	<p>Q Cost-benefit assessment of project impacts and project objectives.</p> <p>A The justification and conclusion of the project, having taken into account the identified environmental impacts and mitigation measures, is provided in Chapter 11. This includes consideration of the project against the objects of the <i>Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979</i>.</p>
249 2	<p>Project funding; Q Project funding, government contributions and commercial incentives or Transurban.</p> <p>A Project funding arrangements are described in Chapter 4. The Australian and State Governments have each committed up to \$405 million to the project. The remainder of the cost of the project would be funded by Transurban and the Westlink M7 Shareholders and would be recouped from tolls on the project and changes to tolling for heavy vehicles on some Sydney motorways. The proposed toll on the project would be generally consistent with the tolling structure on the Hills M2 Motorway.</p>
249 3	<p>Q Increase in tolling and taxes to benefit private sector investment (Transurban).</p> <p>A Project funding arrangements are described in Chapter 4. The Australian and State Governments have each committed up to \$405 million to the project. The remainder of the cost of the project would be funded by Transurban and the Westlink M7 Shareholders and would be recouped from tolls on the project and changes to tolling for heavy vehicles on some Sydney motorways. The proposed toll on the project would be generally consistent with the tolling structure on the Hills M2 Motorway.</p>
249 4	<p>Q Increase tolls for trucking industry.</p> <p>A Project funding arrangements, including tolling changes, are described in Chapter 4. 'each committed up to \$405 million to the project. The remainder of the cost of the project would be funded by Transurban and the Westlink M7 Shareholders and would be recouped from tolls on the project and changes to tolling for heavy vehicles on some Sydney motorways. The proposed toll on the project is consistent with the tolling structure on the Hills M2 Motorway.</p>
249 5	<p>Q Concession Deed changes across the motorway network to fund the Project</p> <p>A Project funding arrangements are described in Chapter 4. The Australian and State Governments have each committed up to \$405 million to the project. The remainder of the cost of the project would be funded by Transurban and the Westlink M7 Shareholders and would be recouped from tolls on the project and changes to tolling for heavy vehicles on some Sydney motorways. The proposed toll on the project would be generally consistent with the tolling structure on the Hills M2 Motorway.</p>

250 1	<p>Q Security of project finance and funding needs to ensure the viability of the project.</p> <p>A Project funding arrangements are described in Chapter 4. The Australian and State Governments have each committed up to \$405 million to the project. The remainder of the cost of the project would be funded by Transurban and the Westlink M7 shareholders and would be recouped from tolls on the project and changes to tolling for heavy vehicles on some Sydney motorways. The proposed toll on the project would be generally consistent with the tolling structure on the Hills M2 Motorway.</p>
250 2	<p>Q Consideration of distance based and time of use tolling.</p> <p>A Project funding arrangements are described in Chapter 4. The proposed toll on the project would be consistent with the tolling structure on the Hills M2 Motorway.</p>
250 3	<p>Project development and alternatives</p> <p>Q Consideration of alternatives to the proposed tunnel to alleviate traffic</p> <p>A Project options and alternatives are provided in Chapter 4.</p>
250 4	<p>Q Consideration of other corridors as part of the current project.</p> <p>A more long term option for an extra crossing over the Hawkesbury River, connection to the Westlink M7 and inclusion of a rail line should be included. The 'yellow route' from the 2004 study would resolve the Macquarie Park accessibility problems.</p> <p>A Project options and alternatives are provided in Chapter 4. NB <u>Project alternatives and route alignment options have been assessed through several reports, including community consultation, since 2002. A road tunnel connection consistent with the project has been reviewed and confirmed as meeting the transport needs of Sydney in the immediate term.</u></p>
250 5	<p>Q The 'purple route' was preferred as it followed the alignment of Pennant Hills Road and avoided going under homes.</p> <p>A The preferred tender design is within the purple corridor option <u>identified by the 2004 report</u>. Details of the options assessment is provided in Chapter 4.</p>
250 6	<p>Q Project delivery program including construction start, staging and duration.</p> <p>A The project description including project staging is provided in Chapter 5. The program for delivery of the project has been developed to strike an appropriate balance between timely implementation of the project and minimisation of impacts on the surrounding environment and communities.</p>
251 1	<p>Q Selection and alternatives for the location of the northern ventilation facility, away from residential area and schools. Suggested alternative to locate the facility within the industrial area located to the North or to the south around Pearce's corner.</p> <p>A The locations of the two project ventilation facilities has taken into account operational efficiencies associated with location close to the main alignment tunnel portals, and balanced consideration of other relevant factors including engineering and construction practicality, local topography and landscape, availability and access to land and the need to acquire land, environmental and land use impacts, and potential community disruption during construction. Further details regarding site selection for the ventilation facilities is provided in Chapter 4.</p>
251 2	<p>Q Selection and alternatives for the location of the southern ventilation facility, away from residential area. Suggested alternative to locate the facility within the Pennant Hills Golf Club, to the east of Pennant Hills Road.</p> <p>A The ventilation facilities for project have been shown through the air quality assessment (refer to Section 7.3), human health risk assessment (refer to Section 7.4) and the noise assessment (refer Section 7.2) to meet acceptable air quality, health and noise outcomes during operation. In most cases, impacts on receivers adjacent to and around the ventilation facilities are very low. On this basis, it has been concluded that both ventilation facilities could be operated in their proposed locations without significant impacts on the environment or local communities. Further details regarding site selection for the ventilation facilities is provided in Chapter 4.</p>

<p>251 3</p>	<p>Q Selection and alternatives for the location of the Wilson Road tunnel support facility. Suggested alternative to locate the facility across Pennant Hills Road in Observatory Park.</p> <p>A For operational and safety reasons, the tunnel support facilities are required to be located at around third points along the main alignment tunnels and directly above the tunnels. The assessments undertaken and presented in this environmental impact statement demonstrate that the Wilson Road tunnel support facility could be constructed and operated without significant impacts on the environment or local communities. Further details regarding site selection for the tunnel support facilities is provided in Chapter 4.</p>
<p>251 4</p>	<p>Q Selection and alternatives for the location of the Trelawney Street tunnel support facility. Suggested alternative to locate the facility in the industrial land area across Pennant Hills Road. For operational and safety reasons, the tunnel support facilities were required to be located at around third points along the main alignment tunnels and directly above the tunnels. The assessments undertaken and presented in this environmental impact statement demonstrate that the Trelawney Street tunnel support facility could be constructed and operated without significant impacts on the environment or local communities.</p> <p>Further details regarding site selection for the tunnel support facilities is provided in Chapter 4.</p>
<p>252 1</p>	<p>Consideration of the Equilibria project proposal as a design alternative. The Equilibria proposal involved the northern portals of the NorthConnex tunnel being moved approximately one kilometre further north along the M1 Pacific Motorway and for the current footprint of the M1 Pacific Motorway to be used for residential development. The alternative Equilibria proposal to government would need to be considered under the NSW Government's unsolicited proposals process. The equilibria proposal does not align with the unsolicited proposal currently being considered by the NSW Government in accordance with <i>The Guide of Submissions and Assessment of Unsolicited Proposals (2012)</i>.</p> <p>A response has been provided to the Equilibria proponents citing safety, traffic management, financial and equity limitations including: residential development.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No suitable alternative for dangerous goods vehicles travelling along the M1 Pacific Motorway. Vehicles carrying dangerous goods would be forced off the motorway around Berowra and would need to travel through additional residential areas of Berowra, Asquith and Hornsby. Alternatively, safety standards would need to be relaxed to allow dangerous goods vehicles in the tunnel which would have potential implications for in-tunnel road safety. • Forcing vehicles who need to access the Pennant Hills road corridor from the M1 Pacific Motorway through a tolled tunnel. • Lack of consideration of traffic management issues of the tunnel extension were closed due to an incident (unlike NorthConnex with Pennant Hills Road remaining as an alternative). • Lack of robust financial and cost estimate information that allows for proposal appraisal. <p>The additional length of tunnelling would also require another intermediate tunnel support facility (similar to the Wilson Road and Trelawney Street tunnel support facilities) in order to provide a safe in-tunnel environment in the event of an emergency. This would result in additional land acquisition, and associated social and environmental impacts.</p>
<p>252 2</p>	<p>Project scope Q The location, number, scale and design features of the northern and southern interchanges.</p> <p>A A project description including interchange information is provided in Section 5. The northern and southern interchanges have been designed to provide efficient traffic connections, and to balance environmental and community issues to minimise impacts overall.</p>
<p>252 3</p>	<p>Q Design options including elevated sections of road or ramps.</p> <p>A Design refinements carried out as part of the tender process are described in Chapter 4.</p>

252 4	<p>Q Mid-tunnel access options for motorists (eg near Beecroft Road).</p> <p>A The reasons for not including an intermediate interchange in the scope of the project are discussed in Chapter 4.</p>
253 1	<p>Q Tunnel depth, alignment options following Pennant Hills Road or under properties.</p> <p>A Design refinements carried out as part of the tender process, including consideration of tunnel depth and the horizontal alignment are described in Chapter 4.</p>
253 2	<p>Q Tunnel interface, including design and implications, with other infrastructure such as the North West Rail Link.</p> <p>A Design refinement details including the consideration of other infrastructure are provided in Chapter 4.</p>
253 3	<p>Q Hills M2 Motorway integration work is on the same side of the motorway as the previous widening for the Hills M2 Motorway Upgrade project. The same residents will be impacted again.</p> <p>A The scope of the Hills M2 Motorway integration works is detailed in Chapter 5. Potential impacts from this project component are provided throughout the impact assessment sections in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8.</p>
253 4	<p>Q Southern interchange ramp design and location resulting in impacts on nearby</p> <p>The design of the southern interchange is described in Chapter 5.</p> <p>A Potential impacts from this project component are provided throughout the impact assessment sections in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8. The southern interchange and tunnel portals have been design and located to optimise traffic efficiency, minimise engineering complexity and cost, and minimise potential impacts on the environment, local communities and land use. The need for land acquisition has been minimise through design of this infrastructure.</p>
253 5	<p>Q Northern interchange and tunnel portal entry and exit design and locations resulting in impacts on nearby residential areas.</p> <p>A The design of the northern interchange is described in Chapter 5. Potential impacts from this project component are provided throughout the impact assessment sections in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8. The northern interchange and tunnel portals have been design and located to optimise traffic efficiency, minimise engineering complexity and cost, and minimise potential impacts on the environment, local communities and land use. The need for land acquisition has been minimise through design of this infrastructure.</p>
253 6	<p>Q Design, including form and height, of the tunnel ventilation and support facilities in relation to existing residential context.</p> <p>Project description including the design of the tunnel, ancillary facilities and ventilation system is provided in Chapter 5. Tunnel ventilation facilities have been design to provide efficient and effective dispersion of emissions, having regard to surrounding receivers, meteorology and topography. The need to minimise visual impacts, land take and disruption to the local community were also important factors taken into account in the design of the ventilation facilities. A similar design process has been applied to other ancillary facilities, which have been subject to a balance assessment of potential environmental, community and land use issues to minimise potential impacts overall.</p>
254 1	<p>Q Limitation of tunnel design to include only two lanes in each direction, when the tunnel is opened.</p> <p>A Design options including the number of lanes are provided in Chapter 4. The decision to open with project to two lanes of traffic in each direction has been based on traffic forecasting and detailed analysis of traffic demands. To future-proof the project, space has been allowed in the main alignment tunnels to mark a third lane in each direction, if growth in traffic demand and other operational considers warrant increased tunnel capacity.</p>
254 2	<p>Q Noise reduction road surface material to be considered as part of project design.</p> <p>A Measures to mitigate and manage noise impacts are provided in Section 7.2. The design of the project includes low noise road pavement for surface works on motorways.</p>

254 3	<p>Q Future extent of additional widening along the M1 Pacific Motorway to accommodate the use of the third lane in each direction.</p> <p>A Any future widening of the M1 Pacific Motorway, if undertaken, is outside the scope of this project. If required in the future, works on the M1 Pacific Motorway would be subject to separate assessment and approval in accordance with the <i>Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979</i>.</p>
254 4	<p>Environmental assessment Q Environmental impact statement methodology for the project.</p> <p>A The impact assessment methodology for each environmental aspect is consistent with relevant guidelines. Details of the assessment methodologies are provided in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8.</p>
254 5	<p>Q Consideration of construction and operational impacts.</p> <p>A Assessment of environmental impacts from construction and operation of the project is provided in the respective sections of Chapter 7 and Chapter 8.</p>
254 6	<p>Q Consideration of alternatives.</p> <p>A A description of the options and alternatives process is provided in Chapter 4.</p>
254 7	<p>Q Degree to which issues raised by the community are addressed in the environmental impact statement.</p> <p>A Details of community consultation are provided in this chapter. Issues raised have been considered in the environmental impact statement and in the design of the project.</p>
254 8	<p>Q Degree to which the assessment process is conducted in an independent manner.</p> <p>A This environmental impact statement has been:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prepared in accordance with relevant guidelines developed by regulatory agencies. • Certified by the authors as neither false nor misleading. • Reviewed by regulatory agencies including the Department of Planning and Environment, the EPA, NSW Health, NSW Office of Water, Office of Environment and Heritage, and Department of Primary Industries. <p>The Department of Planning and Environment has undertaken an assessment of the project and recommended the Minister for Planning makes a determination with consideration given to community and regulatory agency inputs.</p>
255 1	<p>Q Extend consultation period as part of the environmental impact statement public exhibition period due to lack of consultation during the project development phase, the complexity and scale of the project and the significant potential impact of the project.</p> <p>A The public exhibition period for this environmental impact statement is determined by the Department of Planning and Environment, and in accordance with the provisions of the <i>Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979</i>. The minimum period for public exhibition would be 30 days. Any extensions to this period are at the discretion of the Department of Planning and Environment.</p>
255 2	<p>Q Environmental impact statement, technical documents and air quality data should be presented in plain-English and accessible to the public.</p> <p>A The environmental impact statement is prepared to enable the document to be accessible and understood by the general public. A series of community information sessions have been programmed during the public exhibition of the environmental impact statement to provide further opportunities for interested community members to discuss information presented in the environmental impact statement.</p>
255 3	<p>Consultation process Q Availability and accessibility of data collected from field investigations such as noise, air quality and traffic monitoring data to the public.</p> <p>A The data collected from field investigations has been presented in the relevant sections of this environmental impact statement.</p>

255 4	<p>Q Timing and inadequacy of available project information and distribution.</p> <p>A Consultation undertaken during the preparation of the environmental impact statement is described in this chapter. Consultation has included provision of information to the community as it becomes available, and will continued through the public exhibition of the environmental impact statement, including community information sessions.</p>
255 5	<p>Q Extent of distribution area for project related communication (such as Community Update newsletters and letters to the householder).</p> <p>A The distribution area for community information materials has covered the local community around all project components. In identifying the distribution area, all endeavours were made to ensure that potentially affected and interested community members were informed of project consultation activities.</p>
255 6	<p>Q Details of the communication program to advise the community of the project scope, proposed design, tender evaluation, environmental assessment process, project development and opportunities for consultation.</p> <p>A Details of the consultation process throughout the project are provided in this chapter.</p>
255 7	<p>Q Accessibility and location selection of community information session venues.</p> <p>A Community information sessions were scheduled across the project corridor. In identifying the community information venues, all endeavours were made to ensure that potentially affected and interested community members had reasonable access to information session venues.</p>
256 1	<p>Q Community event format – formal Question and Answer structure does not provide enough opportunity for individuals to raise questions and concerns across the project.</p> <p>A Community events were structured to provide a balance between those who preferred to ask questions in an open forum and those who prefer to ask questions on an individual basis. A mix of question-answer sessions, information displays and one-on-one discussions with members of the project team have been provided.</p>
256 2	<p>Q Concern regarding the limited project details available for effective community consultation in the early project stages.</p> <p>A Project details were provided to the community at community information sessions at the earliest available opportunity.</p>
256 3	<p>Q Lack of transparency and community involvement as part of the unsolicited proposal process.</p> <p>A The unsolicited proposals process in NSW, as outlined in Unsolicited Proposals: Guide for Submission and Assessment (NSW Government, 2014) (revised and updated since its original publication in 2012), is a consistent, transparent and streamlined approach for the receipt, assessment and determination of unsolicited proposals that may be developed and submitted by the private sector for works and/ or activities that would have historically been conducted by Government. Unsolicited proposals and the guidelines that govern their assessment and published on the NSW Government website (http://www.nsw.gov.au/your-government/unsolicited-proposals). The unsolicited proposal received by Government from Transurban and the Westlink M7 Motorway Shareholders in relation to the project has been conducted strictly in accordance with published guidelines that govern unsolicited proposals.</p>
256 4	<p>NB: Q Accessibility of background information and previous studies such as the Pearlman Report.</p> <p>A Background information including the 2004 report and the 2007 Pearlman Review are available on the Roads and Maritime Services website at: (www.rms.nsw.gov.au/roadprojects/projects/building_sydney_motorways) Background information relevant to the project has been provided through community information sessions as it has become available.</p>

256 5	<p>Q Opportunity for community consultation on the preferred tender design to inform changes to the project proposal.</p> <p>A Community consultation throughout the detailed design and construction stages are described in this chapter and the Community Communication Framework in Appendix D. Consultation on the location and design of the project has been ongoing since 2002.</p>
256 6	<p>Q Lack of consultation with residents regarding the location and the design of ancillary project surface infrastructure, including the location of the ventilation outlets and tunnel support facilities.</p> <p>A The selection process for the locations of the ancillary infrastructure is provided in Chapter 4. The project, including ancillary project infrastructure, has been designed with a balanced consideration of engineering practicalities, cost implications, road network performance and safety, environmental and community impacts, and land use and land acquisition requirements. The project design has been optimised to minimise impacts overall.</p>
257 1	<p>Q Limited and inaccurate visual images to represent the project proposal. Before and after images requested to provide a more clear understanding of proposed buildings and sites.</p> <p>A <u>Before and after artists' impressions of the project are provided in Section 7.5.</u></p>
257 2	<p>Q Concern project information may not be reaching non-English speaking background families and communities.</p> <p>A Community updates provide relevant information for people of non-English speaking background to gain information regarding the project, including details of translation services.</p>
257 3	<p>Q Inadequate consultation and notification regarding Hills M2 Motorway integration work. Work will result in cumulative construction and long-term impacts on the same communities impacted by the recent Hills M2 Motorway Upgrade project.</p> <p>A Consultation with the local community regarding the Hills M2 Motorway integration works is described in this chapter. The relevant sections of the environmental impact statement have considered the cumulative impacts with the recently completed Hills M2 Motorway Upgrade project.</p>
257 4	<p>Q Complaint management during construction, particularly in relation to night-time work impact on the sleep of local residents.</p> <p>A Consultation strategy including complaint management during construction is provided in this chapter and the Community Communication Framework in Appendix D. Information regarding proposed the hours of works are provided in Chapter 5.</p>
257 5	<p>Potential environmental impacts - Construction methodology</p> <p>Q Construction program, duration of activities and extent of impacts around construction compounds.</p> <p>A The project description including construction staging is provided in Chapter 5. The program for delivery of the project has been developed to strike an appropriate balance between timely</p>
257 6	<p>Q Construction hours for activities at construction compounds. Project description including construction hours at ancillary facilities is provided in Chapter 5.</p> <p>A While much of the construction of the project can be carried out during standard construction hours, some construction activities including tunnelling and tunnelling support, and works within live motorways, must be scheduled out of standard construction hours and / or on a continuous basis for practical or safety reasons.</p>
257 6	<p>Operational traffic Q Potential project benefit to reduce current traffic levels on Pennant Hills Road and the local traffic network.</p> <p>A Assessment of traffic impacts including identification of potential benefits is provided in Section 7.1 and Appendix E.</p>

258 1	<p>Q Improved reliability along Pennant Hills Road due to a reduction in traffic</p> <p>A Assessment of traffic impacts including identification of potential benefits is provided in Section 7.1 and Appendix E.</p>
258 2	<p>Q Impact to traffic flow on the Hills M2 Motorway, Pennant Hills Road, local area networks and the Sydney Orbital network.</p> <p>A Assessment of traffic impacts including identification of potential benefits is provided in Section 7.1 and Appendix E.</p>
258 3	<p>Q Traffic on Pennant Hills Road will not improve as a result of the project because the existing topography and surrounding bushland reserves make Pennant Hills Road the primary north- south roadway.</p> <p>A Assessment of traffic impacts including identification of potential benefits is provided in Section 7.1 and Appendix E.</p>
258 4	<p>Q Management of trucks on Pennant Hills Road and incentives to use the tunnel.</p> <p>A Details regarding heavy vehicle regulatory measures are provided in Chapter 5.</p>
258 5	<p>Q Adjustments to Pennant Hills Road as part of the project proposal to reduce the number of surface lanes, changes to traffic light sequences, funnel vehicles into the tunnel and to include a dedicated bus lane and / or cycle lane.</p> <p>A A detailed description of all work associated with the project is provided in Chapter 5. While the project provides opportunities for future enhancements along Pennant Hills Road, these do not form part of the scope of this project and would need to be considered separately by the relevant government agencies.</p>
258 6	<p>Q Changes to existing intersections and interchanges at the northern and southern end of the tunnel.</p> <p>A A detailed description of work associated with the project including surface works around interchanges is provided in Chapter 5.</p>
258 7	<p>Q Ineffective operation of the interchanges and their integration into the local road network resulting in drivers using local roads as rat runs, especially during construction.</p> <p>A Assessment of traffic performance of the interchanges is provided in Section 7.1 and Appendix E.</p>
258 8	<p>Q Changes to the local road network and traffic conditions on local streets.</p> <p>A Changes to the local road network are outlined in Chapter 5.</p>
259 1	<p>Q Use of traffic lights at the tunnel entry and exit points.</p> <p>A Traffic lights are not proposed at tunnel entry and exit points. Traffic lights at tunnel entry and exit points would not be consistent efficient motorway connection.</p>
259 2	<p>Q Traffic modelling to remove 50 per cent of trucks off Pennant Hills Road is not enough to make an improvement given the increase in future traffic volumes. Pennant Hills Road will remain congested.</p> <p>A Assessment of operational traffic impacts, including future conditions along Pennant Hills Road, is provided in Section 7.1.</p>
259 3	<p>Construction traffic Q Access to construction areas from residential roads and residents impacted along truck haulage routes.</p> <p>A Site access and egress and haulage routes are provided in Section 7.1. Wherever possible, site access points have been located with direct access to and from the arterial road network.</p>
259 4	<p>Q Construction access for work on the Darling Mills Creek viaduct should not use Ventura Road for access.</p> <p>A Access arrangements for the Darling Mills Creek compound are described in Chapter 5. In response to this feedback received, use of Ventura Road access tack has been limited to the delivery and removal of large excavation equipment only. The main access point would be directly to and from the Hills M2 Motorway.</p>

259 5	<p>Q Construction impact on bushwalking access under the Darling Mills Creek viaduct.</p> <p>A Impacts during construction to the walking track are described in Section 7.7.</p>
259 6	<p>Q Traffic delays on the Hills M2 Motorway local roads as a result of construction activities and truck movements.</p> <p>A An assessment of construction traffic impacts is provided in Section 7.1. Disruptions to traffic during construction would be managed to minimise the extent and duration of impacts to the road network.</p>
259 7	<p>Q Impact on existing traffic volumes on Pennant Hills Road and the surrounding road network by introducing large numbers of construction vehicles onto these roads.</p> <p>A An assessment of construction traffic impacts is provided in Section 7.1. Construction traffic would be scheduled and managed to minimise potential impacts on the surrounding road where reasonable and feasible.</p>
259 8	<p>Q Traffic impact from increase in heavy vehicles during construction on location streets and intersections</p> <p>A An assessment of construction traffic impacts is provided in Section 7.1. Construction traffic would be scheduled and managed to minimise potential impacts on the surrounding road network where reasonable and feasible.</p>
259 9	<p>Q Traffic impact along spoil haulage routes.</p> <p>A An assessment of construction traffic impacts is provided in Section 7.1.</p>
260 1	<p>Q Existing parking problems on local streets, particularly near to bus and train stops, will increase during construction.</p> <p>A An assessment of construction traffic impacts is provided in Section 7.1. It is proposed to utilise a central parking location for construction workers in order to limit potential parking impacts surrounding the compounds.</p>
260 2	<p>Q Managing pedestrians around heavy construction vehicles especially during school hours.</p> <p>A An assessment of construction traffic impacts, including the identification of mitigation measures which consider the safety of the public, is provided in Section 7.1. Construction traffic would be scheduled and managed to minimise potential impacts on the surrounding road network where feasible and reasonable.</p>
260 3	<p>Public transport impact Q Changes to public transport service and routes along Pennant Hill Roads, Hills M2 Motorway and local streets during construction and operation.</p> <p>A Potential impacts on public transport and local streets during construction and operation of the project are described in Section 7.7.</p>
260 4	<p>Q Changes to public transport services and routes along the Hills M2 Motorway during construction and operation.</p> <p>A Potential impacts on public transport during construction and operation of the project are described in Section 7.7.</p>
260 5	<p>Q Impact to existing bus stops including Barclay Road and Oakes Road during construction and / or operation.</p> <p>A Potential impacts on public transport during construction and operation, including potential for alterations to the Barclay Road and Oakes Road bus stops are described in Section 7.7.</p>
260 6	<p>Q Provision of additional parking around train stations and bus stops should be considered.</p> <p>A Provision of additional car parking for public transport infrastructure is outside the scope of this project.</p>
260 7	<p>Cyclist considerations Q Impact to cyclists on the Hills M2 Motorway during construction of required westbound integration work.</p> <p>A Potential impacts on cyclists during construction and alternative cycle routes are discussed in Section 7.7.3.</p>

260 8	<p>Q Safety and design considerations for an alternative cycle route during construction.</p> <p>A Potential impacts on cyclists during construction and alternative cycle routes are discussed in Section 7.7.</p>
260 9	<p>Q Opportunity to include a dedicated cycle lane on Pennant Hills Road. The project offers the potential to consider enhancements along Pennant Hills Road in the future, however these do not form part of this project.</p> <p>A The potential for future embellishments would be subject to separate consideration by relevant government agencies and local councils.</p>
260 10	<p>Operational traffic safety Q Likelihood of an incident as a result of overheight vehicles within the tunnel. The tunnel has been designed as the highest tunnel is Sydney to reduce the likelihood of an incident involving overheight vehicles.</p> <p>A This, along with tunnel overheight detection systems are discussed in Section 8.2.</p>
261 1	<p>Q Risk to local communities of a tunnel collapse incident similar to what occurred during construction of the Lane Cove Road tunnel.</p> <p>A Lessons learnt from the Lane Cove tunnel incident have been applied to the design and construction methods for this project. The risk of tunnel collapse is discussed in Section 8.2.</p>
261 2	<p>Q Tunnel design features to minimise driver fatigue and potential for in-tunnel incidents.</p> <p>A Measures to minimise operational hazards and risks including the potential for in-tunnel incidents are provided in Section 8.2. In-tunnel way finding signage is proposed in order to provide interest to the journey through the tunnel and minimise the risk of driver fatigue.</p>
261 3	<p>Hazard and incident response Q Tunnel design features to minimise driver fatigue and potential for in-tunnel incidents.</p> <p>A Measures to minimise operational hazards and risks including the potential for in-tunnel incidents are provided in Section 8.2. In-tunnel way finding signage is proposed in order to provide interest to the journey through the tunnel and minimise the risk of driver fatigue.</p>
261 4	<p>Q Incident management in case of fire or blackout in the tunnel.</p> <p>A Tunnel emergency management infrastructure and procedures are described in Chapter 5 and Section 8.2.</p>
261 5	<p>Q Potential for motorists to be trapped in the tunnel during major bushfire events. The M1 Pacific Motorway and Pennant Hills Road have been blocked as a result of bushfires in the past.</p> <p>A The design of tunnel includes in-tunnel management measures in the event of incidents. These are described in Section 8.2.</p>
261 6	<p>Q Development of emergency response management plan.</p> <p>A The emergency response and management features of the project are described in Section 8.2.</p>
261 7	<p>Noise and vibration Q Existing and increasing noise levels from heavy vehicles on Pennant Hills Road.</p> <p>A Assessment of construction and operational noise impacts is provided in Section 7.2 and Appendix F.</p>
261 8	<p>Q Existing and increasing noise levels on Hills M2 Motorway from heavy vehicles and the use of compression breaking. Existing noise issues since the connection with the Westlink M7 remains unresolved and will increase as a result of widening work and additional heavy vehicles from the tunnel.</p> <p>A Assessment of construction and operational noise impacts is provided in Section 7.2 and Appendix F.</p>
261 9	<p>Q Existing and increasing noise levels along the M1 Pacific Motorway.</p> <p>A Assessment of construction and operational noise impacts is provided in Section 7.2 and Appendix F.</p>

262 1	<p>Q Acceptability of noise impact assessment methodology, including adequacy of monitoring and modelling as well as the process for determining noise mitigation options and properties eligible to receive noise treatment.</p> <p>A The noise and vibration methodology, assessment of potential impacts, and management and mitigation measures are provided in Section 7.2 and Appendix F.</p>
262 2	<p>Q Noise wall movements along the NorthConnex tunnel, M1 Pacific Motorway and the Hills M2 Motorway.</p> <p>A Measures to manage and mitigate operational noise impacts, including an assessment of noise barriers, is provided in Section 7.2.</p>
262 3	<p>Q Noise wall design, height, material and colour. Noise walls should blend into environmental surroundings, eg painted green, similar to some existing noise walls along the Hills M2 Motorway.</p> <p>A An assessment of visual and urban design impacts including noise walls is provided Section 7.5. Final details of the nature, location and design of noise walls would be established during detailed design of the project.</p>
262 4	<p>Q Consideration of noise walls along the Darling Mills Creek viaduct on the Hills M2 Motorway.</p> <p>A Measures to manage and mitigate operational noise impacts, including an assessment of noise barriers, is provided in Section 7.2. Final details of the nature, location and design of noise walls would be established during detailed design of the project.</p>
262 5	<p>Q Design and extent of new noise walls around the tunnel support facilities and ventilation facilities. Clarification on existing noise walls to be retained along the M1 Pacific Motorway.</p> <p>A Measures to manage and mitigate operational noise impacts, including an assessment of noise barriers, is provided in Section 7.2. Final details of the nature, location and design of noise walls would be established during detailed design of the project.</p>
262 6	<p>Q Inadequate existing noise walls along existing roads including the Hills M2 Motorway and M1 Pacific Motorway. Many existing noise walls are made of old materials and are not high enough.</p> <p>A Measures to manage and mitigation operational noise impacts, including an assessment of noise barriers, is provided in Section 7.2. Final details of the nature, location and design of noise walls would be established during detailed design of the project.</p>
262 7	<p>Q Noise impact at properties located near to ventilation outlets and the tunnel support facilities during construction and operation.</p> <p>A Assessment of construction and operational noise impacts is provided in Section 7.2 and Appendix F.</p>
263 1	<p>Q Noise impact on residential properties nearby construction compounds and along spoil disposal haulage routes.</p> <p>A Assessment of construction noise impacts, including construction traffic noise, is provided in Section 7.2 and Appendix F.</p>
263 2	<p>Q Noise impact as a result of night work as part of tunnelling and along the Hills M2</p> <p>A Assessment of construction noise impacts, including potential out of hours works, is provided in Section 7.2 and Appendix F.</p>
263 3	<p>Q Vibration impact as a result of tunnelling work and construction activities, particularly at night.</p> <p>A Assessment of construction vibration impacts is provided in Section 7.2 and Appendix F.</p>
263 4	<p>Q Vibration impact in homes located above the tunnel during operation, particularly where the tunnel ramps are shallow to the surface.</p> <p>A Assessment of construction vibration impacts is provided in Section 7.2 and Appendix F.</p>

263 5	<p>Q Operational vibration impact resulting in disruption and property damage.</p> <p>A Assessment of construction vibration impacts is provided in Section 7.2. The operation of the project tunnels is not anticipated to generate vibration impacts.</p>
263 6	<p>Q Acceptable noise levels for construction and operation. Assessment of construction and operational noise impacts is provided in Section 7.2.</p> <p>A The noise criteria have been established in accordance with the relevant applicable noise assessment guidelines and policies endorsed by the Environment Protection Authority.</p>
263 7	<p>Q Impact along the Hills M2 Motorway from night work and the relocation of existing operational noise walls.</p> <p>A Assessment of construction and operational noise impacts is provided in Section 7.2, including for construction activities to be conducted outside of standard construction hours.</p>
263 8	<p>Q Construction noise impact at properties along Pennant Hills Road, the Hills M2 Motorway and around the two interchanges.</p> <p>A Assessment of construction noise impacts is provided in Section 7.2 and Appendix F.</p>
263 9	<p>Air quality Q Construction dust impact at properties near Pennant Hills Road, Hills M2 Motorway and construction compounds.</p> <p>A Assessment of construction air quality impacts is provided in Section 7.3 and Appendix G.</p>
263 10	<p>Q Potential improvements to local air quality that would result from less congestion and traffic on Pennant Hills Road.</p> <p>A Assessment of operational air quality impacts and benefits is provided in Section 7.3 and Appendix G.</p>
264 1	<p>Q Qualitative and quantitative effects on regional and local air quality.</p> <p>Assessment of construction and operational air quality impacts is provided in Section 7.3 and Appendix G.</p>
264 2	<p>Q Monitoring, management and mitigation of potential local air quality impact. Transparency and availability of air quality data and assessments to the public.</p> <p>A Assessment of construction and operational air quality impacts and measures to manage and mitigate the impact is provided in Section 7.3. Air quality data is provided in the technical working paper: air quality in Appendix G.</p>
264 3	<p>Q Opportunity for tunnel design to minimise in tunnel air quality impact. The tunnel has been designed to maintain appropriate air quality within the tunnel that is protective of the health and amenity of motorists.</p> <p>A An assessment of the air quality within the tunnels is provided in Section 7.4.</p>
264 4	<p>Q Number, location and design height of ventilation facilities along the project</p> <p>A A description of ventilation systems and facilities is provided in Chapter 5 and Section 7.3.</p>
264 5	<p>Q Opportunity to use filtration to treat air quality in the tunnel and from ventilation facilities such as on the M5 East, particularly in residential areas.</p> <p>A Discussion of potential filtration as part of the project ventilation system is provided in Section 7.3. Based on an assessment of the costs and benefits of tunnel filtration, and in light of the minimal air quality and human health impacts of the project, it has been concluded that tunnel filtration is not warranted.</p>
264 6	<p>Q Management of in-tunnel air quality during operation and during incident response.</p> <p>A The project ventilation system has been designed to maintain appropriate air quality within the tunnel that is protective of the health and amenity of motorists. An assessment of the air quality within the tunnels is provided in Section 7.4.</p>

264 7	<p>Q Location of existing background air quality monitoring stations.</p> <p>A The rationale for the locations of the background air quality monitoring stations is provided in Section 7.3.</p>
264 8	<p>Q Duration of background monitoring to inform the air quality assessment.</p> <p>A An overview of background air quality monitoring is provided in Section 7.3.</p>
264 9	<p>Q Location of permanent air quality monitoring locations as part of tunnel operations.</p> <p>A Operational air quality monitoring is described in Section 7.3. Details of operational air quality monitoring would be developed during detailed design of the project, and to meet the specific requirements of conditions of approval, if relevant.</p>
264 10	<p>Q Consideration should be given to monitoring air quality at residential properties nearby the ventilation outlets.</p> <p>A Operational air quality monitoring is described in Section 7.3. Details of operational air quality monitoring would be developed during detailed design of the project, and to meet the specific requirements of conditions of approval, if relevant.</p>
264 11	<p>Q Clarification on what pollutants are being monitored and measured.</p> <p>A The air quality impact assessment methodology is provided in Section 7.3, including pollutants that have been monitored.</p>
265 1	<p>Q Clarification on who is responsible for monitoring and the analysis of the results.</p> <p>A Monitoring has been undertaken by the project on behalf of Roads and Maritime. The analysis of air quality results has been undertaken as part of the environmental impact statement. Future monitoring requirements would be determined in consultation with the Environment Protection Authority and would be undertaken by the motorway operator.</p>
265 2	<p>Q Existing air quality impact along the Hills M2 Motorway, M1 Pacific Motorway and Pennant Hills Road will not be addressed but rather impact will increase.</p> <p>A The assessment of construction and operational air quality impacts and benefits is provided in Section 7.3. Air quality modelling has been conducted for areas likely to be affected by air quality changes associated with the project.</p>
265 3	<p>Q Consideration of weather conditions as part of the air quality assessment.</p> <p>A The air quality impact assessment includes consideration of meteorological conditions. The methodology is described in Section 7.3.</p>
265 4	<p>Q Air pollution contributions from NorthConnex tunnel emissions in comparison to other pollution source in Sydney.</p> <p>A Assessment of construction and operational air quality impacts and benefits is provided in Section 7.3. Predicted contributions of air pollutants from the project have been compared with background concentrations of those pollutants.</p>
265 5	<p>Q Consideration for the EPA to license emissions discharge from the tunnel under the <i>Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997</i>.</p> <p>A Schedule 1 of the <i>Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997</i> provides activities for which an environment protection licence is required. It includes construction but not operation of the project.</p>
265 6	<p>Q Assessment of impacts from nano- particles as part of the air quality assessment.</p> <p>The air quality assessment has been undertaken in accordance with the Director-General's Requirements and the Approved Methods for the Modelling and Assessment of Air Pollutants (DEC, 2005a). The methodology is described in Section 7.3. The assessments particles as small as the PM2.5 fraction.</p>
265 7	<p>Q Scope of air quality assessment to include the tunnel at full capacity. The air quality assessment includes a scenario for the theoretical maximum peak hour capacity.</p> <p>A This is provided in Section 7.3.</p>

265 8	<p>Q Potential assessment of impacts from tunnel portal emissions. Assessment of operational air quality impacts and benefits is provided in Section 7.3.</p> <p>A The project does not currently propose portal emissions from the main alignment tunnels, however this approach may be considered in the future and would be subject to appropriate assessment and approval at the relevant time.</p>
265 9	<p>Q Air quality assessment to include the microclimate of the Spring Gully valley, prevailing winds and other metrological conditions.</p> <p>A The air quality impact assessment includes consideration of local and regional meteorological conditions. The methodology is described in Section 7.3.</p>
266 1	<p>Q Requirements and scope for continuous monitoring of air quality impacts and transparency in reporting.</p> <p>A Operational air quality monitoring is described in Section 7.3. Details of operational air quality monitoring would be developed during detailed design of the project, and to meet the specific requirements of conditions of approval, if relevant.</p>
266 2	<p>Q Two ventilation outlets are insufficient to manage in-tunnel air quality and will result in concentrating emissions at two points rather than distributing emissions across multiple points.</p> <p>A Assessment of operational air quality impacts within the tunnel and around the two ventilation outlets is provided in Section 7.3. The assessment demonstrates that two ventilation facilities are adequate to ensure that air pollution contributions from the project are within air quality and health risk criteria, and in most cases lower than existing background pollution.</p>
266 3	<p>Health Q Air quality impact as a result of the project may cause health issues for residents living near ventilation and emergency smoke extraction facilities.</p> <p>A Assessment of health impacts is provided in Section 7.4. The health assessment demonstrates that the project would not pose an unacceptable health risk.</p>
266 4	<p>Q Adverse impacts from air pollution, particularly on young children and elderly residents.</p> <p>A Assessment of health impacts is provided in Section 7.4. The assessment includes consideration of sensitive populations, including infants, children and the elderly.</p>
266 5	<p>Q Air quality impact at schools and other sensitive receivers within the project corridor.</p> <p>A Assessment of health impacts is provided in Section 7.4. The assessment includes consideration of sensitive receivers.</p>
266 6	<p>Q Health impacts on nearby residents experiencing increased stress caused by the project.</p> <p>A Assessment of health impacts is provided in Section 7.4.</p>
266 7	<p>Q Impacts from new substations on local residents as a result of exposure to electro-magnetic fields.</p> <p>A Consideration of electric and magnetic fields from substations is provided in Section 8.2. Substations and electrical infrastructure would be designed to meet current guidance on electric and magnetic fields from the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA).</p>
266 8	<p>Q Impacts on health as a result of long- term exposure versus short term impacts and irritation.</p> <p>A Assessment of health impacts is provided in Section 7.4. The assessment includes consideration of both acute (short term) and chronic (long term) health effects.</p>
266 9	<p>Q Increase in the incidence of cancer and cardio-respiratory disease as a result of the project.</p> <p>A Assessment of health impacts is provided in Section 7.4. The assessment includes consideration of cancer and cardio-respiratory disease.</p>
266 10	<p>Q Impact of ultra-fine particles on health.</p> <p>A Assessment of health impacts is provided in Section 7.4.</p>

267 1	<p>Q Response to findings from previous reports, noting impact to local air quality as a result of tunnel ventilation outlets and / or portals.</p> <p>A Assessment of health impacts is provided in Section 7.4. The assessment considers previous advice from the National Health & Medical Research Council in relation to air quality in and around road tunnels.</p>
267 2	<p>Landscape character and visual amenity Q Noise wall treatment and colour should complement existing environmental surroundings along the M1 Pacific Motorway and the Hills M2 Motorway.</p> <p>A An assessment of visual and urban design including noise walls is provided Section 7.5. Noise wall treatment long the Mills M2 Motorway would be consistent with the urban design for the recently completed Hills M2 Motorway Upgrade project.</p>
267 3	<p>Q Visual impact on nearby residents from the location of signage and lighting along the Hill M2 Motorway, tunnel portals, toll gantries and other support facilities.</p> <p>A Assessment of visual impact from the operation of the project is provided in Section 7.5.</p>
267 4	<p>Q Visual impact from tunnel ramps and entry and exit portals, including view changes and impacted sight lines.</p> <p>A Assessment of visual impact from the operation of the project is provided in Section 7.5.</p>
267 5	<p>Q Visual impact of ventilation facilities and outlets.</p> <p>A Assessment of visual impact from the operation of the project is provided in Section 7.5.</p>
267 6	<p>Q Request for permanent noise walls and landscaping plantings around the operational ancillary facilities to be carried out early in the construction program.</p> <p>A In response to feedback received during the preferred tender design exhibition a mitigation measure was incorporated to consider the early implementation of permanent noise walls and landscaping around operational ancillary facilities during construction planning. This is described in Section 7.5.</p>
267 7	<p>Q Visual impact from tunnel support facilities.</p> <p>A Assessment of visual impact from the operation of the project is provided in Section 7.5. In response to the feedback received during the preferred tender design exhibition, the two tunnel support facilities have been lowered in height to reduce their overall bulk and visual impact.</p>
267 8	<p>Q Impacts from poor landscaping along existing noise walls and the removal of existing vegetation during construction.</p> <p>A An assessment of visual impact from construction and operation of the project is provided in Section 7.5. Further details of urban design and landscaping measures would be developed during detailed design.</p>
267 9	<p>Q Overshadowing and privacy impacts from new buildings on residential properties.</p> <p>An assessment of visual impact from the operation of the project, including consideration of overshadowing, is provided in Section 7.5.</p>
268 1	<p>Biodiversity Q Identification, management and monitoring of potential impacts on the remaining Blue Gum Forest ridge line. Impact may result from a change in ground conditions and geology.</p> <p>A An assessment of biodiversity impacts, including impacts to Blue Gum High Forest, from construction of the project is provided in Section 7.6.</p>
268 2	<p>Q Assessment of impact on microbats and their habitat as a result of the project and nearby ventilation facilities.</p> <p>A Assessment of biodiversity impacts from construction and operation of the project, including potential impacts to microbats, is provided in Section 7.6.</p>
268 3	<p>Q Loss of established trees and vegetation currently providing a buffer to existing roads.</p> <p>A Assessment of biodiversity impacts from construction and operation of the project is provided in Section 7.6. Visual impacts associated with the loss of screening vegetation are provided in Section 7.5.</p>

268 4	<p>Q Replanting of native flora during and post construction.</p> <p>A Further details of urban design and landscaping measures would be developed during detailed design. It is intended that landscaping would be implemented with native species.</p>
268 5	<p>Q Seed collection before the removal of vegetation to develop native tube stock for replanting.</p> <p>A Rehabilitation measures to mitigate biodiversity impacts are provided in Section 7.6.</p>
268 6	<p>Q Potential impacts on the Bidjigal Reserve Trust land management area.</p> <p>A Assessment of biodiversity impact from construction and operation of the project is provided in Section 7.6. The assessment takes into account potential indirect impacts on the Bidjigal Reserve.</p>
268 7	<p>Geology and soils Q Concern regarding unstable geotechnical conditions along the corridor.</p> <p>A Assessment of regional geology is provided in Section 7.8. Consideration of potential hazards and risks associated with unstable ground conditions are provided in Section 8.2.</p>
268 8	<p>Q Uncertainty regarding existing underground services resulting in tunnelling impacts.</p> <p>A Impacts to existing services are described in Section 8.1.</p>
268 9	<p>Surface water and ground water Q Management of drainage and groundwater issues along the length of the tunnel.</p> <p>A Assessment of surface water impacts, including management measures, is provided in Section 7.9. Assessment of groundwater impacts, including management measures, is provided in Section 7.8.</p>
268 10	<p>Q Impacts on existing protected riparian zones such as Spring Gully Creek.</p> <p>A Assessment of surface water impacts and measures to manage and mitigate these impacts is provided in Section 7.9.</p>
268 11	<p>Q Concerns regarding existing drainage issues.</p> <p>A Assessment of surface water impacts and measures to manage and mitigate these impacts is provided in Section 7.9.</p>
269 1	<p>Non-Aboriginal heritage Q Impacts on the Hornsby Heritage Conservation Area. Assessment of potential non-provided in Section 7.10.</p>
269 2	<p>Resource management and waste minimisation Q Management and storage of material from the tunnel and associated surface work.</p> <p>A Management, storage and disposal of spoil is described in Section 8.3.</p>
269 3	<p>Q Peak oil phenomenon and its potential impact on project viability.</p> <p>A Peak oil is discussed in Section 8.3.</p>
269 4	<p>Cumulative impacts Q Cumulative construction impacts and fatigue experienced by nearby residents from the project (including the Hills M2 Motorway integration work), the North West Rail Link, the Epping to Thornleigh third track and the Hills M2 Motorway Upgrade project.</p> <p>A Cumulative impacts with other major construction projects in the region are assessed within the relevant impact assessment sections in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8. Potential construction fatigue associated with the Hills M2 Motorway integration works are discussed in Section 7.2.</p>
269 5	<p>Social and economic Q Social and economic Impact on and loss of community facilities to accommodate construction sites.</p> <p>A Assessment of construction and operational impacts on community facilities is provided in Section 7.7.</p>
269 6	<p>Q Aesthetic impact at properties near Pennant Hills Road and the Hills M2 Motorway as a result of construction activities.</p> <p>A An assessment of visual impacts from construction is provided Section 7.5.</p>

269 7	<p>Q Impact on quality of life for residents living near ventilation outlets.</p> <p>A Consideration of social impacts is provided in Section 7.7. Impacts on the community are described throughout the relevant assessment chapters.</p>
269 8	<p>Q Recent community impact from the Hills M2 Motorway Upgrade project.</p> <p>A Assessment of cumulative noise impacts and potential construction fatigue along the Hills M2 Motorway (from the cumulative impacts of the project and the recently completed Hills M2 Motorway Upgrade project) is provided in Section 7.2.</p>
269 9	<p>Business Q Business Impact on local business as a result of acquisition or loss in passing trade on Pennant Hills Road.</p> <p>A Potential business impacts, including from direct acquisition and from a loss in passing trade is provided in Section 7.7.</p>
269 10	<p>Q Impact on local businesses as a result of construction impact.</p> <p>A Potential business impacts during construction are described in Section 7.7.</p>
270 1	<p>Q Opportunities for local businesses.</p> <p>A Potential business impacts and opportunities during construction and operation are described in Section 7.7.</p>
270 2	<p>Q Support for businesses affected by the project.</p> <p>A Mitigation and management measures relating to business impacts are provided in Section 7.7.</p>
270 3	<p>Land use and property Q Early identification and notification of potentially impacted properties along the corridor. Rights and influence (do property owners have a say?) of potentially affected property owners.</p> <p>A Details regarding notification and consultation with affected stakeholders are provided in this Section 6.1 and Section 6.3.1 of this chapter. Additional details regarding property impacts are provided in Section 8.1.</p>
270 4	<p>Q Property damage as a result of construction and operation and rectification of damage by the project.</p> <p>A Existing conditions surveys would be undertaken on properties within the preferred project corridor. This, and the potential for damage to properties from vibration, is described in Section 7.2.</p>
270 5	<p>Q Property acquisition of Roads and Maritime owned properties near the southern interchange for the project.</p> <p>A Details regarding property acquisition are provided in Section 8.1. Roads and Maritime already own a number of properties required for the project.</p>
270 6	<p>Q Impact on properties located near the southern and northern interchanges.</p> <p>A Assessment of impacts on land use and property is provided in Section 8.1.</p>
270 7	<p>Q Certainty of the nature and the extent of properties affected by acquisition as part of the project.</p> <p>A Details regarding property acquisition are provided in Section 8.1.</p>
270 8	<p>Q Property valuation process and timing – the project should purchase properties</p> <p>A Property acquisition would be undertaken in accordance with the <i>Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991</i>.</p>
270 9	<p>Q Property owner compensation for loss of property value and quality of life impact as a result of the project.</p> <p>A This environmental impact statement demonstrates that the project would not have a significant impact on surrounding properties or receivers. There would therefore be no basis for devaluation of properties as a result of the potential impacts of the project.</p>

270 10	<p>Q Property value guarantee and/or buy back scheme similar to what was offered as part of the M5 East project.</p> <p>A This environmental impact statement demonstrates that the project would not have a significant impact on surrounding properties or receivers. There would therefore be no basis for devaluation of properties as a result of the potential impacts of the project.</p>
270 11	<p>Q Impact on property values above the tunnel or nearby ancillary surface infrastructure.</p> <p>A This environmental impact statement demonstrates that the project would not have a significant impact on surrounding properties or receivers. There would therefore be no basis for devaluation of properties as a result of the potential impacts of the project.</p>
271 1	<p>Q Consideration of voluntary property acquisition as part of the project.</p> <p>A Property acquisition would be undertaken for properties Property acquisition would be undertaken in accordance with the <i>Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991</i>.</p>
271 2	<p>Q Impact of sub-stratum land acquisition, constraining the future development of private property.</p> <p>A Property acquisition, including sub-stratum acquisition, would be undertaken in accordance with the <i>Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991</i>.</p>
271 3	<p>Q Compensation for sub-stratum land acquisition.</p> <p>A Property acquisition, including sub-stratum acquisition would be undertaken in accordance with the <i>Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991</i>.</p>
271 4	<p>Q Unnecessary impact on private property instead of using public spaces such as Observatory Park and Brickpit Park.</p> <p>A The site selection process to determine the location of construction and operational ancillary facilities is provided in Chapter 4. Impacts to Observatory Park have been avoided due to the high ecological and heritage value of that site. Brickpit Park is an historical landfill, and has been avoided based on contamination and geotechnical stability issues.</p>
271 5	<p>Q Long-term insurance from the project for damages that occur in the future, post construction, as a result of tunnel operation.</p> <p>A Existing condition surveys of properties within the preferred project corridor would be undertaken prior to construction in consultation with each property owner. Any damage attributable to the project would be rectified at no cost to the property owner.</p>
271 6	<p>Q Request for additional geotechnical investigations nearby residences to avoid property impacts and confirm suitability of ground conditions for tunneling.</p> <p>Geotechnical investigations have been undertaken to inform the preferred tender design. It is likely that additional geotechnical investigation would be required to inform the detailed design for the project.</p>
271 7	<p>Q Damage to homes from heavy vehicle movements on residential streets, particularly on older or heritage listed properties.</p> <p>A Vibration impacts from construction and operation, and management measures are provided in Section 7.2. Potential impacts to heritage listed properties are assessed in Section 7.10.</p>

Amalgamation of events, media releases, newspaper articles, letters, reports and GIPA applications leading up to the 15 July 2014 EIS for Transurban's unsolicited offer to build the M1 – M2 tunnel.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAPERS supporting an M7-F3 link instead of M2-F3 (Refer Waite map)

2003		Hopwood seeks second crossing
2005	20 May	Civic Trust to DOTARS listing issues raised at 10 March meeting with Ruddock and DOTARS. P2 Option C is a stand-alone route that will be shown in time to have a far greater reduction on PH Rd traffic than the proposed tunnel.
2005	2 Aug	HIT public meeting at Pennant Hills. Paper logically sets out why Option C is the best short and long term option.
2006	16 Jan	Hopwood supports Option C because bushfires can cut off all access to and from the north. (Note 16 Jan 2003 comment)
2006	12 Mar	Well attended PH public meeting unanimously supports Option C
2006	14 Mar	Hills News reports O'Farrell, Hopwood, Richardson and Tink all support C. Berman 'tunnel proposal should be rethought'. [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
2006	29 Nov	HIT Epping Club meeting. The vast majority supported C when they had the reasons explained. This included Mr Greg Smith before his election as Epping MP.
2006	16 Dec	Bruce Mills B ward Labor candidate supports option C.
2007	22 Jan	Hopwood compelling case for second crossing. Ref 6 January 06.
2007	15 Mar	[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
2007	25 June	Richardson (& Williams) call for option C.
2007	12 Nov	Ruddock notes Pearlman suggested a future crossing is needed.
2007	Dec	Richardson again calls for option C.
2010	June	Smith's letter to Epping electorate supports F3 – M7 link.
2010	Sept	Smith's newsletter asks where is money Howard set aside for link.
2010	Undated	Ruddock reports M2 – F3 link not expected until 2026. <u>THIS WILL BE 10 YEARS TOO LATE!</u>
2012	April	PWC 'The F3-M2 connector: Supporting research for NSROC
2012	12 April	Ruddock supports NSROC's proposal
2012	19 July	Transurban and Gay announce no cost proposed link
2012	23 July	[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

End of 31 July 2012.

Commencement of new information from 8 July 2011 – 13 months earlier

[illegible]

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TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR A STUDY INTO ROUTE OPTIONS FOR THE NATIONAL HIGHWAY THROUGH NORTHERN SYDNEY

The purpose of the study is to:

- identify a route for the National Highway from the WSO to the F3 to relieve pressure on Pennant Hills Road (the interim National Highway route) recognizing that there is no scope for further upgrading on the current route. and
- investigate funding scenarios for the identified route

Identifying the route

In identifying the route account should be taken of:

1. the forecast traffic growth (both heavy and light vehicles) in the period to 2025;
2. the impact on traffic of various funding scenarios identified to finance the Pennant Hills alternative;
3. land use and planned land use in the area through which the road would pass;
4. National Parks and other environmentally sensitive areas;
5. costs, including both construction and maintenance (ie on a whole of life basis);
6. Commonwealth and State regional development strategies for metropolitan Sydney, Gosford and the Central Coast to Newcastle and beyond, outer urban Sydney, and the far north coast of NSW;
7. The need to cater for both National Highway through traffic and commuter traffic; and
8. Staging options.

The following nearby developments in relation to the National Highway can also be an adjunct to the study:

- upgrades that may be necessary to the F3 and M2 in conjunction with the construction of the Northern Sydney link;
- the feasibility study currently in progress for widening of the F3 between Wahroonga and Karing

The identified new route must be suitable for construction of an urban freeway standard road with adequate capacity for the forecast traffic (both commercial and non-commercial) in 2025. Route options should examine the feasibility of tunneling to avoid built up areas.

Integrated transport

In developing route options the consultant is required to integrate any option as far as possible into Sydney's current and planned transport system with objective of relieving traffic pressures on the rest of the road network and local communities. The consultant is specifically required to take account of:

- road, rail and air nodes;
- the NSW proposal to upgrade the Sydney to Newcastle railway, and
- investigate opportunities for public transport from the development of a new National Highway route eg dedicated public transport or high occupancy lanes

Funding options

The study should examine and identify funding options including networking options involving the upgraded parts of the F3 (ie new lanes), the Northern Sydney Link and other links that feed onto the F3. The scope for private sector participation should also be examined.

Consultation

In developing the preferred route Commonwealth, State, Local Government and other interested bodies and the community should be consulted. The successful consultant will need to draw up a program of extensive community consultation to ensure all views are taken into account.

The output

1. A detailed report discussing options and reasons for the preferred option. All assumptions are to be clearly stated and justified.
2. An estimate of the total cost, including land acquisition, and each of the major components for the preferred route and other options.
3. An analysis of private sector financing options
4. Economic evaluation of the preferred route and other options.

5. A broad assessment of the environmental impacts of the preferred route and other options
6. An account of the process of the community consultation, and the outcomes.
7. A map with sufficient detail to allow it to be adopted by NSW planning bodies into their planning schemes. The plan should show the location of major bridges, cuts, fill, tunnels and any other major features.

Roads and Traffic Authority
Department of Transport and Regional Services

4 January 2001

Preface

This Value Management Workshop record presents the findings of a Value Management Workshop held in September 2003 as part of the F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study. The Study applied strategic analysis to the assessment of corridor types and feasible route options to determine an acceptable and preferred option which best satisfies National Highway objectives.

A number of specific routes and associated engineering details such as interchange and ventilation layouts were developed and analysed during the course of the Study, for the purpose of determining feasibility and assessing the options. The specific routes and details described in this document should be seen in this context.

It may be necessary to read sections from the Main Report and Working Papers listed below to gain a more complete understanding of the information being reported in this record:

Value Management Workshop No.1 Record, June 2002

Draft Options Development Report, October 2002

Working Paper No 1:	Community Consultation Report
Working Paper No 2	Engineering Design and Costings Report
Working Paper No 3	Urban Design, Landscape and Visual Assessment Report
Working Paper No 4	Traffic and Transportation Report
Working Paper No 5	Social and Environmental Studies Report
Working Paper No 6	Tunnel Investigations Report
Working Paper No 7	Economics Report

Access to the Main Report is available via the study website at:

<http://commcons.skm.com.au/f3tosydneyorbital>

Details on how to gain access to the Working Papers can be found on the study website.

If Government decides to further develop the recommended option from this Study, an EIS concept proposal including a route alignment and other details will be developed for further assessment. Community consultation will continue through each stage of project development.

- some relief to the interim National Highway;
- expensive (>\$2 billion);
- difficult to stage; and
- would not provide an additional crossing of the Hawkesbury River.

Type A corridor options, which envisage a route mostly in a tunnel, are the preferred approach for a 20-year period. Some concerns apply, particularly in resolving how to connect with the M2 and the F3 and the effects of long tunnels on driver behaviour.

Tunnel Characteristics

- Separate one-way dual tunnels
- Separate ventilation tunnels
- Carriageway widened to suit long tunnels
- Climbing lanes where grades are greater than 4.5%
- Minimum of 2 ventilation stacks
- EPA standards adopted for internal and external air quality

Four feasible options have been developed - Purple, Blue, Yellow and Red moving from Purple in the northwest through Blue and Yellow to Red in the east. The entrance portals create the greatest challenges. The Purple and Blue routes operate very similarly in terms of transport outcomes.

The closer the route is to Pennant Hills Rd, the more traffic would be attracted from the road to the tunnel. Therefore, it is apparent that the Blue and the Purple options would relieve Pennant Hills Rd of more traffic than either Yellow or Red. In a network sense, the Red and to a lesser extent the Yellow option would also take traffic off the Pacific Highway so, in terms of overall network benefits there is little separating Purple and Blue relative to Red.

In conclusion, a major investment of this kind would change the way people behave. On a network such as Sydney's, there would be a significant amount of re-distributed traffic. By building the new link there would be a redistribution of up to 20% of traffic in the corridor and that would provide benefits throughout the rest of the northern network.

2.5 Base Information

Key members of the study team outlined the base information and assumptions that were used in undertaking the F3 to SO Link Study and in developing the options presented at the VM workshop. These presentations occurred when appropriate to support the subject matter under discussion or when a workshop participant requested information.

2.6 Key Points from Presentations

The participants were asked to briefly outline the key points that they had taken from the information presented. The items identified were as follows (note that there was not necessarily agreement from all present on all of these items):

- With regard to the F3 widening the 'Do nothing' Option is not an Option
- A 20 year study period is too short for the scale of the project

- Major investment!!
 - Commonwealth vs State objectives are different
 - How accurate is the assessment of the growth on the Central Coast / Sydney?
 - What is the likelihood of rail improvements?
 - Freight vs passengers (re both, or if we need to chose, which is more important?)
 - Whether the assumptions for rail (forecast of 40% shift) will be achieved
 - Capital cost forecast - in general how accurate?
 - There appears to be a demand for a road upgrade regardless of rail improvements
 - Fit with other projects – Sydney Orbital, Lane Cove Tunnel
 - Why have we structured the study to 20 years? Should be an assessment for a longer period?
 - Is it correct to assume that the Central Coast economy will stay the same?
 - Limits of the capacity on the F3
 - It is a National Hwy project, however there is a small % of National Hwy traffic vs regional (Sydney)
 - Peak hour congestion is predicted to occur on a Type A road link in as little as 10 years after opening
 - Demand management for commuters from the Central Coast
 - Local traffic management issues
 - Clarification of State and Commonwealth objectives
 - Do both Options A & C need to be looked at in relation to:
 - Short term "Option A"
 - Long term "Option C"?
 - Competing functions of roads
 - Affordability
 - Air quality issues
 - Freight: impact on Port Botany expansion vs Hunter Port (for example)
 - Significant differences in the level of relief to Pennant Hills Road and Pacific Hwy result from the different Type A Options
 - Local & regional air quality will be key issues for consideration
- X Project justification is essential. Type C needs to be convincingly rejected before any of the Type A Options can be seriously addressed. In considering the Type C scenario in comparison to Type A, the following need to be addressed:

- What value is placed on another (strategic) crossing of the Hawkesbury River?

- Which scenario better meets the objectives of the National Hwy program?
- Is an "Albury Bypass" scenario with an initial 2-lane configuration along the Type C alignment appropriate and cost effective?
- Which Type appropriately addresses the transportation of dangerous goods?
- Does the Type C scenario more effectively allow for a rail duplication / rail tunnel to Brooklyn to be justified?
- How do the total cumulative costs, including on-going operation & maintenance (eg tunnel lighting & ventilation) and future road capacity expansions (eg future widening of the F3 with its impacts on national parks) compare between scenarios?
- What are the comparative cumulative implications for the adjoining and "downstream" road network for each Type? (eg future operation of Pennant Hills Road South of M2)
- What are the implications of:
 - growth along the M7 corridor
 - the establishment of industry hubs in western Sydney to service the interstate heavy vehicles which will be attracted to the M7 / Pacific Hwy
- The issue of induced traffic needs to be clarified. A tunnel option should not be economically justified by the need to attract commuter cars, but instead should look at reducing heavy vehicles and general congestion on Pennant Hills Road
- Integrated options need to be adequately addressed to ensure that they would not better achieve the desired outcomes. Combinations could include a range of actions:
 - congestion tolling
 - "Albury Bypass" style of sequenced implementation of Type C
 - surface works along Pennant Hills Road to expand capacity & amenity in partnership with on-going urban redevelopment
 - better integration with public transport/Transitway options
 - joint development/tunnelling for road & rail (note SRA have already proposed a tunnel from Hornsby to Brooklyn)
- Long-term considerations need to be ratified. If Type C does not proceed then decisions should still be made about the need or otherwise for a corridor reservation for future road construction.

Note: in relation to the third objective, the group agreed that 'cost' refers to 'whole of community cost'.

3.2.2 Planning Objectives

- To improve travel conditions on National Highway;
- To improve local amenity along Pennant Hills Road;
- To improve travel reliability and operating costs of long distance commercial and freight transport; and
- To serve the future growth needs of long distance transport.

3.2.3 Project Objectives

High Order

- To create a high standard integrated motorway link between the F3 and the Sydney Orbital;
- To alleviate the poor travelling conditions on the interim National Highway;
- To minimise adverse social and environmental impacts;
- To provide opportunities to improve public transport;
- To be economically justified; and
- To be affordable to Government.

Desirable

- To improve congestion on the surrounding network; and
- To achieve a better amenity for the community along the corridor.

3.2.4 The Purpose of This Study

High Order

- To identify a new high standard transport link between the F3 Freeway and the Sydney Orbital to replace Pennant Hills Road as the interim National Highway; and
- To identify a link that satisfies planning and project objectives.

Specifics / Desirable

- To investigate, plan, consult with community on feasible options;
- To investigate the need for a new link;
- To use robust processes;
- To select a route which minimises social and environmental costs; and
- To develop the preferred scheme.

- Achieving more sustainable transport and planning outcomes;
- Achieving broad community support; and
- Provision of a 'missing link' in Sydney's strategic road network.

3.5 Assumptions

In developing any initiative it is necessary to make assumptions. The group was invited to list any assumptions held regarding the proposed study or project. Each item was discussed and assessed by the group in turn.

The assumptions were categorised as being **a Fact, a Working Assumption, or Questionable**. The items identified are sorted into these categories below.

Facts

- From an engineering perspective, all of the options presented can be built;
- M2 will remain as a toll road for the next 25/30 years;
- Modelling was based on a M2 toll of \$3.20, now it is \$3.80;
- The Purple Option gives the least steep grades in the tunnel which would have air quality benefits;
- Any option that contemplates a bridge/surface option through the National Park would be unacceptable in that it clearly fails to meet the high order project objective of "minimising adverse social and environmental impacts". Also fails to meet objective of minimising cost; *No evidence*
- The Link Study Report will raise road network strategic issues beyond a 20 year time horizon;
- The Blue, Yellow and Red Options have a 6% grade (which is greater when compared with the Purple Option) up to Pearce's Corner;
- The Economic Analysis assumes that tolling for the M2 remains in place;
- The network-wide impacts of increased traffic, with significant changes in the M2 tolling regime, will be assessed as part of the Study;
- There is a high level of confidence in the cost estimates;
- Affordability is very much dependent upon the assumptions;
- There are high operating and maintenance costs associated with all options (reflected in the cost to Government of private financing options);
- The Purple Rail Option could have significant impact on the rail corridor and on passenger and freight operations;
- The Purple Central Access Option allows entry and exit along the centre of the route; ?
- Purple Central Access Option allows improved tunnel operation (fire and life safety); ?
- Central Access is only available economically through the Purple Option; and ?
- Central access to the tunnel is desirable. //

SKM

SEPTEMBER 2002

VM WORKSHOP No2 RECORD

A did not include extras

2/6

Criteria	Purple	Base Case
Meets National Hwy objectives	⊕	-
Affordable	-	⊕
Benefit to Cost Ratio	⊕	-
Minimises Social Impacts	⊕	-
Best for Air Quality:		
• local	⊕	-
• regional	-	-
• stacks	-	-
Best for the General Environment:		
• noise	⊕	-
• flora/fauna	-	⊕
• greenhouse	-	⊕
Best for reducing accidents	⊕	-
Minimises National Parks Impacts	-	-
Legislation	-	⊕
Tunnel Operations	-	⊕
Visual Impact	⊕	-
Public Transport Opportunities	⊕	-

3.13.1 Regional transport needs beyond 2020

The consultant team sought guidance from its clients regarding the need to address longer-term regional transport needs on a timescale of 20 to 50 years. Clarification was sought because during the community consultation process this issue was raised time and again by community members.

The concern expressed by the community was that if planning for a regional transport solution is not commenced now, the opportunity could be lost forever.

Forecasts of population and urban development predict that some of Sydney's future growth would occur to the north and west of the city, the very area where it may be logical to construct a second road link to Sydney from the Central Coast and beyond. The concern is that if a route corridor is not reserved in the relatively short term, issues such as land acquisition and environmental impacts could become insurmountable constraints to the provision of such a link.

Following lengthy discussion, the instruction from DOTARS was that the Australian Government felt that examination of longer term options was outside the scope of the Link Study and the issue should be addressed in another forum. Such analysis should more properly occur as part of a strategic planning study for the Sydney region, considering both land-use and transport. This is now the portfolio responsibility of

NSW Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources (DIPNR). DIPNR advised that they are preparing a Sydney Metropolitan Strategy.

It was agreed however, that the Link Study Report should make reference to the community's expressed concerns regarding the development of longer term transport options to the north of Sydney.

Table 10-2: Indicative construction cost estimates of the preliminary options⁽¹⁾.

Option	Surface ⁽²⁾ (\$ million)	Tunnel (\$ million)	Major bridges ⁽³⁾ (\$ million)*	Property acquisition ⁽⁴⁾ (\$ million)	Planning & Design Costs (\$ million)	Total length ⁽⁵⁾ (km)	Total cost (\$ billion) ⁽⁶⁾	Average cost per km (\$ million/km)
Type A corridor options								
1	\$24	\$1,100	\$0	\$10	\$81	7	\$1.1–1.3	\$190
2	\$42	\$1,500	\$0	\$10	\$110	8	\$1.6–1.9	\$190
3	\$33	\$1,600	\$0	\$10	\$120	9	\$1.7–2.0	\$180
4	\$120	\$1,900	\$0	\$15	\$150	11	\$2.1–2.4	\$180
						Range	\$1.1–2.4	\$180–190
Type B corridor options								
5	\$180	\$2,600	\$0	\$60	\$190	19	\$3.0–3.3	\$170
6	\$530	\$1,700	\$0	\$210	\$130	20	\$2.6–2.9	\$130
7	\$850	\$650	\$270	\$420	\$69	30	\$2.3–2.6	\$78
11	\$1,000	\$630	\$68	\$390	\$53	45	\$2.1–2.4	\$46
13	\$0	\$1,400	\$900	\$10	\$210	15	\$2.5–2.8	\$200
15	\$920	\$130	\$160	\$500	\$50	34	\$1.8–2.1	\$53
17	\$580	\$130	\$160	\$560	\$50	26	\$1.5–1.8	\$69
						Range	\$1.5–3.3	\$46–170
Type C corridor options								
8	\$1,000	\$760	\$350	\$800	\$84	54	\$2.7–3.3	\$51
9	\$630	\$1,800	\$350	\$620	\$160	46	\$3.6–3.9	\$75
10	\$850	\$920	\$350	\$450	\$96	51	\$2.7–3.0	\$50
12	\$980	\$950	\$350	\$520	\$99	44	\$2.9–3.2	\$61
16	\$1,100	\$950	\$350	\$310	\$99	48	\$2.8–3.1	\$62
						Range	\$2.7–3.9	\$50–75

Source: Options Development Report (Draft, October 2002)

Notes:

- The analysis was based on information prepared for Value Management Workshop in June 2002. The information for Type A options was refined as more work was done.
- At grade interchanges assumed for this strategic assessment.
- Allows for major bridges in tunnel and bridge sections.
- Broad estimates only based on unit rates.
- Excludes the length of access ramps.
- These are cost estimates, based on strategic analysis, assuming at-grade interchanges at June 2002. Later analysis provided a slightly different cost range (see Table 4 of the Summary Report):-

Type A: \$1.5 to \$2.2 billion (2003 dollars) X
 Type B: \$1.6 to \$3.4 billion (2003 dollars) X
 Type C: \$2.7 to \$3.6 billion (2003 dollars) X

Cost estimates were generally been prepared assuming a two lane dual carriageway standard, based on an 80 km/h to 110 km/h design speed. The cost estimates for the tunnels in the eastern options (1, 2, 3, 4 and 13) were based on dual three-lane tunnels, but with no new grade separation at the existing interchanges.

In preparing the cost estimates, a number of broad assumptions were made about the location of tunnels, including:

- Tunnels to be generally required below heavily developed areas.

Meeting Notes

28 Aug 2003

DURAL FOCUS GROUP MEETING

5/1

SKM

Project	F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study	Project No	IN06111.302
Place of Meeting	Dural Country Club, Dural	Date	28/08/2003; 7pm
Present	John Brewer, RTA (JB) ← Wilson Poon, RTA Peter Prince, SKM (PP) ← Jo Moss, SKM (JM) Ken Robinson, SKM 12 representatives of community groups Round Corner Village Residents Association; Quarry Road Action Group; Concerned Citizens Group; Quarry Road Action Group; Galston Chamber of Commerce;; Local community; Australian Association of Consulting Archaeologists; Galston Area Residents' Association; Galston Area Residents' Association; Jessica Place Bushcare Group; Dural District Progress Association.		
Purpose of Meeting	Community Focus Group Meeting Number Three		

Please note that this document presents a summary of the presentation, discussions, questions and answers during the meeting. The meeting was not recorded verbatim and this is not a transcript.

1 Introduction – Jo Moss

- JM welcomed participants and thanked them for their participation
- JM outlined the purpose of the meeting and the agenda
- JM reiterated the purpose of the CFG and it was agreed that while discussion of issues is encouraged, participants will ensure that any communications outside the group are clearly represented as their individual view or that of their particular community group and not being representative of the CFG as a whole.
- JB also welcomed participants and commented on the importance of consultation at this stage of the study.

2 Presentation on study outcomes to date – Peter Prince

PP outlined the study outcomes to date – these are the titles of the aspects presented. The presentation material is contained in the Attachment to the Notes of Meeting.

- Planning Assumptions
- Destination /Origin of light vehicles
- Where do trucks start and finish
- Public transport only option
- Results of PT only option
- Need for a new link
- Scope and Link Objectives

5/2

SKM

- Broad Corridor Types
- Selection of Corridor Type A
- Four Feasible Type A Options
- Transport Improvements
- Social and Environmental Effects
- Economics and Finance
- Next Steps

3 Questions

- In relation to the predicted 100,000 vehicles on Pennant Hills Road (2021) – how are these figures calculated? 5% per annum growth results in 170,000 vehicles.
 - Using historical growth not necessarily a correct basis for predicting future traffic levels. Predicted traffic levels are based on future population and employment levels and distribution.
- Copy of all figures needed to make informed comment
 - PP responded that these are in the background report; the rest of the data used as a basis for the analysis are in the preliminary work in progress.
- A new road will encourage industrial traffic into the area. No decentralisation proposed. What are the planning assumptions?
 - PP explained that the planning forecasts that are used are from the Department of Planning, Infrastructure and Natural Resources (DIPNR). Study has used the DIPNR forecast population and employment growth over 20 years. DIPNR forecasts indicate that decentralisation over next 20 years is unlikely to occur. The assumed current trends continuing follow NSW State Government expectations.
- Need for change in attitude by government
 - JB commented that this is a transport study and RTA/DoTARS cannot dictate policy to DIPNR. If the project proceeds to the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) stage it will need approval from DIPNR. DIPNR would be involved at the beginning in establishing requirements for an EIS, and towards the end of the process, at the determination phase.
- Need to look beyond current brief
 - PP commented that he would expect government to undertake a study for infrastructure needs beyond 2021 as part of a review of the Sydney Metropolitan strategy, but this is outside the brief for this study.
- Problems are more immediate than long term planning
 - PP commented that the study is considering sustainability in relation to opportunities to increase rail's share of transport in the corridor
- Why are there differences in volumes on Pennant Hills Road for different options. The traffic moving east on M2 is underestimated?

NB

NB

SKM

- PP responded by referring back to the existing traffic Origin/Destination information which is used as one basis for the traffic analysis.
- Assume tolls will be necessary (politically). Yellow will give the same benefits of Blue/Purple options and also benefits people in the east.
- PP commented that a toll on new link would discourage travel to/from east given that these users would need to pay the M2 toll and Lane Cove Tunnel toll.

4 Summary comments from community group representatives

Galston Area Residents' Association

- Tunnels will not help much
- Congestion south of M2 – more traffic will result
- Need to assist Pennant Hill Road north of M2
- In relation to Ventilation stacks – do not repeat M5 mistakes
- Pennant Hills Road relief is a good thing
- Tunnelling to “world’s best practice” and to include filtration of stacks
- Need limits to Sydney’s growth
- Public transport needs to be improved – seamless journeys are required

Jessica Place Bushcare Group

- Yellow would appear best
- Option A is good

Local community

- Tunnels are brilliant
- Ventilation stacks need to be installed to best practice

Galston Chamber of Commerce

- Disappointed with report
- No opportunity for Corridor Types B and C to be taken further
- Tunnel may be unacceptable
- Needed more work on Corridor Types B, C – other benefits not considered (eg infrastructure development)
- F3 traffic funnelling at Hornsby (can we bypass this)
- Report presented to exclude Red/Yellow options – pushed to conclusion Purple/Blue. All factors not considered.
- 20 years is not long enough as a study timeframe – should be longer
- the new link will be redundant before it is opened

Quarry Road Action Group

- Has had little feedback from people in local community
- Type A is a “band-aid” solution and too short term.

NB

X
X

Community Consultation

Summary

A comprehensive community involvement program was implemented to provide the broader community with the opportunity to make a demonstrable input to the F3 to Sydney Orbital Link study and to ensure that the concerns of the community were adequately and appropriately addressed. The community consultation program included activities to meet the information and participation needs of all stakeholders, which included Federal, State and local government elected representatives and officers, industry and community organisations, business groups and the wider community.

The Study Area extends over seven Local Government Areas (LGA). The population of the Study Area is estimated to be approximately 340,000 people, equating to approximately 100,000 households. The Study Area includes a wide diversity of industrial and commercial activities and interests, which were recognised as an important part of the community.

Identification of issues at study commencement

The number of people who participated in the consultation process during its early stages was small, compared to the total population in the study area, but there was commonality of broad issues raised.

Key concerns at that stage ranged from strategic issues – such as encouraging improved public transport, increased freight to rail, and the need to link growing residential and employment areas – to specific issues, such as the need to avoid impact on Lane Cove National Park. Other issues raised included: the need to apply sustainable principles to the study, the consideration of induced traffic, the design capacity of any new link, tolls, impacts on communities and environmental impacts particularly from ventilation stacks and concern about the safety of tunnels in relation to fire and traffic incidents. These were recurring themes through the study.

Consultation on broad options

Community Focus Group meetings were held in late July 2002 when broad corridor options (Types A, B and C) had been identified. The Community Focus Groups were asked for feedback on these three broad options. X

At that stage there were varying views on the relative advantages and disadvantages of the three broad corridor types. Many commented that while Type A would be needed in the short term, government should be taking a longer term view in relation to a western route with a river crossing of the Hawkesbury River. It was made clear that the Type A options would be mostly in tunnel, which appeared to have potential for broad community acceptance provided that appropriate pollution control measures could be placed on the ventilation stacks.

There continued to be strong debate about the new link as a road solution, rather than focussing on other integrated transport management measures including improvements to public transport, demand management, freight to rail and dedicated routes for heavy traffic.

More concerns were raised in relation to the potential scale and significance of environmental impacts of the Type B options than either Type C or Type A, although concerns about the impact of Type C options on National Parks and the Hawkesbury River were also raised.

Consultation on the Type A feasible options

Four feasible Type A route options were placed on display for 10 weeks from July to October 2003. A total of 991 submissions were received. The purpose of seeking public comment on the corridor options was to seek specific feedback on the issues associated with each corridor Type and particularly the Type A options. X

There were high concentrations of submissions from particular geographic areas, with reasonably commonality of views about the potential impacts of options on those areas and hence support for, or opposition to, specific options. The largest number of submissions originated from Wahroonga (20%)

and Turramurra (15%), with the next greatest number originating from Normanhurst (9%) and Thornleigh (6%). Together, submissions from these areas comprised half of the total received.

In decreasing order of their frequency, the ten most often raised issues were: ventilation stacks (predominantly questions about the number and location); general concerns about air quality and impacts of vehicles and tunnel emissions; noise; support for further investigation of public transport options, rather than road solutions; health impacts from vehicle and tunnel emissions, including impacts on health from exposure of toxins if the Brickyard Park forma part of the Type A Purple option; adverse impacts on schools and hospitals; issues about traffic modelling on Pennant Hills Road; impacts on Lane Cove National Park; longer term transport needs for Sydney; and impact on property values.

Key Outcomes

Comments on the project

Many people expressed support for a new link and for the objective of relieving traffic congestion on Pennant Hills Road. Many also sought relief to existing traffic congestion on the Pacific Highway. Many submissions and conversations described first hand experience of the existing poor travelling conditions and diminished local amenity caused by the current level of traffic on Pennant Hills Road, particularly by heavy vehicles.

The project is supported by road transport industry groups. They expressed views that completion of this link is critically important in enhancing the road infrastructure of Sydney and would deliver considerable social and economic benefits to the city as well as to businesses based locally and elsewhere.

A new road link was certainly not supported by all. Many submissions advocated a more comprehensive review of the transport needs of Sydney and for greater focus on integrated transport solutions. In some submissions it was argued that the cost, in the order of \$2 billion, would be better spent on rail. It was submitted that options to improve public transport had not been adequately considered. It was argued that Sydney needs investment that would shift travel demand for mass transit and freight onto efficient rail networks.

Project timing and cost

The 20-year time horizon for the study was considered by many residents, community organisations, some Councils and transport groups as being relatively short for the significant investment required.

Many expressed strong opposition to any toll on a new link. It was argued that a toll would discourage drivers from using the new link with consequent traffic diversion to, and congestion on, untolled alternatives. In this context, it was noted that the traffic figures presented in the public information documents were based on untolled traffic figures only and that information had not been provided on the impacts of tolls on these figures.

Some submissions described the immediate need for the project and considered the announced date of 2007 for commencement of construction to be too late. This comment was also made frequently at the public displays by people who live along Pennant Hills Road. They described the pollution, noise, and the generally unsafe traffic and travelling environment that exists now.

Comment on Type A, B and C corridor options

It was generally acknowledged in submissions that the Type A corridor options would best meet the shorter-term objectives of the project by providing earlier traffic relief to Pennant Hills Road. However, many submissions recommended that a more strategic long-term view needs to also be pursued.

While some supported Type B options, there was strong support for further investigation of a Type C option, on the basis that a long term solution was needed. It was argued that increasing traffic volumes from the Central Coast would ultimately use the capacity on the F3 and the new link, and an alternative route would be required. Another issue raised was the need to provide for a second crossing of the Hawkesbury River as an alternative route during bushfires or in the case of an accident or other action destroying the existing Hawkesbury River Bridge, or rendering it unpassable. Some argued for a Type C option rather than a Type A option because vehicles carrying dangerous goods

would not be permitted to use a tunnel and hence these vehicles would not be removed from Pennant Hills Road (note that it was perceived, not necessarily correctly, that tunnels would not be part of Type B and Type C corridor options).

While many acknowledged the need to address the problems of Pennant Hills Road as quickly as possible, some described the Type A options as a "band-aid" solution and were strong in their view that planning is urgently needed for a much longer term solution – through further investigation of a Type C option. Public comment as expressed in submissions, at displays and at the Community Focus Groups was strong on this issue.

A caveat to support for the Type A route options raised in submissions was the adequacy of the F3 Freeway and interchanges from Wahroonga to Karingong to cater for traffic growth including, if required, capacity upgrade prior to a Type A option being constructed.

Comment on the Type A options

Of those submissions that identified a preference for an option, the majority expressed support for Type A Purple option and there was least support for Type A Red option. These two options are discussed here, with further comment on these options and the Type A Blue and Type A Yellow contained in the main body of the report.

The Purple option appeared to receive the greatest support on the basis that it was perceived to best meet the transport objectives and minimise social and environmental effects. Many submissions commented on the equity of selecting this option. It was argued in submissions that this route has long been known as the orbital route through Sydney, and furthermore residents in this vicinity would also most benefit from a tunnel option. The location of a tunnel that generally follows Pennant Hills Road and the existing rail corridor was viewed by some correspondents as minimising the potential impact of a link on additional properties.

The Purple option passes along a relatively level elevated ridge with no substantial valleys or river crossings and this was considered in submissions to be an advantage in terms of minimising steep grades at either end and crossing under watercourses, that would eventuate with other Type A options.

The opportunity to achieve optimal grades was identified in submissions as assisting in minimising environmental impacts. Overall, it was suggested that the environmental and social impacts from the Purple option would be less significant than for other options.

In relation to the transport network it was contended that the Purple option enables a shorter route for access to and from the western and southern Sydney markets and linkage to the proposed M7 Motorway. It was considered by many to provide the best opportunity for traffic from western Sydney to access areas north of Sydney, would reduce traffic volumes on Pennant Hills Road, improve the amenity for existing residents and to provide a good opportunity for an interchange at M2/Pennant Hills Road.

Notwithstanding the above, significant opposition to the Purple option originated from the Normanhurst/Thornleigh area, in relation to the proposed open trench in the vicinity of the Brickyard Park. Schools, hospitals, aged care facilities and houses are located in close proximity to this area. The brickyard was in the past used for the disposal of putrescible waste and there was significant concern that this area may need to be excavated for road construction. Concerns were expressed about the possible exposure of "toxic" material from the pit, impacts from emissions from the trench, potential developmental and health impacts, noise, and overall impacts on amenity. Furthermore, it was highlighted in submissions that Hornsby Council is progressively developing community and sporting facilities at the Brickyard Park.

Many reasons were put forward in opposition to the Red option. Most common among these was that it would be an abrogation of the government's commitment to the abandonment of the B2-B3 corridor. A large number of people wrote about having purchased/built homes and developed their properties with the understanding that further highway development would not be considered in that corridor. It was argued that the State Government had promised that no properties would be affected in the vicinity of the F3 and the B2-B3 corridor – and that all four Type A options violate this promise.

Introduction

In April 2002, Sinclair Knight Merz was commissioned by the Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA) on behalf of the Department of Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS) to undertake a feasibility study for a National Highway link between the Newcastle Freeway F3 to the Sydney Orbital. The new route would replace the interim National Highway link that utilises Pennant Hills Rd between the M2 and F3. The route would link the F3 with the Sydney Orbital, to form a continuous motorway standard National Highway through Sydney.

N.B.

A comprehensive community involvement program was an integral part of the study. The program was designed and managed to afford the broader community the opportunity to make a demonstrable input to the process, and to ensure that the requirements of the community were adequately and appropriately managed and addressed.

This report documents the process and outcomes of the consultation process.

1.1 The Context for Consultation

The route selection study was expected to attract significant public debate. At the time of study commencement, the proposed link had already received extensive regional print, radio and television media coverage through its announcement, in conjunction with the release of the Western Sydney Orbital Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and subsequent planning approval. Due to the size of the study area and the significant involvement of communities in the Western Sydney Orbital and M2 Motorway projects, as well as those affected by the previously abandoned B2-B3 corridor, it was expected that there would be considerable community interest in this study.

1.2 Purpose of the Community Consultation Program

Community involvement is an integral part of any route selection process. While it is recognised that there are inherent difficulties in seeking community input before route options and specific property impacts are identified, it has nevertheless been found that early community input is essential. Its value lies in early identification and resolution, if possible, of issues that are important to various community sectors, local issues and values and particularly identification of those aspects that are unique to the communities potentially affected.

1.3 Stakeholders

The Community Involvement Program included activities to meet the information and participation needs of all stakeholders.

Stakeholders associated with this project can be grouped into the following:

- Elected Members of Federal and State Parliaments
- Elected representatives of local government
- Officers of Federal, State and Local government agencies
- Local government organisations

- Advisory and interest groups
- Road transport groups
- Residents within the Study Area
- Businesses within the Study Area
- Potentially affected land owners (and ultimately affected land owners)
- Organisations and individuals with significant interests in the project or the area adjoining the proposed route of the project.
- The wider community (including road users).
- The media.

- Design issues such as the capacity of the link, concerns that some trucks could not use a new link, fire and safety in tunnels. Specific issues such as concerns about Pennant Hills Road and possibility of upgrading it as a National Highway link and impacts of widening and safety. Some suggested that dedicated truck lane and cycling lanes should be part of any link
- Questions in relation to whether road would be tolled, and cost of tolls to users
- Location and treatment of tunnel stacks and treatment of air emissions
- Minimisation of effects on human built environment including resumption of houses; impact on property values
- No surface solution in Lane Cove Park (B2/B3)

A second round of CFG meetings was held in late July 2002. At that time the study had been taken to the point where broad options (Types A, B and C) had been identified. The key focus for the July CFG meetings was to gain community feedback on these three broad options. The comments made by the CFG groups are summarised below.

General Comments

- Project is focused on meeting the demand - it should address demand management
- Growth in capacity will see a growth in demand in excess of projections
- Whether changes in work (and therefore journey) practices had been taken into account
- Some commented that it was important to decide the short term solution – plan for now, not try to determine what will happen in the future, whereas others stressed the need for a long term solution. Many suggested the need to consider Type A as short term solution, with longer term as well
- Need for second road out of Sydney. Need to look at Putty Road as potential long term option
- Freight issue needs to be dealt with using other technology i.e. trucks to rail
- Build tunnel as cheaply as possible, use the balance of available funding for rail

Comments on Type A corridor options

- F3 widening to 6 lanes emphasises need for orbital solution by 2006 (makes Type A critical)
- good option – sooner the better
- Some stated that Type A options were logical, but unacceptable in terms of potential environmental and social impacts. Others considered Type A options had the least potential environmental impacts.
- The further east, the better
- If in tunnel there is a need for state-of-the-art filtration; need to locate ventilation stacks in areas where there is good air dispersion
- Start at Macquarie Park, in tunnel. Need interchange facilities at Macquarie Park to go east
- Ensure impacts on M2 are calculated; widening of M2 is required
- Greater benefits in long term than Type B or C
- This option still needs to use F3 – other options are better
- Need relief of Pacific Highway as well, so essential to build Type A
- Design for 3 lanes in each direction in the tunnel

Comments on Type B options

- Not a viable option – use Type A with a link to the orbital
- Would result in increased traffic for new Motorway links
- Not acceptable on environmental grounds – Galston Gorge and Berowra Regional Park
- Does not address needs of growth areas to the west

- Type B does not make sense – needs to connect F3 further north
- In terms of potential for impact on Aboriginal cultural heritage, B is second worst
- Inappropriate for needs
- High cost / high social impact. Significant impact on housing and communities
- Question whether long term benefits outweigh environmental impact

Comments on Type C corridor options

- Too expensive – will take money from more valuable infrastructure needs
- Long term, it is the only viable option for heavy transport and is truly the "missing link"
- Needs to be complemented with a rail solution
- Support Type C in conjunction with Type A – and use Type A for road freight only
- Cleanest and most efficient option
- Need to overcome the problems associated with a single Hawkesbury Bridge crossing – Type C provides a required alternative. Need duplication of the Hawkesbury River crossing for safety/flexibility, to facilitate growth in Sydney's west and access from the west to the tourist and recreational opportunities of the Central Coast
- Will relieve Pennant Hills Road and free up other roads.
- Good in terms of decentralisation and impact on regional centres (such as the Hunter Region). Opens up economic opportunities. Opens the western industrial area. Opportunity to open up recreation and tourism on the Central Coast
- Build in conjunction with Type A because of construction time
- Easiest route to construct
- Worst in terms of indigenous and environmental impacts
- No short term benefit
- Need Types C and A

4

REPORT

F3 to Sydney Orbital National Highway Link Study

BACK GROUND

July 2003

The need for a new link

4/2

A new National Highway route linking the F3 to the Sydney Orbital would serve transport and travel demands beyond the study area for businesses and travellers with origins and destinations outside Sydney, including the Central Coast, the Lower Hunter and northern New South Wales, as well as destinations to the south.

When assessing the need for a new link, it is important to take into account both existing and future travel conditions and transport demands. It is also important to take into account the effects a new link would have on communities outside, as well as within, the study area.

The key planning objectives which need to be considered when assessing the need for a new link are:

- To alleviate poor travelling conditions on the interim National Highway and surrounding network.
- To improve local amenity for people living and working along Pennant Hills Road.
- To improve travel reliability and reduce vehicle operating costs of long distance commercial and freight transport.
- To serve the future growth needs of long distance transport.

Alleviate poor travelling conditions on the interim National Highway and surrounding network

The National Highway connects to Sydney from the north via the F3. It then passes through Sydney along the Cumberland Highway, and connects with the Hume Highway and the F5 in the south-west. The route through Sydney is congested during peak hours and results in major disruptions to long distance traffic movements.

Poor road safety performance

Traffic congestion is often associated with poor road safety performance. An indicator of road safety performance is the number of road crashes per kilometre per year.

Crash rates on Pennant Hills Road and the Pacific Highway were significantly higher than the average across the Sydney Road Network in 1999 and 2001, which indicates that road safety conditions on these roads are well below average.

The recorded 3-year average crash rate in the National Highway corridor is nearly double the Sydney road network average. The number of serious and fatal road crashes along Pennant Hills Road north of the M2 currently averages over 100 per year.

Arterial road section	Serious and fatal crash rate (per km of route per year)
Pennant Hills Road (North of M2)	16
Pacific Highway (Ryde Road to Pennant Hills Road)	23
Sydney Network average	10

Pennant Hills Road

The Western Sydney Orbital and the western section of the M2 Motorway will replace the Cumberland Highway section of the National Highway when the Western Sydney Orbital is completed in 2006. However, Pennant Hills Road north of the M2 Motorway will remain as part of the National Highway.

Traffic levels on this section of Pennant Hills Road have been increasing at an average of 5% per year over the past 10 years. Today, the road carries up to 75,000 vehicles per day and it is currently operating at capacity during peak periods, causing long delays to road users in the morning peak on most weekdays.

Sydney to Newcastle Freeway (F3)

Traffic along the F3 corridor has been increasing at an average rate of 3% per year over the last ten years. Average annual daily traffic flows at the Hawkesbury River Bridge have increased from about 53,000 vehicles in 1992 to some 70,000 vehicles in 2001. During holiday periods traffic flows can be much heavier than the daily average.

70,000
45,000

The F3 Freeway south of Kariong is currently operating at its capacity over peak periods, resulting in unstable flow conditions and delays to road users.

The current widening of the four-lane sections to six lanes between Kariong and the Hawkesbury River will relieve congestion and delay over this section. Widening the F3 to six lanes for the full length, south of Kariong, is likely to provide adequate capacity for the predicted demand and reduce congestion and user delay on the F3 over the next 20 years.

Pacific Highway

The Pacific Highway, which is an important State Highway, is currently operating at capacity in peak periods at the southern end of the F3. Further growth in travel demand between the F3 and the Central Business Districts of the City, North Sydney and Chatswood, and to areas such as Lane Cove and Macquarie Park Industrial Area, is unable to be accommodated within the existing road corridor without increasing congestion and road user delays.

Improve local amenity for people living and working along Pennant Hills Road

If no new link is provided, traffic along Pennant Hills Road is predicted to increase to between 95,000 and 100,000 vehicles per day by 2021, causing traffic congestion to extend to most times of the business day. The number of large commercial vehicles, which currently represents between 10-12% of total traffic, is predicted to double over this period, ie from about 8,000 to 16,000 vehicles per day.

The forecast traffic demand in the corridor has taken into account the likely effects of planned and proposed improvements to regional road transport and to rail public transport and rail freight infrastructure between Sydney and the Central Coast. These initiatives would permit rail to play a much greater role, especially for freight. However, these initiatives by themselves, would not and could not be sufficient to overcome the traffic congestion on the F3, Pennant Hills Road and the Pacific Highway.

As traffic volumes increase so too will the social effects of increasing community severance in Pennant Hills and Thornleigh. There will be higher risks of road crashes involving pedestrians along the corridor, and increasing traffic noise and air quality impacts from vehicle emissions over longer periods of the day.

A major outcome of the community consultation to date is the weight of opinion of people living and working in the area of Pennant Hills Road, whose quality of life is diminished as a result of the current traffic volumes on this road. There are also significant impacts on the users of Pennant Hills Road.

Widening Pennant Hills Road is not an option

An enhanced route between the F3 and the Sydney Orbital is not proposed to be provided by further major upgrades of the existing surface connections due to the fact that Pennant Hills Road is widened to its full potential.

Any further upgrades would have to be in the form of grade separation of intersections at a significant number of locations. This could result in further dislocation and severance to communities based along these routes.

The need to provide better transport

Traffic congestion and air and noise pollution are issues of major concern to Sydney residents. Significant improvements have been made to achieve cleaner fuels, and improved emission controls have been implemented over the last decade. As the Sydney Region develops to potentially 5 million people, it will be essential to avoid worsening pollution levels by continuing to reduce emissions from vehicles, reducing traffic congestion and promoting the use of more sustainable modes of transport wherever feasible, especially public transport, walking and cycling. This will help suitably modified and expanded transport networks to cope in a more sustainable way with the growing population and increasing freight and commercial transport.

The provision of an improved National Highway link between the F3 and the Sydney Orbital has the potential to reduce traffic levels on the surface arterial roads in northern Sydney (Pennant Hills Road, Pacific Highway and Lane Cove Road). This would provide an opportunity to improve the attractiveness of local, bus-based public transport by using the freed-up road space for bus priority measures and improved access to rail stations.

Investment in rail based freight and passenger transport alone would not provide sufficient traffic relief to release the road capacity necessary to provide space for bus priority. Access to rail stations in the corridor would still be subject to traffic congestion. This is because of the significant proportion of car trips with dispersed origins and destinations, including those on the National Highway. Even with significant improvements to public transport services, such as network infrastructure investments, service upgrades and high quality interchanges, there is unlikely to be a major shift in the proportion of trips from cars to trains and buses.

On the other hand, a new National Highway transport link has the potential, by encouraging travellers into their cars, to offset efforts to increase the use of longer distance public transport, and especially

December 2003

7

SKM

TRAFFIC + TRANSPORTATION WP No 4

About 50% of the traffic taken off Pennant Hills Road by Type C would be heavy vehicles, that is about 4,000 trucks including about 2,000 articulated vehicles. The predicted traffic relief from Type A would be higher. (Refer to Table 15-3)

Figure 15.2 also shows that the F3 would carry about 70,000 vehicles per day with Type C in the network in 2021, ie about the same as today (2001).

It can be concluded from this analysis that a Type C option would not satisfy the project objectives over the 20 year planning horizon as well as Type A on traffic grounds.

On a 20 year traffic assessment basis, Type A options are preferred to Type C.

15.3 The F3 south of the Hawkesbury River

Type A options, like Type B options, rely on the existing F3 corridor and the existing crossing of the Hawkesbury River which is a future constraint to growth beyond 2021. This strategic assessment also indicates the need to improve the F3 capacity south of the Hawkesbury River (as well as north of the river crossing), before the completion of a new F3 to Sydney Orbital Type A link. This need is largely driven by the predicted growth in population and commuter travel demand from the Central Coast.

15.4 Planning for Type C Corridor

The F3 will be widened to six lanes for its entire length between Kariong and the Hawkesbury River by 2004. This preliminary analysis indicates that by around 2021 the F3 corridor would be subject to peak demands beyond the capacity of a six-lane freeway, even if the proposed programs to upgrade rail infrastructure and services and increase rail's freight and passenger market shares in the corridor are implemented.

Further capacity enhancements and/or demand management measures are likely to be required beyond the timeframe of this study (2021).

An investigation into the planning need for a new northern transport corridor could be considered as part of the current review of the Sydney Metropolitan Strategy by the NSW Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources. Such an investigation is outside the scope of this study, or National Highway planning.

15.5 Conclusions

Type A Corridor Options best satisfy traffic and transport objectives of a new transport link from the F3 Freeway to the Sydney Orbital. The Type A options have formed the basis of the more detailed analysis described in subsequent sections of this report.

1. Introduction

This report investigates the possible widening of the F3 Freeway between Wahroonga and the Kariong Interchange (Gosford) and has been prepared as part of the F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study. The report describes the following:

- previous RTA investigations;
- traffic forecasts and capacity analysis;
- possible opportunities and constraints; and
- preliminary cost estimates.


The capacity of the F3 Freeway has been investigated with respect to its ability to cater for future traffic demands particularly with respect to the construction of a link to the Sydney Orbital. Depending on the location of the northern interchange of the link, some or all of the F3 Freeway south of Kariong may need to be widened to cater for the additional traffic over the next 20 years.

Traffic projections for the study have shown that an upgraded capacity of the F3 Freeway (generally three lanes each direction) will be exceeded in the year 2021. This could necessitate either an alternative route, or upgrading the F3 Freeway to a minimum of four lanes in each direction, or some form of traffic demand measures including land use and employment development on the Central Coast to limit traffic growth.

This report has been prepared to assess the potential to widen the F3 Freeway to four lanes in each direction from Wahroonga to Kariong.

The level of reporting and costing included is strategic and no design works have been undertaken at this stage.

The study area and the F3 alignment is shown in Figure 1.1



■ Figure 1.1 - The Study Area

6. Alternative Strategies

To assist in the consideration of the suitability of the F3 Freeway to widen to four lanes in each direction a preliminary cost estimate of alternative strategies for increasing the capacity of the "corridor" have been prepared.

A number of alternatives have been considered for the provision of additional capacity for the F3 Freeway. These alternatives include:

- ☐ an elevated, two lane, tidal flow viaduct; and
- ☐ an alternative route.

6.1 Elevated Two Lane Tidal Flow Viaduct

One alternative to widening the F3 Freeway is the construction of a two lane viaduct over the median or one carriageway of the existing formation. The viaduct would be tidal flow, generally carrying southbound traffic in the mornings and northbound traffic in the evenings. This arrangement could then be modified as required for holiday and weekend traffic. Ramps would be provided at various locations to provide access to the existing freeway and to allow the bypass of sections should they be effected by delays such as accidents.

Such a proposal is likely to have significant urban design and community issues (including noise and visual amenity), but would significantly reduce the likelihood of environmental issues.

For costing purposes we have adopted a bridge construction rate of \$2,000/m² for the viaduct and \$3,500/m² for the Hawkesbury River and Mooney Mooney Creek bridges. The preliminary estimate for this proposal, including contingencies, is approximately \$1,500 to \$1,700 million. Although this is higher than the cost of widening to four lanes this proposal does provide 5 lanes in the peak flow direction.

Such a scheme could be the consideration as a PPP or traditional tollway

6.2 Alternative Second Route

A number of alternatives for a second route have been prepared as part of the F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study. These alternatives generally link to areas in western Sydney rather than to Wahroonga.

The cost estimates for the routes investigated are between \$2.6 and \$3.6 billion. The alternative routes do, however, provide a total capacity of 5 lanes in each direction between Sydney and Gosford.

Not included in these reports are the July 2002 and August 2003 Community Focus Group MEETING NOTES

Preface *SKM also provided Peter Wente other papers.*

This Main Report presents the findings from the F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study. The Study applied strategic analysis to the assessment of corridor types and feasible route options to determine an acceptable and preferred option which best satisfies National Highway objectives.

A number of specific routes and associated engineering details such as interchange and ventilation layouts were developed and analysed during the course of the Study, for the purpose of determining feasibility and assessing the options. The specific routes and details described in this report do not constitute a concept proposal.

It may be necessary to read sections from the other reports, records and working papers listed below to gain a more complete understanding of the information being reported in this Main Report:

Draft Options Development Report (October 2002)

Working Paper No 1: Community Consultation Report (December, 2003)

Working Paper No 2 Engineering Design and Costings Report (March, 2004)

Working Paper No 3 Urban Design, Landscape and Visual Assessment Report (December, 2003)

Working Paper No 4 Traffic and Transportation Report (December, 2003)

Working Paper No 5 Social and Environmental Studies Report (March, 2004)

Working Paper No 6 Tunnel Investigations Report (December, 2003)

Working Paper No 7 Economics and Finance Report (March, 2004)

Value Management No.1 Workshop Record (June 2002)

Value Management No.2 Workshop Record (September, 2003)

Access to the Main Report is available via the study website at:

<http://commcons.skm.com.au/f3tosydneyorbital>

Details on how to gain access to the Working Papers can be found on the study website.

If the Government decides to further develop the recommended option this would involve the preparation of a concept proposal and an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), including a route alignment and other details which would be developed for further assessment. Community consultation will continue through each stage of project development.

B

Review of F3 to M7 Corridor Selection – Submission Coversheet

Please complete the following table and sign the declaration below.

Please note: If you are submitting this submission electronically, you are also required to mail a hard copy of the signed and completed cover sheet to the Review Secretariat as soon as possible after that date. The Review Chair retains the right to reject submissions which do

Name: Peter Andrew Waite OAM JP
Address: 28 Warne Street, Pennant Hills, NSW 2120
Phone Number: (0) 9484 3471
Email: waitepeter@bigpond.com
Submission on behalf of (if applicable):

not meet the requirements set out in this paragraph.


Declaration

If submitting this submission on behalf of an organisation, group or someone else mentioned above, I warrant that I am duly authorised to put in the submission on their behalf.

- NOT RELEVANT: refer to page 2

I and any parties to the submission understand that the submission will be treated as a public document and will be available on the review website and may be quoted in the final report.

I and any parties to the submission also understand that I/we may be invited by the Review Chair to attend a meeting, which will be open to the public, to clarify points or answer questions the Chair may have in relation to points raised in this submission.



Signature: By Email Date: 10th April 2007

Copy with signature posted today


CC Hornsby Council
 The Hon P Ruddock MP
 Mrs J Hopwood MP
 Mr G Smith MP

The

Group[®]

Demanding from
MPs, Councillors
and bureaucracies

Honesty *in representation* Integrity *of reporting* Transparency *of process*


April 25, 2007: 'Submission' amended to **DISCLOSURE** to the Independent Review of the F3 to M7
Corridor Selection

Because of concerns about serious inaccuracies, ambiguity and deliberate avoidance of responding to detailed questions about the SKM study I held a meeting with a member of the Concerned Citizen's Group (Liberal Party), Pennant Hills District Civic Trust, Beecroft Cheltenham Civic Trust, and others including Clive Troy.

Because of political or employment affiliations it was decided to establish an 'umbrella structure' – known as **'The H. I. T. Group'** so that the identity of concerned citizens were not disclosed.

I registered The H. I. T. Group[®] as a business name. Item 76, May 25, 2005. Most people have wrongly assumed 'group' means people. H. I. T. is a group of letters that commence the words Honesty, Integrity and Transparency.

[REDACTED]

I have paid all costs for three public meetings, most literature and many advertisements.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Item 205 relates to Hornsby Council's latest report on the Independent Review.

The Independent Review is requested to examine the HIT Groups 29 November Brochure, 186, to help understand the extent of community concerns.

Review of F3 to M7 Corridor Selection – FINAL SUBMISSION

CONCLUSION

If the SKM study, DOTARS and the RTA, had been subject to the principles of Honesty, Integrity and Transparency this Independent Review would not have been necessary.

Compelling evidence indicates there has been considerable political interference in what should have been impartial studies that would have stood up to transparent examination.

Whilst there have been many so called policies no explanations have been forthcoming to explain why they have not been complied with. Instead Ministers and the bureaucracy have avoided responding to many simple questions.

Equally so, some elected representatives at a Federal, State and Local Government level have preferred to rely on misleading advice.

I believe the Independent Review will not have time or resources to make an informed determination in accordance with the ambiguous 'Terms of Reference'.

In my opinion, in the first instance, the Independent Review should put these unanswered questions to DOTARS and the RTA that were raised in The HIT Group 4 page March 12, 2006 meeting paper; item 150 and my FOI, item 204.

The following questions demand answers:

1. Why was a decision made to disregard both the Study 'purpose' as defined in Newsletter 1 and the Australian Government's AusLink guidelines?
2. Was the 'community consultative process' genuine? Newsletter No. 2 – July 2003 clearly indicates that months prior to the September 2003 Value Management Workshop a decision had been made to select a short term option.
3. What evidence exists in government files to justify abandoning the proposed tunnel under Pennant Hills Road in favour of a western above ground connection from the F3 to the Sydney Orbital for completion before 2010?

DISCLOSURES TO THE INDEPENDENT INQUIRY

POLITICAL ASPECTS

In 2002 some members of the Liberal Party of Australia, Pennant Hills Thornleigh Branch, raised concerns with SKM, MPs about the 'community consultative processes' of the SKM Study. Obviously SKM cannot comment.

The concerned members called themselves the 'Concerned Citizens Group' and made numerous representations to SKM, Politicians, in particular the Federal Member for Berowra, the Hon Philip Ruddock whom I have known as well as his late parents as nearby residents for nearly 50 years.

Similarly MP Barry O'Farrell lived opposite me for several years. As an informed person for a number of years I provided advice to Barry and wrote his draft letters/advice on matters relating to local issues raised by the Hornsby Shire Local Traffic Committee. (I had previously been Hornsby Council's representative on this committee during the 1980's as a Hornsby Councillor.)

The SKM report was fatally compromised when *"the instruction from DOTARS was that the Australian Government felt that examination of longer term options was outside the scope of the Link Study and the issue should be addressed in another forum"*. VM Workshop No2 Record

VM Workshop No2 Record records concerns raised over numerous issues by nine (9) state agency professional officers from RIC, DIP&NR, SRA, EPA and National Parks. Twenty three (23) attended from DOTARS, RTA DEM, SKM and TPM.

In other words the Study has never properly, and appropriately, considered the western option B and C that had previously been identified as the preferred options. These matters were referred to in 'our' submissions and again later at several public meetings. **Despite numerous requests and meetings no explanations have been given to explain why the 'SKM terms of reference' were changed.**

It is my and many other's belief that through no fault of SKM the findings in their report are of little, if any value.

Whilst having no formal technical qualifications I possess substantive 'local knowledge' on historical traffic, planning, geographical, construction and logistical experience that I have acquired for well over the sixty-five of my seventy five years.

If called on I will give the Independent Review impartial advice and opinion.

The ICAC November 2003 paper **"Fact-Finder A 20-step guide to conducting an inquiry in your organisation"**. Page 36 *"was I a participant in any of the issues in the inquiry? If you witnessed something or supervised a particular area, you should not be involved in inquiring into those aspects"*.

It would be wrong for the Roads Ministers, DOTARS and RTA staff involved in the SKM and or MWT reports or assessments to be involved apart from explaining, and producing documents to prove that 'due process' has occurred and that there was no political intervention in any way.

PREFERRED ROUTES – PLURAL

Proposals in the SKM report supporting the tunnel under Pennant Hills Road were driven by the RTA wanting to use Federal funds to overcome major local traffic problems. DOTARS should have advised the RTA before 2002 that this was unacceptable. Equally so the Transurban's suggestions 'validated' by MWT did not address numerous other issues.

Whilst I do not agree with it, the State's government 2006 December decision (without appropriate legislation – another political decision) to exempt 'critical infrastructure' from all regulations removes any obstructions to the RTA building the 'local link', with State funds, on the existing road reserve near the Lane Cove Valley and the National Highway from Deane Park to near Mount White via a second Hawkesbury River crossing using National funding'.

When my, and other submissions are critically reviewed by the Independent Inquiry I believe it will be found that the community concerns are justified.

SYDNEY HARBOUR BRIDGE 75th ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS

This bridge was called for in the 1850s and was part of Dr Bradfield's thesis for his doctorate that outlined Sydney's future rail system as it is today.

Since then politicians, who do not have Dr Bradfield's skills, have had many visions that will achieve little because they are merely 'Band-Aid' or 'pipe dream' solutions.

Successful politicians surround themselves with impartial experts who will give them 'frank and candid' advice. Instead, many surround themselves with 'spin doctors' whose expertise is to tell them what they want to hear and how they can convince the public they are right.

I repeat – my IMPARTIAL REVIEW has been caused by **A POLITICAL PROBLEM**

REQUEST

That the Independent Inquiry immediately direct DOTARS and the RTA to:

- Comply with the ICAC Guidelines referred to above.
- Release all documents that prove every community submission was impartially assessed by SKM and appropriately taken into account.
- According to 'procedural fairness' respondents be given the opportunity to question the validity of the assumptions made by SKM during the Independent Review.

My SUBMISSION to Independent Inquiry by April 13

Following are details of extracts from over 200 documents to support my views that the SKM and MWT reports have failed to impartially address the original objectives of the SKM report and Government Policy.

This is not to seen as a criticism of SKM and MWT. They, and the Independent Inquiry findings can only be as good as the limitations of the terms of reference and instructions imposed — by politicians and the bureaucracy.

DISABILITY - ASSETS

I [REDACTED] have no formal education to assess the correctness or otherwise of traffic studies and the basis of computer analysis or grammatical analysis.

I do however have practical skills in preparing counter disaster plans and working with government agencies to develop practical and workable systems and organisational structures. Such work included the Sydney Region Bushfire Association, Police and ASIO for the 1998 World Scout Jamboree near Cataract Dam.

The Independent Review will probably find grammatical errors or lack of detail to understand some of this submission. This should not be an impediment to affording me 'natural justice'.

Should the Independent Review require further information or details I will make it available as soon as requested by hard copy or email.

In the following table a bold DOCUMENT description indicates my belief the item is political.



Peter Waite OAM JP

	DATE	DOCUMENT	RELATIONSHIP
1.	C1840	SM H 'Our Bridge'	<p>75th Anniversary. This article clearly shows how governments 'of the day' had the vision to plan for the future.</p> <p>This submission will illustrate how governments now rely on 'crisis management' and short term solutions instead of carrying out their 'Constitutional' duties. <small>NSW Constitution S5</small></p>
2.	1912	" Dr Bradfield	Appointed Chief Engineer for Sydney metropolitan railway and harbour bridge.
3.	1959	Below	No response to angle parking suggestion by business community to Council and Railways after 16 years.
4.	1975 Nov 11	Minutes	Pennant Hills Residents (Traffic) Assn. Attendees B & M Waite. This committee formed because of traffic speeding and short cutting through 'back streets'.
5.	1979 Jul 6	Ministerial letter to MP Jim Cameron	<p>Re Business Group concerns and petition re parking problems on East side of Pennant Hills Road, DMR would provide 13 parking spaces before 'clearway' restrictions imposed.</p> <p>Widening to occur in approx 2 years.</p> <p>The widening would not be piecemeal.</p>
6.	1981 Jun 4	Telecom – MP Harry Edwards	<p>Page 2 – Delay in widening is inevitable due to unfortunate misunderstanding in the extent of Telecom's involvement in the project.</p> <p>This letter was nonsense. The DMR advised Telecom it must demolish an exchange for road widening and build a new structure.</p> <p>A typical protection of one bureaucracy by another.</p>
7.	1981 Nov	Pennant Hills Traffic & Parking Study for Hornsby Council	<p>Lyle Marshall. Page 7: Widening of Pennant Hills Road by 1986 will not meet the total future demand.</p> <p>Solution proposed was identified as being unacceptable by concerned residents in 1975.</p>
8.	1984 Dec 10	RTA letter & plan re P. H. Road widening program	<p>This plan bore no relationship to the 1979 advice that 'piecemeal' development would not occur.</p> <p>The works started in Pennant Hills in 1981 and continued until 1996. The community deserves better.</p> <p>By then traffic jams occurred and extra turning bays had to be built to and from Boundary Road. Refer to consultant's 1981 report to Hornsby Council.</p>
9.	C1986	ROADS 2000 DMR	<p>Roads Minister Brereton promises "A new deal for road users".</p> <p>"A responsible way forward for road development in New South Wales".</p>
10.	1993 Aug	Liverpool Hornsby Study	"Route Descriptions The following route options could be developed as the National Highway"

11.	1994 Jan 24	Brereton News Release	Liverpool – Hornsby Link Road report released. This release emphasises the difference between state and national highways.
12.	1994 Feb	Bulletin 3	Preferred Route. What was essentially option B in the 2004 SKM report.
13.	1995 Oct	RTA – DOT Overview of Western Sydney Orbital	Commonwealth Roads Minister Brereton: Planning for next 30 years. This hasn't happened
14.	1997	Austrroads – Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development Australia at The Crossroads. E-transport Delivering best practice	Australia at The Crossroads. Nowhere in the SKM report can reference be found to guidelines such as contained in these various papers. The attached extracts "The Future – Summing up" encapsulates the community concerns. Page 62 <i>It is important to build the 'right' projects rather than 'bad projects'.</i> Then, 'Reforming institutions' clearly outlines the current politically dominated 'crisis management processes adopted by governments on all persuasions.
15.	1998 July	Pennant Hills – A study of Traffic & Parking	Despite their claim to the contrary, as yet, Hornsby Council has not taken any interest in this technical report.
16.	2000 May 7	Pennant Hills District Civic Trust	Complaint to Andrew Tink MP that the delegation to Canberra with Hornsby Council had not consulted with communities along Pennant Hills Road about what has become a tunnel under Pennant Hills Road to link the F3 and M7.
17.	2001 Jan	DOTARS – RTA Proposed WSO	"In 1993 the Commonwealth Government announced it intended to extend the National Highway by linking these end points within Sydney". This may be true, however see 1994 above. An entirely different scenario. Refer to July 2003 'Background Report'.
18.	2002 Aug 8	Concerned Citizens Group submission to SKM.	This simple map aided by SMK's own statistics gave 'ball park' estimates that Option C was vastly superior to a tunnel under Pennant Hills Road for a similar cost.
19.	2002 Aug 14 Jul 30	SKM advice re October meeting Notes	Note comments on Option C. Too expensive, Long term, Type C provides alternative to single Hawkesbury Bridge. Attached to this document.
20.	2002 Sept	WORLD HIGHWAYS International magazine	Pages 27 – 29. Tunnels under Paris – 4.5 k and 5.5 k. Vehicles under say 2.3 metres high. Trucks will use a separate tunnel. First tunnel to open 2005. There was a fire in the first tunnel that closed down work for three months whilst it was repaired. The recent Melbourne tunnel fire has highlighted both fire problems and apparent faulty construction work. The SKM report does not properly address these issues that the community raised.

21.	2002 Oct 31	Media Release	"A 2007 start date for the construction of this link is still possible".
22.	2002 Nov 5	SKM advice re above media release.	It is now 2007 and at least three years away according to the 2004 White Paper.
23.	2003 Apr 10	Abigroup letter	Advice that the WSO Community Liaison Group does not encompass the F3 connection.
24.	2003 July	SKM Study – Background Report	January 2001 MPs Anderson and Scully announced the SKM study. P1 footer NO DECISION HAS BEEN MADE ON PREFERRED ROUTE. P23 quotes vehicle numbers and 2007 start.
25.	2003 July	Newsletter 2	"The study findings indicate that corridor Type A options are preferred." This newsletter contradicts the above July 2003 statement.
26.	2003 Sep 1	Minister Ruddock	"A solution must be found"
27.	2003 Sep 8	Media release Minister Anderson	Submission dates extended to 3 October.
28.	2003 Sep 17-18	Value Management Workshop No2 Record	Page 22 – <u>3.13.1 Regional Transport needs beyond 2020</u> "Following lengthy discussion, the instruction from DOTARS was that the Australian Government felt that the longer term option was outside the scope of the link study and the issue should be addressed in another forum". No explanations have been given as to why there was this departure from the terms of reference and government policy. See FOI 28 March 2007
29.	2003 Oct 4	Concerned Citizens Group letter to SKM	This letter raising serious issues has not been properly answered by anyone. Using the SKM statistics the Western Option is the best option.
30.	2003 Oct 8	PH. Thornleigh Liberal Party letter	Refer 17 Feb 2004 Campbell letter.
31.	2003 Oct 21	Hornsby Council	Advice Option C continue to be investigated for long term option, meanwhile support for purple or blue options to alleviate Pennant Hills Road options.
32.	2004 Feb 17	Campbell to Liberal Party.	Announcement to be made soon. Contact Mr Scott Elaurant to arrange a meeting.
33.	2004 Feb 24	Tink to Liberal Party	See letters above and below.
34.	2004 Mar 11	Liberal Party	Possible meeting with Department – Mr Elaurant.

35.	2004 May 6	Joint Media Release. Ministers Anderson and Campbell.	Tunnel under Pennant Hills Road chosen without intermediate access to the tunnel. "The Australian Government will deliver the project under the new AusLink framework".
36.	2004 May 6	Repudiation of above media release.	This eight page paper questions many assumptions in the Minister's joint media release. Extracts from the SKM report were the basis of the challenge.
37.	2004 June	AusLink.	"The Australian Government will fund projects which will have the greatest effect on Australia's long-term future, whatever the mode". The Australian Government determined it wanted a short term solution. We look forward to working together with other levels of government, the private sector and the community to achieve a better transport system for Australia". Surely the community should come first, all the others mentioned are part of the community. How can the community believe anything Politicians, governments and the bureaucracies say or promise? Page 11 Table 2 details the costs of delays to the community. The 1995 costs would have built option C. Page 73 shows the EIS has been delayed. The 2007 promised starting date has been abandoned. This means the budget allocation to commence the tunnel has been deferred until the 2009 – 2014 estimates. Assuming the proposed tunnel was operational by 2014, this means it would have reached capacity by 2020. This is NOT sound planning.
38.	2004 June	MP Tink Newsletter	This glossy brochure indicates Andrew Tink has little understanding of the study.
39.	2004 Jul 13	Herald article – 'bridge' replacing road collapse at Coalcliff	This article examples how the government built this project without an Environmental Impact Study. There is no dispute that this was the right decision. Why couldn't this be done for the F3 to M7 route?
40.	2004 Jun 18	Emails 8.18 re May 5 Media Release	Advice from Ruddock's office Waite is to meet Frame when Senator Campbell is in Sydney. Who is Frame?
41.	2004 Jun 18	Emails 10.42am re May 5 Media Release	Advice from Ruddock's office Waite is to meet Frame when Senator Campbell is in Sydney. – Who is Sylvia Norton? Party Branch needs to be involved because of transparency issues raised at meeting on May 10.
42.	2004 Jun 19	To SKM re selection process	Attached are 2003 letters about the process and June 20 Sun Herald article about road operators.

43.	2004 Jul 6	SKM reply to above.	<p>Pages 2/3. "In view of the large number of submissions received (about 1,000) it was no possible to respond individually to each of the submissions".</p> <p>All that was necessary was to put all the submissions on the internet as well as each assessment.</p> <p>Will the Independent Review do this?</p>
44.	2004 Jul 10	To SKM re above.	<p>I again question who the stakeholders are.</p> <p>As yet, no one has responded.</p>
45.	2004 Jul 13	From SKM	<p>Submissions to the Monthly Chronicle have been read. They do not necessary(ly) reflect SKM's position.</p>
46.	2004 Aug 3	To Minister Lloyd	<p>"We are convinced there was political intervention in the process and the RTA staff or at a political level resulting in an inferior route nominated as the preferred option."</p> <p>Meeting in Ruddock's office August 26.</p>
47.	2004 Aug 6	Minister Lloyd	<p>Advice of 26 August meeting in Ruddock's office.</p>
49.	2004 Aug 26	Meeting in Ruddock office.	<p>Lloyd late. Ruddock left meeting to attend his FEC meeting nearby. [REDACTED]</p> <p>Lloyd and others then joined the FEC meeting. Lloyd spoke about openings in the tunnel contrary to the AG's decision.</p> <p>Ruddock intervened advising Lloyd he cannot go against a Cabinet decision.</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p>
50.	2004 Aug 27	Letter to Lloyd.	<p>Confirming agreement for 'Concerned Citizens Group' to meet with DOTARS and SKM ASAP.</p>
51.	2004 Oct 7	Thornleigh Normanhurst Residents Group	<p>News letter. Mayoral Interview re road issues and in particular the proposed tunnel.</p> <p>Mr Blunt was a former Councillor and was chairman for the HIT meeting on August 2, 2005 at Pennant Hills.</p>
52.	2004 Nov 25	MP Richardson letter	<p>Always preferred the original Lane Cove corridor.</p> <p>What is the difference between operating at above capacity and choke point?</p> <p>Will use best endeavors to ensure exhaust stacks are filtered. This is not good enough for people's health.</p>
53.	2004 Nov/De	Monthly Chronicle	<p>Who made the decision that Option C was outside the 'terms of reference'?</p>

54.	2004 Nov 5	Meeting at SKM offices	SKM, DOTARS, RTA, Concerned Citizens Group (Liberal Party – Jones, Waite) This was a frustrating waste of time. SKM allegedly provided a copy of all reports. The October 2002 Draft Options Development Report was not supplied.
55.	2004 Dec 6	Jones "Concerned Citizens Group" to Ruddock.	Mr Jones's letter and our joint submission to the meeting and assessment of the outcomes. Page 4 par 4. The RTA advised to think carefully about having option C reviewed as it would put the program back 2 or 3 years and the community would suffer. Over 2 years later the Australian Government has decided to review the decision on behalf of a toll road operator and has done nothing about genuine community concerns.
56.	2004 Dec 10	Lloyd to PH Civic Trust	The Australian Government has stated categorically that there will be no opening in Brickyard Park. Refer to Lloyd's comments 26 August 2004. A long term option is outside of the current project. Who made that decision and why has not been answered.
57.	2004 Dec 14	Waite to Ruddock	Reminder he stated we were already in election mode for 2007. The questions raised are unanswered.
58.	2004 Dec 20	Minister Nelson to Waite	Uninformed PR comment from an uninformed bureaucrat. Ruddock is Member for Berowra, not Hornsby.
59.	2004 Dec 23	Lloyd to Waite.	Option C will impact on Berowra Waters. As a former Hawkesbury ferry captain Lloyd shows his lack of knowledge about the subject. Option C is nowhere near Berowra Waters. Whoever drafted this letter is equally uninformed.
60.	2005 Jan 11	Ruddock to Waite	Thanks for January 6 letter.
61.	2005 Jan 28	Lloyd to Waite	Par 2 of this letter admits Option C was part of the study. Purple option best until 2021. Type C varies from \$2.7 to \$3.9 billion. Refer to map at March 12, 2006 for fallacies in the Minister's statement.
62.	2005 Feb 21	Email to Anderson re phone call	1994 study supports a route to the west and questions to proposed tunnels viability.
63.	2005 Feb 22	Letter to Anderson	re 21 Feb email. Note schedule of letters attached.
64.	2005 Mar 10	Meeting with Ruddock and Cory – DOTARS	The Pennant Hills Civic Trust, Concerned Citizens Group met with Ruddock and Cory – DOTARS for 2 hours. It was agreed the Trust and Waite make submissions for DOTARS to respond to. I gave Ruddock a copy of Lloyd's 23 December 2003 letter about option C crossing Berowra Waters. He was less than impressed.

65.	2005 Mar 18	Tink to Liberal Party Branch	DOTARS should release the documents.
66.	2005 Mar 30	Liberal Party to Lloyd	Branch President Ross Barwick, son Sir Garfield Barwick, seeking documents.
67.	2005 April	Auditor General Report, Air Quality	<p>Page 31: the RTA advised 340% increase in the Cross City Tunnel project from 1999 to 2002 was in part due to the direct intervention of The Premier. A short time after the study was made public the Premier resigned.</p> <p>"Project costings not adequate". "Prevents proper up-front evaluations".</p> <p>The SKM report also falls into this category.</p>
68.	2005 Apr 5	Barwick to Waite	<p>DRAFT notes produced by Malcolm Powell – former Liberal Party member.</p> <p>In par 2 he refers to Honesty, Integrity and Transparency, this is where the idea of the HIT Group started.</p>
69.	2005 Apr 18	Jones to Tink	<p>RTA assumptions appear open to question and debate.</p> <p>Dr Ray Kearney's comments about pollution fall out.</p>
70.	2005 Apr 24	Waite to DOTARS	<p>'Concerned Citizen's Group' supplementary submission re 5 November 2004 submission.</p> <p>P3 Minister Costa's proposals to increase speed limits on Pennant Hills Road to 80 kph.</p> <p>P4 Notes Transurban have taken over Hills Motorway.</p> <p>Once again the Australian Government's credibility has been questioned.</p>
71.	2005 April 25	Lloyd to Waite	(Anzac Day) Acknowledges my submission was received on 23 March 2005 and is currently under review.
72.	2005 May 2	Public Meeting Ruddock & Tink	<p>Ruddock advised "He feared that as no money had been put aside by the State in forward estimates, upgrading Pennant Hills Road and the tunnel option might be put off for a long time".</p> <p>The 2004 AusLink White Paper put back the funding until after 2009.</p>
73.	2005 May	Transport forum Darling Harbour	ParsonsBrinkerhoff papers on Tunnels, Bridges, Construction Services
74.	2005 May 20	Civic Trust to Lloyd	March 10 submission. Page 2. Option C does not rely on uncoded assumptions.
75.	2005 May 20	Email to DOTARS	Confirming May 25 meeting in Canberra.
76.	2005 May 25	Office of Fair Trading	The Honesty, Integrity, Transparency Group registration – Peter Waite, Clive Troy

77.	2005 Jun 8	Waite to Tink	<p>Registering concerns that the State opposition was doing little to gain the confidence of the people to change governments.</p> <p>The March 24, 2007 elections proved my point.</p> <p>The attached question about the truth refers to the AusLink November 2002 Green Paper "Our decision to move from the existing piecemeal short-term and mode-specific approach" for a new approach to Australia's national land transport infrastructure".</p> <p>The Independent Inquiry should establish what this means in relationship to the SKM Study.</p>
78.	2005 Jun 7	Changes to EPA Act	<p>This Act was passed with Liberal support. In December 2006 the Government issued regulations completely removing any controls over State Significant Development.</p>
79.	2005 Jun 10	Lloyd to Tink re Jones April 20 letter	<p>Par 4 acknowledges funding (\$20 million) has been approved for planning – not construction.</p> <p>Pars 5 to 7 contain explicit information that until then had never been raised.</p> <p>Why raise them here. The State Government has decided they are not to be impediments to State Significant Developments. Refer to 7 June 2005 comment.</p> <p>The last par avoids the need to widen the uncoded F3 widening to 8 lanes and impact on National Parks.</p> <p>This letters lacks credibility.</p>
80.	2005 Jun10	Jones to Ruddock	<p>Political letter questioning why this matter has not been raised in State Parliament.</p>
81.	2005 Jun 11	Fin Review	<p>Article re removal of appeal from State Significant Development approvals by Ministerial decree.</p>
82.	2005 Jun 11	DOTARS staff advertisement.	<p>Seeks staff for AusLink executive staff to deliver "high quality results within a team environment, often working with other levels of government, the finance sector and freight and logistics industry representatives".</p> <p>No where does this advertisement refer to the community which possess more collective knowledge than governments and their bureaucracies.</p> <p>This is undemocratic. The Independent Inquiry should seek explanations as to where and at what stage is the 'community interest' determined.</p>
83.	2005, Jun 23	Lloyd to Ruddock	<p>This is a series of 'motherhood' statements about government policy that hasn't been complied with.</p> <p>Par 6. "Long term transport requirements for Sydney is a State responsibility (option C)" WRONG</p> <p>Option A is a State responsibility. The RTA hijacked the study to use Federal money to help solve local road problems.</p> <p>From 1994 Option C was to be part of the National Highway. This letter lacks credibility.</p>

84.	2005 Jun 29	Emails to and from DOTARS	Page 2: "I don't want anyone ambushed" Suggested time and date for meeting Tuesday 5 July.
85.	2005 Jun 30	Lloyd to Ruddock	Page 2 par 1: "solving Sydney's urban traffic problems is the responsibility of the NSW Government". Refer to Lloyd's statements in his June 23 letter to Ruddock. The Independent Inquiry is asked to determine the inconsistencies in these two letters.
			[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
87.	2005 Jul 4	DOTARS letter and attachments	This was attached to the above email in black and white. A signed color copy was provided at the meeting. Attachment A. Par 1: "by-passing Pennant Hills Road" is wide open to interpretation. Newsletter 1: "To investigate options for a new National Highway connection between the Newcastle Freeway (F3) and the future Sydney orbital" Par 4 "It is clear that the main purpose of the Study was to find a route that would effectively solve problems of traffic congestion, road safety and amenity on Pennant Hills Road". This is absurd logic. All A options connect to the existing section of the M2 which is already part of the Orbital route. The 'future Sydney Orbital' was clearly the M 7. Refer to Figure 1 of the Options Development Report which shows the Western Sydney Orbital as a dotted line and the M2 as an existing road. It should also be noted that at this time I had not seen and did not realise that the Options Development Report existed. The 17 routes developed. Figure 5.2 The final report acknowledges a Type C option will eventually be necessary. On this basis the reasons for rejecting it are irrelevant because they will eventually have to be addressed by future governments. These reasons are political decisions being supported by the bureaucracy. The 'experts' raised these issues in the Value Management Workshop No.2 Sept 2003. Air Quality: "Type A would have the lowest number of vehicle kilometres traveled and therefore lower exhaust emissions, with type C the highest".

			<p>DOTARS stated that the tunnel may not have any filtration. There is no evidence to support the above claim.</p> <p>Table 4: Economic Performance of Types A, B, C. This table does not disclose \$1 billion required to widen the F3 to 8 lanes and reduce speed limits.</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p>
88.	2005 Jul 5	SKM, RTA, DOTARS, Jones, Swalwell, Waite meeting	<p>Response to emailed 4 July DOTARS reply to March 10 submissions.</p> <p>In the Attachments I ask about the WP5 March 2004. This wasn't answered. SKM later advised I would have to obtain a copy from the RTA. Why wasn't it included?</p>
89.	2005 July 5	DOTARS summary notes of meeting	<p>These are DOTARS interpretation of a 4.5 hour meeting.</p> <p>They are brief, grossly inaccurate and misleading.</p> <p>The only way for the Independent Inquiry to resolve these issues would be to hear both sides views according to the principles of 'procedural fairness'.</p>
90.	2005 Jul 7	Waite reply to Cory email	<p>My opinions are based on the Demographic Centre of Sydney at Silverwater and experiences as the Chairman of the highly successful Save Hornsby Hospital Committee in the late 1980s.</p> <p>In that instance the Government proposed to close four hospitals and build two super hospitals without any credible evidence that the 'dream' would work.</p> <p>The proposals were proven to be politically motivated. The Save Hornsby Hospital Committee was comprised mainly of disgruntled Labor Party members who leaked information.</p>
91.	2005 Jul 7	Later email from Waite to Cory.	<p>I again registered my concerns that we had been 'ambushed'. In retrospect we should have left the meeting.</p> <p>There was no independent chair.</p> <p>Again there is reference to differences in Newsletters 1 and 2.</p>
92.	2005 Jul 8	Swalwell to and from Cory emails.	<p>Swalwell has pointed out the tunnel may only have a six year useful life before Option C is needed etc.</p> <p>Cory reply avoids the need for another route.</p> <p>Without an independent 'umpire' to force DOTARS and the RTA to provide meaningful answers to informed community questions will be ignored.</p>
93.	2005 Jul 9	Ruth Jones for an unwell Derek Jones email to Cory.	<p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p>

			In my opinion SKM tried to be impartial but had the terms of reference changed several times to arrive at a conclusion that would have lead to the Australian Government funding a tunnel under Pennant Hills Road to solve State local traffic problems.
94.	2005 Jul 10	Ruth Jones for an unwell Derek Jones email to Cory.	<p>24 hours makes a lot of difference. Derek has exampled how the bombing in London's rail system had such a disastrous effect.</p> <p>Derek has over 50 years of experience in organising and managing 'communications' systems in Africa, Europe and Australia. For some years he was also the Assistant SES controller for Hornsby Shire.</p>
95.	2005 Jul 11	Waite to and from Cory emails.	Advice re August 2 Public Meeting about the tunnel concerns.
96.	2005 Jul 13	Turnkey paper	<p>Colin prepared this paper in response to Clive Troy's request to assist and make a presentation at the HIT August 2 meeting.</p> <p>With 30 years of experience his expert input cannot be ignored.</p>
97.	2005 July	Health Effects of Air Pollution – Curran	<p>Four page paper presented at Pennant Hills on August 2, 2005.</p> <p>Herald article about M5 smog port quoting Mark Curran's study.</p>
98.	2005 no date	DOTARS to Swalwell PH Civic Trust	<p>"The AG is not responsible for solving Sydney's Transport problems". AGREED.</p> <p>I have highlighted on this letter Option C does not rely on any of these uncosterd assumptions.</p> <p>Equally so it also does not include the \$1 billion plus to widen the F3 to 8 lanes including most bridges including those across the Hawkesbury.</p> <p>The Independent Review should ensure that DOTARS and the RTA respond to these issues that were clearly identified in the SKM report.</p>
99.	2005 JulAug	Monthly Chronicle	Article re H. I. T. public meeting August 2 at Pennant Hills.
100.	2005 Aug 2	PUBLIC MEETING 'paper'	<p>DOTARS Mr Cory attended this meeting as an observer.</p> <p>The four page paper encapsulates concerns raised by several community groups, residents and experts like former RTA Director Ken Dobinson (RTA engineer Llb). Ken is a member of the prestigious Sydney University Warren Centre.</p> <p>The last sentence in red under item 12 "And, is this really a new connection or in reality just 2 additional lanes?" This must be addressed by the Independent Review.</p> <p>As yet DOTARS and the RTA have not responded.</p>

101.	2005 Aug	2005 National Local Roads and Transport Congress.	<p>Government News. PPPs. "There's evidence from Britain that if you involve PPPs, you may as well double the cost. But you get it earlier".</p> <p>Transport Minister Anderson: "All is not well with Roads to Recovery". "Make sure things are done with transparency. There's a lot to be done at your (Local Government) level, there's a lot to be done at state level".</p> <p>The Australian Government admits there are problems.</p>
102.	2005 Aug	2005 National Local Roads and Transport Congress.	<p>Cover pages of Parsons Brinkerhoff centenary publications from a Darling Harbour exhibition associated with the above Congress.</p> <p>TUNNELS BRIDGES CONSTRUCTION SERVICES.</p> <p>Parsons Brinkerhoff have a world wide proven track record in many areas. However, they were commissioned by Hornsby Council in 2004 to prepare a report on possible uses of a former quarry without being advised there was no legal access.</p> <div style="background-color: black; width: 100%; height: 40px;"></div>
103.	2005 Aug 15	Ruddock to Waite HIT	<p>Advising he must act in the best interest of the wider community and not delay the road.</p> <p>Ruddock had obviously not been informed that the 2004 White Paper put the funding back to 2009 – 2014.</p>
104.	2005 Aug 18	Roads Minister Lloyd to Minister Ruddock	<p>Page 2 – "I have directed my Department to wind back its engagement with Mr Waite and his colleagues to a level consistent with the normal treatment of representations on Government decisions.</p> <p>This is a deplorable situation. It is a blatant admission that the Australian Government has a policy to ignore substantive probity issues.</p> <p>The Independent Inquiry should establish who made this recommendation to the Minister.</p>
105.	2005 Sept	Transurban, DOTARS RTA meeting	<p>Source A1 MWT appendix to 22 March 2006 Interim Report.</p> <p>This means that following letters and documents that were considered by, and responded to by DOTARS and the RTA was with their knowledge.</p>
106.	2005 Oct 7	HIT to Baulkham Hills Council Mayor	<p>Confirmation of meeting outcome where Baulkham Hills Council supports "Long term forward planning for a Type C option to the west."</p>
107.	2005 Nov 4	Waite to Debnam	<p>Setting out our previous contact and failure of the Liberal Party to offer any constructive alternatives to the Labor government.</p> <p>Debnam did not respond to my request to have the SKM study reviewed.</p> <p>Also attached was another article from the Chronicle.</p>

108.	2005 Nov 10	S M Herald. Tollways to reap huge profits.	This article appeared about the same time as Transurban approached the Australian Government to review the proposed tunnel under Pennant Hills Road.
109.	2005 Nov 10	Roads Minister to Wayne Merton MP	Whilst admitting the RTA conducted the study this letter passes the 'buck' back to the Australian Government.
110.	2005 Nov 21	HIT Group to 10 Liberal MPs and other Liberals	<p>This Memo attached Minister Tripodi's November 10 letter.</p> <p>It included an invitation to the March 12 meeting at Pennant Hills and also requested comment to enable accurate media releases to be made.</p> <p>Included was the August 2 leaflet and Media Release shown in the next item.</p> <p>At this stage it can be reasonably assumed at least Lloyd should have known of Transurban's proposals.</p>
111.	2005 Nov 21	ROAD RAGE media release	Refer to Minister Lloyd's letter's and the unanimous resolution passed on August 2 by 243 residents at the meeting.
112.	2005 Nov 26	Tink to Tripodi	Request for answers to technical questions for road counts compared to Option C.
113.	2005 Dec 6	S M H millions wasted in new transport debacle	<p>This article examples several 'bad projects' as against 'good projects'.</p> <p>In most instances the projects were aimed at Labor electorates and ignored major problems in Liberal electorates.</p> <p>It is obvious that the separation of power has virtually ceased to exist.</p>
114.	2005 Dec 9	Australian. Public ire stalls plan for longest tunnel	It must be established if Roads Minister Tripodi or the RTA were aware at this time of the Transurban proposals to shift the route.
115.	2005 Dec 14	DOTARS to RTA	<p>Liaise to prepare with it to prepare terms of reference.</p> <p>Source: Source A1 MWT appendix to 22 March 2006 Interim Report.</p> <p>This means between September 2005 and this date Minister Lloyd had agreed to what became the MWT report that is the subject of this submission.</p> <p>There is no indication that MWT had been advised of resident's concerns or other challenges to the integrity of the SKM report.</p> <p>The Independent Review should determine if this has fatally compromised the MWT report in relationship to the community being misled into believing this Independent Review was to examine their concerns.</p>
116.	2005 Dec	Premier's Department Review	Future Provision of Motorways in NSW
117.	2005 Dec 15	Hopwood to Waite	<p>Will attend March meeting – Very interested despite it being initiated by the Australian Government.</p> <p>Judy previously worked for Ruddock.</p>

118.	2005 Dec 15	HIT to Tripodi	<p>Invitation to Tripodi to attend March 2 meeting. (Similar letters sent to many MPs).</p> <p>As yet, the Minister has not responded to the questions.</p>
119.	2005 Dec 22	Tink to Waite	<p>In the light of the Cross City tunnel fiasco Tink's priority to find out whether or not the traffic counts for the Pennant Hills Road Study were based on lane closures.</p>
120.	2005 Dec 29	Waite to Tink	<p>Provided further supportive evidence about our findings and referred to the Latham and Brogden issues.</p> <p>Apart from Ruddock, based on incorrect information, not one Liberal MP has agreed they have an obligation to the residents as against the Party.</p>
121.	2006 Jan	State Infrastructure Strategy	<p>MOU December 2005. M2 to F3 and possibly F3 to M7 links are in the planning stages.</p> <p>P39 Corridor reservation for possible F3 to M7 link.</p> <p>The Independent Review should ensure the RTA produces ALL available documents and explanations.</p>
122.	2006 Jan	Sydney Ports Intermodal Logistics Centre at Enfield	<p>This study indicates an annual growth of 7.5% per annum over the next 20 years. Cumulatively this is about triple the 2006 total.</p> <p>This study makes the estimates provided by the RTA and therefore the conclusions in the SKM study highly suspect.</p>
123.	2006 Jan 27	Reply from SKM to questions about some figures	<p>The figures quoted in my email raise serious issues that confirm there are problems with the integrity of the SKM study as Transurban have also found.</p>
124.	2006 Jan	MWT	<p>In January 2006, Minister Lloyd agreed to an independent review that was presumably based on the report DOTARS issued instructions for on December 14.</p> <p>Why didn't DOTARS afford the community such an opportunity?</p>
125.	2006 Jan 16	Hopwood Media Release	<p>Mrs Hopwood clearly outlined the community concerns and tried to put these issues on the 2007 State election platform. She went against the party.</p>
126.	2006 Jan 17	Waite to Ruddock	<p>Political letter re Hopwood's Media Release requesting that Ruddock have these matters placed on the Agenda for his Federal Electoral Meeting on February 4.</p>
127.	2006 Jan 19	Warren Centre to Lloyd.	<p>Executive Director Professor Dureau makes it very clear both the F3/M2 link and F3/M7 links are required.</p>
128.	2006 Jan 21	HIT to Ruddock	<p>Advice that the community believes advisers have not kept Ministers Anderson, Campbell and Lloyd properly and appropriately informed.</p> <p>Request he ensures Lloyd personally responds.</p> <p>Attachment details concerns.</p>
129.	2006 Jan 25	Tripodi minder to Waite	<p>Minister will arrange for matters to be examined and response ASAP.</p>

130.	2006 Jan 26	Waite to MLC Donnelly (Westleigh)	Invitation to HIT meeting. Also an email was sent. Donnelly has not responded. [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
131.	2006 Jan 27	SKM email reply to Waite Jan 2 email	The questions I raised were not answered. I believe if they had it would have been an admission the study had been compromised by the RTA.
132.	2006 Jan 29	Waite to Ruddock	March 12 protest meeting, political implications and the Warren Centre report.
133.	2006 Feb	Beecroft Cheltenham Civic Trust newsletter	Page 2 of 4 refers to the March 12 meeting and sets out explicit reasons why Option C should be built.
134.	2006 Feb	Joint Select Committee Cross City Tunnel First Report.	Not attached
135.	2006 Feb 5	Jones to Ruddock	Political letter about the Warren Centre report, public opinion and proposed February 22 meeting with Ruddock over the issues.
136.	2006 Feb 12	Pennant Hills Civic Trust open letter	March 12 meeting detailing serious matters of concern about the integrity of the report and political blame avoidance by most MPs.
137.	2006 Feb 16	Minister Lloyd to Minister Ruddock	Par 2, Sentence 2: Following your representations <u>and others</u> I have received on this matter I have asked that my Department, with the RTA engage professional assistance to revalidate the assumptions and modeling underpinning the SKM report and <u>our</u> decision on a preferred route". Is Minister Lloyd referring to the MWT report, and if so where are the references to the community concerns? If it is not the MWT report where is the report that Minister Lloyd is referring to? In my opinion this is gobbledygook.
138.	2006 Feb 22	HIT Media Release	"Whoever they are, the 'experts' must rethink tunnels". Refer to the attachments about uncostered assumptions. The Independent Inquiry is requested to ensure the 'experts' respond.
139.	2006 Feb 22	Ruddock to Waite	This letter given to Waite at 1pm at meeting with Ruddock who gave me a copy of Lloyds 16 February 2006 letter advising he had asked DOTARS and the RTA to revalidate the assumptions in the SKM report. "The best use of funds would be to construct the single best option". Ruddock also gave me a copy of his 23 February media release.
140.	2006 Feb 22	Waite to Lloyd	Form letter to meeting invitees advising Lloyd he had not responded and thanking him for his advice to Ruddock about the review (revalidation)
141.	2006 Feb 22	Waite to Lloyd	Personal HIT letter to reinforce our determination to find out the truth.


142.	2006 Feb 23	RUDDOCK Media Release	Par 2 "This will result in reconsideration for <u>a new link between the F3 and the M7</u> currently being provided by Pennant Hills Road." Not the F3 /M2.
143.	2006 Feb 23	HIT Media Release update	HIT thanks Ministers Lloyd and Ruddock for their intervention.
144.	2006 Mar 5	Bias in F3 to orbital link	Professor Goldberg's paper concludes in par 1 "The bias introduce by such use is consistent with a bureaucratic predetermination to favour the tunnel options". The Independent Review is requested to seriously examine Professor Goldberg's Abstract.
145.	2006 Mar 8	Lloyd to Waite	Response to my February 22 letter. Apology for inability to attend. In his penultimate sentence Lloyd suggests "I am sure you will be pleased , (that the NSW Government will' investigate the need for a western corridor'.
146.	2006 Mar 8	Lloyd to Ruddock	About the HIT Group. Ruddock later personally gave me this letter advising this was NOT the agreement Lloyd had with Ruddock when they met.
147.	2006 Mar 9	NRMA position statement	Requests "an informed decision for road users".
148.	2006 Mar 11	Waite to Lloyd	I am not pleased with the advice in you 8 March letter. This letter sets out 11 other points that demand answers to be submitted to the Independent Inquiry.
149.	2006 March 12	MAP	26 copies of this map were distributed to MPs, Media, Hornsby Council and community organisations MLC Dr Chesterfield-Evans had a copy on his office wall and invited me to explain in detail the MAPs' implications. As yet DOTARS and the RTA have not responded. I request the Independent Review set aside time for me to make a presentation before a determination is made.
150.	2006, Mar 12	4 page Newspaper position paper for the March 12 meeting	The centrefold sets out the Promises, Broken Promises and Reality check list. Center bottom lists three questions to be answered. As yet, no meaningful answers have been received. The back page bottom right requests our elected representatives to seek answers that the Independent Review, in my opinion, should determine.
151.	2006 Mar 12	Media Release	In my opinion this was a fair, unbiased assessment of the meeting. The Independent Review is requested to determine if the SKM study was politically compromised.

152.	2006 Mar 16	Advocate article	MPs Tink, Hopwood and O'Farrell calling for a public inquiry following the HIT meeting.
153.	2006 Mar 16	Hornsby Council TR37/06	Engineers report on meeting to present outcomes of the HIT March 12 meeting. The engineer stands by Council's October 1, 2003 decisions to support the tunnel.
154.	2006 Mar 21	MP Richardson letter to Hills News editor	He would support a Western option if a re-evaluation of the data, perhaps through a public inquiry, supported a change. This is another challenge for the Independent Review to determine.
155.	2006 Mar 23	HIT Media release	This media release is in response to Lloyds March 8 celebration of his 10 years as an MP in the Howard government. The Central Coast News recounts how Lloyd would have still been a service station proprietor if it wasn't for the collapse and closure of the Pacific Highway and his campaign to have it re-opened. This is the very reason why the HIT Group and the community are campaigning for a second Hawkesbury crossing.
156.	2006 Mar 26	Sun Herald	F3 problems. Work has recently commenced to widen the F3 to six lanes. This has diverted traffic back onto the Pacific Highway and created noise problems at night. This was raised at a Hornsby Council public meeting on March 29, 2007 at Mount Colah.
157.	2006 April 6	Pennant Hills Civic Trust to Ruddock	March 12 HIT meeting. Whilst the community is not equipped to make informed comment on methodologies used it does have the expertise to ask commonsense questions.
158.	2006 Apr 13	NRMA briefing notes	Because of political problems in the NRMA I have not actively followed up on these issues.
159.	2006 Apr 18	HIT Group to Lloyd	Compilation of papers requesting an immediate reply. At this stage Minister Lloyd knew the MWT report had been completed and did nothing until February 2007. The Independent Review is requested to ask Minister Lloyd for explanations.
160.	2006 May 14	Sun Herald	Traffic problems on the F3.
161.	2006 May 29	Waite to Lloyd	"Jim; you, Philip, Premier lemma and the community know there are major probity problems with the RTA. When given compelling evidence, why don't you want in inquiry into DOTARS?"
162.	2006 June	Hornsby Council News	Pennant Hills Road: "Council supports the construction of a road linking the M2/7 at the earliest possible time".
163.	2006 Jun 5	Ruddock to Waite	Will seek an explanation from Lloyd re May 19 letter.

164.	2006 Jun5	Ruddock to Hopwood	"Interim report received, which essentially confirms the SKM findings in favour of the Purple Option". Where is this report. Who wrote it?
165.	2006 Jun 16	AusLink to Waite	Thank you for your comments in your 29 May emails. No response to the serious issues raised that were in the letter also posted.
166.	2006 Jun 19	West Pennant Hills Valley Progress Assn to HIT Group	Unanimous motion to abandon the F3/M2 link for a second long term strategic Hawkesbury crossing.
167.	2006 Jun 21	NDTimes add for State Treasury	Infrastructure plans for you local area. F3 to M2 link. <u>Not the F3 to M7</u>
168.	2006 Jun 21	Minister Truss to MP Cadman	Re The HIT Group: Par 4 "In January 2006 Lloyd asked DOTARS to seek that the RTA commission a consultant to review traffic modeling by SKM in relation to this issue (The HIT Group)". This appears to be incorrect. The request came from Transurban. The Independent Review is asked to validate the statements made in Minister Truss's letter.
169.	2006 Jun 22	Hopwood to Waite	"Lloyd should instigate this enquiry into the transparency of the F3 to M7 link study". NOTE: NOT THE F3 TO M2 PROPOSAL
170.	2006 Jun 22	Lloyd to Ruddock	Re Ruddock's 5 and 7 June letters on behalf of HIT and Pennant Hills Civic Trust. Par 2: "no credible evidence has been yet produced which would warrant this step (a public inquiry)" Par 3 uses the Warren Centre report to support the conclusions of the SKM study. 4. This being the case why has Lloyd agreed to investigate Transurban's concerns?
171.	2006 Jun 26	Ruddock to Pennant Hills Civic Trust	Lloyd's June 22 letter attached. Attachment A page 2 par 1. refers to the MWT Interim Findings. This the first public reference to this study. The Independent Review should note this important document.
172.	2006 July	Herald Publication Essential Sydney	This 56 page publication high lights serious issues facing decision makers.
173.	2006 Jul 6	Hornsby Advocate. Less talk, more action	The editorial and Brian Buckley's letter reinforce the deplorable situation the NSW is in.
174.	2006 Jul 11	Pennant Hills Civic Trust to Ruddock	This letter refers to Lloyd's 'snow job' and lack of response to six reasonably simple questions.
175.	2006 Jul 20	HIT to Ruddock	This letter reiterates the three questions in the HIT Group's March 12 newspaper advertisement. Request for Ruddock as AG to initiate an immediate Public Inquiry.



176.	2006 Sep 10	Beecroft Cheltenham Civic Trust leaflet	Ruddock to attend September 10 meeting where guest speaker Associate Professor Ray Kearney will speak about "Health Impacts of Vehicles Emissions Within and From Road Tunnels".
177.	2006 Sep 11	HIT to Ruddock	Thanks for advice Lloyd would shortly announce a public inquiry to 'revalidate the (SKM) study'
178.	2006 Sep 14	Advocate	Ruddock announced a Tunnel rethink.
179.	2006 Sep 21	NSW Roads Office to HIT	This advice makes no mention of the MWT report. The credibility of the Office must be questioned.
180.	2006 Oct 10	Hills Times	The editorial and letter rightly question if governments have the ability to plan for and implement long term strategies for transports issues.
181.	2006 Oct 15	Pennant Hills Civic Trust Open Letter	This letter reinforces the need for the Independent Review to determine the competency of the relevant Roads Ministers and their departments abilities to make long term plans as was done for Sydney in the 1920s.
182.	2006 Oct 21	10,000 Friends of Greater Sydney	Receipt for membership.
183.	2006 Oct 24	Hills Times	Political polka in full swing and Bus service is not the ticket. The editorial and letter are further proof that the public interest is irrelevant.
184.	2006 Nov	North West Rail Link.	Planning Update No.2 EIS on exhibition. I attended a meeting at Cheltenham in late 2006 where the Transport Infrastructure Development Corporation made a presentation. It became obvious that the presenters had no local knowledge. This was a repeat of what happened with the SKM study. The public will not accept this sort of treatment from politicians and the bureaucracy.
185.	2006 Nov 12	Pennant Hills Civic Trust Open Letter	Smoke and Mirrors. The Trust asks "Will the Inquiry have the scope, the will and capacity to see it through". The question is: does this refer to the Independent Review or another inquiry?
186.	2006 Nov 29	HIT EPPING PUBLIC MEETING	I organised this meeting to enable candidates at a Hornsby Council by-election and the 2007 State election to hear community concerns about the F3- M7 link, Rouse Hill Rail Link, Epping Traffic and Parking, CSR's Hornsby Quarry and the failure of our elected representatives to ensure community concerns were appropriately dealt with. The Warren Centre's Ken Dobinson made a detailed power point presentation that left no doubt the community interest was being ignored. A 22 minute DVD about the Hornsby quarry acquisition prepared by a network of concerned residents was shown.

			<p>Whilst not germane to the Independent Review the centrefold and back page have copies of letters and emails etc where Hornsby Council admits it has edited submissions to obtain a legal opinion on resident's complaints. It is clear that complainants have not been afforded their rights to 'Procedural Fairness'.</p> <p>Under the ICAC guidelines the staff involved in the acquisition should not have taken any part in the investigation.</p> <p>Some concerned residents have made a large scale model of the quarry and environs to exhibit at meetings. People do not go to this extent if they do not believe their concerns are not justified. Hornsby Council was quoted about \$30,000 for such a model.</p> <p>The community then spoke about their concerns and some candidates responded about how they proposed to deal with the issues.</p> <p>A 2 hour DVD was made of the entire meeting to enable the community to see if the successful candidates will keep their promises.</p> <p>It remains to be seen if that happens.</p>
187.	2006 Dec 2	Pennant Hills Civic Trust Open Letter	"Pre-determined nonsense" 10 months later and no inquiry.
188.	2007 Feb 16	Email to Tink	<p>I asked Andrew Tink if he would be present at a meeting as a witness.</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p>
189.	2007 Feb17	SM Herald	Tunnel death risk fudged by the RTA. This is another example of the deviousness or sheer incompetence in the RTA.
190.	2007 Feb 19	Ruddock Media Release	<p>"Review of the F3 to Sydney Orbital Route Selection".</p> <p>"Public submissions will be sought in the coming weeks".</p> <p>"Growing traffic flows mean that it is important that residents make sure their voice is heard by making submissions to the review"</p> <p>No where in the release does it refer to Transurban.</p>
191.	2007 Feb 19	Labor Media Release	<p>"It has taken Lloyd two months to respond with yet another review."</p> <p>"Federal Labor will make a decision if Jim Lloyd doesn't".</p> <p>This leaflet was handed out by State Labor Election candidates who were unaware of the MWT report.</p>

192.	2007 Feb 21	Independent Review Map	<p>This clearly refers to the F3 to M7 Corridor Selection and how the F3 to M2 connection was wrongly included in the SKM report in 2001.</p> <p>The public were mislead.</p> <p>The B and C options were on the drawing board in the 1990s as was the Lane Cove Valley route.</p> <p>Being in black and white it is not possible to distinguish which route is which.</p>
193.	2007 Feb 22	SM Herald	<p>Credibility sunk without a trace. The visit of the Queen Mary 2 and the RTA approval to do maintenance on the Harbour tunnel is another illustration of the lack of protocols to minimise traffic chaos.</p> <p>To its credit, the RTA is congratulated on the success of the Bridge Walk my wife and I participated in.</p>
194.	2007 Feb 22	SM Herald	<p>Downer paid columnist \$11,300 to write speech.</p> <p></p> <p>Refer to March 9, 2007 comment.</p>
195.	2007 Mar 3	Sun Herald supplement	<p>Lane Cove Tunnel filtration. Refer to Dr Ray Kearney's comments. He spoke at the Beecroft meeting in 2006.</p>
196.	2007 Mar 8	Hornsby Council	<p>Proposed Link Road F3 to Sydney Orbital.</p> <p>I challenged this report at the meeting. The author, engineer and Councillors had not seen or read the MWT report yet they were all 'experts'.</p> <p>This was despite my producing the MWT report.</p>
197.	2007 Mar 8	Advocate Public Notice re Review	<p>The advertisement does not disclose that the review was being conducted as a result of Transurban's overture's to DOTARS.</p> <p>The Council and public have assumed the Review (Independent, has not been included in the add) was a the result of community concerns.</p> <p>The Independent Review should make a determination on the ambiguity of the 'terms of reference'.</p>
198.	2007 Mar 9	SM Herald	<p>State Public Prosecutor Nicholas Cowdery took to task politicians for failing to expect and take notice of "frank and fearless advice from Departmental advisers".</p> <p>One example was the demise of the RTA's Paul Forward.</p> <p>Note HIT's comment on back of the article.</p> <p>Separation of power no longer exists. This is a political problem that the Independent Review must investigate.</p>

199.	2007 Mar 14	Waite to Hornsby Council	This submission was treated with contempt by Councillors and staff.
200.	2007 Mar 15	Email to Hornsby Council	At Council's March 14 meeting I promised to do this and suggested I make a presentation based on the map supplied that is identical with the March 12, 2006 map included with this submission. None of the matters raised have been acknowledged.
201.	2007 Mar 19	Email to Independent Review	Request for disclosure and copies of documents and that the Independent Review be conducted in accordance with the ICAC guidelines.
202.	2007 Mar 19	Herald article	Railcorp suppression of documents. This is a siege mentality that does not generate trust. Senator quits because he didn't understand his duties. These are deplorable indictments on both the Federal and State legislatures. They are case studies.
203.	2007 Mar 23	Crikey news about Burnley tunnel	Pages 10 and 11 refer to previous disasters and loss of life. The RTA admits, if built, the proposed tunnel under Pennant Hills Road will be the longest urban tunnel in the Southern Hemisphere.
204.	2007 Mar 28	RTA FOI receipt	Request for copy of documents changing the Terms of Reference to the SKM study. Delays occurring because of the extremely high volume of applications.
205.	2007 Apr 11	Hornsby Council report WK19/07	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

Review of the F3 to M7 Corridor Selection



Hon. Mahla Pearlman AO



Australian Government

August 2007



Australian Government

Review of the F3 to M7 Corridor Selection

REVIEW OF THE F3 TO M7 CORRIDOR SELECTION SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

1. The Chair, the Honourable Mahla Pearlman AO, invites written submissions from interested parties (individuals or organisations) to the 2007 independent Review of the F3 to M7 Corridor Selection ("The Review").
2. Submissions should seek to directly address the Review's Terms of Reference (see below) and comply with these guidelines. They must not contain defamatory statements. Some further tips for making your Submission more effective are contained below.
3. Submissions can be lodged via email, facsimile or post. Electronic submissions should be saved in rich text format (.rtf) or as a MS Word document (.doc). Other submissions should be written or typed clearly, preferably in black ink. One copy of the submission is sufficient.
4. **Submissions must also attach a completed and signed submission cover sheet** (see attached document), which includes your name, postal address, telephone number and if possible an e-mail address to enable the Review Chair to verify details of the submission. If the submission made is on behalf of an organisation, please indicate this clearly in the cover sheet. Where a Submission is lodged electronically you are also required to mail a hard copy of the signed and completed cover sheet to the Review Secretariat as soon as possible after that date. The Review Chair retains the right to reject submissions which do not meet the requirements set out in this paragraph.
5. **For the purposes of the Review, submissions will be treated as public documents. All submission will be posted on the Review's website** (www.dotars.gov.au/F3toM7review) for other members of the public to view.
6. The Chair of the Review may also invite those making written submissions to attend a meeting, which will be open to the public, to enable her to follow up or clarify any issues or questions she may have in relation to material contained in their submission.
7. Please note, final decisions on potential public fora including meeting dates and locations will only be made by the Review Chair following consideration of Submissions received.
8. Submissions will be acknowledged electronically or in writing. If you have submitted a submission and you do not receive a formal receipt acknowledgment within 5 working days, please contact the Review Secretariat on 1800 661 904.
9. Submissions should be sent by

10/2

E-mail to:

reviewF3toM7@dotars.gov.au

Or in writing to:

**The Independent Review of the F3 to M7 Corridor Selection
PO Box 593
CANBERRA ACT 2601**

Or by facsimile on:

(02) 62746916

10. The **CLOSING DATE** for receiving submissions is **5.00PM, 13 April 2007**. Acceptance of submissions received after this date will be at the sole discretion of the Review Chair.

11. For any other information or queries about preparing submissions please use the contact details above.

Review of The F3 To M7 Corridor Selection – Terms Of Reference

The Terms of Reference for the Review are listed below (bolded). To assist with the preparation of your submission you may wish to consider the particular areas of interest associated with each Term of Reference.

Giving due consideration to the information in the *Interim Report – F3 to Sydney Orbital Corridor Review March 2006*, consider and advise on:

1. **Whether the assumptions and data used in the *F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study 2004* were valid and reasonable at the time of the study;**
Areas of interest for Term of Reference 1 may include, but not necessarily be limited to:
 - a. The appropriateness of the analysis and methodology used by the consultant, Sinclair Knight Merz (SKM);
 - b. The appropriateness of the options selected for further examination;
 - c. The validity of the models used;
 - d. The accuracy and appropriateness of assumptions made in the study;
 - e. The accuracy and appropriateness of the data used;
 - f. Other models and data that were available;
 - g. The adequacy of the consultation process and the methodology used to consider and incorporate the input provided.

2. **Whether changes since the report's publication affecting land use and transport flows in Western Sydney would support any significant changes to these projections;**
3. **Whether any significant changes to those projections would alter the conclusions reached in the F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study of April 2004.**

Areas of interest for Terms of Reference 2 and 3 may include, but not necessarily be limited to:

Changes which might affect the projections, assumptions or conclusions in the report, such as changes to:

- government planning and policy;
- timing of planned project implementation, including cost implications;
- environmental and heritage considerations;
- societal effects, including health impacts;
- provision of public transport;
- economic indicators/benefits;
- transport mix and flows;
- toll arrangements;
- surrounding networks;
- demographics;
- industry and freight/logistics;
- land use.

How To Make Your Submission More Effective

Here are some points to help make your submission more effective.

- Read the Sinclair Knight Merz and Masson Wilson Twiney Reports and relevant background and other material found on the Review web site
- Be brief, simple and clear.
- Be specific, rather than general in your comments.
- Where possible, address each selection criteria separately.
- Use dot points and headings to help organise your ideas.
- Attach any factual information you may wish to include which provides further evidence or information in support of the points being made in your submission. Make sure your information or other data is accurate.
- Where a Submission may be lengthy, please include an Executive Summary of the main points.

10/3

Terms of Reference for the Review

"Giving due consideration to the information in the *Interim Report – F3 to Sydney Orbital Corridor Review March 2006*, consider and advise on:

- whether the assumptions and data used in the *F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study 2004* were valid and reasonable at the time of the study;
- whether changes since the report's publication affecting land use and transport flows in Western Sydney would support any significant changes to these projections; and
- whether any significant changes to those projections would alter the conclusions reached in the *F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study of April 2004*".

Executive Summary

The Review Process

To reach my conclusions, I followed a process of calling for public submissions, holding meetings in public, analysing submissions and the presentations in public, obtaining data from the relevant authorities, and analysing that data.

Terms of Reference One

Giving due consideration to the information in the *Interim Report – F3 to Sydney Orbital Corridor Review March 2006*, consider and advise on:

- whether the assumptions and data used in the *F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study 2004* were valid and reasonable at the time of the study.

I have concluded from my analysis that the assumptions and data used in the SKM Study were valid and reasonable at the time of the SKM Study.

The basis for my conclusion is as follows:

- SKM adopted a standard approach to its traffic modelling. It used inputs of the then current land use and network assumptions and adopted a standard process of calibrating the STM;
- the differences in SKM's land use projections (population and employment) and those predictions in current 2006 TDC data reflect more up to date census data and government policy;
- the current TDC data reinforces SKM's assumptions about population growth in Outer South Western Sydney, Inner Sydney and the Central Coast;
- the current TDC data reinforces SKM's assumptions that there would be a shift of employment to Western Sydney;
- so far as concerns person trips, there is a slight and insignificant difference (in the order of 0.3%) in 2011 projections of total vehicle distance travelled between SKM's forecast and the current TDC 2006 data;
- there is a close match between SKM forecasts of traffic volumes for 2001 with actual RTA AADT counts in 2002;
- at the highest level, and speaking broadly, there is a similar pattern of distribution of car trips across all SSDs between SKM's forecasts and those projections in the current TDC data; and
- SKM's projections of commercial vehicle origins and destinations are broadly consistent with the CTS 2003 origins and destinations.

10/5

Terms of Reference Two

Giving due consideration to the information in the *Interim Report – F3 to Sydney Orbital Corridor Review March 2006*, consider and advise on:

- whether changes since the report's publication affecting land use and transport flows in Western Sydney would support any significant changes to these projections.

I have concluded from my analysis that there have been policy changes affecting land use and transport flows but those changes would not support any significant changes to the projections in the SKM Study. To the contrary those changes reinforce the need for the Link.

The basis for my conclusion is as follows:

- there have been changes in terms of land use since the time of the SKM Study, and the *Metropolitan Strategy* sets out the most significant of these;
- projections of population and employment increase across the Sydney Region between 2001 and 2031, particularly within south western and north western Sydney and are likely to reflect the *Metropolitan Strategy*. However, the increase in population and employment is not large overall; the matter to notice is that the distribution is shifting;
- the projections for person trips to 2021 show a similar rate of growth between the 2001 data used by SKM and the current TDC 2006 data and the rate of growth to 2031 is also similar. This comparison shows that there is not forecast to be any significant change to the projected person trips in the SKM Study;
- in comparison and broadly speaking, the projections show less bus trips forecast in the current TDC 2006 data than in the 2001 data used by SKM, and hence there are projected to be more cars using the road network in 2021 than forecast by SKM but the relative change is not significant;
- there are differences in car driver trip projections between the 2001 data used by SKM and the current TDC 2006 data, but growth occurs in western and south-western Sydney and again reflects the *Metropolitan Strategy*;
- in terms of total car driver trips the current TDC 2006 data adopts a continuation of the growth rate used by SKM, and the largest difference in projected growth is likely to occur in western and south western Sydney, again reflecting the *Metropolitan Strategy*;
- the projections show that more car driver trips are taking place within the Central Coast rather than to/from the Central Coast reflecting the greater employment increase within the Central Coast;
- projected daily car trips in 2001, 2021 and 2031 show only a small proportion to and from the Central Coast and reveal a pattern of distribution east and west across the Sydney Region rather than north to south;
- there have been only minor changes in daily traffic counts since the opening of the M7 across all main roads and the motorways in the study area; and

- as far as can be derived from the available material, there is an indication that the origins and destinations of commercial freight vehicles might shift towards the Central Western SSD and such flows are likely to accord with the draft *Sydney Urban Corridor Strategy*. This is confirmed by recent M2 commercial vehicle traffic counts, which indicate that the majority of heavy vehicles are travelling west of Pennant Hills Road rather than east.

Terms of Reference Three

Giving due consideration to the information in the *Interim Report – F3 to Sydney Orbital Corridor Review March 2006*, consider and advise on:

- **whether any significant changes to those projections would alter the conclusions reached in the *F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study of April 2004*.**

I have concluded from my analysis that there is no case altering the conclusions reached in the SKM Study.

In particular:

1. there is a need for the Link now;
2. the Type A corridor is to be preferred against a Type C corridor, but planning for a Type G corridor should commence immediately;
3. a Type A corridor Purple option should be the preferred route; and
4. a motorway standard east facing connection between the Purple option and the M2 should be examined in the concept design of the Link.

Public Input

A number of issues raised by the public should be considered during the development of a concept proposal and the preparation of an EIS. These are:

1. amenity issues, such as ventilation stack, noise and vibration impacts, tunnel safety, tunnel gradients and structural impacts on affected properties;
2. costing and financing issues, such as future road upgrades as a consequence of the construction of the Link;
3. the issue of lane configuration, that is, a three lane tunnel in each direction or a two lane tunnel in each direction but with climbing lanes at gradients; and
4. the appropriate tolling regime, that is the adoption of no toll scenarios, or different tolling regimes, or flexible tolling.

10/7

1 Review Process

The following outlines the context for and the steps that I took in coming to the conclusions that allowed me to provide answers to the terms of reference of the review (the Review).

1.1 Background

Sinclair Knight Merz (SKM) was commissioned by the New South Wales Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA) to carry out a strategic study for the Australian Government to identify a route for the National Highway connecting the F3 and the Western Sydney Orbital (now the M7) or the M2 Motorway (M2) to relieve pressure on Pennant Hills Road (the interim National Highway).

SKM produced its final report in 2004 (the SKM Study). It comprised a main report, seven working papers, a draft options development report and two value management workshop records.

SKM concluded that a Type A corridor Purple option (linking the F3 to the M2) would meet the terms of reference under which it was appointed and would satisfy the objectives and criteria underpinning the SKM Study.

Throughout this Report, I have used the term "the Link" to refer generally to a new route connecting the F3 and the M2. When referring to particular corridors or routes, I have used the names accorded to them in the SKM Study.

Subsequent to the publication of the SKM Study, Transurban Ltd (which became the owner of the M2) made submissions asserting that a Type A corridor Yellow option would provide a better route. To assess that assertion, Masson Wilson Twiney (MWT) was appointed to carry out a desktop review of the traffic forecasts used by SKM and Transurban (the MWT Report).

1.2 Establishment of the Review Process

As part of the Review process, a Secretariat was set up to report directly to me. It comprised four members of staff of the Australian Government Department of Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS) who had no previous connection with the SKM Study nor any direct involvement with NSW road proposals. Those members were Joan Armitage, Simon Stratton, Erin Cann and Tracey Butcher.

Stephen Alchin of Booz Allen Hamilton and Christian Griffiths of GTA Consulting were appointed as technical advisers in order to provide me with advice and data analysis, so that I could evaluate the information and data provided to the Review.

10/9

Terms of Reference for the Review

"Giving due consideration to the information in the *Interim Report – F3 to Sydney Orbital Corridor Review March 2006*, consider and advise on:

- whether the assumptions and data used in the *F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study 2004* were valid and reasonable at the time of the study;
- whether changes since the report's publication affecting land use and transport flows in Western Sydney would support any significant changes to these projections; and
- whether any significant changes to those projections would alter the conclusions reached in the *F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study of April 2004*".

CUT + PASTE

How To Make Your Submission More Effective

Here are some points to help make your submission more effective.

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 - Attach any factual information you may wish to include which provides further evidence or information in support of the points being made in your submission. Make sure your information or other data is accurate.
- Where a Submission may be lengthy, please include an Executive Summary of the main points.



MEDIA RELEASE

The Hon Jim Lloyd MP

Minister for Local Government,
Territories and Roads

14 September 2007
L066/2007

F3 TO M7 REVIEW RELEASED TODAY

Minister for Local Government, Territories & Roads, Jim Lloyd, today released the report on the Review of the F3 to M7 Corridor Selection, saying that it provided a clear way forward on the project.

On 19 February 2007, the Australian Government commissioned the Hon Mahla Pearlman AO to conduct an independent review to examine the technical underpinnings and robustness of the processes followed in the original corridor selection study and to ensure that the previous decisions taken on the F3 to M7 corridor selection were soundly based. Ms Pearlman is a former Chief Judge of the NSW Land and Environment Court.

In undertaking the Review, Ms Pearlman invited submissions and held public meetings with the people and organisations that provided submissions. A total of 53 submissions were received, and public hearings were held in June. Ms Pearlman submitted her report on 31 August and met with the Minister to brief him on 3 September.

The Review report has confirmed the original decision by the Government to provide a link between the F3 and M2, broadly along the alignment of Pennant Hills Road. It recommended that:

- the preferred route follow the Purple Option and that this now be progressed to the next stages of investigation including: detailed design, economic and financial assessment and environmental impact assessment; and
- a Option C (western) corridor be planned now.

Mr Lloyd said that the report had identified a small number of issues that would require consideration in the preparation of an environmental impact statement and that further public consultation would be a key element in taking the project forward and determining the precise route for the link.

"The Australian Government will work with the NSW Government to deliver this important link and I have written to Eric Roozendaal, the New South Wales Roads Minister, today to advise him on the outcome of the review", Mr Lloyd said.

"I have also asked Mr Roozendaal for an update on planning of the Option C corridor, which the NSW Government committed to undertake in its Sydney Metropolitan Strategy released in 2005."

Mr Lloyd thanked Ms Pearlman for her efforts in conducting the Review. He also thanked the people and organisations who made submissions to the Review and participated in the public hearings.

Media Contacts

James Larsson (Mr Lloyd's Office)

02 6277 7060 / 0434 305 130

The report can be downloaded by visiting: www.dotars.gov.au/roads/F3toM7Review/index.aspx



URL: http://www.ministers.dotars.gov.au/jl/releases/2007/September/L066_2007.htm

C

FURTHER TO THE HISTORY LEADING TO THE UNSOLICITED PROPOSAL ATTACHED
IS a copy of my 27-page submission to the Pearlman review of the SKM report that lists 205 letters, reports or submissions up to 11 April 2007. I have also compiled a correlated table that includes reference to items not included in the Pearlman table as being Item number followed by A, B, C etc so that it is in chronicle order. As necessary I have included supporting documents or made more detailed explanations with the benefit of hindsight.

ITEM	DATE	DOCUMENT	RELATIONSHIP
3 A	1968	Sydney Region -1970-2000 Outline Plan	Shows NW sector as Blacktown/Parramatta to Windsor.
3 B	1971	The new Expressways	Castlereagh – Great Western Hwy – Lane Cove Valley
3 C	1992 16 Sept	Hornsby Advocate	<i>"Take the Easy Way . . .get on the Metroad and follow the NUMBERS!!"</i>
12 A	1994	Preferred route	As described by DMR John Brewer and Maunsel PL.
13 A	1995	Western Orbital	As shown on original list
13 B	1995	Austrorads	Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development
14	1997	Australia at the Crossroads	Pages 62 – 64 <i>'It is important to build the "right" projects rather than "bad" projects" Reforming institutions, A national; commitment is needed, A national vision . . . is essential. When will that happen?</i>
16 A	1997	Strategy for Traffic Management	Austrorads Research and Development paper.
16 B	2000	Roads 2000	DMR Sydney Region
16 C	Undated	Bridges/Construction	Two Parsons Brinkerhoff PR leaflets.
17	Jan 2001	DOTARS – RTA Western Proposed WSO	1993 proposal confirmed. Seeks Expression of Interest
17 A	2002 April	F 3 Sydney Orbital Link Study News letter 1	<i>"Investigations between Kariong and Sydney Orbital from Dean Park to the M2 Motorway at Macquarie Park"</i>
17 B	2002 22 July	Concerned Citizens Group (Liberal Party)	5 page letter questioning SKM about how the Study they are preparing is progressing and examples major accidents in the Mont Blanc and St. Gothard tunnels as being two recent examples in the event of fire.
17 C	2002 8 Aug	Concerned Citizens Group (Liberal Party)	Committee chair forwards my five-page submission to SKM. P1 of my letter to committee omitted. Map of options included.
20	2002 Sept	World Highways	French booklet about problems with tunnels including fire.
17 D	2003 July	F 3 Sydney Orbital Link Study News letter 2	<i>"Investigations between Kariong and Sydney Orbital from Dean Park to the M2 Motorway at Macquarie Park"</i>

17 E	2003 C July	F 3 Sydney Orbital Link Study News letter 3	Map shows Options C B A <u>This is the first change to what the Terms of Reference and items 1 & 2 above.</u> <i>"The study findings indicate that corridor Type A options are preferred, as they would best meet the project objectives by:"</i>
17 F	2003 28 Aug	SKM Dural Meeting Notes	P2 Questions: JB (John Brewer ref 12 A) re EIS. PP beyond 2021 brief. What is planned for 2030? Waite one page assessment of meeting
17 G	2003 30 Aug	Concerned Citizens Group	3 page letter to SKM about consultative process.
17 H	2003 8 Sep	Waite letter to Ruddock re CCC group	Waite 2 page letter and 6 page observations set out serious concerns before SKM's report was completed. I believe there are several items in these papers that should be carefully considered by the DoP when assessing my submission why the tunnel should be scrapped.
17 I	2003 29 Sep	Liberal Party concerns about ToR for SKM	Request from Pennant Hills Liberal Party for MP Judy Hopwood to obtain information.
17 J	2003 Sep	SKM workshop No 2 record	17/18 Sep. P1/A2 , 2-day workshop attended by 32 people from SKM22/23 and government agencies. P 21/22 Canberra bureaucrat felt longer-term options to be in other forums.
32	2004 17 Feb	Senator Campbell to MP Tink	Re Pennant Hills Liberal Party concerns about delays with the SKM report what the findings will be. Reply: <i>'Type A corridors were preferred to Type B and C corridors. . . .'</i>
37	2004	AustLink White Paper	This should be considered in relation to all the White Paper to ensure they are not misrepresented. Refer to initial paper then attached P3 1999-2000 Domestic freight: Road 72% Rail 26%, tonnes-kilometres Road 37% Rail 35% <u>P5 Total non freight Growth 1970-2020 Road</u> <u>P7 Urban passenger 1970-2020 Kilometres</u> <u>Non-urban passenger task by mode 1970-2020 B T K</u> <u>P 11 Table 2 Costs of Urban road traffic delays</u> This shows how Sydney had the highest in 1995 at \$6 billion and only increased to 8.8 in 2015, whilst the other states increased by 16.9 billion. The reasons are not explained. <u>P 15 AusLink-a new approach to planning and decision making</u> infers a national approach is the best solution. The question is when will politicians make decisions in the nations best interests instead of their best interests?
47 A	2004 Aug 6	Minister Lloyd	Letter to Waite re Ruddock meeting noted in original paper on 26 August 2004 before Ruddock's Federal electoral conference of about 50 members. L [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

48 A	Aug 15	Email to Lloyd/reply	This confirms meeting with Ruddock and doubts about a Mr Frame attending.
49 A	Aug 27	Waite to Lloyd re meeting	This letter clearly sets out the problems with the SKM 2004 report and problems when the F3 is closed by accidents as there are no practical alternative routes.
55 A	2004 16 Nov	Liberal Jones to Ruddock	This letter and agreed accuracy of the notes sums up the concerns of many Pennant Hills residents apart from Liberal Party members. The RTA's John Brewer was present. He is referred to in items 11 and 17 D.
55 B	2004 6 December	Waite to Ruddock.	Why has no one explained why Option C was rejected?
55 C	2005	Waite to DOTARS Cory	11 page letter explaining Pennant Hills Thornleigh Liberal Party is the 'Concerned Citizens Group'.
67	2005 April	Auditor General Report Air quality	Page 35 refers to cost blowouts because of the Premier's intervention.
75	2005 12 May	NOT 20 as listed. Email to Corry at DOTARS	Meeting with Ruddock on 22 May, will be in Canberra on 24. Corry agreed to meet. 2 hour meeting achieved little except that AustLink White Paper and several other documents were provided in an attempt to prove nothing was wrong.
86 A	2005 4/5 July	Email re meeting next day	<p>This snap meeting gave only an afternoon and evening to arrange for 3 Pennant Hills residents to attend.</p> <p>DOTARS Ashok prepared the Summary Notes. By four votes to the Pennant Hills 3 votes we did not agree with item 2 relating to Option C.</p> <p>Peter Prince and Hari Kisham had little alternative than to agree.</p>
95 A	2005 11 July	Email exchanges with Corey re 5 July meeting re my 2 August meeting	Corey was trying desperately to protect the credibility of SKM's conclusions and requested I amend my 22 August 2005 draft paper.
99 A	2005 2 August	4 page A4 ad in Monthly Chronical.	 <p>Ten years later little if anything has changed. There are even more reasons now why the NorthConnex tunnel is a "bad project".</p>
125 A	2006 16 Feb	<i>Libs in conflict over tunnel link Hills News</i>	<p>Hornsby MP Judy Hopwood "the tunnel, connecting the M2 Motorway with the F3 Freeway should be re-thought and a possible second crossing of the Hawkesbury River considered to lessen the load on Pennant Hills Road.</p> <p>Liberal Hills MP Richardson (and Mayor Berman) supported the idea but rejected it as being too costly. </p> <p>This article raises the issue "an alternative route when the F3 was closed on New Year's day." 2006 NB 2006</p>

150 A	2006 12 March	Second Pennant Hills Public meeting re tunnel	My 4 page A3 advertisement in the Monthly Chronicle called for a "RE-EVALUATION OF 'OPTION C' An above ground alternative north-south route . . . " ~ NB: "RE-EVALUATION"
152	2006 16 March	Hornsby Advocate	MPs O'Farrell, Hopwood and Tink support Option C and seek tunnel Inquiry after they attended the 12 March meeting where there was a unanimous decision for Option C after they had seen the proof SKM was directed to recommend Option A.
159	2006 18 April	Waite to Minister Lloyd	"REVALIDATE entire M2 to F3 Link Study or hold an immediate Public Inquiry"
175 A	2006 13 August	The H. I. T. Group (Waite) Media Release	'PUBLIC INQUIRY DEMANDED' My three page paper set out flaws in the SKM Study and have Option C commenced in 2007.
188 A	2007 22 January	MP Judy Hopwood Media Release. Refer to 125 A 16 January 2006	"A COMPELLING CASE FOR A SECOND CROSSING OF THE HAWKESBURY RIVER" "From 5pm 21 January the Main Northern Railway Line, the F3 and Pacific Highway have been in various stages of closure. . . . I have longed called for a second crossing. . . , It would also provide a security solution if the current routes north out of Sydney were cut for any reason." Berowra and sections from Mt Ku-ring-gai to Cowan were isolated for three days. Resident action stopped much of this area from being burnt out. I helped my son put out embers falling on his and nearby property that backs onto Ku-ring-gai Chase. Many people have very short memories [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
201 A	2007 14 March	Discussions with Hornsby Council's executive manager works	[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
202 B	2007 19 March	Urgent disclosures to Pearlman Inquiry	Further to 201 A, my disclosure explained that the HIT Group is not a group of people but Honesty Integrity and Transparency that I registered. It is no more of a legal entity than 'North Connex' many incorrectly believe is a legal entity that is now subject to my GIPA (FOI) application to the Minister to establish fact.
201 C	2007 27 March	FOI to RTA for decisions to change the 2001 Terms of Reference.	This FOI application was on my H. I. T. Group letterhead. I later found out the RTA correctly determined it did not hold any information and that the decision to have the Pearlman Review conducted was made in Canberra, not the RTA as I and many others had incorrectly believed for years.
201 D	2007 16 May	RTA FOI decision	The RTA released documents relating to my application. It did not include any DOTAR's instruction to SKM to alter the Terms of Reference.

201 E	2007 8 April	Pearlman Review submission	<p>My detailed 27 page submission included a large coloured commercial Sydney Region map that I had added details of why the recommended option was not the best route and SKM's costing's indicated Option C was about the same as the tunnel including the necessary works on the F3 to enable the tunnel AND Pennant Hills Road carry the traffic.</p> <p>M/s Pearlman chose to have my map used as it was far clearer than the two supplied by DOTARS that I was given at the end of the three day hearings. I still have them. A B/W copy is attached showing comparisons from the SKM report.</p> <p>At no stage has anyone questioned the accuracy of this map and observations I made.</p>
201 F	2007 18 June	Pages 52-54 Pearlman transcript	<p>I was the sixth speaker. DOTAR's M/s Riggs then spoke for some time. M/s Pearlman then gave DOTARs M/s Riggs 5 minutes longer (P5 line 20)</p> <p>Line 24/25 <i>"I fear I have talked to much."</i></p> <p>Lines 30 to 46 refer to M/s Riggs denying the Terms of Reference had been altered. It was then noted M/s Pearlman, another person and I had asked for a copy of the Terms of Reference for the Inquiry.</p> <p>M/s Riggs lines 30 – 35 are correct. [REDACTED]</p> <p>P53 M/s Riggs <i>"I would hate for this inquiry to think that the Federal Government was not in any way not looking to the future in respect of Sydney's growth. . . . The art of putting land transport infrastructure into place is not a science. . . . So we are quite happy, very happy indeed, to see that the Sydney Metropolitan Strategy has in it a reference to he NSW Government's further investigation of the need for a future option C-type route".</i></p>

DOCUMENTS AFTER THE PEARLMAN INQUIRY CONTINUE ON NEXT PAGE

DOCUMENTS AFTER PEARLMAN INQUIRY

202	2007 28 June	MP Richardson Media Release.	<i>"Libs challenge lemma Govt to fast-track new road north. . . . regardless of what decision Pearlman reaches. . . MP Ray Williams, said that the preferred option for the Northlink was for a westerly connection between the M7 and Kariong. . . . MP Hartcher . . . said the case for Northlink is well made out. . . . torrential downpour that washed part of the Pacific Highway at Somersby on 9 June and took the live of 5 people reinforced the need. . . ."</i>
203	2007 12 July	ADT applications07321	Waite V RTA. Re FOI for 2001 ToR documents Planning meeting 27 August
	14 Aug	RTA re Internal review	Would contact DOTARs to establish if they had ToR amended
	13 Sep	DOTARs does not hold documents	Withdrawn after speaking to RTA's representative in ADT before hearing.
204	2007	Cover page	NW subregion Draft Strategy sets out proposals to release more land and was one of the reasons for the NW railway.
205	2012 21 July	SMH Weekend Business	<p><i>"The road from smart bombs to tollways" is about Transurban's new chief executive Scott Charlton having left his role as the chief operating officer at property developer Lend Lease.</i></p> <p>Lend Lease is the successful tenderer to build the NorthConnex tunnel. Lend Lease is also still preparing design plans referred to in the EIS that have not yet been completed.</p>
206	2014 12 August	SMH electronic edition and 13 August 2014 hard copy pages 1 and 4 is an a more detailed report	<p>Whilst there may be nothing untoward with the above arrangements, a current court case over the alleged \$144 million legal battle over the Lane Cove Tunnel cannot be ignored.</p> <div style="background-color: black; height: 40px; width: 100%;"></div> <p>The important issue with the NorthConnex project is to ensure that if the tunnel is approved and constructed, on behalf of the taxpayers, the State will not accept any responsibility for any loss, liability or permit increases in tolls to enable Transurban etc to recoup losses.</p>

Mrs Jo Moss
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Concerned Citizens Group,
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Tel.(02) 9484 4304

8th August 2002

Dear Mrs Moss,

Further to our 22nd July letter attached are some thoughts on the Community Consultative meetings. Thanks are due to Mr Peter Waite, a member of our group, who is responsible for compiling much of the information contained in this submission.

Please let me know if you or one of the team requires more detail.

Due to his extensive local knowledge Mr Waite, 9484 3471, would probably be best able to answer questions on technical detail.

Yours faithfully,

D.R. Jones

For and on behalf of F3/Sydney Orbital Link 'Concerned Citizens Group'.

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22nd July 2002

Dear Mrs. Moss,

F3 TO SYDNEY ORBITAL LINK STUDY

This submission is made on behalf of a group of long established residents located in suburbs directly adjacent or near to the Pennant Hills Road/M2/Orbital.

The group have wide ranging contacts throughout the area, and are deeply interested in the future welfare and practical development of Sydney N.W. Region and of the nation as a whole.

It is hoped that you will regard the submission in the way it is intended. Namely as an impartial and considered routing of the link, bearing in mind vital longer term national traffic requirements, whilst maintaining realistic environmental and ecological standards.

What is now under study, is a vitally important part of a major - if not the major national trunk highway in Australia. A route which links the North and the South of the Continent, and along which both commercial and private traffic must be able to move quickly and efficiently. No country, especially a continental one - can continue to develop if it lacks an adequate transportation infrastructure - e.g. U.S.A. Railroads and highways, Europe fast Motorways and Railways crossing the EU. Currently much of Australia's transport infrastructure is either second rate or bad.

The cry in the past has nearly always been lack of money, either Federal or State or both. But at the beginning of the 21st Century, bearing in mind the rise of highly competitive, hitherto underdeveloped countries, can we afford **NOT** to spend money on urgently needed infrastructure, such as Road and Rail which will serve the country well into this century

Now is not the time to penny pinch and adopt second rate and inadequate compromises which will not truly serve the purpose and will satisfy no-one.

Now is the time to think big and act positively.

To turn to specifics;-

OPTIMUM SOLUTION

It is submitted that by far the best solution would be for the link to run roughly NNE from the Orbital/M2 junction, and to join the F3 at a point well to the North of Hornsby.

This solution envisages a second crossing of the Hawkesbury probably around Courangra/Spencer with the link then joining the F3 at Mt. White or Calga/Kariong. Obviously detailed surveys would need to be carried out, but it does seem possible that the Old Northern Road and Canoelands Road could both be utilised.

Looking to the future, a second crossing of the Hawkesbury is highly desirable, in fact, essential.

It is not acceptable, either strategically or commercially that all N-S Road communication and much of the accompanying infrastructure should be carried on one bridge. In the event of a catastrophic failure caused by say earthquake [Newcastle], fire or even terrorist activity, the value and need of an alternative route becomes unarguable.

In the mid 1990's the Pacific Highway, F3 and Railway were closed for 3 days due to bushfires. Fortunately this was during Christmas holidays, otherwise the disruption would have been infinitely more serious as there is no other practical N-S route.

Further, it seems extraordinary to say the least that over the Blue Mountains there have been for many years 2 routes - the Great Western Highway and the Bells Line of Road. These routes to the West are certainly important but not to be compared to the importance of the main N-S trunk highway [

The current State Transport Minister Mr. Scully, has recently stated "The Western Sydney Orbital is.....the most significant freight road in the country.]

How many times have one or the other - and sometimes both routes to the West been cut, but nearly always one has remained open. It is also interesting to note that no organisation has complained that the Bells Line of Road has in any way degraded or devastated the environment. In fact, it can be said to have opened up without damage the beauty of the National Park areas to thousands of people which otherwise would have been and are virtually inaccessible.

Again, if not left too long, a route could be built from the Orbital North via the Old Northern Road, Canoelands Road and Spencer through to Cessnock and Singleton via Wollambi. This would allow interstate traffic from the Illawarra, Southern and Western Sydney access both to the New England and Pacific Highways. It is understood however, that this possibility may be outside the terms of the present study,

ADVANTAGES

Adoption of the solution proposed means that through traffic would have a clear unobstructed run away from heavily populated areas, and that the choke points/bottlenecks that presently exist would be eliminated.

Traffic coming from the South destined for Carlingford, Castle Hill, Pennant Hills, Thornleigh, Normanhurst and Hornsby, on leaving the Orbital would continue along the M2 and enter Pennant Hills Road at the existing junction. In the opposite direction, traffic destined for Sydney and for the above locations would continue as now i.e. F.3. Pacific Highway or Pennant Hills Road.

Newcastle, Sydney and Wollongong are already merging into a conurbation. The solution gives industrial/commercial traffic and commuters the possibility of using the conventional route through Sydney and up/down the Pacific Highway or alternatively using an unobstructed and much faster route to reach their business destinations - many of which these days are not located in Central Sydney.

The link route should ideally be above ground. Tunnels - other than short ones - are to be avoided. They are expensive to build and maintain. There is always a high pollution content within them which has to be extracted. In the event of a major accident or fire, victims are extremely difficult to reach, and if the fire damage is severe, the road can be blocked for a considerable period of time. e.g. Mont Blanc and St. Gothard are two recent examples.

It is accepted that some of the terrain over which the projected link would be run is difficult. However, modern highway engineering, using high or low level viaducts, possibly linked by short tunnels where necessary, would overcome much of this.

None of the technology is new and has been long proven in many parts of the world.

Furthermore, construction over "greenfield" sites is far cheaper and quicker than other alternatives. It avoids long delays and horrendous and unproductive costs associated with the re-siting of dense infrastructure, widening of roads [bottlenecks, increased accidents] and resumption of property.

PENNANT HILLS ROAD

Although no formal survey has been undertaken, nevertheless the overwhelming consensus of opinion, not only amongst those living directly in the area, but also amongst those very familiar with the road, is that the Pennant Hills Road is already traffic saturated. Between the intersection of the M2/PHRoad and the entry to the F3 just short of Pearce's Corner - a distance of just under 8 Kms - there are 21 sets of traffic lights.

As the main National artery running N/S, the traffic load of heavy commercial vehicles is extremely high and becoming higher every year.

The constant stop/start plus build up of these vehicles at the lights causes a heavy pollution level of unburned diesel fuel in densely populated residential areas, not to mention the long traffic tail backs, both North & South, especially during the morning and evening.

If it was decided to widen the PHR this would be an extremely expensive and time consuming exercise as the road is fronted almost everywhere by either new or relatively recently constructed property with considerable above and below ground infrastructure.

The problem does in fact appear to be recognised by the statement on P.1 of your newsletter No.1 - April 2002. The danger lies in that in any so-called ecological or short term cost saving compromise, the problem could be shelved or ignored to the detriment of a truly viable and forward looking national trunk route, not to mention the health, wellbeing and peace of mind of those people already badly affected by the PHR situation as it now is.

A Mr. Simon Leake of Thornleigh - not in any way connected to this Group - puts forward a well reasoned argument in a letter to the Hornsby & Upper North Shore Advocate for Thursday July 11, P.10. A copy of this is attached.

TUNNEL M2 WAHROONGA- F3

Other than the drawbacks already mentioned, a tunnel could be helpful. **However, by comparison** there is substantially less heavy industrial traffic out of Sydney that uses the Pacific Highway or the M2 to connect with the F3.

The overwhelming amount of heavy traffic [semi trailer] is either coming up from the South wishing to by pass Sydney by using the F7, or alternatively emanating from the industrialised area of Western or Southern Sydney also using the F7 or James Ruse Drive and joining the P.H.Road at the existing intersection.

As stated in your newsletter, this traffic load can only be expected to increase substantially. Such traffic will not willingly continue along the M2 until it meets the tunnel. It might be forced to do this by direction, but more realistically this traffic will use the P.H. Road between Pearce's Corner [F3] and the P.H.Road/M2 intersection.

In this case in a very short time something like gridlock will ensue.

ECOLOGICAL/ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

It is not realistic or practical to expect that a major world city can expect to confine itself forever within large areas of untouched wilderness close at hand.

Sydney will expand - is expanding - it must or it will die. All cities either expand or contract. They cannot stand still.

However today cities and the road and rail infrastructure surrounding and entering into them, can be managed in such a way as to minimise or even eliminate any suggestion of devastation or massive degradation of the environment.

Modern highway engineering including bridges can be, and more usually is, both elegant and visually satisfying. This applies to motorway/railway bridges or viaducts spanning deep valleys, flood plains, rivers or harbour waterways e.g. Anzac Bridge.

Viaducts are common in some of the most beautiful locations in Europe, such as South Germany, Austria, Italy and Switzerland. Think of the magnificent railway viaducts in the U.K. which are regarded as features of the landscape. Modern engineering enables high volumes of traffic, both road and rail to move quickly and effectively with minimal pollution, as engines are operating at efficient fuel burning speeds.

Flora is not in any way affected and Fauna is barely affected and moves quite freely through under road water conduits or specially constructed animal runs e.g. Alaska highway/pipeline, Russian pipeline etc.


Note that ON/OFF ramps are kept to minimum as they are now on the Sydney-Canberra Freeway. On the other hand the solution suggested would have the added benefit of opening

up new areas of National Park and the Hawkesbury for controlled tourism and recreation without in any way damaging the environment or ecology.

Looking to the future, the adoption now of second rate solutions will constrict and cripple orderly, vital, economically responsible development. It will also impact adversely on the current urban and suburban environment, and provide little relief if any, for several hundred thousand people. Now is the time to look to the future, plan realistically but with sensitivity, and do the job properly first time.

Hopefully this submission will be of some interest. We would be pleased to discuss the matter further with you should you so desire.

Yours faithfully,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'D.R. Jones', with a long, sweeping horizontal line extending to the right.

D.R.Jones

for and on behalf of F3/Sydney Orbital Link. Concerned Citizens Group.

Viewpoint

Build the link road or choke to death

THERE is a lot of ill-informed nonsense being talked about road versus rail in the M2-F3 link road debate.

The problem with Pennant Hills Rd is not commuters, as they could perhaps be put back onto rail, it is freight. Rail is the method of choice for moving a million tonnes of coal to a port but for general goods rubber-wheeled trains are the more efficient method.

Trucks on Pennant Hills Rd are carrying general goods for which they have an unassailable competitive advantage.

Instead of providing for these rubber-wheeled trains we force them to stop at 19 traffic lights and pump carcinogenic fumes into our



Write to The Editor, *The Advocate*, PO Box 1647, Northgate, Hornsby, 1635. Letters may be faxed to 9476 4997 or email hornsbyadvocate@ang.newslink.com.au. Letters must include the author's daytime phone number, address and signature. Comment should be kept brief.

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dormitory suburbs. Given a dedicated roadway, modern prime movers can haul road trains quite safely at a constant speed, saving on wear and tear, fuel and pollution. Why is it so difficult to recognise

fundamental technological shifts? Don't call them freeways, the self-appointed environmentalists get too emotional, call them dedicated roadways.

I urge the authorities to have the conviction and strength to ignore unrealistic opposition and build this dedicated roadway before the people of Hornsby shire choke to death.

You have left it too late and radical surgery is required.

Simon Leake, Thornleigh

SYDNEY ORBITAL - F3 CONNECTIONS
CONCERNED CITIZENS GROUP
8 AUGUST 2002

**POSSIBLE
BOATING
TOURIST
FACILITY**

CALSONEWCASTLE GAS PIPING

OPTION 1


OPTION 2

**SYDNEY
BASIN**

**SYDNEY
BIOGEOGRAPHICAL
CENTRE**

**CANDERBA
MELBOURNE**

WOLLONGONG



F3 – SYDNEY ORBITAL LINK. 8th August 2002

Option C assessment by “Concerned Citizens Group”.

This is based on provisional information given by Sinclair Knight Mertz to consultative meetings at Pennant Hills and Dural on 30th and 31st July. It is an expansion of the submission made on 22nd July 2002.

For the purposes of comparison with **Option A**, the two routes have been split into sections in this ‘table’. Option B is not realistic or practical and should be abandoned.

The table should be viewed in conjunction with the accompanying map. Shown on the map is the demographic centre of Sydney, on a North South axis, which is approximately at the Silverwater Bridge. (source Coopers Lybrand, Melbourne)

The significant advantages of **Option C** can be fully seen in relation to **Option A**. The greatest advantage is that the only interference to the F3 would be at the northern end in comparison with connections being made to the middle and western end of the M2, and at the southern end of the F3. This would then provide an alternative route when the F3 and M2 were being widened in the future.

Sector	Option A cost	approximately equals	Option C cost
1	M2 link to F3		Calga or Mt White to south side of Hawkesbury
2	F3 widening Wahroonga to Hawkesbury		S side of Hawkesbury to N end Boundary Rd
3	From Dean Park to west end of M2		N end Boundary Rd Maraylya to Dean Park
4	Existing M2 widening to Macquarie		n/a

The major change suggested is to delay the Orbital connection to west end of M2. Traffic counts may show that it would only need to be a four lane road and the M2 not widened.

Statistics given at the consultative meetings appeared to indicate **Option C** should reduce through traffic on Pennant Hills Road to a greater extent than if **Option A** were adopted whereas other figures given indicated the opposite. This need to be clarified.

Critical figures needed are origin/destination/traffic counts for vehicles on the F3. The volume of local traffic will not materially alter regardless of the option chosen. Also needed are counts for every major intersection from the Commenara Parkway, to James Ruse Drive.

At Dural mention was made of the success of the Express bus service from The Hills district to the City via the M2. This has been confirmed by Station Master Andrew Laarhoven at Pennant Hills who reports a substantial drop in ticket sales. It has also been observed that traffic delays on Boundary Road Pennant Hills have dropped around the same time.

Over the last three years it has been observed on Saturday mornings heavy traffic has increased on Pennant Hills Road to the extent that by 6.30 am traffic light phasing has changed from 'on demand' to 'peak demand'. At the same time traffic on the Pennant Hills Bellamy – Stevens Street bypass has significantly increased at 6.30am on week days with a noticeable increase since County Drive was opened onto Castle Hill Road late last year.

The practicality of banning heavy vehicles in peak periods as was suggested at the Dural meeting is questioned. EG Three concrete plants operate at Thornleigh. None have sufficient storage capacity for 'big pours'. This necessitates bringing in regular supplies during the day to maintain deliveries. Some jobs take all day. It is simply not practical to build bigger storage facilities or stop delivery of concrete in peak hours. If it were done at night there would then be complaints from residents.

Deliveries are already made to supermarkets from 5am or earlier. The question must be asked would the community accept two and three waste pickups throughout the night; and should the community expect people to do shift work to save them having to pay more taxes to provide a better transport system? There are many social justice questions to be answered.

The location of the M2-F3 connection would depend on the location of toll plazas to serve both routes. This would need to be carefully thought out and is not a consideration in **Option C**.

Equally so the contract with the M2 owners must be made public as there may be some form of compensation provided. All the cards must be put on the table. Before the M2 was opened it was claimed that would solve the Pennant Hills Road problems. This confirms traffic projections have been woefully inadequate. Worst case scenarios should be used.

Apart from apparent cost savings the most significant attraction of **Option C** is that it is mostly a greenfield route that will not disrupt major traffic flows during construction and would also cost substantially less because there would be far fewer services to be relocated.

It is guesstimated **Option C** would be about 20ks less than **Option A** for the average journey. In terms of time, money and reduced accidents the long term advantages would be immeasurable, especially if the projected fuel crisis eventuates. The benefits for many from the NW sector would be far greater. EG Bathurst to the Central Coast and Newcastle.

If a cost benefit analysis was done using 'marginal rates of substitution' for alternative options to users it is doubtful if **Option A** could be justified especially if the traffic delays resulting from lane closures during widening of the M2/F3 were taken into account. For either option the public will pay for the delays in time, fuel, taxes and toll. During the construction phase and in both the short and long term **Option C** should be a substantially superior option.

Tunnels are far more costly to build and maintain. Whilst the excavated rock is in high demand it will have to be removed at either Wahroonga, and or near the M2 whereas in a greenfield site civil engineers design and construct roads to lose excavated material thereby removing the need for road transport to other sites.

Pollution generated by vehicles is dispersed into the atmosphere. Concentrating it into exhaust stacks is fraught with problems. Internal combustion engines require oxygen mixed with fuel to generate power. If the oxygen is polluted engines cannot operate efficiently thereby generating more pollution. The use of tunnels needs far more research before they are allowed to be used as band aid solutions to overcome traffic problems.

In the event of accidents in a tunnel the potential for major delays and injury to rescuers is far greater in a tunnel. Helicopter or many other evacuation procedures are precluded.

An important issue to be raised in the report is the environmental affects on the flora, fauna and ecology of any route as against the social and environmental affects on the personal lives and well being to each member of the community. How will this be evaluated?

Politicians at the behest of some members of the community have locked up land for National Parks and other purposes such as land right claims. Would those decisions reflect the majority opinion of the community if they were asked were they prepared to sacrifice some protected land for the long term benefit of the health of large sections of the community?

Pollution is described as the unwise use of natural resources, whilst conservation is described as the wise use of natural resources. Is **Option A** a wise or unwise use of natural resources?

For bus and transport operators it means increased productivity and reduced costs. In some instances it would make a major difference to drivers on log-book rest periods.

Politically **Option C** should be welcomed by members of both major political parties. It will shorten links from the south, Wollongong, southern, western and north western Sydney and the Hunter to the north. A win win situation for the great majority.

The report is paid for by the community. It must be represent community opinion and be made available to the public. This matter is far too important to allow bureaucrats and politicians to selectively comment on for political purposes. It is of both State and National significance.

The most important factor that cannot be ignored and must be given the highest possible rating in the evaluation process is **Option C**. It provides an efficient high capacity alternative route in the event of a disaster blocking the F3, Pacific Highway and main northern rail line as happened when all of these routes were blocked by bushfires for several days in the mid 1990's.

The Stephen Bathgate submission

On page 3 Stephen estimates **Option A** would require a 6.8 k tunnel and notes that the 1.7k Eastern Distributor tunnel cost \$700 million.

At the Dural meeting the estimate for **Option A** was given at \$1 billion. (\$1,000 million.)

Stephen's estimate for **Option A** is a 6.8 k tunnel. This is 4 times the quoted length of the Eastern Distributor. This would then put **Option A** at a theoretical cost of \$2.8 billion.

Assuming economies of scale prevailed and less intersections are involved it is doubtful if the cost could be reduced to below \$2 billion which was the cost estimate given for **Option C**.

Other major factors to be considered would be pro-rata inflationary costs and the reduced cost of financing **Option C**. The sector from the F3 to Windsor Road could be opened probably two or three years earlier before the works required to make **Option A** fully functional were completed. Whilst it will not provide the final solution in itself this is a major incentive to overcome the ever increasing problems at the southern end of the F3/Pacific Highway/Pennant Hills Road as quickly as possible.

Costs estimates need to be clarified and documented to allow more informed comment.

SKM Orbital Consultative Meeting at Dural. 28th August 2003. Comment by P Waite

There were about 14 members of the public at the meeting and five associated with the study.

Computer slides and overheads were used to explain the findings and how the study would proceed. Requests to provide copies of the slide and verbal statistics were not answered.

It was acknowledged our submission had been received last year and we would be advised why the questions raised had not been responded to.

I challenged claims that by 2021 Pennant Hills Road would only increase to 100,000 vehicles per day when p5 of the study reported that over the past 10 years traffic had increased 5% pa which would mean that by 2021 the theoretical volume would be about 140,000. It was explained that the opening of the M2 had caused an aberration and the figure quoted were correct and that 'peak periods' would extend over a longer time to carry the extra traffic!

Figures on one slide appeared to indicate traffic origin – destinations were 30% NW, 20% S/SW and 10% W. This indicates 60% could use option C and could also take traffic from the east to the west on the M2 to use option C. This would then take much of the F3 traffic off Pennant Hills Road and to some extent from the Pacific Highway.

As option C cuts about 20k off the trip to Kariong this route would attract traffic from suburbs such as North Ryde, Epping, Carlingford and Parramatta to option C. It would then give the M2 operators additional toll from vehicles travelling against the peak traffic flows.

Others present also found the figures hard to correlate. Several people expected that Option C would have been included in the study even if only to provide figures to justify why it was not an option at the present. It was in part explained that the Federal and State Ministers had instructed no options were to go through National Parks or sensitive areas.

If true, two Ministers have imposed their views not¹ to allow the consultant and community to make informed and open comment. National Parks are created at the request of the community. National Parks and Ministers can be changed by community opinion.¹ Corrected
'7/7/2004

It is inconceivable a route is to be selected and then an EIS prepared to justify the route. One is interdependent on the other and cannot be separated.

There was general agreement that a 20 year forward plan needed to be developed for the future. I then outlined the Concerned Citizens Groups concerns pointing out that it has been known for over 20 years the widening of Pennant Hills Road and the opening of the F3 would not solve the increasing traffic problems and that the Bellamy Street route was identified as becoming a 4 lane clearway back onto the Pacific Highway at Hornsby and then north through Asquith, Mt Ku-ring-gai, Berowra and beyond yet no notice was taken.

I indicated I spoke to some MPs and firmly believe that agreement on the project would not be reached by the Federal and State governments and that the project would not proceed, and if it did it would not be completed by 2011.

This meeting proved beyond reasonable doubt that the process is not transparent. Apart from addressing the above concerns the community should unite, demand explanations and call for an urgent report on the long term advantages of option C and immediate establishment of a road reservation to enable orderly and cost effective planning.

Ms J Moss,
Community Liaison Manager,
F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study,
Reply Paid 164, St Leonards NSW 1590

D.R. Jones,
Concerned Citizens Group,
11 Lutanda Close,
Pennant Hills, NSW 2120

30th August 2003

Dear Sirs,,

F3 TO SYDNEY ORBITAL LINK STUDY -
BACKGROUND REPORT

Having now had an opportunity to consider and discuss the Background Report, our members are seriously concerned at the lack of detail supporting conclusions reached and statistics quoted. We are also concerned that no displays were mounted at Shopping Centres in or at least one of three areas vitally interested in the matter namely Pennant Hills/Thornleigh/Normanhurst, thus limiting the ability of local residents to update themselves on where the situation now stands.

It is not acceptable to say that brief details appeared in local newspapers and that displays were mounted at Carlingford and Hornsby. Even now it is possible for you to mount displays in the shopping centres at Pennant Hills and Beecroft.

In regard to the Report itself, we would wish to submit the following questions and comments for your review and reply:-

- 1 What are the full terms of reference given to SKM for this study and by whom?
Does para 1 p.1 of the Background Report constitute the entire terms of reference or is there more?
- 2 Is it understood and accepted that this link forms a vital part of Australia's most important National Highway running from the bottom of the Continent to the top
- 3 Bearing in mind the huge expansion/population explosion taking place **now** in the N.W. of Sydney e.g. Castle Hill/Kellyville/Rouse Hill etc, why is no provision being made **now** for the large number of people/vehicles who will wish to travel regularly to the Central and Northern coasts and beyond. The only outlet for them is P.H.'s road and the F3. Discarded Option C needs far more detailed and serious consideration than is given in the report. A new bridge over the Hawkesbury and alternative routing of the main trunk highway could even now be considered imperative for economic, strategic and social reasons. How many times has the F3 been severed or blocked? What would happen is a terrorist attack succeeded in severing or destroying the existing bridge?
- 4 The Orbital is scheduled for completion in 2006. Only then - in 2007 - **providing all funding/clearances/agreements/resumptions etc** [see p.23 penultimate paragraph] are in place, does the construction of the link commence - in itself a 4 year project. It is accepted that P.H.'s road is already fully loaded and has a high accident rate. How will this road cope with the projected traffic increases over the next 8 - 9 years.

Note New car sales from January 1st to June 30th were up over 21%. It must be recognised both by Governments and Consultants that more people want to use more cars and they do expect adequate roads to be provided **in a timely fashion**. Rail can

help but it cannot provide anything like a full answer, as is already acknowledged.

- 5 Will SKM please disclose to what extent the proposed options will improve, if at all, the **current** situation on P.H.'s road and the Pacific Highway when the works are completed.
- 6 What variations to vehicle numbers might be expected if a toll is imposed.
- 7 What will be the effects on air quality with toxic gases being expelled in concentration and in volume from tunnel vents.
- 8 Has the fact that the Purple Option could be built over a tip containing toxic waste been taken into account.
- 9 Much more detailed information is required about projected population increases in each **specific** area affected by the study, including also the N.W.
- 10 Will Skm identify the origin/destination of traffic using the F3 that would use alternative routes to the Options presented.
- 11 At what stage will SKM acknowledge that tunnels - in this case long tunnels - Are high cost, high maintenance and dangerous options. A serious event resulting in fire or explosion [terrorist or otherwise] or even a simple accident, could close the tunnel for long periods of time, even months. There are a number of precedents to prove this.
- 12 Will SKM accept and make clear that over 20% of GDP is attributed to road transport
- 13 Will SKM accept and explain that for every 1.5% increase in GDP traffic increases by nearly 10%.
- 14 Explain that 74% of truck trips are less than 92K and rail in most instances is not a viable alternative.
- 15 Please advise if there is any intention to widen the M2 tunnels at Epping to accommodate the increased traffic load if either the Red or Yellow Options were adopted.
- 16 Will you provide any detail from the Stage 1 "Familiarisation" as quoted on P2 of the report
- 17 Will SKM undertake now to provide further and sufficient information to enable all interested parties to make properly informed comment.


18 SKM's attention is drawn to the publication "Australia at the Crossroads", P.62

Quote : "At a minimum, it is widely agreed that it is important that road and traffic authorities ensure that major road proposals in urban areas are considered, **and seen to be considered** as part of a broad whole of government approach where **all** reasonable alternatives are properly examined and decisions can be seen to be free of sole providers. Hand in hand with this, the road and traffic authorities need to ensure their cultures and skills become businesslike and

outcomes focused."

The Concerned Citizens Group would be grateful to receive your acknowledgement of receipt of this letter, and we look forward to your detailed reply in due course.


Yours faithfully,



D.R. Jones

"Austroads published this document. It is a joint organisation of all State, Territory, Federal and N.Z. ^{subroad} Transport Departments.

The Ministers, brief, advisors and SKM have gone against this recommendation "WHY?"



File

28 Warne Street
Pennant Hills 2120
8th September 2003

The Hon P Ruddock MP
Member for Berowra
PO Box 1866
Hornsby Northgate 1635

Dear Philip

Thank you for replying to the matters I informally raised with you about **the SKM Sydney Orbital Study Link**.

Whilst this letter is written on my own behalf I know that many members of the 'Concerned Citizens Group' are very unhappy with the consultative processes.

To me, your letter and media release are not 100% accurate. My concerns are that there was NO provision for 'study team members' to meet and speak directly with the public in Pennant Hills which is the suburb, your suburb, that is most directly affected by the study.

Why have a meeting at Dural that is not affected in any way by the recommended proposals. The 'study team member' at Dural obviously did not know what was in the brochure or that Pennant Hills had a shopping centre and suitable locations to meet 'study team members'.

This has not imbued many people with confidence in the integrity of the study. Whilst willing to be corrected in my opinion the process is an absolute sham and an insult to the community.

My assessment of the 'Consultative meeting at the Dural Country Club on 28/9/03', further comment on the paper Derek Jones and myself prepared for the 'Concerned Citizens Group' and Derek's submission on behalf of the 'Concerned Citizens Group' are attached.

Knowing you grew up in Bellamy Street Pennant Hills I am sure you would be well aware of the significance the ever increasing role it is again playing in relieving the pressures on Pennant Hills Road. Even though it is not fully open the widening of the Duffy Avenue bridge has caused an increase in traffic using the Stevens, Bellamy – County Drive route.

The Duffy Avenue bridge is now being used to bypass Pennant Hills to the F3. It wont be long before motorists revert to using the back route to Hornsby, onto the Pacific Highway to Berowra and beyond. Traffic counts are not needed to substantiate the visually obvious.

It is a disgrace that this problem was identified nearly 22 years ago yet nothing has been done. Part of Yarrara Road is already a defacto 24 hour 'clearway'. Tunnel or not, urgent planning with proper public consultation is needed for an alternative route such as option 'C'.

The Bellamy Street problem was again raised in the July 1998 'Study of Parking and Traffic in Pennant Hills' submitted to Hornsby Council. For five years Hornsby Councillors have gone to extraordinary lengths to avoid dealing with this study.

The Councillors responsible for this delay should be publicly called to account and explain the reasons why they have done nothing. They cannot blame the staff. I have documents showing the staff have done everything possible to have the study properly dealt with.

Today State Transport Minister Michael Costa admitted buses will have to replace trains on many routes. How much more proof is needed that the community is being misled?

Unless the economy collapses by 2011, the projected completion date for the tunnel, it will be too late then to address the already totally unsatisfactory and unacceptable traffic problems. On a population basis I believe the 'National Highway' should have two routes through Sydney.

The time to deal with the Australian transport system and in particular the northern gateway to Sydney is now.

Before it is too late will you directly intervene in this most serious matter that directly affects your electorate and approach the Prime Minister and also seek the support of your State colleagues whose electorates are also affected.

With kind regards to Heather and yourself,

Yours sincerely



Peter Waite 9484 3471

Copy Mrs J Hopwood MP for Hornsby
 Mr B O'Farrell MP for Ku-ring-gai
 Mr A Tink MP for Epping
 Mr D Jones, Concerned Citizens Group
 Cr J Muirhead, Mayor Hornsby Shire Council
 Pennant Hills District Civic Trust
 Sinclair Knight Merz
 Media

Attachments: Further personal comment by P Waite 8/9/03
 Concerned Citizens Group – presentation to Group members 25/8/03
 Personal comments by P Waite on Dural Consultative meeting 28/8/03
 Media release by D Jones and P Waite 28/8/03
 Extract from 1981 Traffic and Parking Study for Pennant Hills ---
 The Hon P Ruddock MP media release 1/9/03.
 Concerned Citizens Group submission to the Study consultants
 Extract from the July 1998 Pennant Hills Study of Traffic and Parking

FURTHER COMMENT ON F3 TO SYDNEY ORBITAL LINK STUDY. 8 Sept 2003

As no meaningful response has been received to the detailed submission lodged by the 'Concerned Citizens Group' on 8th August 2002 I register my deep concerns at the lack of data provided at any stage on which to make informed comment.

'THE BACKGROUND REPORT'

Page 3 refers to 'stakeholders'. The public are the stakeholders. This report is about the allocation of public resources for the benefit of the community. It is not about politicians, bureaucrats or those seeking personal gain. The public are entitled to know the FACTS.

P5. It is deplorable that the study admits the purple option will do nothing to reduce the high accident rate on the Pacific Highway identified in the table at the top of column 2.

P6. 'Improve local amenity for people living and working along Pennant Hills Road'. The study states *"If no new link is provided, traffic along Pennant Hills Road is predicted to increase to between 95,000 and 100,000 vehicles per day by 2021, causing traffic congestion to extend to most times of the business day"*. It is known most 'peak hour' traffic problems are caused by people travelling to and from work or school. It beggars belief to infer that these people will have to vary their business or school times.

P5-6. Estimates that if nothing is done vehicles on Pennant Hills Road will increase by 20,000 per day by 2021 and that 8,000 of these will be trucks. This means the projected car increase is only 12,000, or 18% increase as against a 100% increase for trucks from 8,000 to 16,000. Noting that the population is anticipated to increase by 20% in the same period I find it very difficult to accept these figures as even being 'ball park'.

Having reviewed the available information several times I am even more convinced that option 'C' is the best solution. It will also provide a practical and realistic alternative route in the AM peak from Sydney via the M2 westward and then to the north and in the PM peak in the opposite direction.


AUSTROADS statement must be repeated:

SUMMING UP AUSTRALIA AT THE CROSSROADS. P62:

"It is important to build the "right" projects rather than "bad" projects. Road and traffic authorities should make decisions using improved, more rigorous analysis techniques in their attempts to meet community goals in the most economically efficient and businesslike manner".

- - *"At a minimum, it is widely agreed that it is important that road and traffic authorities ensure that major road proposals in urban areas are considered, and seen to be considered, as part of a broad "whole of government" approach where all reasonable alternatives are properly examined and decisions can be seen to be free of bias of sole providers. Hand in hand with this, the road and traffic authorities need to ensure their cultures and skills become more businesslike and outcomes focussed"* (as in State Rail).

"are properly examined" I rest my case.



Peter Waite

'CONCERNED CITIZENS GROUP' – Pennant Hills -Thornleigh.

Comment and concern about the F3 to Sydney Orbital - National Highway Link Study.

25th August 2003.

Following are two assessments by members of the 'Group'.

1. As admitted in the report there is no provision for the very large expansion of industry / population in the NW sector which is already taking place.
2. Sydney Orbital is scheduled for completion in 2006. Only then – in 2007 – providing all clearances/agreements/resumptions etc. are in place does the construction of the link commence – in itself a four year project. Pennant Hills Road will bear the full brunt of the inevitable traffic increases from 2003 – 2010/11. This is a road which the reports admits in 2003 is already fully loaded, in fact overloaded.
3. There is no point in widening the F3 to three lanes between the Hawkesbury Bridge and Calga interchange, and not at the same time widening the two lanes into three between the bridge and Sydney. The potential for gridlock and accidents is obvious.
4. Constructing two lane tunnels – a possibility suggested in the study – cannot be regarded as a serious contribution to constructing Australia's major economic and social trunk route with a view to the inevitable longer term development.
5. See p23 – penultimate paragraph. It contains many assumptions and provisos etc. (escape clauses). This link is vital. It must be constructed now and the necessary funding provided.
6. The report shows restricted and outmoded thinking. It has not kept pace with what is required to day. Question: What are the terms of reference? For Australia's major national highway from the north to south of the continent old style party politics and/or State versus Federal jockeying becomes irrelevant and dangerous. It is not in the national interests to adopt second rate and budget conscious decisions. The money to do the job properly can be found if the will is there. If a railway can be built between Alice Springs and Darwin then surely a long term solution plus funding can be found for such a vital requirement.

An alternative view: “Points to consider”. The study does NOT:

1. Explain the study area is by far the most important road/rail link in Australia’s economic, strategic, defence and social interests.
2. Show why Option C was not, or should not be included for public comment. (Page 11 rules out option C without providing any statistics or justification.)
3. The Terms of Reference for the Study. (refer to 6 on previous page)
4. Disclose to what extent the proposals will improve, if any, the current situation on Pennant Hills Road and the Pacific Highway will be when the works are completed.
5. Disclose possible variations to vehicle numbers if a toll is proposed.
6. Explain how the Purple Option could be built over a tip containing toxic waste.
7. Adequately explain the affects on air quality.
8. Take into account the NW sector land releases. (refer to 1 on previous page)
9. Adequately detail projected population increases.
10. Indicate if, and how the tunnels at Epping are to be widened to accommodate extra traffic if the Red or Yellow options were adopted.
11. Identify the origin/destination of traffic using the F3 that would use alternative routes. (Unless it is known where vehicles are coming from or going to meaningful projections cannot be made. This is normal procedure.)
12. Acknowledge tunnels are high cost, high maintenance and dangerous options.
13. Acknowledge more vehicle trips are made for shopping than for transport to and from work.
14. Acknowledge over 20% of GDP is attributed to road transport.
15. Explain for every 1.5% increase in GDP traffic increases nearly 10%.
16. Explain 74% of truck trips are less than 92k and rail in most instances is not a viable alternative.
17. Disclose any of the above detail from the Stage 1 “Familiarisation” of the Study process (page 2). (Does it exist, and if so where is it, and when will it be made available?)
18. Provide sufficient information to make informed comment.
19. Acknowledge new car sales for January 1 to June 30 2003 were up over 21%. (All involved in the consultative process must recognise more people want to use more cars and expect more roads to be provided; not excuses.)

Brief assessment of the F3 to Sydney Orbital - National Highway Link Study on behalf of the "Concerned Citizens Group".

P3 "Study area". *F3/ Kariong, Deane Park to Macquarie Park – 340,000 people".* This study is of national significance and strategic importance to Australia that both directly and indirectly affects every Australian and visitor to Australia.

The F3 combined with the main northern rail line is the most critical link in the movement of people and goods in Australia. The route has been blocked three times in recent years by bushfires. Should locations such as Mt Kuring-gai where the F3, Pacific Highway and rail line adjoin be closed by a natural disaster or terrorist attack for a week or more the personal and financial cost would be horrendous.

It would be even worse if a road and or rail bridge over the Hawkesbury was damaged or destroyed. It could take up to a year to replace. The recent loss of power in New York and Auckland a few years ago are examples as was the disastrous explosion in Yallorn.

"Study team members will be available to answer questions and listen to suggestions – " Three people visited Dural on August 14 and asked a 'team member' why there was no consultation and display in Pennant Hills; which is the worst affected location.

He commented there was more concern raised in the Dural area AND that as he did not know the area was unaware if there was a shopping centre or suitable location in Pennant Hills for a display. He also said he had no statistics and advised Sinclair Knight could not reveal them.

P4 "About road design". Serious concerns are held about the capacity of the M2 especially at Epping and the intersection with Pennant Hills, Windsor and Old Windsor Roads. Comments are also made in the annexure about fire and safety in tunnels.

"Issues most commonly raised". There is no indication as to numbers and if comments were backed up with a submission.

P5 The study acknowledges the crash rates on Pennant Hills Road and Pacific Highway were significantly higher than the average across the Sydney Road Network in 1999 and 2001 and that indicates road safety is below average.

About 1998 Police A/C Lola Scott was challenged about the closure of Pennant Hills Police Station at the Pennant Hills Bowling Club when she was challenged about her statement that the M2 would solve the accident and traffic problems on Pennant Hills Roads. Despite her promise, she never responded to the matters raised at that meeting and her projections have been proven wrong.

P5/6 These pages list *"serious and fatal crash rates and local amenity of people living and working along Pennant Hills Road"*. No statistical information is given as to deaths and serious illness caused by the noise and air pollution caused from the operation of, and exhaust emissions from vehicles and diesel powered locomotives. More information is needed.

P7 *'Non-car transport needs'* is referred to in annexure.

P8 *'Predicted population growth over next 20 years'. 'Effects of growth on transport demand'. 'Need for major improvements'*. Referred to in annexure.

P13/14 Suggesting option A could be interpreted as now being four different options, purple, blue, yellow and red (the original) stretches the imagination beyond belief. Purple, blue and yellow are three distinctly different options and should be described as Options D, E and F.

P15 Purple option. It was apparently assumed because the brickpit is shown as green on a map this could be used as an 'open cut' for 500 metres. This is a tip site that contains toxic waste. This suggestion beggars belief.

Blue option. Noting the problems in obtaining adequate land and then building the existing interchange it is not seen how this could be achieved unless flyovers and a semi clover leaf design was constructed. It is doubted the required land would be made available.

P16 Yellow option. The M2 has major AM and PM problems. Additional tunnels would be needed to alleviate the existing constraints at Epping.

Red option. As with the yellow option, additional tunnels at Epping would be required.

P17/18 Unless the projected figures for Pennant Hills Road and Pacific Highway are quoted the total vehicles per day figures are meaningless and informed comment cannot be made. No where is it shown the current counts, projected counts or any comment if in fact any of the proposals will reduce traffic on Pennant Hills Road or Pacific Highway.

Equally so figures also need to be provided inclusive of a toll.

Also required would be the projected number of trucks with dangerous goods and over size vehicles that would be prohibited in the tunnels and continue to use Pennant Hills Road.

The potential to provide some relief on local roads is questioned. There is already adequate visual evidence signalised intersections from Duffy Avenue Thornleigh to Boundary Road Pennant Hills regularly become gridlocked in the AM and or PM peak. On some Saturday mornings there is well documented evidence that when some sporting events at Pennant Hills Park are conducted one lane in Pennant Hills Road becomes a 'parking lot' for up to three hours because of right turning vehicles into The Crescent. It often takes over an hour to exit from The Crescent. Altering traffic light phasing to overcome this problem would further reduce the capacity of Pennant Hills Road.

P19/20 Environmental and social effects. The **'Effects on air quality' must be PUBLICLY addressed BEFORE any tunnel option is further considered.**

Collectively these statements address the NIMBY objections and those who are not immediately affected. They do not address the flow on effects on the local community that have been and will continue to be adversely affected by decades of inadequate planning or political decisions.

P21/22/23 Key issues being investigated in the study. 'Air quality and tunnel ventilation'. "*Road tunnels generally improve air quality by taking cars and trucks off congested surface streets*". This means nothing, it is a motherhood statement. Option C without tunnels would do the same. Further comment is made in annexures.

P24 Privacy Statement. MPs Ruddock and Tink should FOI a copy of the 'brief', traffic counts and results of the assessment of our submission and any other relevant information that may be identified in the consultative process.

REFERENCES:

AUSTRALIA AT THE CROSS ROADS. Roads in the Community – A Summary. 1997.
Published by AUSTROADS. (RTA NSW, VICROADS, DOT Q, WA Main Roads, DOT SA, DOT T, DOT NT, RUS ACT, Commonwealth DOT, AUS LGA, Transit NZ)

P12 Main method of Travel, Victoria, 1994. Percentages

Mode	Work	Education	Shopping
Walking	4	20	8.7
Bus, Tram, Taxi	3	6	3
Car	85	52	87

P 15. Freight Movement in Australia in 1969. 74% of total road freight travels less than 92km. Rail is not a viable or cost effective option.

P 16 The Freight Transport Sectors Compared. 20% of GDP comprises road transport costs.

Weight transported by road.	74%	Rail 23%.	Sea 3%.
Distance by weight	33%.	Rail 32%.	Sea 35%
Value	73%.	Rail 19%,	Sea 6%. Air2%

Growth in vehicles numbers compared to the Australian economy.

Cars, Commercial GDP. Each of these are within a few % points from 1930 to 1990.

1930 10%, 1945 15%, 1960 40%, 1975 60%, 1990 100%

(Last year household debt increased over 14%. ABC news reported on August 20 that for the six months to June 30 new car sales were up over 21%. People are voting for cars.)

P18 Increase in Average Traffic Levels on Australian Roads. 1981 - 1994

Nat Hwy. 93%, Rural Art. 38%, Rural Local – 42%, Urban Art. –18% Urban Local 140%.

P19 Road freight increase 3 to 4 times GDP economic growth rate between 1976 to 1985.

B doubles, larger trucks and increased distances travelled **have nearly halved road freight rates** in real terms since 1971.

86% of increase in car commuters between 1976 and 1991 was attributed to women.

(This paper was prepared to assist the level of understanding of road-related issues within road authorities, the community and decision makers. Have they read and understand it?)

STRATEGY for TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT Research and Development

AUSTROADS 1997

P vi. Changes in road length, vehicle ownership and usage for Australia. 1976 Index 100

1976 to 1994. Trucks (tonne/k) 300. GNP 150. Cars (v/k) 145. Road length 110.

WORLD HIGHWAYS September 2002.International Magazine. UK, England, Europe.

P27. Paris tunnel. 10k US\$1.5 billion.. “there have been fears over safety after the Mont Blanc tunnel disaster. - - A fire in a construction hauling locomotive - - - lost nearly three months in construction time”. Similarly a fire in a ski train caused major loss of life recently.

Not Ken DOBINSON.

COMMENT

Detailed advice was obtained from a retired and highly experienced DMR engineer who is totally opposed to tunnels on safety, environmental, high operating and ever increasing maintenance costs, and environmental grounds.

The Group is also very concerned about the security risks posed by what in some places is a single route.

Because of its versatility for domestic, commercial and industrial convenience road transport has become an integral part of the economic growth of Australia that rail cannot compete with on short hauls.

'Rate of stock turnover' and JIT (just in time) inventories mean that component manufacturers supply assembly lines according to need to the extent that no stocks are held. This drives down costs and provides the finished article to the consumer at the lowest possible competitive price. The motor vehicle industry is a prime example.

DEMOGRAPHICS

ERNST & YOUNG (from memory) in 1998 estimated the demographic centre of Sydney near Silverwater Bridge and moving to the NW. Since then the NW sector has been rapidly developing and new immigrants to Sydney are arriving at 50,000 per year. This in itself will increase Sydney's population by 1,000,000 within 20 years. Apart from this, country towns are dying as more people move to the eastern seaboard.

The proposed release of another 20 to 40,000 housing lots in the NW sector will increase traffic movements to the central coast and beyond.

Now that people are living longer and more migrants are arriving the growth of vehicle usage will be far in excess of the capacity of existing roads. The quoted figures appear rubbery.

Noting it is suggested the Red and Yellow options would only remove 5,000 vehicles from the Pacific Highway and Purple and Blue none what is proposed to be done to solve the identified high accident rate and congestion on the Pacific Highway?

SUMMING UP AUSTRALIA AT THE CROSSROADS. P62 A few words from the experts:


"It is important to build the "right" projects rather than "bad" projects. Road and traffic authorities should make decisions using improved, more rigorous analysis techniques in their attempts to meet community goals in the most economically efficient and businesslike manner".


- - *"At a minimum, it is widely agreed that it is important that road and traffic authorities ensure that major road proposals in urban areas are considered, and seen to be considered, as part of a broad "whole of government" approach where all reasonable alternatives are properly examined and decisions can be seen to be free of bias of sole providers. Hand in hand with this, the road and traffic authorities need to ensure their cultures and skills become more businesslike and outcomes focussed" (as in State Rail).*

COMMENT Without proper statistics and disclosures meaningful comment is impossible.

The questions are **"Can, and will our politicians insist this be done"?**

D







Cr Nick Berman
Mayor
Hornsby Shire Council
296 Pacific Hwy
Hornsby NSW 2077
nberman@hornsby.nsw.gov.au

cc: Robert J. Ball
General Manager

Friday 8 July 2011

Dear Nick

Thank you for contacting us to discuss the proposed M2/F3 Inter-Connector. We are pleased to be able to offer our services to work with you to develop a summary of the benefits of this link road drawing on existing analysis.

The proposed link is a motorway connection about 8 kilometres in length, mostly tunnel, from the southern end of the F3 at Wahroonga to the M2 Motorway at Carlingford. It would complete a motorway standard National Highway link on the north-south route between Melbourne and Brisbane bypassing Sydney via the Sydney Orbital network. The project would improve access to Sydney from the Hunter, Central Coast and the high growth Sydney-Brisbane corridor and would relieve congestion along arterial roads in Sydney's northern suburbs as well as facilitate changes to Pennant Hills Road that improve local access.

Over the 10 year history of proposals for this initiative, a number of supporting documents have been developed including analysis of the costs and benefits of the link, a business case and a submission to Infrastructure Australia. The Commonwealth Government had also earmarked \$150 million for a planning study for the link but has now deferred this commitment which has created some uncertainty about the priority of the project at both State and National levels.

We understand you are seeking a short document that draws on this existing work to clearly articulate the high level benefits of the road link and which can be used to communicate the importance of the project. Benefits of this project accrue at a range of scales. As well as the national and regional benefits, the document should highlight the local impacts of congestion on Pennant Hills Road and the importance of the link to address these. The document is likely to be publicly released and provided to organisations including Infrastructure Australia and Infrastructure NSW.

Our proposal for preparing the document involves completing the following steps:

- **Step 1 – Project inception:** we will meet with you to confirm our project plan and obtain from you copies of any relevant documents. In view of the tight timeframes we also propose to use this opportunity to discuss your perspectives of the issues affecting local residents and businesses. If it avoids delay in commencement of the project, this meeting could be held using teleconference facilities.
- **Step 2 – Review and analysis:** we will review the available documentation to identify the key themes and high level benefits of constructing the inter-connector and the scale at which they occur including regional, district and local benefits and summarise key elements of the evidence base. Based on our discussions with you in step 1, we also propose to contact

Disclaimer

This Report has been prepared for the Northern Sydney Regional Organisation of Councils (NSROC) and Gosford City Council under the terms of our Engagement Contract with NSROC but does not necessarily reflect the views of NSROC.

In preparing this Report we have only considered the circumstances of NSROC. Our Report is not appropriate for use by persons other than NSROC, and we do not accept or assume responsibility to anyone other than NSROC in respect of our Report.

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WILL THE MISSING LINK KEEP MISSING OUT?

The Federal Government's 2012-13 Budget had one piece of good news for the Hornsby Shire and Sydney's north with the re-commitment of \$150 million for F3-M2 design work.


I raised local residents' criticism of the decision to cut these funds in the 2011-12 Budget directly with Prime Minister Gillard at the 2011 Australian Local Government Association conference. This was followed up with a sustained campaign by Hornsby Council and other councils in the region.

The Howard Government's Pearlman Report (2007) established the most viable option for the F3-M2 link to be the 8 kilometre tunnel between Wahroonga and West Pennant Hills.

It is important to keep the pressure on all levels of government to see that this project is delivered and does not suffer further delays.

Feedback from local residents to elected representatives and the media will go a long way to ensure that the "Missing Link" is not forgotten yet again.

Yours sincerely



Nick Berman

Mayor, Hornsby Council

President, Northern Sydney Regional Organisation of Councils

Po Box 2137 Normanhurst 2076

SMS/Phone 0411 216 332

email: nickberman@bigpond.com

Web: www.nickberman.com.au



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and **facebook**

SURVEY

1. Would you like the State and Federal Governments to work together in building the F3-M2 Motorway Connector (found to be the most viable option by the Howard Government's Pearlman Report)?

Yes ☐ No ☐

2. Would you like yet another inquiry to be held to establish a suitable route for the missing F3-M2 link?

Yes ☐ No ☐

3. Would you like to see the missing link completed as soon as possible

Yes ☐ No ☐

4. Should additional longer term suggestions be considered, with options including the Dean Park - Kariong Road and the Windsor - Singleton Road (Route 69)?

Yes ☐ No ☐

"After completing survey please return to PO
Box 2137, Normanhurst 2076

or

nickberman@bigpond.com".

Written & authorized by Nick Berman

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Transurban Sponsorship of Beecroft Bush Generation



Hornsby Mayor Nick Berman and Transurban's General Manager of NSW Assets, Mr Darren Moy, assist with bush regeneration in Beecroft where the Hills M2 Motorway will be provided much needed sponsorship to support the work of local volunteers.

Nick Berman Mayor



Please do not hesitate to contact me via the **FEEDBACK** function if there are any issues you wish to raise with Nick or if you believe he can be of assistance.

You are also welcome to subscribe to Nick Berman's regular e-newsletter.

**Hornsby Shire
Council**

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
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The missing link and missing out

PRIORITISING SYDNEY'S
F3-M2 MOTORWAY CONNECTOR

WITH SUPPORTING RESEARCH UPDATE
BY PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS

MAY 2012



City of Ryde
Lifestyle and opportunity @ your doorstep



HORNSBY
SHIRE COUNCIL



NSROC
Northern Sydney
Regional Organisation
of Councils

Public left to pick up bill for mayor's failed venture

Kelly Burke
URBAN AFFAIRS

A FAILED business venture by the long-standing mayor of Hornsby, Nick Berman, has cost taxpayers more than \$1 million and left unpaid debts of nearly \$5 million as well as hundreds of thousands of dollars owing to his former employees.

The former staffer in the Howard government became Hornsby's first popularly elected mayor in 2004, and was returned to office in 2008.

Since 2009 he has been the president of the Northern Regional Organisation of Councils and this weekend he is seeking a third four-year term as mayor.

But Mr Berman has left a string of creditors and unpaid employees in the wake of his private business dealings, and questions have been raised over his fitness to hold public office.

The Australian School of Business and Technology was placed into liquidation in September 2008. The school was owned by Atozed International, and Mr Berman was the sole director at the time.

Yet when the *Herald* put questions to Mr Berman on Thursday, he insisted others were to blame for the multimillion-dollar collapse. "Everyone ultimately has

Council elections – what you need to know

- ▶ Voting is compulsory for all Australian citizens 18 and over. The penalty for not voting is \$55.
- ▶ If you own a property or a business in another council area you may register to vote for that council as well.
- ▶ Polling booths are open from 8am to 6pm.
- ▶ You cannot lodge an absentee vote and you must be in your local council area.
- ▶ You are voting for councillors, and, in some councils, the mayor.

to share some responsibility ... I'm not the big villain in all this," he said.

At the time of the company's collapse, the school had more than 300 foreign students enrolled who had paid their fees in advance. However, when the liquidators moved in, there was just \$1637 in the company's bank accounts.

The liquidator's report to creditors the following March said that it appeared that share investments owned by Atozed had been sold for \$75,000 just before Atozed went under, although the liquidator could not identify what happened to the proceeds.

In addition, the liquidator found that about \$150,000 had been made in loans to the company's former director Avinash Nickkawade who was Mr Berman's business partner in another venture, Power Education.

'Everyone ultimately has to share some responsibility ... I'm not the big villain in all this.'

Nick Berman, Hornsby mayor

Mr Berman said he was unable to comment on these transactions because he did not have the information immediately at hand and could not recollect fully what had taken place four years earlier.

He also pointed out the company he inherited was already in administration and it was his aim for the company to trade itself out of difficulty.

"I was there trying to run a business I knew had serious debts," he said. "The owner did not tell me everything I needed to know."

The fallout from the collapse meant the federal government was forced to pay more than \$1 million to students who had paid their fees to Mr Berman, while the Australian Taxation Office became one of the school's major unsecured creditors, which were owed \$4.9 million in total. A further \$500,000 is still owed to the teaching staff.

One of the former employees told the *Herald* the school still owed her tens of thousands of dollars in wages after staff were only partially paid or not paid at all throughout the last six months of the company's life.

"It cost me my marriage, it cost me my health," she said. "We were told the director would take out loans and sell property to pay us, but that never happened."

Another former employee said she was surprised to learn that Mr Berman had become a successful figure in local government. "How can this man be a mayor, when he owes so many people a lot of money?" she asked. Both women asked to remain anonymous because they still work in the private college sector.

On May 31, 2010, Deloitte concluded it was unable to pursue Mr Berman through the courts because there was no money left to pay the liquidator. Moreover, the time had lapsed to take legal



the company from his former business partner. Photo: Kate Geraghty

director three months earlier, then operating as the sole director of the company until October 2010.

A Deed of Variation signed by Mr Berman in December 2007 shows from that time forth he took sole responsibility for Atozed, including its debts.

"I'm surprised to hear that," said Mr Berman, who insists he inherited the financial mess from his former business partner. He said he did not believe his past business dealings had any relevance to his competency as a councillor or the mayor of Hornsby.

Nick Berman ... the mayor of Hornsby said he inherited a financial mess

action, with suggestions in the liquidator's report Mr Berman had failed to respond in a timely manner to the liquidator's queries about certain transactions.




This Mr Berman disputes, saying he gave "full co-operation" to all authorities.

"Someone else may have been

dragging their heels but not me ... why don't you have a chat to the owner," he said, referring to Atozed's previous director, Mr Nickkawade.

ASIC records show Mr Nickkawade resigned as a director in September 2007, with Mr Berman having become a co-

Dec 5, 2000



Some of Mr Berman's addresses - Lansdowne Street, Parramatta, left, Ladbury Avenue, Penrith, and Palm Grove, Normanhurst, right. Photos: Brendan Esposito and Ben Rushton

Invited to address moving issue of her staffer



Paola Totaro

For nearly three years, Mr Nicholas Berman appeared in the Sydney White Pages under the same address, a quiet avenue in suburban Parramatta.

But the electoral rolls tell a different story, revealing that Mr Berman moved house no fewer than four times, each new address coinciding with his political ambition and candidature in political polls.

Mr Berman's intriguing residential path - which began with him enrolling in the same address as his old boss, the Federal Minister for Sport, Ms Kelly - has claimed the attention of Federal Parliament as a beleaguered ALP tries to stem the damage from the Queensland electoral rosters issue and tar the Government with the same brush.

"Will you immediately refer these matters to the Australian Federal Police to investigate whether there has been any breach of the Commonwealth Electoral Act or any other law?" the Opposition Leader, Mr Beazley, asked the Prime Minister.

According to copies of the electoral rolls, on July 11, 1997, Mr Berman - then Ms Kelly's electorate officer and now a Liberal councillor on Hornsby Council - enrolled as a resident of 2 Caley Crescent, Lapstone.

Already listed on the roll in this three-bedroom house were Ms Jackie Kelly, Mr Gary Clark (then Ms Kelly's partner and now her husband) and a 39-year-old man, Mr Martin McKowen.

Less than a year later, in May 1998 and several months before

the Federal election, Mr Berman declared his electoral enrolment as 6 Ladbury Avenue, Penrith, where Ms Kelly now lived. Meanwhile, Mr Berman's wife, Ms Kirsten Bruce, remained enrolled at 10/24 Lansdowne Street, Parramatta, the same address under which Mr Berman appeared in the Sydney White Pages and the address he transferred to after the election in October.

In March 1999, Mr Berman stood for Liberal preselection for the State seat of Parramatta.

His failure to win the seat sparked another move, this time with his wife, to 2A Palm Grove

ing that period was not in Penrith at all, but at 10/24 Lansdowne Street, Parramatta? Minister, were you aware of your staff member's false enrolment?"

Ms Kelly told the House that the question simply reflected the ALP's desire to "fling it around and see if it will stick elsewhere".

"It hinges fairly and squarely on the Labor Party and their activities in Queensland. If they have a serious allegation to make, then they should go outside the privilege of this Parliament and make it."

Yesterday, the *Herald* left five messages with Mr Berman. He did not return any calls.



Mr Berman, left, moved house no fewer than four times, each new address coinciding with his political ambition and candidature in political polls.

in Normanhurst - just in time to contest the local council elections in September. This time Mr Berman was successful, winning a position on Hornsby Council where he remains.

In Federal Parliament yesterday, the shadow treasurer, Mr Simon Crean, asked Ms Kelly if she could confirm that Mr Berman had enrolled himself at her address on two separate occasions, and if she was aware of her staff member's "false enrolments".

"Isn't it true that Mr Berman's actual residence before and dur-

In a statement last night Ms Kelly confirmed that Mr Berman had been a member of her staff, and when he first began working for her in 1996 he lived in West Lindfield, too far away to commute all the way to her office in Penrith.

She said that Mr Berman remained on the roll at her address until 1998, but until today they had never discussed his electoral listing.

She added that a former Air Force colleague had also shared her house at the same time as Mr Berman.

20 July 2014

Waite 19 July 2013 Submission Item *5 PEARLMAN INQUIRY

The community understood the Pearlman report was to determine if the terms of reference for the SKM report had been complied with.

It wasn't publicly known that the then owner of Hills Motorway had requested a review of the proposed tunnel intersection with the M2.

Second day of the Inquiry transcript, 18 June 2006, page 52 from 30 to 46:

"MS Riggs; I did hear Mr Waite in his remarks . . . the terms of reference were changed half way through the study, I refute that . . . They were not changed in any way.

(My comment (page 18 par 1) acknowledges I made a mistake and should have said SKM was directed not to comply with the terms of reference. Next four pages is the evidence)

We have, as a result of a request from Ms Armitage during the course of last week (before the hearing commenced), provided you with a copy of those terms of reference.

MS PEARLMAN: Yes. I knew that we had asked for it, I haven't yet seen those terms of reference, but that is important, **because that submission raised by Mr Waite** and at least one other person, so it is important that I have a look at that."

After three days of public hearings there were another three days listed to consider what were technical details in private. I assume it was for Hills Motorway to justify its desire to increase its toll profits.

Until the findings of the Pearlman inquiry were received that included the Terms of Reference and transcript the public did not know that the whole process was a bureaucratic farce.

In my opinion any reference to the Pearlman inquiry findings, apart from my request planning be made for the F3 – M7 link, have little if any credibility.

Peter Waite

29
30 MS RIGGS: I did hear Mr Waite say in his remarks to you
31 that the terms of reference for the SKM study were changed
32 halfway through the study and I simply have to refute that.
33 The terms of reference for the SKM study were embodied as
34 an appendix to the contract between the RTA and SKM at the
35 time that SKM took on that work. They were not in any way
36 changed during the course of the study.
37

38 We have, as a result of a request from Ms Armitage
39 during the course of last week, provided you with a copy of
40 those terms of reference.
41

42 MS PEARLMAN: Yes. I knew that we had asked for it.
43 I haven't yet seen those terms of reference, but that is
44 important, because that submission has been raised by
45 Mr Waite and at least one other person, so it is important
46 that I have a look at that.
47

Record

A number of projects that Nick Berman supported when Mayor of Hornsby Shire Council will be delivered in 2013. The most significant of these is the new Hornsby Aquatic Centre

Nick is proud to serve on a Council that has won dozens of environmental awards over the past decade. In 2006 he was recently elected as an Oceania representative to the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) Executive Committee, 2006-2009. He saw this election as a reflection of Hornsby's reputation internationally as a leader in sustainability - something which residents, councillors and council officers deserve praise for.

In preparing the Hornsby Shire Residential Housing Strategy, Nick Berman ensured local residents were given the opportunity to contribute to the preparation of this strategy, while being prepared to make the tough decisions where necessary.

Through the Local Government Association, to which Nick has been an active conference delegate, Hornsby Council has worked on a number of important issues such as the Hornsby Quarry and the need for an F3 to Orbital link, as an alternative to Pennant Hills Road.

As President of the Northern Sydney Regional Organisation of Council (NSROC) between 2009 and 2012, Nick Berman worked to highlight the shortfall of funding for infrastructure in Northern Sydney from state and federal governments. The Missing F3 to M2 Link, Hornsby Hospital and commuter parking are just three examples of this.

As a B-Ward Councillor, Nick strongly supported Council's efforts to widen the Duffy Avenue Bridge and served on the Dartford Road Working Party which planned the funding and construction of the Thornleigh Indoor Sports Centre. While this centre has been well-received since opening in late 2003, Council has not rested on its laurels, with the Cherrybrook Aquatic Centre opening in October 2005 and the Berowra Skate Park opening soon after in December. Planning continues to develop further sporting and recreational facilities over the next 10 to 15 years.

A Youth Forum was held at the Hornsby Shire Council Chambers in 2003. This was something that Nick had lobbied for, from the time he first became a Councillor and was part of a consultation program that Council's Youth Services team held across the Shire. Feedback from residents of all ages has proven valuable in ensuring Council's services are directed effectively.

Please do not hesitate to contact me via the **FEEDBACK** function if there are any issues you wish to raise or if you believe I can be of assistance.

You are also welcome to subscribe to my regular e-newsletter.

Hornsby Shire News

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28 Warne Street
Pennant Hills NSW 2120
21st March 2005

Mr E Cory
Section Head NSW/ACT
DOTARS
PO Box 594
Canberra ACT 2600

F3 – Sydney Orbital Connection

Attn Jennie Breen

Dear Ed

As agreed at the meeting attached is the discussion paper I have prepared.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Please let me know what the Ministers would like to do to proceed with the resolution of this matter.

I will be back by 12th April and would like to clear this important issue up by the end of April.

Yours sincerely

Peter Waite OAM JP

Copy: The Hon P Ruddock MP
 Mr A Tink MP
 Mr D Jones, Concerned Citizens Group
 Mr P Swalwell, Pennant Hills District Civic Trust

Waite EMAIL ADDRESS DELETED 9484-3471

F3 – Sydney Orbital Link. (Prepared by Peter Waite for discussion purposes) 21 March 2005

Comment in this discussion paper does not necessarily reflect the views of the 'Concerned Citizens Group' (Pennant Hills Liberal Party) or the Pennant Hills District Civic Trust.

Discussion Paper: For discussion between Ed Cory DOTARs and Peter Waite ^(a former Hornsby Councillor and local resident for over 70 years) following a meeting of the Pennant Hills District Civic Trust on 10 March 2005. In attendance were Minister Ruddock, Mr Cory, Messrs Jones and Waite, ^(members of the Concerned Citizens Group and Pennant Hills District Civic Trust) and 12 members of the Trust Executive. Chair: Trust President Phil Swalwell.

Former Hornsby Council Mayor Robert Browne was to also prepare a submission for discussion.

Purpose: To establish if the selection process for the recommend route, purple Option A was compromised by:

- Inaccurate number counts and projections, and
- Partial influences by NSW Government agencies.

History: In 2002 Derek Jones and Peter Waite, members of the Pennant Hills Thornleigh Branch of the Liberal Party, and many members of the consultative groups raised concerns about the consultative processes for this project. They raised their concerns at a Branch meeting where it was informally agreed that they be the representatives of the 'Concerned Citizens Group'. Mr Jones attended the (2003) Pennant Hills meetings whilst Mr Waite attended the (2003) Dural meetings so that they could compare notes and prepare balanced submissions and reports.

After representations to the Hon P Ruddock MP he arranged for Minister Lloyd to meet with Branch President Barwick, Jones, Waite and himself.

When Minister Lloyd stated there would be openings and connections along the tunnel for intermediate access Minister Ruddock corrected him advising the government had agreed there would be NO openings.

Minister Lloyd arranged a meeting for Jones and Waite with SKM, DOTARS and the RTA for 5 November.

They reported to the 'Group' no evidence was available to prove the best route was chosen. Attached are the points raised at 5th November ¹ meeting and detailed comment that was sent to Minister Ruddock on 16th November 2004 ² with copy to Minister Lloyd requesting answers on behalf of the Group' and Waite's letter ³ of the same date. AS YET, THE POINTS RAISED HAVE NOT BEEN ANSWERED.

Following representations by the Pennant Hills Civic Trust to Minister Ruddock in late 2004 a meeting was arranged for 10 March 2005 as detailed above.

Page 7 of this letter: The PURPOSE of the F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study was:

- *To investigate options for a new National Highway **connection** between the Newcastle Freeway (F3) and the future Sydney Orbital. The new connection will replace Pennant Hills Road as the National Highway route (Newsletter No 1 – April 2002) ²².*

Ministerial Letters

Recent letters from the Transport Minister and other Federal and State MPs indicated they and or the Government had not been correctly advised in regards to the following issues:

1. Dec 10, 2004 ⁴ *"I am advised SKM's study took into account --- as well as the opinions of residents and business community before arriving at the recommended Purple Option"* The Groups research contradicts this statement. Refer 21 Feb 2005 letter ⁵ to Minister Lloyd, and *"The Government expressed its preference for a fully tunneled link, but has NOT ruled out the possibility of an opening"* This statement is contrary to Minister Ruddock's August 2004 advice to Minister Lloyd and about 40 others present, (2004110030 & 2004110014,), and
2. Dec 10, 2004 ⁶ *"Furthermore, a 'C' Option would adversely impact on the national parks and heritage areas in the north western area of Sydney"*. Such statements as this that are taken from the SKM report are of deep concern because they are seen as attempts to justify putting off making a decision on Option C. These challenges will have to be eventually addressed. *"Building a 'C' Option would not remove the need for a major upgrade of the Pennant Hills Road"* (2004110517). This is an admission that the tunnel is simply an upgrade of Pennant Hills Road and not an alternative route for the National Highway. refer 13 Jan 2005 letter ⁷ to Minister, no reply,
3. Dec 23, 2004 ⁸ *"par 3(c) "Preliminary investigations show that a 'C' Option will have parts of the route on surface with substantial tunnels and extensive bridge structures around Berowra Waters"* January 6, 2005 Mr Jones again wrote another (unanswered) letter ⁹ direct to Minister Lloyd. Waite also wrote to Minister Ruddock. Option C did NOT impinge on Berowra Waters as the Minister claimed by the Minister who formerly worked the Hawkesbury as a Ferry Master ¹⁰, (refer to attached detailed 6 January letter ¹¹ to Minister Ruddock refuting much of Minister Lloyd's letter). The SKM report clearly indicates and the Minister states *"a possible need for a second crossing"* thereby passing the responsibility to the NSW Government (2004110635, 23 Dec 2004), and
4. Jan 28, 2005 ¹² *"The Type C option would not remove the need for an immediate costly upgrading of Pennant Hills Road"* and other misleading statements made in previous letters (2005010150). (This proposal relies on up to \$10 billion of unfunded assumptions that are not necessary for Option C. Furthermore this discussion paper shows serious inconsistencies in the reports that have compromised the Study to the extent that it cannot be relied on.)

State MP Michael Richardson railed at Waite's circulating a copy of Richardson's 25 November 2004 letter ¹³ to a resident and Waite's 4 December response ¹⁴ to Minister Ruddock with copies to 12 Liberal MPs. Some of the replies have been very interesting. However, as yet not one MP has supplied any information that proves the best route has been selected.

The Liberal Party, Pennant Hills Thornleigh Branch (Concerned Citizens Group), after receiving a copy of the 1994 report on 14th February 1994 Final Community Bulletin 3¹⁵ : 'Liverpool – Hornsby Highway Study' that recommended a western (C type Option) and the 14th February 2005¹⁶ discussion critique' unanimously passed the attached resolution on 14th February¹⁷. It also agreed to go public if the Federal Government did not provide 100% proof that the study AND the Coalition had not been compromised.

*To prove the point on environmental issues attached is a report on the avoidance of an EIS by the NSW government when building a bridge to replace the collapsed Lawrence Hargrave Drive near Wollongong.*¹⁸

Another example is how the NSW government passed legislation after residents successfully challenged DIPNRs consent given to Collex for a waste transfer station at Clyde. This matter is again before the Courts. A major factor to be considered by DOTARS in responding to this Discussion Paper is that two residents without any legal experience or training have twice successfully defeated a multi national company and the State once.

The implications of this are particularly relevant to item 1 in the letters from the Minister. The Minister appears to be indicating that - the "opinions of the residents and business community do not have sufficient merit to outweigh the opinions and intellectual capacity of professionals and bureaucrats.

At no stage has the Minister, SKM, DOTARS, RTA or any other politician provided any meaningful answers to the technical questions and documents produced. Many emails and letters have simply been ignored or answers supplied that avoided issues raised.

On 10 June 1999 Ted Mack spoke at Pennant Hills about 'Australia's Sham Democracy'. At one point Ted said "Community values are not a matter of expertise – only the community has a right to determine values – not the bureaucracy. Not the politicians. Not the lawyers or academics" ¹⁹.

Discussions revealed that the Sydney Orbital was fully financed by the Commonwealth based on State planning decisions. The Commonwealth should change its policies and adopt the "He who pays the piper calls the tune" approach when dealing with F3 connection and base the funding on Commonwealth policy. It is absurd that the Commonwealth is prepared to allow taxpayers funds to be used for projects that cannot be supported on basis planning principles.

Hornsby Council prepared a comprehensive report ²⁰ supporting the Lane Cove Valley route that would reduce the traffic and accident rate on the Pacific Highway together with a submission supporting a C option westerly route. Is it to be assumed that Hornsby Council traffic planners and Councillors opinions do not matter?

A similar situation applied at Berowra Waters where Planning Minister Refshauge called in for determination applications Hornsby Council staff recommended be refused. Residents successfully challenged Refshauge's approvals. Two S/Cs and two barristers appeared for the Minister and applicant. A junior barrister represented the appellants. The Ministers team claimed the Act provided that the Court did not have the power to overturn his decision. In other words the Minister claimed he was above the law. The Court changed Refshauge's decision but not his arrogance and contempt for the law and the community.

Waite's 8 page presentation titled '*Has the community been deceived*' (circa June 2004) was based on the April/ May 2004 Joint Media Release by Ministers Anderson and Campbell. There has been no meaningful response to that and many other submissions or the report on the outcome of the 5th November 2004 meeting with SKM, DOTARS and the RTA.

It is attitudes and arrogance like these examples that bring politicians and bureaucrats into disrepute.

North and South Tunnel Intersections: Figures 11-2, 11-3 ²¹ Historically proposed works such as these will involve lengthy delays for many months. This has not been addressed in the study. It is only 10 years since through traffic, residents and businesses in the area were subjected to inordinate delays and loss of amenity.

An argument has been advanced that traffic counts provided have only been for the western side of Pennant Hills Road. This is seen as spurious as most of Hornsby Shire residents have to access or cross Pennant Hills Road. The exceptions being Epping and Eastwood residents who will use or cross Pennant Hills Road to travel to the northwest and the F3.

North: Two lanes from the F3 widen into 3 lanes at Mt Colah to become a 3k parking lot in AM peak. Vehicles then crawl when lights go green at the Pacific Highway and Pennant Hills Road. These 3 lanes become 3 lanes on Pennant Hills Road and effectively 2 lanes on Pacific Highway that are already carrying heavy local traffic at capacity.

No meaningful counts of the F3 and local traffic at these intersection are provided to give an accurate count or %age using each route.

South: The proposed layout will cause confusion for those who do not know the area. The merging of traffic will increase the existing serious accident rate and delays.

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Page 70⁴⁸ Diagram 6.1 uses estimated numbers as against %ages in diagram 2.13. Figures and %ages for the Pacific Highway and Ryde Road in these two diagrams appear to conflict with each other. Figure 2.13 shows Ryde Road as having 11% against the 20% using the Pacific Highway whilst figure 6.1 shows 84,300 using Ryde Road as against 56,000 using the Pacific Highway. Both cannot be correct.

Working Paper 1 - Community Consultation

Page 20.⁴⁹ "there was strong support for further investigation of a Type C option, on the basis a long term solution was needed".

Several other reasons to justify Option C were also listed.

Page 36:⁵⁰ 5.1 Key Outcomes Par 2: "Type C options would be further investigated to provide a long term western route and potential second crossing of the Hawkesbury. Making provision for such a route through the planning process was important to many members of the community and key stakeholders".

Value Management Workshop No2 Record – SEPTEMBER 2003

Page 7⁵¹ reports that approximately 3 vehicles in 5 from the F3 travel down the Pacific Highway whilst the %ages quoted indicate only 40% travel to the City and North East. Refer to fig 2.13⁴⁷. Which is right?

The same page indicates 57% of heavy vehicles have origins/destinations that would use Pennant Hills Road. This coincides with the figures given out at the Community Consultative meeting at Galston in August 2003.

Page 5.⁵² RTA's Dr Kishan reports *"there are not many examples in the world of tunnels 6-8 km long and certainly none in Australia. Therefore, if the project proceeds there will be a multitude of technical challenges to be addressed, not to mention the social challenges that would arise"*. This statement is cause for deep concern and should have been seriously addressed by the Ministers before they agreed to accept the Purple A Option.

Professional commentators at this workshop raised some serious concerns over the proposed tunnel option. P10⁵³ : *"By building this new link there would be a redistribution of up to 20% of traffic in the corridor that would provide benefits throughout the rest of the northern network"*. This is misleading because the chosen route will not greatly alter the traffic on the Pacific Highway south of the F3.

Pages 11 and 12⁵⁴ also raise issues that have not been answered in the study. In particular the last two on Page 11⁵⁵ . *"Project justification is essential. Type C needs to be convincingly rejected before any of the type A Options can be seriously addressed. In considering the Type C scenario in comparison to type A, the following needs to be addressed:*
- what value is placed on another (strategic) crossing of the Hawkesbury River?".

Page 12⁵⁴ concludes long term planning needs to be made for Option C.

Page 22⁵⁶ refers to DOTARS advice that the Australian Government wanted Option A as a short term solution thereby avoiding the need to confront the State Government over its lack of planning.

Newsletter 2, July 2003⁵⁷

By comparison, Corridor Types B and C would Remove less traffic from Pennant Hills Road (fewer than 10,000 vehicles per day in 2021⁵⁷).

Summation of SKM's F3 to Sydney Orbital Report

No reference or provision is made for the diversion of traffic when the tunnel is closed as it will be from time to time due to computer and power failures, fire, breakdowns, accidents and maintenance. **The only reasonable explanation is because there is no alternate route.**

The report indicates two lanes each way will be required if there is a toll and three lanes each way without a toll. How will this affect the traffic if Pennant Hills Road is narrowed to 2 lanes in each direction as suggested?

Newsletter 2 suggests Option C would only reduce traffic on Pennant Hills Road by up to 10,000 vehicles per day by 2021 (about 10% ⁵⁷). Page 10 ⁵³ of the VM Workshop suggests a 20% redistribution of traffic by building the tunnel. What does this mean? 'Working paper 4' page 122 ⁴⁵ suggests only 19,000 or 20% vehicles per day would use option C by 2021.

As against the above, estimates in the 'Working Papers 4 – Traffic & Transportation' on pages 22, 40 and 43 and the 'Value Management Workshop' page 7 all indicate 57 to 60% of the F3 traffic could use Option C. Even if the 57 to 60% was reduced to 40% this is a 100% improvement on the Working paper 4 20 percent estimates ⁴⁵ and 200% percent better than Newsletter 2 estimates ⁵⁷.

The selected route DOES NOT meet the: The PURPOSE of the F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study:

- *To investigate options for a new National Highway 'ROUTE' ('CONNECTION' in Newsletter 1 ²²) between the Newcastle Freeway (F3) and the future Sydney Orbital. The new route will replace Pennant Hills Road as the National Highway. (Newsletter No 2 – July 2003 ⁵⁸)*
- *May 7, 2004 SMH Herald ⁵⁹ "The aim of the study was to identify a high standard transport link (not route or connection) between the F3 and the Sydney Orbital. The new link (not connection or route) would replace Pennant Hills Road as the National Highway".*

Conclusion

P 5 16

The only conclusion that can be arrived at from available information is:

- *the Commonwealth Government has allowed the NSW Government to hijack their study to overcome local traffic problems without any serious thought for the future,*

PS Comments attributed to Minister Anderson (SMH 21/3/05 Safer Pacific Highway just got closer ⁶⁰) further detract from the credibility of the SKM report

July 2014: I believe my comments on page 11 of my letter are sufficient justification to show the SKM study lacks credibility and cannot be relied on because SKM was directed not to comply with the 2001 Terms of Reference. I do not suggest SKM's study prepared in accordance with the 2003 directions, or the 2007 Pearlman findings were wrong.

Peter Waite

28 Warne Street
Pennant Hills NSW 2120
21st March 2005

Mr E Cory
Section Head NSW/ACT
DOTARS
PO Box 594
Canberra ACT 2600

F3 – Sydney Orbital Connection

Attn Jennie Breen

Dear Ed

As agreed at the meeting attached is the discussion paper I have prepared.

[REDACTED]

Please let me know what the Ministers would like to do to proceed with the resolution of this matter.

I will be back by 12th April and would like to clear this important issue up by the end of April.

Yours sincerely

Peter Waite OAM JP

Copy: The Hon P Ruddock MP
 Mr A Tink MP
 Mr D Jones, Concerned Citizens Group
 Mr P Swalwell, Pennant Hills District Civic Trust

Waite EMAIL ADDRESS DELETED 9484-3471

F3 – Sydney Orbital Link. (Prepared by Peter Waite for discussion purposes) 21 March 2005

Comment in this discussion paper does not necessarily reflect the views of the 'Concerned Citizens Group'

(Pennant Hills Liberal Party) **or the Pennant Hills District Civic Trust.**

Discussion Paper: For discussion between Ed Cory DOTARs and Peter Waite ^(a former Hornsby Councillor and local resident for over 70 years) following a meeting of the Pennant Hills District Civic Trust on 10 March 2005. In attendance were Minister Ruddock, Mr Cory, Messrs Jones and Waite, ^(members of the Concerned Citizens Group and Pennant Hills District Civic Trust) and 12 members of the Trust Executive. Chair: Trust President Phil Swalwell.

Former Hornsby Council Mayor Robert Browne was to also prepare a submission for discussion.

Purpose: To establish if the selection process for the recommend route, purple Option A was compromised by:

- Inaccurate number counts and projections, and
- Partial influences by NSW Government agencies.

History: In 2002 Derek Jones and Peter Waite, members of the Pennant Hills Thornleigh Branch of the Liberal Party, and many members of the consultative groups raised concerns about the consultative processes for this project. They raised their concerns at a Branch meeting where it was informally agreed that they be the representatives of the 'Concerned Citizens Group'. Mr Jones attended the (2003) Pennant Hills meetings whilst Mr Waite attended the (2003) Dural meetings so that they could compare notes and prepare balanced submissions and reports.

After representations to the Hon P Ruddock MP he arranged for Minister Lloyd to meet with Branch President Barwick, Jones, Waite and himself.

When Minister Lloyd stated there would be openings and connections along the tunnel for intermediate access Minister Ruddock corrected him advising the government had agreed there would be NO openings.

Minister Lloyd arranged a meeting for Jones and Waite with SKM, DOTARS and the RTA for 5 November.

They reported to the 'Group' no evidence was available to prove the best route was chosen. Attached are the points raised at 5th November ¹ meeting and detailed comment that was sent to Minister Ruddock on 16th November 2004 ² with copy to Minister Lloyd requesting answers on behalf of the Group' and Waite's letter ³ of the same date. AS YET, THE POINTS RAISED HAVE NOT BEEN ANSWERED.

Following representations by the Pennant Hills Civic Trust to Minister Ruddock in late 2004 a meeting was arranged for 10 March 2005 as detailed above.

Page 7 of this letter: The PURPOSE of the F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study was:

- *To investigate options for a new National Highway **connection** between the Newcastle Freeway (F3) and the future Sydney Orbital. The new connection will replace Pennant Hills Road as the National Highway route (Newsletter No 1 – April 2002) ²².*

• Page 2

(13 July 2014: SKM never included its terms of reference in any report because of intervention of State and Federal bureaucrats probably at the direction of Ministers or senior political advisers.)

Ministerial Letters

Recent letters from the Transport Minister and other Federal and State MPs indicated they and or the Government had not been correctly advised in regards to the following issues:

1. Dec 10, 2004 ⁴ *"I am advised SKM's study took into account --- as well as the opinions of residents and business community before arriving at the recommended Purple Option"* The Groups research contradicts this statement. Refer 21 Feb 2005 letter ⁵ to Minister Lloyd, and *"The Government expressed its preference for a fully tunneled link, but has NOT ruled out the possibility of an opening"* This statement is contrary to Minister Ruddock's August 2004 advice to Minister Lloyd and about 40 others present, (2004110030 & 2004110014,,), and
2. Dec 10, 2004 ⁶ *"Furthermore, a 'C' Option would adversely impact on the national parks and heritage areas in the north western area of Sydney"*. Such statements as this that are taken from the SKM report are of deep concern because they are seen as attempts to justify putting off making a decision on Option C. These challenges will have to be eventually addressed. *"Building a 'C' Option would not remove the need for a major upgrade of the Pennant Hills Road"* (2004110517). This is an admission that the tunnel is simply an upgrade of Pennant Hills Road and not an alternative route for the National Highway. refer 13 Jan 2005 letter ⁷ to Minister, no reply,
3. Dec 23, 2004 ⁸ *"par 3(c) "Preliminary investigations show that a 'C' Option will have parts of the route on surface with substantial tunnels and extensive bridge structures around Berowra Waters"* January 6, 2005 Mr Jones again wrote another (unanswered) letter ⁹ direct to Minister Lloyd. Waite also wrote to Minister Ruddock. Option C did NOT impinge on Berowra Waters as the Minister claimed by the Minister who formerly worked the Hawkesbury as a Ferry Master ¹⁰, (refer to attached detailed 6 January letter ¹¹ to Minister Ruddock refuting much of Minister Lloyd's letter). The SKM report clearly indicates and the Minister states *"a possible need for a second crossing"* thereby passing the responsibility to the NSW Government (2004110635, 23 Dec 2004), and
4. Jan 28, 2005 ¹² *"The Type C option would not remove the need for an immediate costly upgrading of Pennant Hills Road"* and other misleading statements made in previous letters (2005010150). (This proposal relies on up to \$10 billion of unfunded assumptions that are not necessary for Option C. Furthermore this discussion paper shows serious inconsistencies in the reports that have compromised the Study to the extent that it cannot be relied on.)

State MP Michael Richardson railed at Waite's circulating a copy of Richardson's 25 November 2004 letter ¹³ to a resident and Waite's 4 December response ¹⁴ to Minister Ruddock with copies to 12 Liberal MPs. Some of the replies have been very interesting. However, as yet not one MP has supplied any information that proves the best route has been selected.

The Liberal Party, Pennant Hills Thornleigh Branch (Concerned Citizens Group), after receiving a copy of the 1994 report on 14th February 1994 Final Community Bulletin 3¹⁵ : Liverpool – Hornsby Highway Study' that recommended a western (C type Option) and the 14th February 2005¹⁶ discussion critique' unanimously passed the attached resolution on 14th February¹⁷. It also agreed to go public if the Federal Government did not provide 100% proof that the study AND the Coalition had not been compromised.

To prove the point on environmental issues attached is a report on the avoidance of an EIS by the NSW government when building a bridge to replace the collapsed Lawrence Hargrave Drive near Wollongong.¹⁸

Another example is how the NSW government passed legislation after residents successfully challenged DIPNRs consent given to Collex for a waste transfer station at Clyde. This matter is again before the Courts. A major factor to be considered by DOTARS in responding to this Discussion Paper is that two residents without any legal experience or training have twice successfully defeated a multi national company and the State once.

The implications of this are particularly relevant to item 1 in the letters from the Minister. The Minister appears to be indicating that - the "opinions of the residents and business community do not have sufficient merit to outweigh the opinions and intellectual capacity of professionals and bureaucrats.

At no stage has the Minister, SKM, DOTARS, RTA or any other politician provided any meaningful answers to the technical questions and documents produced. Many emails and letters have simply been ignored or answers supplied that avoided issues raised.

On 10 June 1999 Ted Mack spoke at Pennant Hills about 'Australia's Sham Democracy'. At one point Ted said "Community values are not a matter of expertise – only the community has a right to determine values – not the bureaucracy. Not the politicians. Not the lawyers or academics"¹⁹.

Discussions revealed that the Sydney Orbital was fully financed by the Commonwealth based on State planning decisions. The Commonwealth should change its policies and adopt the "He who pays the piper calls the tune" approach when dealing with F3 connection and base the funding on Commonwealth policy. It is absurd that the Commonwealth is prepared to allow taxpayers funds to be used for projects that cannot be supported on basis planning principles.

Hornsby Council prepared a comprehensive report²⁰ supporting the Lane Cove Valley route that would reduce the traffic and accident rate on the Pacific Highway together with a submission supporting a C option westerly route. Is it to be assumed that Hornsby Council traffic planners and Councillors opinions do not matter?

A similar situation applied at Berowra Waters where Planning Minister Refshauge called in for determination applications Hornsby Council staff recommended be refused. Residents successfully challenged Refshauge's approvals. Two S/Cs and two barristers appeared for the Minister and applicant. A junior barrister represented the appellants. The Ministers team claimed the Act provided that the Court did not have the power to overturn his decision. In other words the Minister claimed he was above the law. The Court changed Refshauge's decision but not his arrogance and contempt for the law and the community.

Waite's 8 page presentation titled '*Has the community been deceived*' (circa June 2004) was based on the April/ May 2004 Joint Media Release by Ministers Anderson and Campbell. There has been no meaningful response to that and many other submissions or the report on the outcome of the 5th November 2004 meeting with SKM, DOTARS and the RTA.

It is attitudes and arrogance like these examples that bring politicians and bureaucrats into disrepute.

North and South Tunnel Intersections: Figures 11-2, 11-3 ²¹ Historically proposed works such as these will involve lengthy delays for many months. This has not been addressed in the study. It is only 10 years since through traffic, residents and businesses in the area were subjected to inordinate delays and loss of amenity.

An argument has been advanced that traffic counts provided have only been for the western side of Pennant Hills Road. This is seen as spurious as most of Hornsby Shire residents have to access or cross Pennant Hills Road. The exceptions being Epping and Eastwood residents who will use or cross Pennant Hills Road to travel to the northwest and the F3.

North: Two lanes from the F3 widen into 3 lanes at Mt Colah to become a 3k parking lot in AM peak. Vehicles then crawl when lights go green at the Pacific Highway and Pennant Hills Road. These 3 lanes become 3 lanes on Pennant Hills Road and effectively 2 lanes on Pacific Highway that are already carrying heavy local traffic at capacity.

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Page 182.⁴⁶ "29 *The reallocation of road space on the existing Pennant Hills Road would be an essential part of the project. These works have not been fully investigated and therefore not costed in the estimate of costs given in Working Paper 2*'. This question was raised at the 5th November meeting. The RTA advised this cost would not be borne by the RTA. This is further evidence of DIPNR's input.

Page 25⁴⁷ diagram 2.13 refers to a number plate survey. Assuming 4% of the 54% from the Pacific Highway and F3 has destinations south of Ryde and Boundary Roads where does the remaining 50% of traffic from the F3 go? It is inconceivable that it is all going to Hornsby and the NE Region.

Page 70⁴⁸ Diagram 6.1 uses estimated numbers as against %ages in diagram 2.13. Figures and %ages for the Pacific Highway and Ryde Road in these two diagrams appear to conflict with each other. Figure 2.13 shows Ryde Road as having 11% against the 20% using the Pacific Highway whilst figure 6.1 shows 84,300 using Ryde Road as against 56,000 using the Pacific Highway. Both cannot be correct.

Working Paper 1 - Community Consultation

Page 20.⁴⁹ *"there was strong support for further investigation of a Type C option, on the basis a long term solution was needed"*.

Several other reasons to justify Option C were also listed.

Page 36:⁵⁰ 5.1 Key Outcomes Par 2: *"Type C options would be further investigated to provide a long term western route and potential second crossing of the Hawkesbury. Making provision for such a route through the planning process was important to many members of the community and key stakeholders"*.

Value Management Workshop No2 Record – SEPTEMBER 2003

Page 7⁵¹ reports that approximately 3 vehicles in 5 from the F3 travel down the Pacific Highway whilst the %ages quoted indicate only 40% travel to the City and North East. Refer to fig 2.13⁴⁷. Which is right?

The same page indicates 57% of heavy vehicles have origins/destinations that would use Pennant Hills Road. This coincides with the figures given out at the Community Consultative meeting at Galston in August 2003.

Page 5.⁵² RTA's Dr Kishan reports *"there are not many examples in the world of tunnels 6-8 km long and certainly none in Australia. Therefore, if the project proceeds there will be a multitude of technical challenges to be addressed, not to mention the social challenges that would arise"*. This statement is cause for deep concern and should have been seriously addressed by the Ministers before they agreed to accept the Purple A Option.

Professional commentators at this workshop raised some serious concerns over the proposed tunnel option. P10⁵³ : *"By building this new link there would be a redistribution of up to 20% of traffic in the corridor that would provide benefits throughout the rest of the northern network"*. This is misleading because the chosen route will not greatly alter the traffic on the Pacific Highway south of the F3.

Pages 11 and 12⁵⁴ also raise issues that have not been answered in the study. In particular the last two on Page 11⁵⁵. *"Project justification is essential. Type C needs to be convincingly rejected before any of the type A Options can be seriously addressed. In considering the Type C scenario in comparison to type A, the following needs to be addressed: - what value is placed on another (strategic) crossing of the Hawkesbury River?"*.

Page 12⁵⁴ concludes long term planning needs to be made for Option C.

Page 22⁵⁶ refers to DOTARS advice that the Australian Government wanted Option A as a short term solution thereby avoiding the need to confront the State Government over its lack of planning.

Newsletter 2, July 2003⁵⁷

By comparison, Corridor Types B and C would Remove less traffic from Pennant Hills Road (fewer than 10,000 vehicles per day in 2021⁵⁷).

Summation of SKM's F3 to Sydney Orbital Report

No reference or provision is made for the diversion of traffic when the tunnel is closed as it will be from time to time due to computer and power failures, fire, breakdowns, accidents and maintenance. **The only reasonable explanation is because there is no alternate route.**

The report indicates two lanes each way will be required if there is a toll and three lanes each way without a toll. How will this affect the traffic if Pennant Hills Road is narrowed to 2 lanes in each direction as suggested?

Newsletter 2 suggests Option C would only reduce traffic on Pennant Hills Road by up to 10,000 vehicles per day by 2021 (about 10% ⁵⁷). Page 10 ⁵³ of the VM Workshop suggests a 20% redistribution of traffic by building the tunnel. What does this mean? 'Working paper 4' page 122 ⁴⁵ suggests only 19,000 or 20% vehicles per day would use option C by 2021.

As against the above, estimates in the 'Working Papers 4 – Traffic & Transportation' on pages 22, 40 and 43 and the 'Value Management Workshop' page 7 all indicate 57 to 60% of the F3 traffic could use Option C. Even if the 57 to 60% was reduced to 40% this is a 100% improvement on the Working paper 4 20 percent estimates ⁴⁵ and 200% percent better than Newsletter 2 estimates ⁵⁷.

The selected route DOES NOT meet the: The PURPOSE of the F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study:

- To investigate options for a new National Highway 'ROUTE' ('CONNECTION' in Newsletter 1 ²²) between the Newcastle Freeway (F3) and the future Sydney Orbital. **The new route will replace Pennant Hills Road as the National Highway.** (Newsletter No 2 – July 2003 ⁵⁸)
- May 7, 2004 SMH Herald ⁵⁹ "The aim of the study was to identify a high standard transport link (not route or connection) between the F3 and the Sydney Orbital. **The new link (not connection or route) would replace Pennant Hills Road as the National Highway**".

Conclusion

P 5 16

The only conclusion that can be arrived at from available information is:

- **the Commonwealth Government has allowed the NSW Government to hijack their study to overcome local traffic problems without any serious thought for the future,**

PS Comments attributed to Minister Anderson (SMH 21/3/05 Safer Pacific Highway just got closer ⁶⁰) further detract from the credibility of the SKM report

July 2014: I believe my comments on page 11 of my letter are sufficient justification to show the SKM study lacks credibility and cannot be relied on because SKM was directed not to comply with the 2001 Terms of Reference. I do not suggest SKM's study prepared in accordance with the 2003 directions, or the 2007 Pearlman findings were wrong.

Peter Waite

INDEX

1. Letter to Department of Planning about submission
2. Historical list since unsolicited offer received
3. Relevant Act and 'NorthConnex' justification
4. Attachment A SKM 2001 – 2004 report
5. Attachment B Pearlman 2007 Inquiry
6. Attachment C history from 1968 - references to reports
7. Transurban and NSROC support
8. Supporting documents in file numbered:
 - 1 Attachment A
 - 2 Attachment B
 - 3 Attachment C
 - 4 4 – 9 in front of tab 1
 - 5 10 – 19 behind tab 1
 - 6 20 -29 behind tab 2
 - 7 30 – 39 behind tab 3
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 - 9 50 -59 behind tab 5
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 - 11 70- 77 behind tab 7. NB 76 is self explanatory when read

Poor vision for the state in blurring of the divide

10 April 2008

BRUCE LODER

In NSW, until about 1980, there was a clear separation of government and the management and administration of public works and services. The government established the public policy and the non-political public service and government instrumentalities delivered the required works and services in accordance with the law and in the public interest.

The NSW public service has accomplished some extraordinary achievements. The country rail system, the Sydney metropolitan rail system, the Sydney Harbour Bridge and associated underground railway, and the Sydney water storage are prime examples. Of these, the services of overseas consultants and contractors were used only on the Sydney Harbour Bridge and on that work all the planning, including the preliminary design and feasibility assessment, was done by the NSW Department of Public Works.

The respective heads of the departments and instrumentalities were eminently qualified to run their departments and were supported by competent staff. For the most part the heads were selected from staff groomed for senior positions within the "permanent" service and enjoyed some certainty of tenure.

The situation began to change about 1980. About that time there was a move within the public service proper, as distinct from the instrumentalities, to promote the re-election of the govern-

ment as a primary aim. Subsequently, the procedure and criteria for appointing department heads were changed. As a consequence, department heads are now often unable to provide ministers with the sound advice and guidance they require to administer their portfolio, and ministers have assumed a greater role in the functioning of the individual departments, for which they are ill-equipped.

These are the circumstances in which the economically and financially disastrous Cross City and Lane Cove tunnels were conceived and built.

The Government, which allowed the works to be built (and even boasted of the achievement), assured us no government

lane closures and those who divert to alternative routes. While the extra travel cost for each individual is small, the total will amount to a substantial sum over the term of the toll franchise. This in turn will have an adverse affect on the economy.

Over the past 30 years the state Treasury has increased its control over the expenditure of public funds. In common with the Commonwealth and other states, the NSW Treasury is opposed to public debt and does not differentiate between operating expenditure and investment. While tolls have been used on appropriate public works in the past to discharge public debt the so-called public and private

were seen as investment opportunities by the private sector, which apparently convinced the government of their merit.

Unfortunately, the Roads and Traffic Authority failed in its role as guardian of the public interest probably because, in common with the rest of the public service, it no longer has the ability to do so.

Both the Cross City and Lane Cove tunnels are ill-conceived and doubtful economically. It goes without saying that neither are financially viable as toll roads. The Lane Cove Tunnel has the further defect of virtually eliminating Epping Road as an effective link in the Sydney Metropolitan road system. In effect a toll is being levied on a previously existing untolled road - a technique used only as a means of limiting vehicular access to a centre as in Singapore and London.

The deterioration in management and skills in the public service exemplified in the Roads and Traffic Authority extends throughout the service and explains in part the problems of delivery being experienced in health, transport and public works.

It will not be easy to restore the public service to an effective provider of works and services and guardian of the public interest, but until then and until the roles of government and public service are once more clearly defined, we can expect the standard of government in NSW to continue to decline and the quality of services in NSW to continue to fall relative to other states.

Bruce Loder is a former NSW commissioner for Main Roads.

Ministers have assumed a greater role in the functioning of the individual departments, for which they are ill-equipped.

money was involved. Lucky for them. Governments do not have any money; they only direct how the public's money is spent. The public will pay for the tunnels through tolls that are higher than they should be, because the scope of the work was far more extensive than required to achieve an economic solution.

But of more concern is the extra travel cost incurred and extra pollution caused by those who suffer the increased congestion created by traffic diversion and

enterprise partnerships have evolved to overcome Treasury opposition to public debt.

Of the seven such partnerships completed on the Sydney metropolitan road system to date only the Cross City and Lane Cove tunnels have been abject failures. The Sydney Harbour Tunnel, M4, M5, M2 and M7 were all economically sound and financially feasible and were constructed to satisfy a transport need. The Cross City and the Lane Cove tunnels

1,2,3 refer Files A, B, C

4

28 Warne Street,
Pennant Hills, NSW 2120
3 March 2012

5

The Premier
The Hon Barry O'Farrell MP
GPO Box 5341
SYDNEY, NSW 2001

Bob Carr's appointment as a Senator and Minister for Foreign Affairs

Dear Barry,

From memory Carr resigned in March – April 2005 shortly before Bob Sendt's Auditor General report became public. P31; Cross City Tunnel costs blew out due to:

- **"A revision of the scope by the Premier"**

[REDACTED]

NSW Joint Select Committee on the Cross City Tunnel First report February 2006. Greg Pearce was one of the opposition's representatives.

xvii: former and current Premiers etc failed to attend.

P43, **3.50 Carr** *'We made a key policy decision that, unlike the M2, there would be no public money going into this.'*

P115; ***Is there public control of the road network?*** 7.1; lemma has publicly stated:


- ***"Never again will we surrender control of our road network."***

P 120: ***"Fetters on the discretion of the RTA."*** The contract was biased.

P 137: **8.37 *"concealment is a fertile ground for suspicion and loss of confidence. This is a major element of public interest in the present case. And it demands the total lifting of all the existing constraints on disclosures."***

This should be used to discredit the Gillard government and Robertson's State opposition. Barry/Philip, please let me know if you can use this ASAP. [REDACTED]

With kind regards


Peter Waite

Copy: Philip Ruddock
Matt Kean

6

27 March 2012

Mr Peter Waite
28 Warne Street
PENNANT HILLS NSW 2120

Dear Mr Waite

Peter

Thank you for your letter of 3 March 2012.


I have read your letter with interest and share your concerns regarding the mismanagement of the Carr Government in relation to the Cross City Tunnel.

After 16 years of Labor Government in NSW, the NSW Liberals & Nationals Government is working hard to deliver the infrastructure to rebuild NSW.

In September 2012, Infrastructure NSW will deliver a 20-year State Infrastructure Strategy (SIS) to the NSW Government. It will, for the first time in NSW's history, provide a long-term and holistic view of the infrastructure needed in the state. The NSW Government is committed to improving infrastructure and addressing the challenges and opportunities ahead.

Thank you again for taking the time to write to me.

Yours sincerely



Barry O'Farrell MP
Premier

cc. Matt Kean MP, State Member for Hornsby
Hon Philip Ruddock MP, Federal Member for Berowra

28 Warne Street
Pennant Hills NSW 2120
17 May 2013

7

The Hon Duncan Gay MLC – Minister for Roads and Ports,
Level 35, Governor Macquarie Tower
1 Farrer Place
SYDNEY NSW 2000

NSROC & Gosford Council's support for the F3 to M2 tunnel

Dear Duncan,

Today I received from Hunters Hill Council's General Manager Barry Smith PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) Terms of Engagement (ToE) to prepare a study supporting the proposed F3 to M2 Tunnel. As you are aware I have tried for nearly two years to acquire the technical documents to support what became NSROC's submission. None exist.

The ToE and PwC's disclaimer of any responsibility render its study valueless. [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] Page 3 notes PwC are Hornsby Council's auditors. On several occasions I [REDACTED] have questioned [REDACTED] over the accuracy of Hornsby Council's Annual Reports. [REDACTED]

My concerns are that former Mayor Berman cannot be trusted. I have grounds to suspect that as Chair of NSROC he made this approach to PwC at the request of Transurban to support their offer to build the F3 – M2 Tunnel.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

I suggest before any commitment is made on this matter it be deferred until I have completed and sent my submission to Premier O'Farrell in early June. I will copy you at the same time.

Yours sincerely



Peter Waite 9484 3471

CC Premier O'Farrell
Hornsby MP Matt Kean
Hornsby Mayor Steve Russell
Hunters Hill GM and GM's of the seven other Council's involved

7

28 Warne Street
Pennant Hills NSW 2120
17 May 2013

Mr Barry Smith
General Manager
Hunters Hill Council

Re NSROC's & Gosford Council's support for the F3 to M2 tunnel

Dear Mr Smith,

Thank you for sending me the PwC Terms of Engagement NSROC entered into with PwC.

This booklet sets out my concerns about the credibility of the study.

I am copying this booklet to all other Council's General Managers for their and their Council's information.

In my opinion NSROC's Constitution should be amended so that it operates under the Local Government Act, or be immediately disbanded because at the moment it cannot be held to account. That is not the fault of its Executive Officer.

The front page of my booklet sets out my concerns for the Minister.

Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Peter Waite', with a stylized flourish at the end.

Peter Waite 9484 3471

The missing link and missing out

PRIORITISING SYDNEY'S
F3-M2 MOTORWAY CONNECTOR

WITH SUPPORTING RESEARCH UPDATE
BY PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS

MAY 2012



City of Ryde
Lifestyle and opportunity @ your doorstep



HORNSBY
SHIRE COUNCIL



NSROC
Northern Sydney
Regional Organisation
of Councils

17 JUNE 2012
8

4.

28 Warne St, Pennant Hills NSW 2120

Formal GIPA application to Hornsby Council under the GIPA Act for NSROC records:

(Informal application was emailed to the President and executive officer on 11 June 2012)

Noting reasons in my Code of Conduct complaints as set out in item 3:

1. All communications to and from PwC,
2. All communications to and from councils, mayors or other staff, or the names of those who made the arrangements
3. All communications to and from John Hanna – Thornleigh resident, Allan Ferguson - Omega Plumbing Thornleigh, Kylie Loades - NRMA director, Hon Phillip Ruddock MP, Brendon Lyon - Infrastructure Partnerships Australia, Clr Alison McLaren, WSROC President, (non member) Gosford Council

or the names of those who made the arrangements.

This information to include documents supplied to these people to prove the M2 to F3 connection is the best and cheapest solution.

4. Total cost of the PwC report, NSROC report and its administrative costs in this matter
5. Names and technical qualifications of those who took an active part in the compilation of these reports,
6. Copies of minutes relating to the above reports.
7. Constitution of NSROC and any government authority to operate.
8. Cost for each Council's membership of NSROC.

As NSROC does not appear to be an agency and the issues raised are in the public interest, there should be no cost for Hornsby Council to process this application apart from the \$30 application fee.

Please contact me if you require any further information

Peter Andrew Waite 17 June 2012

28 Warne Street
Pennant Hills, NSW 2120
25 June 2012

9

The Hon P Ruddock MP
PO Box 743
Pennant Hills NSW 1715

Your Community Survey – ‘Have your say . . .’

Dear Philip

Thank you for seeking comment on 4 of 13 issues quoted. Because of my concerns about Nick Berman I limit my comments to point 4: *‘Improving local roads and infrastructure’*.

- July 7, 1982: Northern Standard. *‘Cr Waite refers to 1960 proposal to widen Pennant Hills Road is long overdue – Berowra to Hornsby expressway would not be needed.* Since then I have learnt much, seen many broken promises and delays by governments.

- Nick Berman survey seeking comment on *‘The missing link’* with my reply. I am waiting for Berman’s reply to see if he will organise a Council Workshop to establish the best option or options, before the council elections.

NSROC’s paper *‘The missing link and missing out’*

- Your photo is on page 10 of this 16 page booklet with your quotation I assume is correct.

On page 2 is mention of the 2007 Pearlman report. We both know the Pearlman report was to *‘revalidate’* recommendations in the SKM report and were not to establish the best option. The NSROC booklet also refers to a meaningless 60 page A4 report by PricewaterhouseCoopers. Page i is PricewaterhouseCoopers disclaimer that passes responsibility for the content back to NSROC. No one wants to accept responsibility.

- FROGS 8 Oct 2008 paper (10,000 Friends Of Greater Sydney (at Sydney Uni)) about *‘The Sydney Orbital to F3 Freeway Link’*. Par 2 refers to the Pearlman report.

The then 2005 -2021 time frame quoted next to figure 1 assumes the tunnel will be operating and the M7 to F3 link will be completed by 2021. When read in its entirety the Pearlman report found there were no basic statistics to back up many of the assumptions/recommendations. No one from Hornsby Council attended the hearing!

I have applied under the NSW GIPA Act (FOI) for all the NSROC papers [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

If you share my concerns I am sure the community would like to know if you would prefer to have a tolled M7 to F3 connection that the majority of large trucks would use, in preference to a tunnel and years of delays whilst the F3 is widened to eight lanes, possibly with tolling as well as Pennant Hills Road to six lanes from the M2 to James Ruse Drive.

Please let me know if you require further information or would like to meet with me to clarify any of the matters I have raised or omitted.

Yours sincerely

Peter Waite

10

28 Warne Street,
Pennant Hills, NSW 2120
28 June 2013

Reference: *Political File New LG Act*

The Hon Don Page MP
Minister for Local Government
Level 33, Governor Macquarie Tower
1 Farrer Place, SYDNEY NSW 2000

LOCAL GOVERNMENT TASKFORCE

Dear Minister Page,

Enclosed with this letter are some observations I would like the Taskforce to consider.

I have done this because there does not appear to have been any provision for community input.

It would be appreciated if they were forwarded to the Chair Mr John Turner for the Taskforces consideration.

Yours sincerely

Peter Waite

SUBMISSION TO THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TASKFORCE

[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]

28 Warne Street,
Pennant Hills, NSW 2120
14 July 2012

The Hon P Ruddock MP
PO Box 743
Pennant Hills NSW 1715

Review NSROC decision to endorse the F3 M2 tunnel

Dear Philip

Thank you for your 3 July 2012 reply to my comments about NSROC's decision to support the F3-M2 tunnel proposal and your offer to discuss these issues with me.

These papers support the M7-F3 options, and due to delay, why there is no benefit in building the tunnel as it was always recognised as a short term solution until 2021.

This is particularly important now that the State announced it is proposing to make the NW sector a major area for Sydney's urban development over the next 20 years. It should be noted that most of the sand and blue metal required will come via the F3-M2 until the second crossing is built. Toll and safety wise the M7-F3 is a better option.

Because this matter affects the wider community I asked the Pennant Hills District Trust if they would like to have a representative attend the meeting. Yesterday President Marcia Horvai advised the Trust supported the opportunity for you to visit the issues again and nominated Mr Andrew Kowalski to attend. I understand you have already met Mr Kowalski. The Trust and I hope you will agree.

Andrew has advised he can be available any days apart from Tuesdays. I can be available most times except PM on 1 August or any Thursday before 10am.

Please arrange for someone to contact me to arrange a meeting with you.

Yours sincerely

Peter Waite – 9484 3471 or waitepeter@bigpond.com

Copy: Mr Kowalski

PAPERS supporting an M7-F3 link instead of M2-F3

2003	Refer 16 Jan 2006 paper	Hopwood seeks second crossing in March 2006 election campaign
2005	20 May	Civic Trust to DOTARS listing issues raised at 10 March meeting with Ruddock and DOTARS. P2 Option C is a stand-alone route that will be shown in time to have a far greater reduction on PH Rd traffic than the proposed tunnel.
2005	2 Aug	HIT public meeting at Pennant Hills. Paper logically sets out why Option C is the best short and long term option.
2006	16 Jan	Hopwood supports Option C because bushfires can cut off all access to and from the north. (Note 16 Jan 2003 comment)
2006	12 Mar	Well attended PH public meeting unanimously supports Option C
2006	14 Mar	Hills News reports O'Farrell, Hopwood, Richardson and Tink all support C. Berman <i>'tunnel proposal should be rethought'</i> . [REDACTED]
2006	29 Nov	HIT Epping Club meeting. The vast majority supported C when they had the reasons explained. This included Mr Greg Smith before his election as Epping MP.
2006	16 Dec	Bruce Mills B ward candidate supports option C.
2007	22 Jan	Hopwood compelling case for second crossing. Ref 6 January 06.
2007	15 Mar	Because I questioned council's support for tunnel; the Mayor asked for details to support option C. [REDACTED]
2007	25 June	Richardson (& Williams) call for option C.
2007	12 Nov	Ruddock notes Pearlman suggested a future crossing is needed.
2007	Dec	Richardson again calls for option C.
2010	June	Smith's letter to Epping electorate supports F3 – M7 link.
2010	Sept	Smith's newsletter asks where is money Howard set aside for link.
2010	Undated	Ruddock reports M2 – F3 link not expected until 2026. <u>TOO LATE!</u>



The Hon Duncan Gay MLC/2

Minister for Roads and Ports

Deputy Leader of the Government
Legislative Council

MEDIA RELEASE

19 July 2012

NSW GOVERNMENT STUDIES UNSOLICITED PROPOSAL FOR F3 TO M2 LINK

NSW Roads Minister Duncan Gay today announced the NSW Government had received an unsolicited proposal from private motorway operator Transurban for a possible F3 to M2 Motorway Tunnel link underneath Pennant Hills Road.

"Let me make it clear this proposal is in its very early stages," Mr Gay said.

"But it is encouraging that the private sector is interested in investing in Sydney's motorways and has come to Government with a proposal," he said.

"As part of the normal process for unsolicited private sector proposals, we have set up a cross-agency assessment committee to investigate its merits.

"The committee includes representatives of Department of Premier and Cabinet, NSW Treasury, Transport for NSW, Infrastructure NSW and Roads and Maritime Services.

"There are potentially three stages to the assessment, which include strategic assessment of the initial submission, development of a detailed proposal and negotiation of a final binding offer.

"Following the initial consideration of the proposal, it has been decided to progress to Stage 2.

"In the next six months the committee will work with Transurban to complete Stage 2 of the assessment. This requires the proponent and Government to work cooperatively in the development and assessment of a detailed proposal, from which it can be determined whether the parties want to proceed to negotiate a final binding offer.

"It is important to note that we are still in the initial stages of the assessment process, so while we are looking into the proposal, there is no guarantee or commitment from either Government or Transurban that it will lead to delivery of a project.

"We need to be assured any proposal like this offers not only value for money for NSW taxpayers but that it also meets the NSW government's long term transport objectives."

Information and the status of the assessment of this proposal can be found on the NSW Government's Unsolicited Proposals webpage - www.nsw.gov.au/unsolicitedproposals

Media: Lance Northey 0467 743 192

19 July 2012

**NSW Government in discussions with Transurban
for the potential delivery of F3/M2 connector**

Transurban today welcomed the NSW Government's announcement (attached) to conduct an exclusive assessment of the merits of a proposal for the delivery of a freeway grade connection of the F3 Freeway to the M2 Motorway (F3/M2) with Transurban.


While the NSW Government's announcement does not commit the parties to a project, Transurban welcomes the opportunity to work with NSW to develop a detailed proposal and potentially deliver a project that would add significant value to Sydney's northern corridor and the city more generally.

Transurban will provide significant expertise to Stage 2 of the NSW Government's process with engineering, traffic forecasting and financing specialists.

Transurban CEO, Scott Charlton, said: "We are encouraged by the NSW Government's announcement and the potential opportunity to enhance the Sydney road network. The design, construction and financing of major city infrastructure remains a huge challenge for Governments and I consider Transurban to be ideally positioned to assist the NSW Government in achieving the best outcome for motorists and the community."

"The Board and I are conscious of the outstanding NSW asset base Transurban currently has in place and the role it plays in the community. It is important to understand today's announcement in context; it gives us the opportunity, but does not mandate Transurban, to assist the NSW Government in achieving one of the three key "missing links" in the Sydney road network."

"We now look forward to progressing the transport agenda in Sydney by working diligently through Stage 2 of the process".



Amanda Street
Company Secretary

Investor and media enquiries

Wesley Ballantine +61 3 8656 8904
General Manager Investor Relations, Media and Government

Public

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SMH. JULY 20, 2012 Private pitch to build missing link between freeways

Josephine Tovey
STATE POLITICS

THE state government is considering a private-sector proposal to build a multibillion-dollar tunnel to link the M2 and F3, regarded as one of the key "missing links" of the Sydney road network.

Transurban, which built the Lane Cove Tunnel, has lodged an unsolicited proposal with the government for the motorway tunnel link, which would likely be tolled and would connect the F3 with the greater Sydney motorway network, keeping many trucks off suburban link roads.

The government has not committed to the project, which has passed through only the first stage of a three-stage process, including an initial appraisal by Infrastructure NSW and the Department of Premier and Cabinet. But the Roads Minister, Duncan Gay, said the government was pleased with the proposal and it would require a "minimum of government money".

"Whilst, as you could imagine, I'm as keen as hell to be able to deliver one of these missing links we are not building up hopes that this is definitely going to happen," he said.

Neither the government nor Transurban could provide an estimate of the total cost. But an indicative cost assessment

Speed cameras spark accusations

The opposition has accused the government of manipulating a road safety report to boost support for its increase in mobile speed cameras. A government report released earlier this week cited a 19 per cent drop in road fatalities as evidence for the effectiveness of mobile speed cameras in the program's first 12 months of operation. The Opposition Leader, John Robertson, said the figures did not take into account a wide range of factors that could be contributing

to the 19 per cent drop and did not examine crash data for mobile speed camera locations, but rather the whole state. A spokeswoman for the Roads Minister, Duncan Gay, said Labor's criticism was hypocritical. "This criticism is coming from the same Labor party that was planning to roll out mobile speed camera enforcement to more than 12,000 hours, or 40 per cent more than our program," she said.

Josephine Tovey

by an earlier independent review, found it would require about \$400 million a kilometre. Though no specific route has been released, it's understood it would be about eight kilometres long, bringing the project cost to about \$3.2 billion.

The Opposition Leader, John Robertson, said he was concerned the project could go ahead without ever going to tender, which is not required under the government guidelines for unsolicited proposals.

"If the O'Farrell government is serious about ensuring the best value for taxpayer money, they will put this project out to tender," he said.

A spokesman for Mr Gay said if the proposal didn't offer value for money it wouldn't proceed

to the third stage of assessment. "The stage-two process determines value for money by testing it against the public sector comparator," he said.

The Hornsby MP Matt Kean welcomed the proposal, saying it would alleviate congestion on Pennant Hills Road and remove large volumes of trucks from a residential area.

But he said it was important commuters weren't funnelled into any toll road or that air quality was not compromised.

"I would be very concerned about unfiltered stacks in suburbia," he said.

The Tourism and Transport Forum said a tunnel would be a "vital freight and passenger connection between the central coast, the Hunter and Sydney".

The road from smart bombs to tollways

When your eTag goes bing, meet the tall Texan who says kerching, writes Matt O'Sullivan.

It comes as a surprise to learn the first job of Scott Charlton, an unassuming Texan who this week began keeping watch over many of Australia's major toll roads, was designing laser-guidance systems for smart bombs.

It's quite the contrast from his latest role as the new chief executive of Transurban, a dour infrastructure asset with stable income that befits the times of post-financial crisis risk aversion.

Charlton is not your stereotypical swashbuckling Texan. Born in Houston and raised near Dallas, the tall, incredibly personable executive with a shock of silver hair is no J.R. Ewings — the brash, loud Texan of *Dallas* fame.

In fact, Charlton, who studied to become an electrical engineer at a university in the US's second most populous state, doesn't have much of an American accent, given the length of his stay in Australia.

Charlton might have been sitting in the chief executive's chair at Transurban since only Monday but he is no stranger to the world of toll-roads and other pieces of infrastructure.

"At one time or another, in one of

Weekend Edition July 21-22, 2012

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LETTERS



Lanes will go missing with link

The proposal by Transurban to build an F3 to M2 tunnel is interesting, but we need to see the details ("Private pitch to build missing link between freeways", July 20).

Knowing Transurban, Pennant Hills Road would have to be narrowed from three general traffic lanes in each direction to one lane, probably between the M2 and the F3. The same thing happened to Epping Road over the Lane Cove Tunnel.

How would traffic conditions on Pennant Hills Road be better under this proposal? What would they be like in 10, 20 or 30 years' time?

Kevin Suffern West Pennant Hills



Not your stereotypical swashbuckling Texan ... the charismatic Scott Charlton is no stranger to the world of toll roads and infrastructure Photo: Rob Homer

THE CV

CHARLTON, Scott

CAREER

- ▶ 1995 to 2000 Head of project finance, Deutsche Bank
- ▶ 1992 to 1995 Director of

"He was charismatic and had an incredibly loyal team," a former colleague says.

"He had such a tight team that they would always defer to him. He fights for capital and he's good

coming into the discussion about how risk is shared."

Having left his previous role as the chief operating officer at the property developer Lend Lease, Charlton's mandate will be to deliver

21/12/2010 1.4

28 Warne Street,
Pennant Hills, NSW 2120
23 July 2012

15

Mr Lance Northey
c/- The Hon Duncan Gay MLC
Parliament House
Macquarie Street
Sydney NSW 2000

Re: *Unsolicited Proposal for F3 to M2 link*

Dear Mr Northey

As promised this afternoon attached are some papers that indicate **Transurban's offer is a poison chalice.**

1. July 7, 1982 Northern Standard article about my concerns.
2. August 2002 extract from SKM's F3 to M2 'hidden' papers. DOTARS cans other options
3. B O'F's 27 March 2012 letter to me about this September's Infrastructure proposals
4. Hornsby Council's 21 May Media release; contact NSROC President Nic Berman
5. My 8 June reply to Berman's council election campaign
6. survey re *Missing Link*
7. Hornsby Council's acknowledgement of my GIPA application re F3 M7 link details
8. Philip Ruddock's secretary 17 July email re NSROC's decision. Meeting 6 August
9. Duncan Gay's 19 July media release with Transurban's offer
10. SMH 20 July article
11. Hornsby Council's 20 July website: NSROC supports unsolicited F3 M2 tunnel
12. Waite 20 July cautioning Gay, Berejiklian and Kean to be careful
13. Waite to Alex Hawke Federal MP seeking his support for the F3 to M7 option

If Alex Hawke replies I will send a copy to you. I will be providing a copy of this letter to Philip Ruddock at our 6 August meeting.


As suggested in my the last par of my email to local newspapers copied to Alex Hawke, it would be interesting to ask Transurban if it would build the Western option at no cost instead.

Apart from exercising caution, at this stage I do not see it necessary to take any further action. However, please let me know if you require further information.

Yours sincerely

Peter Waite – 9484 3471 or waitepeter@bigpond.com

Copy: Barry O'Farrell without attachments



PAPERS supporting an M7-F3 link instead of M2-F3 (Refer Waite map)

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- 2003 Hopwood seeks second crossing
- 2005 20 May Civic Trust to DOTARS listing issues raised at 10 March meeting with Ruddock and DOTARS. P2 Option C is a stand-alone route that will be shown in time to have a far greater reduction on PH Rd traffic than the proposed tunnel.
- 2005 2 Aug HIT public meeting at Pennant Hills. Paper logically sets out why Option C is the best short and long term option.
- 2006 16 Jan Hopwood supports Option C because bushfires can cut off all access to and from the north. (Note 16 Jan 2003 comment)
- 2006 12 Mar Well attended PH public meeting unanimously supports Option C
- 2006 14 Mar Hills News reports O'Farrell, Hopwood, Richardson and Tink all support C. Berman *'tunnel proposal should be rethought'*.
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- 2006 29 Nov HIT Epping Club meeting. The vast majority supported C when they had the reasons explained. This included Mr Greg Smith before his election as Epping MP.
- 2006 16 Dec Bruce Mills B ward Labor candidate supports option C.
- 2007 22 Jan Hopwood compelling case for second crossing. Ref 6 January 06.
- 2007 15 Mar **I questioned council's support for tunnel. Berman asked for details to support option C.** [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

16

2007 25 June Richardson (& Williams) call for option C.

2007	12 Nov	Ruddock notes Pearlman suggested a future crossing is needed.
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2007	Dec	Richardson again calls for option C.
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2010	June	Smith's letter to Epping electorate supports F3 – M7 link.
------	------	--

2010	Sept	Smith's newsletter asks where is money Howard set aside for link.
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2010 Undated Ruddock reports M2 – F3 link not expected until 2026.
THIS WILL BE 10 YEARS TOO LATE!

2012 April PWC 'The F3-M2 connector: Supporting research for NSROC'

2012	12 April	Ruddock supports NSROC's proposal
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2012	19 July	Transurban and Gay announce no cost proposed link
------	---------	---

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

28 Warne Street
Pennant Hills NSW 2120
8 August 2012

Mr Ballantyne
Transurban
Level 3
505 Little Collins Street
Melbourne, VIC 3000

- **M2 – F3 tunnel proposal construction and disruption problems**

Dear Mr Ballantyne

On 6 August I met with my federal MP The Hon Phillip Ruddock about Transurban's unsolicited proposal to part fund the construction of a tunnel to link the M2 and F3.

Having lived near Pennant Hills Road for over 55 years and Epping over 25 years, being a Hornsby councillor from 1980 to 1987 and a builder, developer and investor I have seen traffic increase at a far greater rate than successive government and consultant projections.

In 1980 Lyle Marshal & Associates conducted a survey for Hornsby Council. The draft recommended Pennant Hills Road be eight lanes and Boundary Road six lanes. The then DMR instructed Council to have the report amended to reduce Pennant Hills Road to six lanes with no alteration to Boundary Road. History has shown Lyle Marshal was correct.

After SKM completed its comprehensive report in April 2004 [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

After I went to Canberra in a futile attempt to obtain support papers for some information in SKM's report Mr Ruddock organised a meeting with SKM, DOTARS, RTA and three members of the Concerned Citizens Group. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

A new factor probably not taken into account is that there are no large sand and blue metal sources left in the Sydney basin and are no longer shipped to Glebe for city construction. As a regular traveller on the F3 there has been a dramatic increase of 10 wheel trucks with boggy trailers from Kulnura onto the M2 or Pacific Highway to the North Shore and Palm Beach.

Another factor is over the last two or three years street commuter parking at Pennant Hills has nearly doubled as there are inadequate bus services for young people in the expanding Hills district. Even if there was I doubt they would be used as they have bought or given cars to travel at night and weekends as there are no practical safe alternatives.

Page 16 of SMK's Summary Report Table 3; *'Summary of Environmental Impacts as low for the tunnel and improve most with 'Effect On Air Quality'*. RTA's "expert" advised SKM the tunnel may not have filtration systems on exhaust vents. This infers nearby residents will be subjected to more pollution.

SKM's *'Indicative cost estimates of the preliminary options average'* for the recommended F3 – M2 9K link was \$1.7-2.0 billion whilst the Type C 51K link was \$2.7-3.0 billion. However, as a stand alone link Option C is the total cost whereas the F3-M2 link also required the widening of the F3 to 8 lanes with additional climbing lanes at an estimated cost of \$1 billion.

This requires a second bridge over the Hawkesbury River and necessitates a reduction in speed limits meaning the F3 did not comply with National Highway policy. Greenfield sites are usually more cost effective and quicker to complete. Necessary works at tunnel ends require congested lanes to be closed. That will increase both traffic delays and accidents.

Political implications. For several years there were large meetings of concerned residents from Berowra to Epping. They identified many reasons why an M7-F3 link should be constructed. Some of the reasons are set out in former Hornsby State MP Judy Hopwood's 22 January 2007 attached Media Release.

Judy's concerns were based on concerns for over 2,000 residents who could not be evacuated. Apart from the fire fighters already in Berowra there was no way to save Berowra and many residents except for a wind change that came. As a former chairman of the Sydney Region Bushfire committee whose members were all of the Councils from Broken Bay to the Blue Mountains and Wollondilly Shire Bushfire Brigades I shared Judy's concerns.

The attached 'Disclaimer' page from PriceWaterhouseCoopers 32 page 2012 'Report for the Northern Sydney Regional Organisation of Councils and Gosford City Council' accepts no responsibility for the content of the report and does not allow it to be used for any purpose. Without support evidence the report is meaningless political gobbledygook.

That is an example of a waste of public money to support the F3-M2 link without taking into account the facts. When in opposition the now Premier O'Farrell and several other MPs at a packed Pennant Hills meeting all supported the F3-M7 link for many reasons explained to the meeting by Ken Dobinson who was a former Deputy Director of the RTA. Ken lives in the area and was the DMR's Divisional Engineer for widening Pennant Hills Road to six lanes.

State and Federal governments waste time, money and resources seeking ways to avoid funding works or services unless they will help being re-elected. This is exacerbated by governments creating an environment where they have privatised many services where both the government and community are 'ripped off' by opportunists to make a quick profit as politicians no longer have impartial advisers with practical experience in relevant disciplines.

Option C is now the only practical long term alternative. It is too late to build a tunnel. The SKM and Pearlman reports and experts who contributed to those reports all generally agreed Option C should be in operation about 2021. In reality it should be in operation before 2015.

I realise Transurban is not a construction company and relies on contractors for its projects. I am suggesting Transurban seeks a transparent joint venture with the State and Federal Governments for a tolled F3-M7 connection with competitive tenders.

If further information is required please let me know.


Yours faithfully

Peter Waite OAM JP

02 9484 3471

waitepeter@bigpond.com

CC The Premier, The Hon Barry O'Farrell MP
The Hon Philip Ruddock MP
The Hon Greg Smith SC MP for Epping
Mr Matt Kean MP of Hornsby
Media



Top Ryde City
Shopping Centre

TOP RYDE FOR SALE


Top Ryde City Shopping Centre is for sale and will be placed on the market tomorrow for expressions of interest closing on September 27.

Simon Rooney of Junes Lang LaSalle has been appointed to co-ordinate the formal Expressions of Interest sale campaign.

Top Ryde City was officially opened by Prime Minister Julia Gillard two years ago on the eve of the last federal election.

Simon Rooney who is Australian Head of Retail Investments at Jones Lang LaSalle says the time is now ideal for a new specialist retail owner/manager to reposition and relaunch the centre and present significant value added opportunities.

He says "the opportunity to acquire 100 per cent interest in a virtually brand new major regional shopping centre asset in metropolitan Sydney is a once in a cycle proposition".



Greg Smith SC MP
Member for Epping

M2 to F3 Road Link must have filters

Recent proposals by Transurban, the company which operates the M2 roadway that they build a tunnel linking the M2 to the F3 at Wahroonga have raised new hopes for people living near Pennant Hills Road.

Residents of Carlingford, West Pennant Hills, Pennant Hills, Thornleigh and Normanhurst have been suffering for years from the constant grind of B-Double Trucks and other heavy vehicles as they constantly pound along Pennant Hills Road, filling those in smaller vehicles with fear and harassing nearby residents with noise and fumes. Gridlock is the order of the day and many have been sceptical that any relief is likely.

The proposed tunnel will be the longest ever built in the Southern Hemisphere and the need for filtration of the fumes from the tunnel is more necessary than for shorter tunnels such as the M5 East and the Lane Cove Tunnels.

Experts such as Professor Ray Kearney have warned that unfiltered tunnels are poisoning people <<http://www.dar.csiro.au/pollution/Meander/index.html>> and pointed out the need for efficient filtration to protect motorists in tunnels, as well as residents living in the vicinity of tunnels.

It is important that the community are given iron clad assurances by any future tunnel builders and that government closely monitors such projects.

Any relief given to those suffering from the overburdened Pennant Hills Road is welcome, but it must be a safe and clean project.

If you require assistance on State Government matters please contact my office on 9877 0266
Suite 303, 51 Rawson St Epping
epping@parliament.nsw.gov.au

INSIDE

Weekend
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theform

commercial
real estate

MY CAREER

The Sydney Morning Herald

News Review

City in a jam

Does Barry O'Farrell have the big ideas to move Sydney? **Jacob Saulwick** analyses the draft transport master plan.

If Barry O'Farrell and his ministers had arrived from Mars, never having seen Planet Earth, Australia, or the city of Sydney until March 2011, the transport plan they announced this week might be considered a reasonable first crack at conceptualising the needs of this city and state.

But they did not and it is not. The draft transport master plan, released on Tuesday, was billed as a fresh direction for transport policy in Sydney and NSW over the next 20 years. But the plan offered little detail, and its defining feature was a loose commitment to a number of motorway schemes.

The lack of detail is frustrating and inadequate, and it is also an issue on which the *Herald* has an institutional position. In 2009, fed up with the

inability of the previous administration to chart and stick to an agenda on Sydney's transport needs, the paper commissioned its own inquiry.

The inquiry's resulting plan asked, and tried to resolve, many of the questions the O'Farrell plan either ignores or sidesteps.

These questions still need answering.

WILL THE MOTORWAYS REDUCE CONGESTION?

There are two issues here. Are more motorways in Sydney a good idea? And will they go to the right areas?

More people drive in Sydney than use public transport. Almost 70 per cent of trips in Sydney are by car, and the percentage is higher in the Illawarra and Newcastle. The city needs good roads.

And if the O'Farrell government's

plan is to be believed, there will be a lot more of them built in the next 20 years.

Another M5 tunnel will link the south-west suburbs to the airport, making the M5 East an eight-lane motorway. The M4, which stops at Strathfield, will cut through the inner west to either Camperdown or the Anzac Bridge, and then in a tunnel down to the airport.

In the north, the F3 will be extended under Pennant Hills Road to meet the M2, and the unbuilt F6 will course through the Sutherland Shire and the southern suburbs to meet up with the airport and eventually the CBD.

There might also be new motorways from the M2 at Lane Cove to the M4 extension at Camperdown and down to the east of the airport.

In other words, most of these motor-

ways will ostensibly make it much easier to drive to the centre of Sydney and the busy area around the airport.


"In most major North American cities, as in Europe, the idea of a new radial urban freeway towards the CBD would be met with near-universal ridicule," said one transport planner, who is still working for the government and therefore does not want to be named.

"These freeways simply encourage vehicles to enter the inner city at a rate faster than city streets can absorb that traffic," the planner said.

Where will the cars go once the motorways have deposited them in the inner city? Where will the new M4 traffic go once it gets to Camperdown or the Anzac Bridge? And where will

Continued Page 4

Illustration: Simon Letch



8/9 Sept 2012

8/9 Sept 2012

Sir Humphrey alone would be at ease in this mire

A former senior transport executive once told me that in all his years of government work, the public interest would have been better off if there had been complete transparency about everything the department did.

The bureaucrats would not have liked it.

But nothing would have been lost by having every bit of work, all correspondence and drafts and internal analysis, on the public record for anyone and everyone to look at.

There would be so much information that little scandals and tit-bits of disagreement would be swamped by context. It would not be a scandal, for instance, if one public servant disagreed with a government initiative, because it might also be obvious that I agreed.

And the public interest would benefit by the greater accountability induced by all the exposure.



JACOB SAULWICK

One of the issues that occupies my time as a transport reporter is the crush of buses through the centre of Sydney.

Last year I put in a freedom of information request for a study into how many buses the area around Wynyard could handle.


The request was successful and in January I received a report called the "Wynyard Precinct Bus Network and Street Design Study 2011" by GTA Consultants.

The report included the prediction that the number of buses arriving in the central business district would increase by more than 30 per cent by 2020.

Now that's a story, I thought. Thirty per cent more buses in the city within eight years—that's horrific.

But when I went to the department to check a detail, a spokeswoman said that the report didn't mean to say 2020, as it did throughout. The prediction was really for 2050.

Well that's less of a yarn—that sort of prediction is obviously meaningless—and I didn't



Behind the report are literally tens of millions of dollars in work hours and consultants' reports

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Subject: TRANSURBAN'S OFFER TO BUILD F3 - M2 TUNNEL AT NO COST TO STATE

From: Peter Waite <waitepeter@bigpond.com>

Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2012 09:08:01 +1000

To: Barry O'Farrell <barry@barryofarrell.com>, Duncan Gay <duncan.gay@parliament.nsw.gov.au>, Matthew Kean <hornsby@parliament.nsw.gov.au>, Steve Russell <srussell@hornsby.nsw.gov.au>

BCC: Bill Aitken <news@monthlychronicle.com>

Dear Barry, Duncan, Matt and Steve

Transurban's offer is a poisoned chalice.

I have an application before the Administrative Decisions Tribunal to have NSROC's support for the tunnel overturned.

I have the documents to show SKM was directed by the State and Federal government NOT to recommend the link from the F3 to the M7 at about Riverstone.

I am posting an extract from the SKM report that advises the F3 will have to be widened at great cost from Wahroongah to Kariong.

If the Hawkesbury Bridge cannot be widened to 8 lanes another bridge will be required.

Speed limits will have to be reduced and more accidents will occur and cause increased delays.

The proposal does not comply with the guidelines for a National Highway.

Please do not make a commitment until you have impartial expert advice.

Regards

Peter Waite

28 Warne Street
Pennant Hills 2120
24 September 2012

The Hon Barry O'Farrell MP
27 Redleaf Ave
Wahroonga NSW 2076

Transurban's offer to build F3 – M2 link is a poison chalice

Dear Barry

As promised in today's email enclosed is page 1 of my application to the Administrative Decisions Tribunal to have the Northern Sydney Region Of Councils (then President Nick Berman's) 'decision' to support the F3-M2 tunnel **overturned**.

The extract from the SKM report sets out reasons why the F3 from Wahroonga to Kariong section will need to be made eight lanes with speed limits reduced as it will not meet the national guidelines. I made this clear at the three public meetings held in 2006. As you know at that time several politicians supported the F3-M7 link.

That is why I documented how the Kulnura M7 link could be built at a similar cost using SKM's estimates, and completed with little traffic disruption.


Documents show SKM was directed not to recommend the Kulnura M7 link as it went through a National Park. However all reports indicate a second route is necessary going through or under a National Park and be in operation by 2025. The development of western Sydney indicates this link will now be required by 2020.

Assuming a tunnel is built on the M7 route all dangerous goods trucks will have to continue to use Pennant Hills Road that doesn't comply with the guidelines. If SKM can afford to borrow the funds surely the State and Australian governments could.

Why waste billions on a flawed proposal? Please do not allow the government to make a decision until there has been open and transparent community consultation and reporting this time.

I am copying this to other MPs and Hornsby Mayor Russell to also seek their support or reasons Transurban's tunnel proposal should be approved.

Yours sincerely



Peter Waite 9484 3471

Copy: The Hon Duncan Gay MLC
 The Hon Phillip Ruddock MP
 Mr Matt Kean MP
 Hornsby Council Mayor Steve Russell

11 Oct 2012
Z1

S41 APPLICATION FOR ACCESS UNDER THE
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION (PUBLIC ACCESS) ACT 2009 NO 52

Applicant

Surname

WAITE

Mr

Given Names

PETER ANDREW

(a) AGENCY

**The Hon Duncan Gay MLC
Minister for Roads and Ports
Parliament House
Macquarie Street
SYDNEY NSW 2000**

(d) Postal Address

28 WARNE ST PENNANT HILLS NSW 2120

Phone Number

9484 3471

Details of Application: I request access to documents concerning

Evidence Transurban's offer to build F3 – M2 tunnel at no cost is best option

To assist in making a decision attached is:

- **A brief summary of why I and others believe the F3 – M7 is the best option is currently before the Administrative Decisions Tribunal ADT 123265.**
- **My 24 September 2012 letter to Premier O'Farrell; CC Minister Gay etc**

NB: An ADT Planning Meeting is set down for 18 October. I will be seeking subpoena for Minister Gay or delegate to appear on the basis that this application is not determined or rejected without compelling supporting evidence proving my assessment is flawed.

(c) FEES AND CHARGES \$30

No discount requested \$30 Cheque attached

Applicant's signature

Date: **11 October 2012**

Agency Use Only

Received on...../...../.....

Acknowledgement sent on...../...../.....

21

SECTION 42, additional information:

x Attached is the Sydney Morning Herald 20 July 2010 article by the then Director Sam Haddad explaining the processes undertaken by the Department of Planning after "John Mant's . . . ill informed discussion on these pages last week." x

Without entering into that 'debate' Mr Haddad made it clear the process must be **"The department continues to strengthen its checks and balances to ensure probity and transparency in process and outcomes."** Column 2 par 3.

[REDACTED]

I made another GIPA application. A meaningless 59 page list of 523 documents was sent. My \$30 application fee and \$370 payment for work involved was returned. I applied to the ADT 133265 to have the documents released. I withdrew it because of technical errors I made in my application. Regardless, the issues raised are still valid. The Minister's determination should **"ensure, probity, transparency in outcomes."**

SECTION 42, Public Interest consideration (Council 1976 map attached)

Based on the existing bridges at Edgeworth David Avenue, North Shore rail and Pacific Highway over the F1 I raised concerns with an officer at the Pennant Hills Golf Club community information meeting and was assured *"there were no problems"*.

Pennant Hills office staff provided the ***"Fact sheet – Northern Ventilation Outlet July 2014"***. This ***"Artists impression"*** sheet shows at 1, ***"a maintenance bay"*** next to the eastern lane then crossing to the Pacific Highway lane. Is it part of the EIS?

I raised concerns at the Information Centre on 31 July 2014 because the EIS does not show tunnel entrance and exit "lane designs". On 2 August I returned for other *"Fact sheets"*. Staff volunteered and read out to me an email from RTA's chief project engineer to them that indicated: ***"squeeze problem are still to be overcome"***.

At the Hornsby 'Air quality' meeting I raised the issue of what happens with exhaust fumes in this area when there is gridlock and was advised ***"it has been examined and will not be a problem"***. How could that be, when the ***"squeeze problem"*** had not been identified in the EIS and is still to be overcome"?

Driving north on Sunday at 6.45 am and back again on Monday at 2.20 pm in very light traffic each way I noted the supports for each of the 3 bridges have three substantial concrete walls protected by substantial crash barriers including one between each of the N / S 3 lanes. It appears crash barriers may be needed for all of this section because there is no room for a centre nature strip or breakdown strip.

Whilst I can only guess, I suspect these bridges pose a significant, if not an impossible problem to overcome, especially as there will also have to be provision made for the third north bound lane from the tunnel when the need arises circa 2025.

Three lanes also means if those lanes are at 100% capacity, the 40% from PH Road and Pacific Highway will be able to join the M1 three lanes. Hornsby Shire 1976 Town Planning map I have had since 1980 indicate **where** the Edgeworth David Ave bridge to rail bridge 800m, then 480m to Pacific Highway bridge as the ***'squeeze' will be.***

Peter Waite



The Hon. Duncan Gay MLC

Deputy Leader of Government in the Legislative Council
Minister for Roads and Ports

22

Mr Peter Waite

28 Warne Street

Pennant Hills

NSW 2120

7 November 2012

Invalid government information access application

Dear Mr Waite,

We received your application under the *Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009* (GIPA Act) on 31 October 2012

Your application is invalid because you have not provided enough detail about the information you are seeking.

In your access application, you seek access to "Evidence (that) Transurban's offer to build F3-M2 tunnel at no cost is the best option".

I cannot identify any documents you seek based on the brief description you have provided.

The Government has not come to any conclusions about the proposal from Transurban, as it is still being assessed.

I apologise not having informed you in 5 working days of receiving your application.

Not having responded within the five working days, I have arranged for your \$30 application fee to be refunded.


Your refund is being processed and will be forwarded to you in coming days.

Rights of review

If you do not agree that your application is invalid, you may seek a review of this decision. Your review rights are summarised in the *enclosed* leaflet. You have 20 working days from the date of this letter to apply for an internal review, or 40 working days to apply for an external review.

If you do not wish to seek a review or amend your application, you are entitled to a refund of the application fee.

If you have any questions I can be contacted on 9228 5271 or you could call and I could assist you in making your application valid.





The Hon. Duncan Gay MLC

Deputy Leader of Government in the Legislative Council
Minister for Roads and Ports

23

14 November 2012

Mr Peter Waite
28 Warne Street
Pennant Hills
NSW 2120

Dear Mr Waite,


Thank you for your letter received by this office 14 November 2012.

Under section 82 (2) of the GIPA Act, an internal review is not available if the decision is made by an agency, being the Minister.

I note you also have lodged a review under section 89 of the GIPA Act with the Information Commissioner.

The refund of your \$30 application fee still is being processed and will be mailed to you in coming days.

Yours sincerely





The Hon. Duncan Gay MLC
Deputy Leader of Government in the Legislative Council
Minister for Roads and Ports

24

22 November 2012

Mr Peter Waite

28 Wame Street

Pennant Hills

NSW 2120

Dear Mr Waite,

Thank you for your letter received by this office on 20-11-12 in relation to your GIPA application.


You ask that your application process restart as you believe the Act had not been complied with, as you should have been directed under S 52 Agency to assist with invalid applications.

In my 7 November letter to you, I suggested you could call and I could assist you to make your application valid.

I note you have lodged a review of the original decision with the Information Commissioner.

The refund of your \$30 application fee is enclosed.

Yours sincerely



2012

25

Subject: GIPA application

From: Peter Waite <waitepeter@bigpond.com>

Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2012 17:04:33 +1100

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[[Thank you for your 22 November 2012 letter and refund cheque received on 27 November. For some reason our mail delivery in recent weeks has been very erratic.

I will be working at Laguna next Sunday and Monday.

On Tuesday I have an appointment at the request of the Projects Manager Dave Coker in charge of the proposed Freight Rail Line project for goods trains from Cheltenham to Pennant Hills. I understand he wants me to elaborate on my suggestions to overcome some technical problems that may assist in reducing community opposition and also the cost.

I should be able to ring you as suggested on Wednesday next week.

Regards

Peter Waite 9484 3471

26

28 Warne Street
Pennant Hills NSW 2120
6 December 2012

[REDACTED]

- **Transurban's offer to build the F3-M2 tunnel at discounted cost to the State in return for a \$10 toll**

Dear [REDACTED]

Thank you for agreeing to meet with me at the Governor Macquarie Tower on Thursday 13 December at 10am. I will bring DOTARS two meaningless maps intended to be used at the Pearlman 2007 review of the SKM report and a copy of mine that was used instead. [REDACTED]

Transurban wanted the M2 connection shifted to increase its toll revenue to the detriment of the National Highway objectives and wider community interest.

Enclosed is my updated paper with support papers for your advanced information about my concerns. I have hi-lighted the critical points of community concerns.

Included is a copy of my 6 December letter to Mr John Anderson member for Bennelong as a result of our brief discussion yesterday.

If you require further information for our meeting please let me know.

Regards

Peter 9484 3471 waitepeter@bigpond.com

Copy: Mr J Alexander member for Bennelong

**Transurban's offer to build the F3-M2 tunnel at discounted cost to
the State in return for a \$10 toll**

INTRODUCTION: What would Sydney be like if governments hadn't supported Bradfield's Harbor Bridge and rail network proposals? This project should have continued to be progressively expanded after WW2 to make way for future development instead of costly retrofits like the proposed tunnel under Pennant Hills Road for a short term solution.

The '*Terms of Reference*' and Sinclair Knight Mertz's (SKM) July 2003 '*Background Report*' sought '*A new National Highway*'. SKM made it clear they were directed not to comply with the '*Terms of Reference*'. Also, the tunnels and widened F3 would not meet National Highway guidelines.

The determining issue is why build expensive tunnels to link the M2 and F3 that will become gridlocked because the F3 must be reduced to two lanes at work sites to build the required fourth lane from Wahroonga to Kariong as set out in the SKM report?

SUMMARY: The State is committed to the North West rail (NW rail) link to overcome decades of neglect to provide services to the NW Sector. The Terms of Reference for what became SKM's 2004 report did not take into account the NW rail link. It may reduce pressure on the M2 and Pennant Hills Road but will have little affect on the F3.

During the consultative process it was admitted the RTA traffic statistics were out of date and did not address the NW sector growth demands. Living near Pennant Hills Road daily visual observance of traffic volumes already exceed SKM's projected annual increases.

It doesn't make sense to build the tunnel and widen the F3 to 8 plus lanes when a new four and preferably six lane route F3-M7 should be operating within seven to 10 years.

Based on SKM's 2004 estimates the second Hawkesbury crossing would cut about 20ks off a trip from the M7 to Kulnura. As the route is more direct and level it would also save fuel and nearly an hour for a return trip. The incalculable strategic importance of having a second route in the case of bushfires or accidents that cause delays on the F3 must be considered.

CONCLUSION: Unless it can be shown that a subsequent study has been carried out that proves the SKM report and this submission are both flawed, Transurban's offer should be immediately rejected in favor of the F3-M7 option 'C'.

SUBMISSION: 'Terms of Reference': This is now a \$7 billion project. SKM's papers prove its 2004 report was compromised when it was directed not to recommend the western option by the State and Australian Governments. **1**

SKM's 17 route options were prepared in accordance with the Terms of Reference. They were then classified into 3 groups A, B, and C. The west option C had 10 alternatives. **3**

SKM's July 2003 'Background Report, The need for 'A new National Highway route linking the F3 to the **Sydney Orbital would serve . . . northern New South Wales as well as destinations to the south.**' - **Alleviate poor travelling conditions on the interim National Highway and surrounding network.**' Option A does not comply with the Terms of Reference or conform to the stated objectives. **4**

SKM's 28 August 2003 Dural Community Consultative meeting notes on pages 1, 2 and 3 show how SKM was directed not to comply with the Terms of Reference. I suspected this had happened and discussed this with SKM's manager days before the meeting. **5**

Community consultation: Page i refers to Focus Group meetings in July 2002: '*Four feasible Type A route options were placed on display for 10 weeks from July to October 2003. Page ii and iii sets out discussion points. Page i then states 'In April 2002, SKM was commissioned by the RTA on behalf of DOTARS to undertake a feasibility study for a National Highway link between the Newcastle Freeway F3 to the Sydney Orbital. The new route would replace the interim National Highway link that utilizes Pennant Hills Rd between the M2 and F3. **The route would link the F3 with the Sydney Orbital, to form a continuous motorway standard National Highway through Sydney.** — . . . The program was designed and managed to afford the broader community the opportunity to make a demonstratable input to the process, and to ensure that the requirements of the community were adequately and appropriately managed and addressed.'* Whilst SKM tried to do this one or more persons prevented it. Pages 10 & 11 also details concerns **6**

Page 2 of the Dural Consultative meeting notes 'Need for change in attitude by government': '*— JB commented that this is a transport study and the RTA/DoTARS cannot dictate policy to DIPNR. If the projects proceeds to the EIS stage it will need approval from DIPNR. DIPNR would be involved at the beginning in establishing requirements for an EIS, and towards the end of the determination phase . . .*' Page 3: SKM placed on record the meeting's frustration that SKM had been instructed to only recommend Option A. Whilst not recorded it was made very clear that the direction had come from the Premier's office. **5**

December 2003: SKM's *Traffic & Transportation report WP No 4: 15.4 Type C corridor* examines issues such as rail changes that may affect commuters and freight if implemented ***within 10 years from now***. That is by 2013 7

SKM's s extracts explain why the F3 from Wahroonga to Kariong would need to be widened to 8 lanes plus climbing lanes. These would cause more accidents, and speed limits to be reduced if the tunnel was built. It would include widening the Hawkesbury and Mooney Mooney bridges if possible, or two new bridges. 8

At the Pearlman hearing on 18 June 2007 AustRoads M/s Riggs correctly repudiated my claims the Terms of Reference were altered. ^{Last attachment page} What I should have said to M/s Pearlman was SKM was directed not to comply with the Terms of Reference. 10

The Hon Mahla Pearlman AO's 2007 findings '*revalidated*' SKM's tunnel recommendation. I attended the three day hearing. Her report recommended at 3. b. '*a Type C corridor be planned now*'. As far as I know nothing has been done 10

Knowing Hornsby council did not attend the 2007 Pearlman hearing to revalidate SKM's June 2004 final report I submitted a GIPA application to NSROC and Hornsby Council for the papers. NSROC's executive officer and Chair Cr Berman did not reply.

Hornsby Council released everything NSROC sent the Council. Also NSROC does not appear to be a legal entity to make decisions for member councils. Based on SKM's advice '*It may be necessary to read sections from other reports, records and working papers listed below to gain a more complete understanding of the information being reported in this main report*' I doubt few have read or understand SKM's detailed 5,000 page report. **How then can politicians, councilors, lawyers and advisers make informed decisions?** 9

Circa June 2012 The Northern Sydney Regions of Council's president Hornsby Mayor Berman released a glossy 16 page A4 booklet promoting the F3-M2 tunnel. There was a 30 page report prepared by PriceWaterhouse Coopers dated April 2012 supporting the proposal. This paper has a '*Disclaimer*' denying any responsibility for the reports content advising NSROC be contacted for details. 11

Transurban has not replied to my 8 August 2012 letter about my concerns. 12

My September 2012 papers for the ADT and 18 October 2012 paper were not considered. They reiterate how the Terms of Reference for the SKM report were circumvented at 'VM Workshop No 2 record' p 22 and 23: *'Following lengthy discussion, the instruction from DOTARS was that the Australian Government felt' (who made that decision?) 'that the examination of longer term options was outside the scope of the Study and the issue should be addressed in another forum . . . '* Not mentioned is the necessity to widening the F3 to eight lanes from Wahroonga to Somersby. **2**

Some RTA traffic counts used by SKM, were estimates and assumptions that were inaccurate and out of date. Also well documented in other reports such as the Auditor General are traffic projections for the Cross City Tunnel were exaggerated to encourage builders to submit attractive proposals that would give them a substantial return on their investments. Both operators failed as did the Brisbane tunnel highly promoted 'cash cow' where many lost their retirement funds and homes because they could not repay their loans.

SKM suggested the second crossing would be needed by 2025. Even if the tunnel could be quickly built and in operation by 2016 the second crossing is now needed before 2020. 'Experts' at two workshops conducted by SKM raised these issues. **2**

Also relevant is the third freight train line I believe will soon be built from Epping to Thornleigh. This is to hold freight trains to allow passenger trains to run on time and increase the number of freight trains. The State and Federal Governments should also take into account the impact of Hunter coal trains going to the Port Kembla loader and return. When the intermodal freight yard/s are built near Holdsworthy, there will be more freight trains on this line. Assumptions about this are a given and should not be overturned unless there are logical and compelling reasons. Page A5 of SKM's Appendix A F3 Widening document sets out assumptions for rail works to be completed as the basis for their calculations. They are also in WP4 p126 **7**

On 14 September 2012 Minister Lloyd's Media Release concludes *'I have also asked (NSW Roads Minister) Roozendaal for an update on planning of the Option C corridor, which the NSW committed to undertake in its Sydney Metropolitan Strategy released in 2005.'* **11**

6 December 2012 Peter Waite 9484 3471

waitepeter@bigpond.com

SUPPORT DOCUMENT LIST OF EXTRACTS SUPPLIED

1.	2001 4 Jan	TERMS OF REFERENCE – Route for National Highway through northern Sydney	3 pages
2.	2002 Sept	Value Management Workshop No 2 Record	8 pages
3.	2002 October	SKM Options development estimates for A, B and C routes	1 page
4.	2003 July	SKM BACKGROUND REPORT	3 pages
5.	2003 28 Aug	Dural Focus Meeting Notes	3 pages
6.	2003 December	Working Paper 1 Community Consultation	7 pages
7.	2003 December	Working Paper No 4 Traffic and Transportation estimates	1 page
8.	2004 March	Working paper Engineering and Design pages A-1 & A-15 sets out many options including the F3-M7	2 pages
9.	2004 April	Main Report listing all SKM papers	1 page
10.	2007 13 April	Review of F3 M7 Corridor Selection Submission Guidelines and The Hon Marla Pearlman's findings	10 pages
11.	2012 April	PriceWaterhouse Cooper Disclaimer for responsibility for its report	1 page
12.	2007 14 Sept	Hon Jim Lloyd MP's media release	1 page
13.	2012 8 Aug	Waite letter to Transurban explaining problems. No reply	2 pages

28 Warne Street
Pennant Hills NSW 2120
2 April 2013

27

The Hon Duncan Gay MLC
Minister for Roads and Ports
Level 32 Governor Macquarie Tower
1 Farrer Place
SYDNEY NSW 2000

- **Northern Sydney Region Of Council's (NSROC) support for F3-M2 tunnel and Transurban's unsolicited offer to build the tunnel**

Dear Minister

On 11 October 2012 I submitted a GIPA application for *'Evidence Transurban's offer to build F3 – M2 tunnel at no cost is best option'*.

I then met with your [REDACTED] on 13 December 2012 and provided evidence that showed NSROC's support for the tunnel offer is based on flawed assumptions.

I was impressed when [REDACTED] advised he would arrange for Transurban to review my submission and advise the independent committee why the proposed tunnel is the best option when all factors are taken into account.

The Sinclair Knight Mertz (SKM) April 2004 study. Page 1 of SKM's Main Report Foreword states *'This is a summary report on a study to identify a preferred option for a new National Highway link through northern Sydney between the F3 Sydney to Newcastle Freeway and the Sydney Orbital'*. The last page 20.3 Capacity Issues *". . . . There will be a need to increase the capacity of the F3 over some sections south of the Hawkesbury River crossing by **2012** (Completed). Further capacity enhancements and/or traffic demand management measures impacting on the F3 **Freeway** are likely to be required beyond the timeframe of this study (2012)'*.

My earlier submissions included evidence that SKM was advised by the Federal Government's opinion was that the Terms of Reference did not include the western option. Who made this decision? It should also be established who made the State decision that the western option should not be recommended partway through the process?

Enclosed is evidence I believe proves beyond reasonable doubt that the support by eight councils and several State and Federal politicians for the tunnel is based on a flawed proposal submitted to NSROC by its then president Hornsby Mayor Nick Berman. I believe this was for political purposes.

Under informal and formal GIPA applications, NSROC, Hornsby, Gosford, Ku-ring-gai, Lane Cove and Ryde have determined they do not hold any technical evidence to support NSROC's proposal. This leaves Hunters Hill, North Sydney and Willoughby to respond.

At 16 in my comments about the PWC report I concluded: *'In my opinion the final par indicates that Transurban had discussions with Hornsby Mayor Nick Berman in late 2010 or early 2011 to recommend to NSROC and adjoining councils and MPs to prepare a study to promote building the M2 – F3 tunnel. The April 2012 NSROC publication released in May 2012 was followed by The Hon Duncan Gay's and Transurban's media releases about Transurban's 'unsolicited proposal'.*

Based on this I submit that you should advise the Premier and Cabinet it appears:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3. Planning immediately commences for the Western option, and
4. The Federal Government's commitment be requested for the immediate allocation of funds for the National Highway to be completed by 2021.

Please advise if clarification or additional information is required.

Kind regards

Peter Waite 9484 3471 waitepeter@bigpond.com

Support documents or extracts

1. 2010/11 NSROC Regional State of the Environment Report page 5 item 7:
M2/F3 Interconnector- Proposal for NSROC Financial Report. At the Sept 2011 Board Meeting the NSROC President (Berman Hornsby Council) tabled a proposal for a consolidated report on the research on the potential F3-M2 Road link. Proposal referred to the GMAC for further consideration.
2. 2011 NSROC meeting 9 F3-M2 PROPOSAL Support and agree to take report to
8 Sept NSROC. R Ball to advise non NSROC contributors.
3. 2011 GM advisory committee welcomed Hornsby Council's new GM Scott
6 Oct Phillips to commence on 18 October 2011.
4. 2011 6 M2/F3 connector Agreed NSROC members support and provide
10 Nov funding. NSROC \$7,000
5. 2011 11. F3/M2 Consolidation Report. Approx \$30,000 required. Further
8 Dec details to be provided at GMAC 5 December meeting. Record not included in GIPA determination.
6. 2012 GMAC meeting. 6 F3-M2 Consolidation Report (Attachment B-TBP) not
2 Feb released under GIPA appn. Further information from Lin Fox to be received.

It is anticipated that this report will be combined with the NSROC Regional Priorities document will be the key formal documents for input for the NSW Long Term Transport Masterplanning consultation which is ongoing in 2012.

7. 2012 Board Meeting 10.2 NSW Transport Masterplan Consultation and M2/F3
9 Feb Interconnector Research Paper. At 10 Nov 2011 Board meeting, the Board agreed to prepare a research paper on the feasibility of the M2-F3 Interconnector link. . . . currently being draft and anticipated to be completed in March 2012. . . . it will be considered by GMAC for out of session endorsement.
8. 2012 P10 NSROC Submission-NSW Long Term Masterplan Discussion Paper.
April Completion of M2-F3 link into the Sydney Orbital. . . . A consequential initiative . . . is the need to plan for a second Hawkesbury River crossing, which should be targeted as a regional priority for the Central Coast and NW Sydney concurrently with the construction of the F3 M2 link.

P14 Freight Transport – NSROC argues that the key freight infrastructure missing in Sydney is the construction of the F3-M2 Link, which when built, will complete the National Freight Route.

This issue is of such concern to our region that we have developed a separate paper and commissioned research to articulate the benefits of this project in the NSROC report "Missing Link and Missing Out- Prioritising Sydney's F3-M2 Motorway Connector", attached separately.


In short, the F3-M2 Connector is the only section of the National Road Network through Sydney that is not of motorway standard. All governments have recognized the need to provide this infrastructure from national, state and local perspectives to ensure freight, business and individual transport functionality.

PricewaterhouseCooper April 2012 Supporting research

9. Page i This is an outline of how NSROC operates and member councils
10. Page i **DISCLAIMER** PWC does not accept any responsibility for their report.
again Instead it refers readers to NSROC and member councils.
11. P4 Introduction and overview relies on NRMA reports.
12. P6 - 7 Refers to the history and outcomes of the SKM 2004 report and 2006 Pearlman 2006 review of the SKM report.
13. P9 – 18 **Impact of the missing link** refers to government, NRMA and other references probably found by Google or similar.
14. P19–28 **Why the F3-M2 Connector?** 3.2 *Alternative routes previously considered* P 21 advises why options B and C (western) were rejected by SKM. Nowhere does the PWC report explain why SKM was directed not to recommend the second Hawkesbury crossing options 'C'.
15. P 27 Bullet point 3 refers to ' . . . the possible intent to reserve a Type C corridor for long term future demand . . . ' Both the SKM and Pearlman reports recommended planning for an Option C corridor should immediately commence. It is obvious PWC, NSROC, member councils and other councils had not read the entire SKM and Pearlman reports and recommendations.
16. P29-31 **4 Next Steps 4.1 Provide a strategic planning context.** PWC correctly reports about the many reports and failures of successive State and national infrastructure priorities.

4.2 Update and complete supporting analysis reports there have been a number of studies of preferred routes and cost benefit analysis undertaken. As is usual with many reports recommendations are made that others do not properly consider.

4.3 Investigate funding options makes several suggestions and concludes nothing will happen until funding sources are identified and committed.



24 June 2013

28

GOVERNMENT INFORMATION PUBLIC ACCESS APPLICATION to

Division of Premier and Cabinet
Governor Macquarie Tower
1 Farrer Place, SYDNEY NSW 2000

Date: 24 June 2013

Applicant: Peter Andrew WAITE,
28 Warne Street
Pennant Hills NSW 2120

Phone: 9484 3471 Email: waitepeter@bigpond.com

Payment \$30

Noting in 2004 SKM and the Pearlman Review in 2007 both recommended a Western Option is built to link the F3 with the Sydney Orbital to complete the National Highway to link Melbourne and Brisbane;

In the public interest I seek all documents relating to the 'unsolicited proposals unit' of the Division of Premier and Cabinet relating to the proposal by Transurban to build and F3-M2 link including all documents whether it be briefing notes, reports or emails.

On 13 December 2012 I met with Minister Gay's adviser [REDACTED] who agreed to have Transurban address my concerns in it submission to the independent assessment committee.

In accordance with the GIPA Act please advise with the receipt for \$30 that this application has been received and make a determination within 20 working days.

Peter Waite



Premier & Cabinet

29

Our ref: DPC13/05690
2013-251249

26 JUN 2013

Mr Peter Waite
28 Warne Street
PENNANT HILLS NSW 2120

Dear Mr Waite

Application for access to government information

I refer to your application made under the *Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009* (the GIPA Act) to the Department of Premier and Cabinet dated 24 June 2013 requesting access to:

"all documents relating to the 'unsolicited proposals unit' of the Division of Premier and Cabinet relating to the proposal by Transurban to build and F3-M2 link including all documents whether it be briefing notes, reports or emails".

Your application was received by the Department on 25 June 2013. It is a valid application under the GIPA Act and must be decided within 20 working days of receipt, by 23 July 2013 (subject to any suspension or extension of the time for deciding the application).

If your application is not decided by that date, it is taken by the GIPA Act to have been refused. If this occurs, you are entitled to a refund of your application fee and you may seek a review of this refusal (see enclosed fact sheet).

A receipt for the \$30 application fee is enclosed.

Processing charges

There may be charges for processing your application. The application fee you have paid will count towards these charges. We will provide you with an estimate of any charges at the earliest opportunity.

We may ask that you pay an advance deposit of up to 50 per cent of these costs. You also have the right to seek a review of our decision about processing charges (see enclosed fact sheet).

Inclusion of details in disclosure log

The government information you are seeking may be of interest to other members of the public. If this is the case and you are granted access to the information requested, the GIPA Act requires us to record the following details about your access application in our "disclosure log":

- the date on which your access application is decided,
- a general description of the government information released,
- whether any of that information is available to other members of the public, and
- if the information is available, how it can be accessed.

This disclosure log is on the Department's website at:

http://www.dpc.nsw.gov.au/prem/accessing_dpc_information/dpc_disclosure_log


You have a right to object to these details being included in our disclosure log in certain circumstances. For example, you might object if the government information you seek contains your own personal information or concerns your business, commercial, professional or financial interests. However, even if you do object, we may still decide to include details about your access application in our disclosure log.

You can ask for this decision to be reviewed. Your review rights are summarised in the enclosed fact sheet.

Inquiries

The Department's Office of General Counsel will contact you if any matters relating to your application require further clarification or discussion. Please contact Melissa Watt, Senior Project Officer, Information Access Unit, Office of General Counsel, on telephone (02) 9228 3671 if you have any questions in relation to your application.

Yours sincerely



Rachel McCallum
Deputy General Counsel

Public inquiries are not what they used to be, but we still need them

The great reforms of the 1980s were driven by public inquiries. The present crop needs the right subject, the right timing and the right people.



Gary Banks

Australia has experienced an unprecedented number of public inquiries in recent years, encompassing many important areas of public policy.

Early in the (first) Rudd administration, policy reviews were simultaneously under way for higher education, the health system, taxation, climate change, innovation, automotive assistance, consumer policy, paid parental leave and drought assistance.

Many have taken place since then. Inquiries into industrial relations and the funding of schools and disability services are notable recent examples. Moreover, a range of others are in prospect under a Coalition government.

Public inquiries can make an important contribution to public policy.

Indeed, the big economic reforms during the reform era of the 1980s and 1990s were all founded on them (for example, the Asprey tax inquiry, Campbell finance sector inquiry and Hilmer competition review, to name just three).

They provide a means of marshalling expertise on specific issues. They are also a vehicle for the seeking of views and public testing of policy ideas without directly implicating government.

They are thus an important potential source of political learning about what to do and how to get it done. In these respects they can compensate for capability gaps in public administration (gaps that have been increasing in my view).

Public inquiries can be especially useful to an incoming government, providing it with authority to change policies put in place by its predecessor.

Despite these in-principle advantages, a number of the recent inquiries appear not to have borne fruit.

Instead of underpinning policy success, in the dual sense of resulting in policies that do good and are widely accepted, there has arguably never been a time when there has been so much dispute and division about so many important public policy issues.

Why has the slew of public inquiries in recent years not matched the record of the earlier era?

The answer, to borrow from an advertising slogan, is that "inquiries ain't inquiries". How they are constituted and framed can vary greatly, as can the way

There has arguably never been a time when there is so much dispute about so many public policy issues.

governments handle them. Experience is instructive about the "success factors".

The most basic is selecting the right topics. Public inquiries lend themselves to policy issues that are complex and contentious, having the potential to both shine light and reduce heat.

But if they are to realise this potential and meet public expectations, they need to be given enough scope. For example, the exclusion of the GST from what was billed as a "root and branch" review of the tax system compromised it before it got started. While the post-implementation review of the Fair Work Act had no formal exclusions, its terms of reference focused on legal implementation rather than

economic impacts. Both times, chances to push reforms were missed.

Timing is also important. As the old saying goes, the right thing at the wrong time is the wrong thing. For example, a review of the "anti-dumping system" originally slated for 1998 was finally sent to the Productivity Commission in 2010, when a rising dollar was placing considerable competitive pressure on many manufacturers.

The predictable outcome was rejection by government of an important public interest reform and the introduction of more protectionist elements into the regime, with the Opposition urging an even harder line. Right topic, wrong timing.

It is generally also better if an inquiry reports early in a government's term, giving it clear air for implementation. Too late in the electoral cycle and even the best report becomes a political football. This led the commission on occasion to delay a draft report. Its review of the National Competition Policy in 2004 is one instance. The ambitious reform agenda it proposed was far better received for appearing just after the election than just before.

The contribution of an inquiry often comes down to having the right people in the right setting. Competence without conflicts is the minimum requirement for such a role. But integrity and openness of mind are obviously important too.

Public controversy around appointments, such as occurred for the Bracks auto inquiry and McCallum review of the Fair Work Act, can make it hard for an inquiry to gain traction.

Arguably, the more independent the governance of an inquiry and the more rigorous and transparent its processes, the

less reliance need be placed on the qualities of those heading it. Being at arm's length from the policy department, with a hand-picked secretariat, is ideal for "big" policy topics, although departmental secretariats have sometimes also worked well.

However, the recent trend of departmental heads being appointed to chair reviews alongside external appointees is not good practice. While gaining competence, perceived conflicts arise, weakening public credibility. This approach also deprives a government of "deniability" and makes it hard to release preliminary findings for scrutiny and thus avoid unintended consequences. The Henry tax review illustrates the problems.

Even when all the right boxes have been ticked, a successful outcome is not assured. How the commissioning government chooses to handle an inquiry report, and how skilfully it does so, will often be the deciding factor.

This occurs in a political realm where negotiations inevitably come into play. The real risk is of deals that get political acceptance at the cost of undermining the policy itself. Gambling and carbon are two important examples.

In sum, inquiries have much to offer public policy, but can be challenging to get right. However recent examples of policy-making in "sensitive" areas, like the 457 visa episode, have led me to the view that even a poor inquiry may sometimes be better than the alternative.

Gary Banks is dean of the Australia and New Zealand School of Government. He gave the inaugural Peter Karmel Lecture in Canberra last night at the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia.

PW

4/7/13

4/7/2013

docs/s

30

Roads are high on the agenda for motorists. Open Road invited Prime Minister Julia Gillard and Leader of the Opposition Tony Abbott to outline their infrastructure policies so that our Members are better informed on polling day



JULY AUGUST 2013 Page 13

HON TONY ABBOTT MHR, LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION COALITION

THE NRMA IS CORRECT to decry the state of our nation's roads.

At this election, people should indeed demand better roads – so the premise of the NRMA's election pitch is exactly right.

After five years of inertia and broken promises from Federal Labor, the Coalition has made a series of affordable and deliverable commitments to major road projects across Australia.

In particular, the Coalition is fully committed to three big projects in NSW that are on the NRMA's priority list, namely:

- WestConnex
- The F3 to M2 missing link
- The Pacific Highway duplication from Newcastle to the Queensland border.

This is how a Coalition government will make these projects happen:

WESTCONNEX

A Coalition government will provide \$1.5 billion to WestConnex. This commitment will enable the project to proceed in conjunction with the private sector.

WestConnex will significantly improve traffic flows on the M4 and M5 and will mean faster travel times between western Sydney and the city. It will also mean safer roads.

Unlike the current Federal Government, we will keep our word. Labor had set aside \$300 million for planning the M4 East, for example, but in 2011-12 diverted \$270 million of this money elsewhere.

More recently, Federal Labor has offered NSW \$1.8 billion

(almost all of which is to be given after 2018), but only if NSW agrees to about \$6 billion in conditions!

There are no conditions on our funding commitment, other than that the job gets done.

Should the Coalition win the election, Premier O'Farrell and I will work together to get this project going within 12 months of the next federal election.

F3 TO M2 MISSING LINK

The missing F3 to M2 link has been talked about for decades. We will get this project built.

By building this link we can reduce the freight costs for all the trucks that use this important national road corridor.

The project is supported by Infrastructure Australia. It will involve a tunnel from the southern end of the F3 at Wahroonga to the M2 Motorway at Pennant Hills Road. It will involve improvements to the M2 Motorway between Pennant Hills Road and the North Rocks Road intersection.

We aim to have the F3 to M2 link started by late 2014, pending

the finalisation of commercial agreements between the private sector and NSW.

DUPLICATION OF THE PACIFIC HIGHWAY

Late in 2012, I drove a truck from Brisbane to Wyong to see firsthand the actual state of the Pacific Highway.

Too much of the highway is still a goat track from the 1970s. NRMA Members have named it "the worst road in NSW" with one road death, on average, every two weeks.

That is why a future Coalition government will complete the duplication of the Pacific Highway from Newcastle to the Queensland border and restore the 80:20 funding partnership with the NSW government.

With freight expected to treble on the eastern seaboard by 2030, the poor state of the highway is impacting national productivity. Infrastructure Australia has estimated that for every dollar spent on the upgrade there will be \$1.50 in economic benefits.

Our \$5.6 billion commitment includes \$3.56 billion held up by the Gillard government's dispute with the NSW government and \$2.08 billion provided from funding redirected from a Sydney rail project that isn't on the NSW government's priority list.

We will make sure the Pacific Highway is finished by the end of the decade.

My message to NRMA members is that these projects will finally get done. There will be no broken promises, no fine print and no excuses. A Coalition government will make them happen.

RIPE FOR ACTION:

Tony Abbott in December 2012, taking his fruit truck to the Pacific Highway to see what state it was in.



INTERNAL REVIEW

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GOVERNMENT INFORMATION PUBLIC ACCESS APPLICATION DPC13/05690
2013-251249

Division of Premier and Cabinet
Governor Macquarie Tower
1 Farrer Place, SYDNEY NSW 2000

Date: 6 August 2013: Ten working days after due date

Applicant: Peter Andrew WAITE,
28 Warne Street
Pennant Hills NSW 2120

Phone: 9484 3471 Email: waitepeter@bigpond.com

Payment \$ nil. No notification received to justify a delayed decision

Peter Waite



Premier & Cabinet

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Our ref: DPC13/05690
2013-251249

Mr Peter Waite
28 Warne Street
PENNANT HILLS NSW 2120

- 8 AUG 2013

Dear Mr Waite

Application for access to government information

I refer to your application made under the *Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009* (the GIPA Act) to the Department of Premier and Cabinet dated 24 June 2013 and received on 25 June 2013 requesting access to:

"all documents relating to the 'unsolicited proposals unit' of the Division of Premier and Cabinet relating to the proposal by Transurban to build an F3-M2 link including all documents whether it be briefing notes, reports or emails".

Refund of application fee and processing charges

I confirm your letter dated 23 July 2013 enclosing your cheque in the sum of \$370 was received by the Department on 25 July 2013.

A receipt for the advance deposit of \$370.00 is enclosed.

Your application was originally due to be decided within 20 working days of receipt by 23 July 2013 but the decision period for your application was suspended on 17 July 2013 pending receipt of the requested advance deposit. As this was received on 25 July 2013, the decision period was reactivated and your application was due to be decided by Wednesday, 31 July 2013.

Your application has not been decided within time. In accordance with section 63(1) and (4) of the GIPA Act the Department is deemed to have decided to refuse to deal with your application and I am refunding your advance deposit and your application fee. Your refund will be forwarded separately.

Late decision

The Department intends to continue to deal with your application and make a late decision on the application. I note it was estimated the total time for completing processing of your application was 30 hours. Once searches are completed the Department will advise you if this time estimate should be revised.

I anticipate being in a position to decide your application by **Thursday, 22 August 2013** but the Department will keep you informed should that date need to be revised.

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Scope of your application

I note you have declined to narrow the scope of your application by excluding emails at this stage. However you have attempted to narrow your application by identifying the specific issue you are interested in:

"has there been any fraud, negligence, incompetence, favouritism or other issue/s that has lead to endorsement of a proposal to build a tunnel that will create major traffic delays during construction, and will not resolve the problems when complete, because the Pacific Highway from Wahroonga to Kariong will not have the capacity to carry the projected traffic increase without being widened."

The Department will therefore conduct searches for government information held by the Department as specified in your original application concerning the specific issue you have now identified.

However in your letter dated 23 July 2013 you also refer to items 1 to 12 under the subtitle 'Revised Application.' These items appear to relate to a separate access application you have made previously in November 2012 to the Office of the Hon. Duncan Gay MLC which is a separate agency to the Department. Therefore the Department has had no involvement in processing your previous application and therefore items 1 to 12 are not considered relevant to your application dated 24 June 2013 currently being processed by the Department.

Rights of review

A deemed decision to refuse to deal with your application is reviewable under Part 5 of the GIPA Act but please note the Department is intending to make a late decision. Your review rights summarised in the enclosed brochure commenced on 31 July 2013 but the review period is extended to the end of the review period for the last of any reviewable decisions. I.e. from notification of the late decision date, you will have 20 working days to apply for an internal review, or 40 working days to apply for an external review.

Inquiries

Please mark any correspondence to the Department concerning your application for the attention of the Information Access Unit. Please contact Ms Melissa Watt, Senior Project Officer, Information Access Unit, Office of General Counsel, on telephone (02) 9228 3671 or via email GIPA@dpc.nsw.gov.au if you have any questions in relation to your application.

Yours sincerely



Karen Smith
Deputy General Counsel

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Subject: RE: INTERNAL REVIEW

From: Email Acknowledgment <do_not_reply_here@minister.nsw.gov.au>

Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 23:18:29 +0000

To: Peter Waite <waitepeter@bigpond.com>

Thank you for your email to the office of the Hon. Duncan Gay MLC, Minister for Roads and Ports.

Please be assured that your email will receive all necessary attention.

Kind Regards

Office of the Minister for Roads and Ports.

The Hon. Duncan Gay MLC

Level 35, Governor Macquarie Tower

1 Farrer Pl, SYDNEY NSW 2000

Email: office@gay.minister.nsw.gov.au NSW

Tel: 02 9228 5271

This message is intended for the addressee named and may contain confidential information. If you are not the intended recipient, please delete it and notify the sender. Views expressed in this message are those of the individual sender, and are not necessarily those of the office of the Minister.

From: Peter Waite [mailto:waitepeter@bigpond.com]

Sent: Tuesday, 13 August 2013 9:16 AM

To: GIPA@dpc.nsw.gov.au; Public Gay's Office_Email

Subject: INTERNAL REVIEW

WITHOUT PREJUDICE

ATTENTION

M/s Melissa Watt, Senior Project Officer, Information Unit, Office of General Counsel

RE: My 6 August INTERNAL REVIEW GIPA DPC13/05690

Dear M/s Watt,

Yesterday I received the NSW Premier and Cabinet's 8 August 2013 advice this application would be processed as a **late decision**.

Noting the circumstances of my application where I advised the Minister in late 2012 and early 2013 I would make a GIPA application for this information if it wasn't provided, Section 63 (2) of the Act does not appear to allow an agency an unfettered right to assume it may make a **late decision** without my consent.

However, if I am satisfied the DCP provides the Information requested within 15 working days, the time for an 'Internal Review', I will not exercise my right of appeal to the Administrative Decisions Tribunal.

The Deputy General Council's 8 August 2013 advice referred to my 23 July 2013 letter did not make any

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reference to the extract where I had stated:

REVISED APPLICATION

Item 1: I will delete this item as I know it was Mr John Brewer who made to 2002 decision for SKM not to comply with the Terms of reference.

Item 2: If Minister Gay's [REDACTED] submitted my submission to Transurban it its entirety, I will accept his, or his delegates letter to Transurban as being sufficient evidence.

Item 3 : Transurban's total response in detail is still requested including anything where privacy issues were raised.

Whilst I may be wrong, in my opinion if [REDACTED] is contacted he should be able to supply all of the documents requested. If he cannot, a late decision would only delay my right to submit an Internal Review application about a questionable and contentious \$6 billion project that may not solve the problems Transurban claims it will solve.

I am copying this email to [REDACTED] for his and also Minister Gay's information as Minister for Roads and Ports.

Yours sincerely

Peter Waite 9484 3471

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	Content-Encoding:	base64



Premier & Cabinet

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Our ref: DPC13/05690
2013-318504/2013-318507

Mr Peter Waite
28 Warne Street
PENNANT HILLS NSW 2120

19 AUG 2013

Dear Mr Waite

Application for internal review of a decision made under the GIPA Act

I refer to your application for an internal review of a decision made by the Department of Premier and Cabinet under the *Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009* (the GIPA Act) dated 6 August 2013, in respect of your access application dated 24 June 2013 seeking access to:

"all documents relating to the 'unsolicited proposals unit' of the Division of Premier and Cabinet relating to the proposal by Transurban to build an F3-M2 link including all documents whether it be briefing notes, reports or emails".

Valid application for internal review

Your application for internal review of the Department's deemed refusal to deal with your application was received by the Department of Premier and Cabinet (the Department) on 12 August 2013.

I note that in accordance with section 85(2) of the GIPA Act no fee is payable for the internal review because the Department did not decide your access application within time and as a result is deemed to have refused to deal with the application.

Your application for internal review is a valid application under the GIPA Act and must be decided within 15 working days of receipt, by 2 September 2013 (subject to any extension of time under the GIPA Act).

If your application is not decided by that date, it is taken by the GIPA Act to have been refused. If this occurs, you may seek a review of this refusal (see enclosed fact sheet).

In accordance with the GIPA Act, the internal review is a review of the original decision not to decide the application in time. The internal review is to be done by making a new decision as if the original decision had not been made. Please be aware that the scope of the application is not broadened on review.

Late decision concerning your original access application

I note that your application for internal review is dated 6 August 2013 prior to your receiving the Department's letter dated 8 August 2013 advising that the Department would continue to deal with your application.

The Department still intends to decide your original application and will give you notice of its decision as soon as practicable.

I anticipate that the Department will be in a position to decide your application within the internal review period, by 2 September 2013.

Other matters

I also refer to your email to the Department dated 13 August 2013. I note in your email you state the Department's letter to you dated 8 August 2013 did not make reference to items 1 to 3 under the section titled 'Revised Application' in your letter dated 23 July 2013.

I note in the Department's letter to you dated 8 August 2013, you were advised that items 1 to 12 appear to relate to a separate access application you have made previously to a separate agency.

Your original access application dated 24 June 2013 made to the Department does not contain items 1 to 12. Therefore the information you provided in your letter dated 23 July 2013 does not amend your application.

[REDACTED]

In processing your application dated 24 June 2013, the Department is obliged to conduct reasonable searches for information held by the Department when your application was received.

If you seek information held by the Office of the Hon. Minister Duncan Gay, MLC Minister for Roads and Ports you should make a separate application to that agency. I note you appear to have made a previous application to that agency.


Inquiries

Please mark any correspondence to the Department concerning your application for internal review for the attention of the Information Access Unit at the following address:

Information Access Unit
Department of Premier and Cabinet
Level 37, Governor Macquarie Tower
1 Farrer Place
SYDNEY NSW 2000

Please contact Ms Melissa Watt, Senior Project Officer, Information Access Unit, Office of General Counsel, on telephone (02) 9228 3671 or via email GIPA@dpc.nsw.gov.au if you have any questions in relation to your application.

Yours sincerely



Paul Miller
General Counsel



Premier & Cabinet

59 pages of documents listed.
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Our ref: DPC13/05690
2013-318504/2013-340413
- 2 SEP 2013

Mr Peter Waite
28 Warne Street
PENNANT HILLS NSW 2120

Dear Mr Waite

Application for internal review of a decision made under the GIPA Act

I refer to your application for an internal review dated 6 August 2013 of a deemed refusal by the Department of Premier and Cabinet not to deal with your access application under the *Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009* (the GIPA Act) dated 24 June 2013 seeking access to:

"all documents relating to the 'unsolicited proposals unit' of the Division of Premier and Cabinet relating to the proposal by Transurban to build an F3-M2 link including all documents whether it be briefing notes, reports or emails".

Section 84(1) of the GIPA Act provides that an internal review is to be done by making a new decision, as if the decision being reviewed (the original decision) had not been made, with the new decision being made as if it were being made when the access application to which the review relates was originally received.

Decision about access

I have today decided your application for internal review, under section 58(1)(e) the GIPA Act, by refusing to deal with the application because I am satisfied that dealing with the application would require an unreasonable and substantial diversion of the Department's resources.

Statement of reasons

I have decided that the work involved in completing your application would require an unreasonable and substantial diversion of the Department's resources.

I note that, upon first receiving your application the Department wrote to you advising that it estimated that dealing with your application would involve approximately 30 hours of processing time. Accordingly an advance deposit of \$370 was imposed; a refund for this advance deposit and the application fee of \$30 is enclosed.

In retrospect it is clear that the original estimate of the time it would take to deal with your application was seriously underestimated.

I am advised the Department has already spent at least 28 hours searching for and preparing a schedule of the information held by the Department that falls within the scope of your application. I note the Department has identified 532 relevant documents. These documents include:

- emails between Departmental officers
- emails and correspondence between members of the assessment panel (including the Department)
- emails and correspondence between the Department and other NSW Government agencies
- emails and correspondence between the Department and the Commonwealth
- emails and correspondence between the Department and members of the public
- emails and correspondence between the Department and Transurban and linked partners
- documents provided by Transurban and linked partners
- documents provided to or created by the assessment panel members
- consultant reports
- legal advice
- Cabinet information.

I am satisfied that for the Department to proceed to consider the public interest considerations both for and against disclosure and make a decision in respect of the public interest balancing test concerning 532 documents would in this case require an unreasonable and substantial diversion of the Department's resources.

To complete your application, it would be necessary to undertake consultation in accordance with section 54 of the GIPA Act with multiple third parties in respect of most of the documents.

In making my decision that consultation is required, I have had regard to the Office of the Information Commissioner's Guideline 5 'Consultation of public interest considerations under section 54 of the GIPA Act' and Guideline 4 'Personal information as a public interest consideration under the GIPA Act.'

I am satisfied that information in the documents is of a kind that requires consultation on public interest considerations under section 54 of the GIPA Act because the information includes personal information about a person (in accordance with the definition of personal information contained within clause 4 of schedule 4 to the GIPA Act), it concerns a person's business, commercial, professional or financial interests and concerns the affairs of a government of the Commonwealth section (54(2)(d)).

Further I am satisfied that, due to the type of information contained in the documents, the third parties concerned may reasonably be expected to have concerns about the disclosure of the information; and finally I am satisfied that those concerns may reasonably be expected to be relevant to the question of whether there is a public interest consideration against disclosure.

Original decision

The decision being reviewed is the deemed refusal of your application as it has not been decided in time. On 19 August 2013, you were notified that the Department still intended to decide your original application and make a late decision. I am advised the Department continued to process the application but has not made a late decision as of today's date. As my decision on the internal review has now been made, no late decision will be given.

Under section 60(2) of the GIPA Act, in deciding whether dealing with an application would require an unreasonable and substantial diversion of an agency's resources, the agency is not required to have regard to any extension by agreement between the applicant and the agency of the period within which the application is required to be decided.

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Release of Index of Documents

Notwithstanding that I have decided to refuse to deal with your application, in accordance with the policy objectives of the GIPA Act and pursuant to section 76 of the Act, I have decided to release to you an index listing the documents that the Department identified from its searches as being relevant to your application (Annexure A).

I have considered the information contained in that index and am satisfied that the release of this information would not, of itself, be subject to an overriding public interest against disclosure and nor would its release require the Department to first consult with relevant third parties under section 54 of the GIPA Act.

(Should a separate application for any particular document contained in this index be received by the Department then that application would be considered on its merits in accordance with the Act.)

Other publicly available information

You may also be interested in other information relating to the Transurban unsolicited proposal that is already publicly available. Such information includes material that has been published on the following websites:

- o <http://www.nsw.gov.au/unsolicitedproposals>
- o http://www.rta.nsw.gov.au/roadprojects/projects/building_sydney_motorways/m2_f3
- o <http://www.transport.nsw.gov.au/media-releases/nsw-government-studies-unsolicited-proposal-f3-m2-link>
- o <http://www.transurban.com/96.htm>

Fees and charges

In accordance with section 87 of the GIPA Act, I have decided that no processing charges should be imposed for this application.

Rights of review

The Department's deemed refusal to deal with your application and this decision are reviewable decisions under section 80(c) of the GIPA Act. If you are aggrieved by these decisions, you may seek review under Part 5 of the GIPA Act. There are two forms of review:


- external review by the Information Commissioner, or
- external review by the Administrative Decisions Tribunal.

Your review rights are summarised in the enclosed fact sheet. You have 40 working days after the date of this letter to apply for an external review.

Inquiries

Please contact Melissa Watt, Senior Project Officer, Information Access Unit, Office of General Counsel, on telephone (02) 9228 3671 if you have any questions in relation to this letter.

Yours sincerely


Paul Miller
General Counsel

ANNEXURE A**Schedule of records**

No.	Description of record	Location of record in Department	Format of record
	<u>Folder 1 of 10 – Governance and Probity</u>		
1	Transurban F3M2 Link Unsolicited Proposal – List of people who have signed probity documents (signed documents in file: DPC12/01696) As at 30 July 2013	Major Projects	Document
2	Transurban F3M2 Link Unsolicited Proposal – List of people who have signed probity documents (signed documents in file: DPC12/01696) As at 5 October 2012	Major Projects	Document
3	Stage 3 Unsolicited Proposal F3-M2 Link – Transurban – Governance and Projects Teams	Major Projects	Document
4	F3-M2 Steering Committee – Proposal Development	Major Projects	Document
5	Email from Finlay Consulting to Simon Smith dated 13/8/12 (6:47PM) concerning deed and agreement	Major Projects	Email
6	Email from Simon Smith to Finlay Consulting dated 13/8/12 (4:19PM) concerning deed and agreement	Major Projects	Email
7	Email from Transurban to Simon Smith dated 10/08/12 (2:33PM) concerning changes to confidentiality deed	Major Projects	Email
8	Email from Simon Smith to Transurban) dated 07/08/12 (2:51PM) concerning marked up version of draft agreement	Major Projects	Email



No.	Description of record	Location of record in Department	Format of record
524	Email from David Newman to Simon Smith dated 5 July 2013 (1:16pm) titled 'Blue - SC1XX-2013 – Update on Transurban F3-M2 Unsolicited Proposal 7.5.13_1.docx' concerning marked up blue	Economic Development and Transport Branch	Email
525	Draft Cabinet Minute SC175 Funding Arrangements for Transurban's F3-M2 Unsolicited Proposal Minister for Roads	Economic Development and Transport Branch	Document
526	Email from David Newman to Vicki D'Adam dated 7 May 2013 (12:44pm) titled 'Fwd: SC175 Funding Arrangements for Transurban's F3-M2 USP' concerning approval by Simon Smith	Economic Development and Transport Branch	Email
527	Email from David Newman to Vicki D'Adam dated 7 May 2013 (12:44pm) Fwd: SC175 Funding Arrangements for Transurban's F3-M2 USP' concerning approval by Simon Smith	Economic Development and Transport Branch	Email
528	Draft Cabinet Minute SC175 Funding Arrangements for Transurban's F3-M2 Unsolicited Proposal Minister for Roads	Economic Development and Transport Branch	Document
529	Email from David Newman to Alanna Linn dated 7 May 2013 (12:20pm) concerning F3M2	Economic Development and Transport Branch	Email
530	Email from David Newman to Mathew Sherb dated 31 January 2013 (11:16am) titled 'Summary comments by TED on F3-M2 Cabinet Minute.docx' attaching condensed comments	Economic Development and Transport Branch	Email
531	Summary Comments: on "Update on Transurban's Unsolicited Proposal for the F3-M2 Link"	Economic Development and Transport Branch	Document
532	Email from David Newman to Mathew Sherb dated 24 October 2012 (10:45am) titled 'CIC Minute – update on F3-M2 unsolicited proposal' commenting on	Economic Development and Transport Branch	Email

No.	Description of record	Location of record in Department	Format of record
	Cabinet Minute		

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F3-M2

In March 2012, the NSW Government received an unsolicited proposal from Transurban to design, build, operate, maintain and finance a tolled motorway linking the F3 Freeway at Wahroonga to the Hills M2 at West Pennant Hills. This community update outlines the proposal and next steps in the process.

Background

In 2002, the Australian Federal Government commissioned an investigation to identify a preferred option to link the F3 Freeway and the Sydney Orbital Network, to deliver an improved travel experience for road users. The preferred F3-M2 corridor was announced in May 2004. The selected corridor was confirmed as the preferred option in 2007 following a review by the Hon Mahla Pearlman AO.

In May 2013, the NSW Premier and the Minister for Roads and Ports announced the proposal had progressed to stage three of the Unsolicited Proposal process.

Stage three involves the negotiation and submission of a final binding offer. The key steps include:


- Negotiations between Government, Transurban and the Westlink M7 shareholders to finalise and agree the commercial terms and conditions for the proposed agreement.

- Obtaining planning approval for the proposed project.
- Obtaining a firm price for the project.
- Agreeing a program to deliver the project.

Proposed project objectives

- Reduce traffic congestion, particularly along Pennant Hills Road, providing shorter travel times for road users.
- Provide a motorway that is safe and reliable for road users.
- Reduce the number of heavy vehicles along Pennant Hills Road, and as a result improve safety, local air quality and noise amenity along the corridor.
- Provide opportunities for improved public transport in the area around Pennant Hills Road.

Indicative F3-M2 project corridor



F3-M2 Project

www.rms.nsw.gov.au/f3tom2

Project information line: 1800 997 057 (free call)

Email: F3-M2enquiries@transurban.com

The F3 Freeway has recently been renamed the M1 Pacific Motorway. The F3-M2 is a working name for this project at this preliminary stage.



Transport
Roads & Maritime
Services

- Improve the efficient movement of state and national freight.
- Minimise adverse social and environmental impacts in the local area during construction and operation.
- Provide a high standard access controlled motorway that integrates with the regional transport network.
- Demonstrate excellence in design and environmental sustainability.
- Be economically justified and affordable to Government.

Key features of F3-M2

- Twin motorway tunnels with two lanes in each direction and provision for future widening to three lanes.
- A northern interchange connecting with the F3 Freeway, the Pacific Highway and Pennant Hills Road.
- A southern interchange connecting with the Hills M2 Motorway and Pennant Hills Road.

Funding

The Federal and State Governments have each committed around \$405 million to the project. The remainder of the cost will be funded by Transurban and the Westlink M7 shareholders.

Process and next steps

Transurban and the Westlink M7 shareholders have issued a Request for Tender for the design and construction of the project to a shortlist of three parties. The tendering period is due to close at the end of November 2013.


Tenderers have been requested to deliver an innovative, cost effective and environmentally responsive design to be constructed within a budget of \$2.65 billion. The project may not proceed should bids exceed \$2.65 billion.

A State Significant Infrastructure Application has been developed and submitted to the Department of Planning & Infrastructure. This report, which will be published on the Department's website, (<http://majorprojects.planning.nsw.gov.au>), will assist the Director-General to develop environmental assessment requirements that will be addressed in the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).

In parallel to the tender assessment, an EIS will be prepared. The EIS would assess the impacts associated with the project and identify measures to minimise these impacts. This assessment would be finalised based on the design of the preferred tenderer.

A decision to proceed with the project will be made at the end of 2013 following the close of the tender period. It will be subject to bids meeting governance requirements and project criteria within the construction budget of \$2.65 billion.

Approval process



Field investigations

Field investigations, involving a range of studies, are being undertaken to inform the project. Upcoming studies include air quality monitoring which will involve the placement of five air monitoring stations along the project corridor to collect air quality data.

The project team would like to thank property owners, residents and businesses for their co-operation during the studies.

Community involvement

The project team are committed to quality engagement with the community throughout the life of the project. You will receive updates at key stages of the project and have opportunities to provide important feedback.

If you would like to register to receive project updates, please send your details to the project email **F3-M2enquiries@transurban.com** or call the project information line (free call) **1800 997 057**.

Mandarin

如果你需要口译员, 请致电 131 450 联系翻译和口译服务署 (TIS National), 要求他们致电 1800 997 057 联系 Community Information Line。我们的工作时间是 9am – 5pm。

Korean

통역사가 필요하시면 번역통역서비스 (TIS National)에 131 450 으로 연락하여 이들에게 1800 997 057 번으로 Community Information Line 에 전화하도록 요청하십시오. 저희의 근무시간은 9am – 5pm 입니다.

Vietnamese

Nếu cần thông ngôn viên, xin quý vị gọi cho Dịch Vụ Thông Phiên Dịch (TIS Toàn Quốc) qua số 131 450 và nhờ họ gọi cho Community Information Line qua số 1800 997 057. Giờ làm việc của chúng tôi là 9am – 5pm.

Disclaimer

While this publication has been formulated with duly considered information, Roads and Maritime Services (Roads and Maritime), Transurban and the Westlink M7 shareholders (the "Stakeholders") make no warranty or representation as to the accuracy, adequacy, suitability or completeness of the information contained in this publication. The Stakeholders disclaim all warranties, representations or endorsements, express or implied, with regard to this publication including but not limited to, all implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, or non-infringement.

Reasonable efforts have been made to ensure that this document is correct at the time of publication, however the Stakeholders, their agents and employees, disclaim any and all liability to any person in respect of anything or the consequences of anything done or omitted to be done in reliance upon the whole or any part of this document.

If you need an interpreter, please call the Translating and Interpreting Service (TIS National) on 131 450 and ask them to telephone the Community Information line on 1800 997 057. Our business hours are 9am to 5pm Monday to Friday.

Arabic

إذا كنتم بحاجة إلى مترجم، الرجاء الاتصال بخدمة الترجمة الخطية والشفوية (TIS National) على الرقم 131 450. والطلب منهم الاتصال بوكالتكم Community Information Line على الرقم 1800 997 057. أوقات عملنا هي 9am-5pm.

Cantonese

若你需要口譯員，請致電 131 450 聯絡翻譯和口譯服務署 (TIS National)，要求他們致電 1800 997 057 聯絡 Community Information Line。我們的工作時間是 9am – 5pm。

Privacy statement

Transurban and the Westlink M7 shareholders are collecting and retaining on behalf of Roads and Maritime Services (Roads and Maritime) your personal information which you provide by registering. You are not required to provide this information.

All personal information collected will be used solely for the purpose of providing you with information about the F3-M2 proposal and may be disclosed for this purpose. Otherwise, Roads and Maritime, or Transurban, and the Westlink M7 shareholders will not disclose your personal information without your consent unless authorised or required by law.

Roads and Maritime is subject to the *Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998*, and to the extent that your information is held by Roads and Maritime, it will be held at 101 Miller Street, North Sydney NSW. You have the right to access and correct the information if you believe that it is incorrect. Your privacy is also protected under the *Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)* and the National Privacy Principles set out in the Privacy Act.

Transurban Group is a toll road owner and operator with interests in Australia and the United States.



Australian Government



The new state
of business

F3-M2

State Significant Infrastructure Application Report
September 2013

The analysis demonstrated that corridor A, which captured options that generally took the form of a southern extension of the F3 Freeway corridor to the Hills M2 Motorway, best satisfied the planning and project objectives. It was acknowledged that corridor C would potentially provide greater long term strategic benefits, but would not be warranted within the 20 year time frame of the study.

Following the selection of strategic corridor A, further investigations resulted in the identification of four options that would be taken forward for further analysis, being:

- The red option, which extended from the F3 Freeway at Wahroonga to the Hills M2 Motorway at Macquarie Park.
- The yellow option, which extended from the F3 Freeway at Wahroonga to the Hills M2 Motorway near North Epping.
- The blue option, which extended from the F3 Freeway at Wahroonga to the Hills M2 Motorway at the Pennant Hills Road interchange.
- The purple option, which extended from the F3 Freeway at Wahroonga to the Hills M2 Motorway at the Pennant Hills Road interchange and generally followed the alignment of Pennant Hills Road.

The four options are shown in Figure 2-2.

In assessing the four options, it was assumed that all four options would be in tunnel for the majority of the corridor length and that connections to the existing road network would be mostly built within the existing road reserves. The options were assessed against technical criteria relating to engineering feasibility, land use impacts, urban design and regional development, urban design and landscape, and social and environmental grounds.

These options were also publicly exhibited between July and October in 2003 and were subject to a value management workshop held over two days in September 2003.

The evaluation of the options was informed by community feedback and a value management workshop. The evaluation concluded that:

- All four options would provide similar road user benefits, however, the purple and blue options would provide the preferred route for trucks over the next 20 years. Further, it was also acknowledged that the red option would provide similar benefits to the purple option in terms of network traffic effects. Overall, the purple option best satisfied the transport objectives.
- The purple and blue route options are preferred based on social and environmental grounds. These options would yield significant social benefits to people living and working along Pennant Hills Road as a result of the significant traffic relief to Pennant Hills Road.
- On economic grounds, all options had high capital costs. However, the purple option performed the best.

Overall, it was concluded that the purple option was preferred as it satisfied the planning and project objectives better than the blue, yellow or red options. It was also concluded that the purple option performed best in terms of the technical criteria considered in the assessment and that the purple option performed better than the other options in terms of social and environmental impacts based on the assessment conducted for the purposes of the study.

2.2.3 *Review of the F3 to M7 corridor selection*

In 2007, a review of the 2004 report was undertaken by the Honourable Mahla Pearlman AO at the request of the Federal Government to confirm:

- The validity and reasonableness of the assumptions and data applied to the assessment.
- If land use and traffic flow changes in western Sydney would support changes to the projections applied in the assessment.
- Whether significant changes to those assumptions would alter the conclusions reached in the 2004 report.

The review concluded that:

- The assumptions and data used in the 2004 report were valid and reasonable at the time of the study.
- There have been changes affecting land use and traffic flows since the 2004 report, but that these changes reinforce the selection of the purple option.
- The purple option should be the preferred route and should progress to the next stage of design and development.
- Any future concept should consider east facing ramps at the Hills M2 Motorway to make the option more attractive to motorists.
- A long term option, being strategic corridor C, should be planned for.



133265

TUNNEL
FILED 38

- 9 SEP 2013

Administrative Decisions Tribunal

New South Wales

ADMINISTRATIVE
DECISIONS TRIBUNAL

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW OF A REVIEWABLE DECISION

GENERAL DIVISION

File number (for office use only)

133265

PARTIES

Applicant

WAITE, Peter Andrew

Respondent

NSW Government Premier & Cabinet

DECISION FOR REVIEW

Attached is a copy of the decision to be reviewed

Date of decision for review and reference number

2 Sept 2013 – DPC13/05690

2013-318504/2013-340413

Date you received notice of the review decision

4 September 2013

LEGISLATION

Specify the Act and section

GIPA Act S100

under which the decision is made

INTERNAL REVIEW

Is the decision for review the decision made after an application for internal review? YES

GROUNDS FOR APPLICATION

The reasons for seeking a review of the decision are:

NSW Government Premier & Cabinet failed to determine the amended application as requested in its original decision.

LATE APPLICATION

N/A

PARTY DETAILS

APPLICANT

Name WAITE, Peter Andrew

Address 28 Warne Street, Pennant Hills

Phone / Fax 02 – 9484 3471

Email waitepeter@bigpond.com

APPLICANT'S LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE (IF ANY)

Name

Address

Phone / Fax

Email

RESPONDENT

Name NSW Government Premier & Cabinet;

MILLER Paul General Counsel (WATT Melissa)

Address GPO Box 5341, SYDNEY NSW 2001

Phone / Fax 9228 5555 (Watt Melissa 9228 3671) / Fax 9228 5249

SIGNATURE



Applicant's signature

Name

WAITE, Peter Andrew

Date

5 September 2013

REGISTRY DETAILS

Level 10, John Maddison Tower, 86-90 Goulburn St Sydney 2000

Phone (02) 9377 5711 TTY (02) 9377 5859

www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/adt

39

28 Warne Street
Pennant Hills NSW 2120
10 October 2013

FOR THE PERSONAL ATTENTION OF

The Hon D Gay, Minister for Roads and Ports
Level 35, Governor Macquarie Tower
1 Farrer Place
SYDNEY NSW 2000

Transurban's unsolicited offer to build the F3 – M2 link

Dear Minister Gay,

Attached is copy of my letter to Minister Berejiklian regarding the Draft Freight & Ports strategy as it relates to Transurban's offer and my application to the Administrative Decisions Tribunal to have documents produced and or amended.

In my opinion there are several associated issues that should be resolved in other forums. It would be appreciated if your Divisions representative/s at the hearing know that I will assist in every way possible to establish the facts for your information.

Please let me know if there is anything I can do to assist in the meantime.

Yours sincerely

Peter Waite

To the householder



Australian Government



The new state
of business

F3-M2

OCTOBER 2013

40

Dear resident

Re: F3-M2 project introduction and community involvement

Further to the first community update you would have received recently on the proposed F3-M2 linking the F3 Freeway at Wahroonga to the Hills M2 at West Pennant Hills, **we invite you to attend a community event to introduce the F3-M2 proposal and members of the project team.**

Community events will be held on:

- **Tuesday 22 October 2013, 6.30pm - 8pm, Turramurra Masonic Hall and Function Centre,** 1247 Pacific Highway, Turramurra (entry via Turramurra Avenue).
- **Wednesday 23 October 2013, 6.30pm - 8pm, Muirfield Golf Club,** Barclay Road, North Rocks (entry via Perry Street).
- **Thursday 24 October 2013, 6.30pm - 8pm, Hornsby War Memorial Hall,** 2 High Street, Hornsby.

We would like to hear the views of community members and businesses about the F3-M2 proposal, in particular:

- What do you see as the community benefits in the proposal?
- What aspects of the proposal are important to you?
- Are there any issues relating to your local community you think we should be aware of?
- Should the proposal proceed, what are the most important considerations during design and environmental assessment?
- How do you want to receive information, discuss issues, share values and engage with the project team in future project stages?

We look forward to meeting you and encourage you to provide your feedback by email to F3-M2enquiries@transurban.com or via the project website at www.rms.nsw.gov.au/f3tom2 or via mail to PO Box Q410, QUEEN VICTORIA BUILDING NSW 1229. If you have any questions on the proposal, please contact the project information line on 1800 997 057 (free call).

Yours sincerely

Tim Parker (Hapkes)
Tim Parker

F3-M2 project team

F3-M2 project

www.rms.nsw.gov.au/f3tom2

Project information line: 1800 997 057 (free call)

Email: F3-M2enquiries@transurban.com

The F3 Freeway has recently been renamed the M1 Pacific Motorway.
The F3-M2 is a working name for this project at this preliminary stage.




Transport
Roads & Maritime
Services

Indicative F3-M2 project corridor

The key features of the proposal are:

- Twin motorway tunnels with two lanes in each direction and provision for future widening to three lanes.
- A northern interchange connecting with the F3 Freeway, the Pacific Highway and Pennant Hills Road.
- A southern interchange connecting with the Hills M2 Motorway and Pennant Hills Road.



LEGEND

- The project corridor
- National parks/state forests
- Parks and reserves
- Future North West Rail Link (in tunnel)
- Major road
- Minor road
- Waterway
- Railway

40



Transport
for NSW

Received 18 October.
41

ML13/10200

Mr Peter Waite
28 Warne Street
PENNANT HILLS NSW 2120


15 October 2013

Dear Mr Waite,

The Minister for Roads and Ports, the Hon Duncan Gay MLC, has requested that I acknowledge receipt of your letter of 10 October 2013.

The matter is receiving attention.

Yours faithfully,



Subject: F3-M2 COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT
From: Peter Waite <waitepeter@bigpond.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2013 16:08:39 +1100
To: F3-M2enquiries <F3-M2enquiries@transurban.com>, Northern Districttimes
<northerndistricttimes@cng.newsltd.com.au>

42

The proposed F3-M2 tunnel Transurban project team.

On 8 August 2012 I wrote to Transurban about this project. As yet I have not received a reply.

To save time at the public meetings, this is to give the project team an opportunity to address the issues I raised in my letter to Transurban at the 22, 23 and 24 October 2013 meetings.

When the meetings commence I suggest each member of the project team should explain where they live, what their backgrounds are, detailed knowledge and personal experience of traffic problems in this area, knowledge of the SKM and Pearlman reports and community public meetings from 2005 to 2008 about the proposed tunnel.

QUESTION 1; Why wasn't a consultative meeting arranged for Pennant Hills that is the most affected suburb by traffic jams and accidents in Sydney? (Recent NRMA survey and report) In my opinion this indicates a lack of knowledge about the problems and solutions.

Yours sincerely

Peter Waite

28 Warne Street
Pennant Hills NSW 2120
8 August 2012

Mr Ballantyne
Transurban
Level 3
505 Little Collins Street
Melbourne, VIC 3000

M2 – F3 tunnel proposal construction and disruption problems

Dear Mr Ballantyne

On 6 August I met with my federal MP The Hon Phillip Ruddock about Transurban's unsolicited proposal to part fund the construction of a tunnel to link the M2 and F3.

Having lived near Pennant Hills Road for over 55 years and Epping over 25 years, being a Hornsby councillor from 1980 to 1987 and a builder, developer and investor I have seen traffic increase at a far greater rate than successive government and consultant projections.

In 1980 Lyle Marshal & Associates conducted a survey for Hornsby Council. The draft recommended Pennant Hills Road be eight lanes and Boundary Road six lanes. The then DMR instructed Council to have the report amended to reduce Pennant Hills Road to six lanes with no alteration to Boundary Road. History has shown Lyle Marshal was correct.

After SKM completed its comprehensive report in April 2004 it was later confirmed that there was political



Ray Williams MP

Parliamentary Secretary for Transport and Roads
Member for Hawkesbury

14 Nov 2013
doc/s * 18

ML13/10200

44

Mr Peter Waite
28 Warne Street
PENNANT HILLS NSW 2120

Dear Mr Waite,

Thank you for your letter of 10 October 2013 to the Minister for Transport regarding the Draft NSW Freight and Ports Strategy. The Minister has asked me to respond on her behalf. I note you have also written to the Minister for Roads and Ports on this matter and trust you will accept this as a response to both approaches.

Your feedback is greatly appreciated. I am advised in response to your feedback, a statement in Case Study 10 of the Draft Freight and Ports Strategy has been amended. The statement refers to the following recommendation of the 2007 Pearlman Review: 'The 2007 Pearlman Review into the F3 to M7 corridor selection recommended that work commence on the identification and reservation of a corridor for a new orbital link to the west of the current M7 Motorway.'

This has been changed to: 'The 2007 Pearlman Review into the F3 to M7 Corridor selection recommended that planning work commence to identify a corridor for a future orbital link between the M7 Motorway and F3 Freeway on the Central Coast.'

The statement has been amended so it cannot give the impression it recommends an outer Sydney orbital (M9). The orbital link recommended by the Pearlman Review only connects the Westlink M7 with the Central Coast. The outer Sydney orbital identified in the NSW Long Term Transport Master Plan connects the Central Coast, Western Sydney and Wollongong.

I hope this has been of assistance.

Yours faithfully,

14 NOV 2013

Ray Williams MP

Parliamentary Secretary for Transport and Roads
Member for Hawkesbury



Crown Solicitor's Office

My Ref: 201302751
T01 Katrina Sanders
Tel: (02) 9224-5076
Fax: (02) 8224-5355
Email: crownsol@agd.nsw.gov.au

45

15 November 2013

Mr Peter Waite
28 Warne Street
PENNANT HILLS NSW 2120

By email waitepeter@bigpond.com and by post

Dear Mr Waite

Waite PA v NSW Department of Premier & Cabinet - 133265

I refer to the above matter.

Information you are still seeking

You have applied for access to "all documents relating to the 'unsolicited proposals unit'... relating to the proposal by Transurban to build and [sic] F3-M2 link including all documents whether it be briefing notes, reports or emails."

By letter dated 17 July 2013, you were invited to narrow the scope of your application, in particular by excluding emails. By letter of 25 July 2013 you declined to do so.

On internal review, Premier and Cabinet decided to refuse to deal with your application on the basis that it would require an unreasonable and substantial diversion of the Department's resources. However, you were provided with an index describing 532 documents identified as falling within the terms of your application.

Katrina Sanders called you on 8 November 2013 noting that your original application is extremely wide and inviting you once again to narrow the scope of your application. You declined to narrow your application, instead indicating that you had a proposal to put to the Tribunal. You did not explain what your proposal is.

Ms Sanders called you again on 14 November to ask if you are pressing your application. You said that you want the Minister to deal with your matter and not Premier and Cabinet. Ms Sanders explained that the Tribunal is not able to make an order of that kind.

On 14 November you sent an email stating that you had lodged two new applications with the Tribunal. Ms Sanders called the Registry but was unable to ascertain whether you had lodged new applications or what these new applications related to. From the information you have provided, however, it seems that you are not pressing your application for review of the decision made by Premier and Cabinet.

Scope of the proceedings

I would like to provide you with some further information about the scope of these proceedings.

You have applied for access to information. On review, the Tribunal will make the correct and preferable decision, based on the material before it: *Administrative Decisions Act 1997*, s. 63(1). However, it is limited to making a decision on your original access application. That is, it may affirm the decision, vary it, set it aside and make a different decision, or set it aside and remit the matter for reconsideration by the administrator: s. 63(3).

In your email of 14 November, you indicated that you are seeking the Tribunal to refer your matters to the relevant Minister. This is not an order that the Tribunal can make.

Correspondence

Please find enclosed a Notice of Representation by Legal Practitioner or Agent, filed today.

The Crown Solicitor is the solicitor on the record in these proceedings. Please ensure that you send all correspondence and documents to me and not to Premier and Cabinet.

Costs

In the Tribunal, each party generally bears its own costs: *Administrative Decisions Act 1997*, s. 88(1). However, the Tribunal may award costs, if satisfied it is fair to do so, having regard to factors including whether a party has vexatiously conducted the proceedings (s. 88(1A)(a)(vi)) or has made a claim that has no tenable basis (s. 88(1A)(c)).

Despite numerous attempts, I am unable to clarify what information it is that you are seeking or indeed whether you intend to press your application at all. The fact that you have lodged two fresh applications suggests that you may be conducting the proceedings vexatiously.

Further action

In order for me to try to resolve this matter, can you please, in writing, clarify:

1. Whether you are pressing your application for a review of the decision made by Premier and Cabinet on your access application, and
2. If so, what information it is that you are seeking. I note that the information cannot be anything falling outside the terms of your original application.

Can you please do so as soon as practicable, and preferably within the next 2 weeks (ie by Friday 29 November).

Yours faithfully



Katrina Sanders
Senior Solicitor
for Crown Solicitor

cc Registrar, Administrative Decisions Tribunal



Administrative Decisions Tribunal
New South Wales

COPY 45

NOTICE OF REPRESENTATION BY LEGAL PRACTITIONER OR AGENT*

** The Tribunal's permission must be granted before an agent can represent a party. The agent should request permission the next time the matter is listed.*

File number 133265

Division General

RECEIVED

PARTIES

15 NOV 2013

Applicant Peter Waite

ADMINISTRATIVE
DECISIONS TRIBUNAL

Respondent Premier and Cabinet

NOTICE

The legal practitioner /
agent* named below
(please tick)

☐ represents the applicant

☒ represents the respondent

☐ represents another party (please specify).....

OR ☐ has ceased to represent the applicant / respondent / other party in these proceedings
and that party's address for service now is:

LEGAL PRACTITIONER / AGENT* (delete one)

Name Crown Solicitor

Address 60-70 Elizabeth Street Sydney

Phone / Fax Ph: 9224 5076 Fax: 9224 5222

Email Katrina_Sanders@agd.nsw.gov.au

Signature and date

K. Sanders 15.11.13

CONSENT BY PARTY FOR AGENT* TO REPRESENT

I consent to the agent named above representing me in these proceedings. I understand that
all correspondence will be sent to my agent.

Name

Signature and date

REGISTRY DETAILS

Level 10, John Maddison Tower, 86-90 Goulburn St Sydney 2000
Phone (02) 9377 5711 TTY (02) 9377 5859
www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/adt

46

Subject: ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS TRIBUNAL PLANNING MEETING 10 DECEMBER 2013
From: Peter Waite <waitepeter@bigpond.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Nov 2013 09:46:34 +1100
To: [REDACTED] <office@gay.minister.nsw.gov.au>
CC: Katrina Sanders <Katrina_Sanders@agd.nsw.gov.au>

Dear [REDACTED],

Last night Channel 10 reported tenders will be called for the F3 - M2 link.

Yesterday I received from Ray Williams MP a letter on behalf of Minister Gay acknowledging The Draft Freight and Ports Strategy acknowledging I was correct when in advising the Marla Pearlman report had been incorrectly reported as supporting the Draft Strategy has been corrected because she recommended planning commence for the F3 - M7 link (near Riverstone).

My application to the ADT is to have Transurban prove the F3 to M2 link is the best option. If successful, this will delay commencement and possible found the F3 - M7 link should be built.

It is based on our 9 December 2012 meeting where you agreed Transurban would be given my detailed 6 December 2012 paper to address in its submissions in its submissions to the Independent Review Panel.

This was done because you explained why my GIPA application was rejected and I accepted your advice as to what I should do.


In my opinion the Crown solicitor appointed to this matter has not been properly briefed by the Minister's office.

It appears that for some unexplained reasons his Department has responded instead of his office.

It would be appreciated if you would ensure the Crown Solicitor is properly briefed with all the relevant material.

Regards

Peter Waite



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Figure 1

§ 87(2)(b) [REDACTED]

§ 87(2)(b) [REDACTED]

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46. 9 Aug
2013

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47. 19 Aug
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49. 2 Sep
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50. Jul Aug
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51. Sept
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52. 19 Sep
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53. 30 Sep
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54. 1 Oct
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56. 6 years
is 2020

[REDACTED]

28 Warne Street
Pennant Hills NSW 2120
10 December 2013

ref: Minister Gay 10 December 2013

48

FOR THE PERSONAL ATTENTION OF

The Hon D Gay MLC, Minister for Roads and Ports
Level 35, Governor Macquarie Tower
1 Farrer Place
SYDNEY NSW 2000

Transurban's unsolicited bid to build the F3 – M2 tunnel

Dear Minister Gay,

This is not a complaint about you. It is about what the coalition inherited from Labor. Today I withdrew my application in the Administrative Decisions Tribunal to refer this matter to you because the Crown Solicitor submitted the ADT didn't have that power. ADT 133265.

Under the GIPA Act I applied to you on 11 October 2012 for a copy of Transurban's offer. Your [REDACTED] returned my application and suggested we meet and discuss how my concerns could be addressed. On 6 December 2012 I posted my three page submission with 20 pages of supporting evidence to [REDACTED].

We met on 13 December and amicably discussed the issues. [REDACTED] agreed to submit my concerns to Transurban to submit its reply to the Independent Review Panel. On 24 June 2013 by error I applied to the Division instead of you for Information but **did** refer to [REDACTED] advice. What happened is irrelevant. The issue still is for Transurban to address.

In September 2013 the Australian and State Government published the '*F3-M2 State Significant Infrastructure Application Report - Proposed scope of the environmental impact statement*'.

In mid October 2013 Transurban delivered to householders a leaflet about its proposed tunnel and '**community involvement events**' at Turramurra, Muirfield Golf Club and Hornsby on 22, 23 and 24 October. No explanation was given to concerns there was no '*event*' at Pennant Hills that is the worse affected suburb. I attended the 24 October '*event*' where we were told what would occur. We were advised to speak to one of the ten or so staff present who would answer questions. I explained my concerns to the chairman. He fobbed me off on the basis that they were irrelevant as did other members of the '*team*'. One however is the RTA representative on the '*team*' who is waiting to find out what your response to me will be. '**Transparent community consultation**' is necessary.

I have submissions before the Minister for Planning about flawed '*EIS statements*' relating to the ETTT rail project, and the controversial Planning Reforms ICAC Commissioner IPP personally suggested to Minister Hazzard would allow uncontrollable corruption to flourish.

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(Hornsby Council ADT 133329) In July 2012 NSROC (Northern Sydney Region of Councils) published a \$39,890 report supporting Transurban's F3 – M2 tunnel.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Whilst knowing it is not necessary to request you act in the community interest, please let me know if you or your advisers require further information and what your decision will be.

Yours sincerely



Peter Waite

Copy Premier O'Farrell

Inclusions: Three page 6 December 2012 submission and 20 pages of support documents
My 2 page paper **Political shenanigans** about former Mayor Berman and ex GM
Two letters from Ray Williams MP on behalf of Transport Minister Berejiklian
Four newspaper advertisements published from June to December 2013
Premier O'Farrell's 27 March 2012 letter to me about Cross City tunnel etc

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28 Warne Street
Pennant Hills NSW 2120
21 March 2014

By email and signed hard copy by post

FOR THE PERSONAL ATTENTION OF

**The Hon D Gay, Minister for Roads and Ports
Level 35, Governor Macquarie Tower
1 Farrer Place
SYDNEY NSW 2000**

Transurban's unsolicited offer to build the F3 – M2 link

Dear Minister Gay,

Yesterday I met with RTA officers to discuss my continuing concerns that the acceptance of Transurban's offer is not the right decision. It was agreed they would send my submissions to you as we agreed my concerns are political matters in which they cannot be involved.

My 24 June 2013 GIPA Act application to you was for copies of Transurban's offer. On 2 September 2013 the 'DPC13/05690 2013-318504/2013-340413' decision was to deny access as it would take an unreasonable time to compile the information. A list of 532 documents was supplied. I applied to the ADT to Review the decision and withdrew it based on legal technicalities raised by the Crown Solicitor.

When Sinclair Knight Mertz (SKM) prepared its report about a link from the F3 to M7 it was directed by bureaucrats not to comply with the Terms of Reference and only recommend a short-term option. The complete report was made available to anyone who wanted it as a DVD or hard copy. I was given both. A Transurban paper briefly refers to the SKM report.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

MPs O'Farrell, Hopwood, Tink, Richardson, Williams and Hartcher all supported the F3-M7 link. Judy reinforced her support when a bushfire cut the F3, highway and railway line for three days. Has the strategic importance of an alternative route been documented?

In 2015 the electorate will decide who is elected at the State elections. Will you have Transurban's files opened for public scrutiny' to prove beyond reasonable doubt its offer is: the best solution; there has been nothing untoward; and your Department will always do right by the community. Your reply is requested within 14 days.

Yours sincerely

Peter Waite

CC by email Premier O'Farrell
Above RTA officers



Tunnel file

28 Warne Street
Pennant Hills 2120
6 April 2014

The Hon P Ruddock MP
PO Box 743
Pennant Hills NSW 1715

F3 Orbital Link connection Independent Review: WHAT IS THE TRUTH?

Dear Philip,

Attached are my questions for NorthConnex to respond to about yesterday's meeting. I did not raise them as I felt it was more important to learn what other people's concerns are.

Whilst you, Greg Smith, and Robert Browne were present it was made very clear that our elected representatives should also be involved in consultative meetings to ensure valid concerns are properly addressed.

One example being many people not receiving any notices and in particular there were none for the Central Coast residents who may comprise over half of the daily traffic.

Then there is the probity issue the State must address to prove there have not been any secret deals, commissions or political deals made to prevent another crossing being built.

Yours sincerely

P

Peter Waite

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28 Warne Street
Pennant Hills 2120
6 April 2014

Tunnel file

Email to NorthConnex to have addressed before and then in the EIS

Introduction

██████████ NSW Minister for Planning's approval of the Epping Thornleigh Third Track (ETTT) in July 2013. **This matter is still the subject of serious ongoing disputation.**

Environmental Impact Statements should be transparent and openly identify and properly explain any adverse problem if an EIS is to be seen to be impartial.

1. Whilst it has been indicated that the EIS and other documents will be on a website, hard copy must also be made available at no cost. This particularly applies to affected persons and those who for many reasons are unable to use a computer.
2. An EIS on a proposed project such as this covers a multitude of issues, everyone already raised should be identified by the public should be included in the EIS briefing paper, and not just 'precised' comment on several similar submissions.
3. The EIS should clearly list every property that will be within the 50 metres nominated route. (Total c120 metres.) It can be clearly seen my home is directly over the proposed route shown on the plans and every owner be formally advised before the EIS is issued. (Privacy issues prevent the owner's/resident's names being disclosed.)
4. An elevation of the proposed route should be released as soon as possible so that affected residents know if their property is above Hawkesbury sandstone, shale, 'unstable land' or possible water table. For instance there were many wells in Pennant Hills settlers built to obtain a constant supply of water even during drought. (Whilst not under the route, several 'water tables' at Hornsby quarry can be seen.)
5. Traffic counts included in Transurban's unsolicited offer, and those used by the RTA or others in making the assessment should be immediately made available so that what is included in the EIS are accurate.
6. Excavated material. It is understood that about 2.5 million cm of material will be removed presumably via Pennant Hills Road. The ETTT is already removing material mostly via Beecroft Road to North Ryde. The NW Rail Link will be removing material along Castle Hill Road at Cherrybrook. Have there been any negotiations between the project teams to ensure interruptions to traffic will be minimised? If not, who will be responsible to ensure on a daily basis the local communities only have minimal disruptions on traffic and parking.
7. Projected traffic increase over the next 30 years. Meetings were advised that the 'break-down' lanes would be used by emergency vehicles, and when necessary they would be used for traffic.
8. What is proposed to be done when this occurs and on those north-bound three lanes limit access to the M1 from the Pacific Highway from Hornsby and Wahroonga and Pennant Hills Road because of insufficient capacity?
9. SKM's 2004 report advised the F3 would have to be widened to eight lanes and an extra climbing lane in each direction from the Hawkesbury River for trucks, speed limits permanently reduced along the whole route, and a toll be introduced to pay for the work. Who will do this work, and how will it be done?

51


10. **ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION** The Federal and NSW fund the construction of a link from the M7 to Kariong through a Government Guaranteed public Investment Debenture Fund such as was done by the NSW Water Board after WW2. There should not be any private operator involved taking commissions. This could be made very attractive by allowing the interest payable not being subject to tax. Properly structured, investment funds could assist all States and the Federal Governments meeting the increasing demands on taxation revenue.
11. SKM's 2004 estimates indicated both routes from the F3 (M3) at Kariong to the M2 or M7 were virtually the same. The M7 route is the best option as it would have less impact on having to relocate services, disrupt and delay traffic on the M1 for years.
12. **POLITICIANS** I believe Transurban's unsolicited offer of \$2.75 billion is a 'poisoned chalice'. It will be borrowed and the interest repaid by motorists. If it is accepted, future governments will have to find an antidote. The \$900 million provided by the governments will be irrecoverable if Transurban fails to complete the project.
13. Before proceeding any further, all of the documentation should be made public to that an objective assessment can be made as I requested Minister Gay in 2012.

At this time I have not received any meaning response despite many requests.
14. Before the final EIS brief is submitted to the '*impartial consultant*', both NorthConnect and the Minister should provide a copy of their assessment of submissions made during this part of the consultative process, to the persons who made them so that they have 14 days after receipt to advise of any corrections that should be made.

The above, and other submissions should minimise any later disputes, make NSW Planning's impartial assessment of the EIS easier, quicker and transparent and most importantly be evidenced by politicians being actively involved in proving what would be the best solution.

Peter Waite

16 JUN 2014
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doc/s
Dr Simon Longstaff
St James Ethics Centre




16 Jun 2014
P12
P11. T...

We all want a better world. We're here to do our bit. The Ethics Centre is about leading and framing national engagement, not only about who we are, but about who we want to be, where, in our finest moments, we want to go. If that's a legacy you think worth considering, then please talk to us about becoming a benefactor. It could make all the difference in the world. Please call Dr Simon Longstaff on (02) 82675779 or 0418 410 187 or contact him at simon.longstaff@ethics.org.au

ST JAMES
ethics
CENTRE

It's full speed ahead on big-build highway



EXCLUSIVE

ANDREW CLENNELL
STATE POLITICAL EDITOR

SYDNEY will be ringed by a new M9 motorway or an outer Sydney orbital running from the Central Coast to the Illawarra via a corridor west of the M7 under a plan to be flagged in today's state Budget.

The announcement is part of the \$5.5 billion roads budget, the largest in Australia's history, that includes \$4.6 million for "strategic planning investigations" on building the motorway.

March election. Mr Baird has already confirmed there will be a \$5 million feasibility study for a Spit Tunnel in the Budget, but The Daily Telegraph has revealed the government will also today provide some real infrastructure money, with \$400 million set aside for a Parramatta Light Rail.

The pre-election Budget therefore has a heavy focus on Western Sydney, where the government holds critical seats it wants to keep.

Mr Baird has promised that a half sale of the "poles and wires" he will take to the election will yield \$20 billion, which he has promised to spend on a \$9 billion second Harbour rail

the Pacific Highway into another year, forcing the state government into deficit in 2014-15.

It is an incredible turnaround from the forecast at the mid-year review of a \$2.5 billion deficit but a \$900 million increase in stamp duty revenue, as well as asset sales, has helped it along.

Treasurer Andrew Constance is expected to bring in a surplus in 2015-16. Yesterday he promised \$61 billion in infrastructure spending in the next four years. This spending goes on roads, rail and hospitals as well as the electricity networks.

On the money dedicated to M9 planning, roads minister Duncan


great example. The M9 would connect the centres of Camden and Windsor. It was listed in the Long Term Transport for NSW

work to identify and develop a corridor for this motorway, with a focus on the Western

"It is likely certain corridors will be used. For example, the material and the Northern Sydney Airport lands in Western

Grand designs

The NSW Government's plan for road and rail transport



IF PENNANT HILLS ROAD TUNNEL PEAK HOUR TRIP TIMES WILL REMAIN THE SAME

Traffic no faster even with \$3b tunnels

Jacob Saulwick
Transport

Some Sydney roads are so clogged that even building multibillion-dollar tunnels underneath will not make them faster to drive on.

At least that is the prediction for one of the city's most notorious stretches - Pennant Hills Road - under which a new nine-kilometre toll road will be built.

The environmental impact statement for the so-called NorthConnex project, a \$3 billion road tunnel to run from the M2 motorway at West Pennant Hills to the M1 motorway, was released on Tuesday by the Department of Planning.

The environmental impact statement predicts that even when road tunnels are built by about


2019 under Pennant Hills Road, the time it will take to drive along the surface road will be about the same as it is now.

It takes about 18 minutes to drive south along Pennant Hills road in the morning peak hour. When the tunnels are built in 2019, it should take even longer, about 20 minutes, according to predictions in the statement.

But the situation would be much worse if the tunnel was not built. Without the tunnel, the drive south down Pennant Hills Road in the morning peak hour would increase from 18 minutes to 27 minutes by 2019, the government predicts.

For motorists prepared to pay a toll - likely to be more than \$7 one way - the trip should take as little as five minutes.

The chairman in transport and



logistics network modelling at Sydney University's Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies, Michiel Bliemer, said he had not studied the NorthConnex proposals but that, in general, the construction of new toll roads tended to induce more traffic on to alternative free roads.

"Just building roads does not always help, that is what is known," Professor Bliemer said. "Building more roads makes it more attractive to drive a car."

For motorists and communities along Pennant Hills Road, one of the main potential improvements of the project will be fewer trucks along the corridor.

The government plans to mandate that all trucks can use the underground motorway tunnels, where they will need to pay a toll of about \$20 one way.

The mayor of Hornsby, Steve Russell, said he was a big supporter of the NorthConnex project - in particular for clearing trucks off the road - but had some concern over the planned location of two exhaust stacks near housing.

Mr Russell said the exhaust

stacks could be built further from housing at relatively little extra cost. Residents will have the opportunity to comment on the environmental impact statement for 60 days.

Tolls on the M7 motorway will be extended for seven years to help pay for NorthConnex, which the state opposition has said is unfair to residents of western Sydney.

A spokeswoman for Roads and Maritime Services said: "Pennant Hills Road is currently at a standstill daily due to accidents or breakdowns."

"NorthConnex will ease traffic congestion, improve local amenity and connectivity for people living and working in the area by removing around 5000 heavy vehicles from Pennant Hills Road every day."

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JUNE 2014
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25 JUNE

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Thank you for attending this informal meeting.

As my voice is not very loud I would like you to briefly look at the papers I have prepared and draft suggestions. I apologise that my memory for names is not as good as it used to be.

You are welcome to look at some of the many publications and a few documents I have. A few are on the table tennis table.

Please let me have your name and contact details if you feel you may like to be involved. Otherwise you should be able to see what is on - *M1TunnelVision* - in about two weeks.

NorthConnex is opening an Information Centre for at least 3 days a week. It appears it will be on the corner of Pennant Hills and Yarrara Roads. I do not know when the EIS will be released.

If you have any concerns about my proposals please let me know so that I can hopefully resolve them by amending my proposals to assist the affected and wider community best interests.

If built, the tunnel is proposed to be under our home. As a former builder, I believe there may be some deleterious affects on properties near the tunnel portals and access shafts.

Sincerely

Peter Waite 9484 3471 waitepeter@bigpond.com

Discussion paper:- M1TunnelVision.org - meeting 25 June 2014
Informal committee. It is intended this be a one off meeting. NB: Away 30 June – 3 July.

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Purpose:

It will **NOT** be *glossy* or advise residents what they should or should not do, or require people or groups to send us their submissions relating to **M1TunnelVision.org**

Publish contact details for NorthConnex, relevant authorities, politician's contact details and other such information to assist people to make informed comments.

This is an '**Information system**' to enable concerned residents to have as much credible information as possible, and learn about problems that had not been anticipated.

Ideas to assist in formatting submissions. Ensure the Department of Planning impartially assesses every submission and does not allocate them into groups, unless 100% identical, to prevent them avoiding assessing every submission.

What can be done if the Dept of Planning fails to properly assess submissions?

Web site:

Decide if the Beecroft Cheltenham, P.H. West Pennant Hills and Wahroonga Groups are prepared to nominate a contact person/s details on the website.

Information and accuracy of author or source of:

Reports, traffic counts, future traffic estimates, photos, letters, emails, newspaper articles and media releases etc to be checked and if necessary commented on.

Authors and source of material must be included in all texts.

We should challenge statements such as '**it is anticipated**' in 'EIS' to prevent the avoidance of contentious issues. If this happens demand a revised EIS to be prepared for public consultation before any determination is made

I agree with former RTA Chief Bruce Loader's 10.4.2008 SMH article explaining how politicians **now** make decisions about matters they do not understand.

Operation:

I am prepared to act as an email contact for collection and processing of material but do not have a scanning facility to forward printed items to my Web provider.

Conditions:

Send NorthConnect the website address to look at and respond if they choose.

No responsibility is accepted for the accuracy or relevance of information – add a disclaimer.

Involved groups/residents to prepare and submit relevant material to me.

Cost:

I will meet the cost of processing information and website. **Peter Waite**

Important INFORMATION HELD at 25 June 2014

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1. Sinclair Knight Mertz reports and submissions 2001 – 2004 SKM directed not to comply with its *Terms of Reference* by State & Federal bureaucrats.
2. Subsequent meetings/correspondence 2005 & 2006
3. 22 January 2007 *A compelling case for a second Crossing of the Hawkesbury River* after the F3, Pacific Highway and rail lines all closed for 3 days by bushfire.
4. 10 March 2006 packed meeting at Pennant Hills Community Centre voted unanimously to support second Hawkesbury River crossing. Hopwood, Tink, O'Farrell present.
5. 16 March 2006 Advocate *Local MPs seek tunnel inquiry* Hopwood, Tink, O'Farrell
6. 28 June 2007 *Libs challenge lemma Govt to fast-track new road north* – MPs Richardson, Williams, Hartcher; *This would involve a new bridge over the Hawkesbury . . .*
7. SMH 10 April 2008 Former RTA head Bruce Loader explains how Treasury is major problem now that most works are done the contractors.
8. 4 July 2007 *Public inquiries are not what they used to be, but we still need them*
9. Sept 2011 Board meeting *'the President (Mayor Berman) tabled a proposal for NSROC a consolidated Financial Report of the research on the potential M2/F3 Road link. Did this come from Transurban?* [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
10. 19 July 2012 Minister Gay/Transurban media releases re tunnel proposal.
11. Pennant Hills Civic Trust April 2014 newsletter questions NorthConnex credibility
12. Advocate late May 2014, O'Farrell ***Firing up over smoke stack***
13. 6 June 2014 meeting Waite/MP Williams, Sec. to Minister Gay re three serious issues
14. 17 June 2014 Telegraph p2 Outer orbital link with M7/M2
15. 19 June 2014 AFR p48 Outer Orbital link (& rail) over 2nd Hawkesbury crossing
16. ABC 4 Corners **23 June 2014** Dr Kerri Schott ex CEO Sydney Water and others made it clear [REDACTED]. ICAC Com. lpp; *corruption in NSW and National Liberal Parties that should be subject to urgent Inquiries.* lpp asked who can the electorate trust? Where is the ***Liberal leadership ?***

27 JUNE 2014

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\$13b motorway Confusion over plans

Gay admits he may have gone 'too early' with WestConnex

Jacob Saulwick
Transport

The order in which the \$13 billion WestConnex motorway will be built is clouded in confusion after Roads Minister Duncan Gay conceded he may have released plans for the project "too early".

Changes to the project also mean the Baird government could spend tens of millions of dollars on homes and businesses it no longer needs to buy. Under plans announced late last year, the first stages of the 33-kilometre project to be built were a widened M4 motorway to Strathfield and then a M4 East tunnel under Parramatta Road to Ashfield.

But the M4 East tunnel may be dug after separate tunnels are built to connect the Anzac Bridge and Victoria Road directly with Tempe, Camperdown and Leichhardt.

Premier Mike Baird and Mr Gay announced this month they could extend WestConnex to the north and south if the state's electricity poles and wires were sold.

But it was not clear at the time that sections of WestConnex already announced would also be built in a different order. Shooters and Fishers MP Robert Borsak has said that at a meeting three weeks ago with Mr Gay and WestConnex Delivery Authority chairman Tony Shepherd, he was told the M4 East tunnel to Ashfield would not be the first section built.

Mr Gay said on Thursday Mr Borsak's claim was correct.

While the Roads Minister did not provide any details, this might mean the recently announced tunnels between Anzac Bridge and Parramatta Road could be constructed earlier.

"If that adds up, and we are do-

ing the evaluation at the moment, it may mean that the sequencing would change," Mr Gay said.

The overhaul means some homes and businesses slated for compulsory acquisition near Parramatta Road may not be required. But Mr Gay said if people still wanted to sell, the government would buy their properties.

"If we've made an offer to someone for their house and we change what we are going to do with it, that offer stands," he said.

"By going out early to engage the community as soon as possible, we've indicated that we might have needed buildings that we may not need in the future.

"You've got to balance between going out as early as possible and maybe going too early," he said.

Ashfield mayor Lucille McKenna called the confusion created by the changes "laughable".

"Here we've had this massive project announced, people told their homes and businesses are going, and now we are told the sequencing might be different, it will be all good," she said.

Labor's roads spokesman, Walt Secord, said a cloak of secrecy had descended on the WestConnex project. "In Duncan Gay's narrow world, anyone trying to apply rigour to his decision-making is committing treason and supports traffic congestion."

Mr Borsak recently agreed to Mr Gay's request to block a parliamentary inquiry into WestConnex. The Shooters and Fishers MP, who lives in Ashfield, said this had helped save Ashfield Park from partial destruction for the motorway.

A spokeswoman for the WestConnex Delivery Authority said more detail on the new tunnels would be handed to government later.

Cheap tribunal proposed for home compo fighters

KIRSTY NEEDHAM STATE POLITICS EDITOR

PAGE 9 Sun Herald 29 JUNE 2014

Residents who face losing their homes for new roads and rail should be able to take their fight for compensation to a low-cost tribunal for a fairer outcome, Labor says.

The Baird government's plans for WestConnex, NorthConnex, the North West Rail Link, new light rail in inner Sydney and Parramatta and a raft of new roads in western Sydney will displace thousands of families.

Labor will use the special sitting of Parliament on Wednesday to give notice of an amendment to the land acquisition law in the upper house.

Negotiations already under way between Transport NSW and home owners in Surry Hills and Haberfield have become bitter. Residents complain the government has made below-market offers.

Only 20 of 69 owners at the Olivia Gardens apartments in Surry Hills have struck a deal with Transport NSW, despite an August deadline for compulsory acquisitions to make way for a light rail route.

"If I haven't agreed by that date, my apartment isn't mine any more," Carsten Koehler, 47, said. "I will have to go to the Land and Environment Court. It's putting so much stress on me. I need to find somewhere to live."

Mr Koehler has lived in his "perfect" home for 10 years and believes the initial offer of \$820,000 for his two-bedroom, air-conditioned apartment was "a joke".

He loves the vibrancy of Surry Hills, where he can "walk everywhere", and says he wants to stay in the area.

Amid a property market boom, Transport NSW has raised its offer, but Mr Koehler says it is still \$30,000 less than other neighbours have been paid. "I'm still negotiating and I'm not getting anywhere," he says.

The tactics and delays by the gov-

**I'm still negotiating
and I'm not getting
anywhere.'**

Carsten Koehler, Surry Hills

ernment negotiators were "shameful", he said.

Some families who had agreed on a price had been left waiting months for payment and forced into expens-

ive bridging finance to purchase new homes.

Labor wants these disputes to be heard in the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, which would cost \$500, and give faster remedies.

"This is about giving a fair hearing to local families," Opposition Leader John Robertson said.

Labor believes the proximity of a home to transport, shops, schools, parks or family should also be considered in any government valuation.

"This legislation gives the community the opportunity to pursue claims that they feel are unjust and do not take into account their unique circumstances," Mr Robertson said.

Labor transport spokeswoman Penny Sharpe said residents being displaced by infrastructure projects

felt the government "is running right over the top of them".

Sue O'Keefe is another Olivia Gardens resident who finally agreed to a price with Transport NSW last month but is unhappy with the "appalling process" that, at one point, had the government renege on a price agreed by its valuer.

"We were going to stay here for 20 years and had just spent \$200,000 renovating two apartments," she said. Transport NSW told her she would not be compensated for the renovations and refused to allow her to take her new Miele kitchen appliances with her, raising her suspicions.

Ms O'Keefe says a tribunal process would be faster and cheaper than going to court.

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29 June 2014
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ramedics could not revive the soldier.

to whether all poten-
teasures were taken,
lpine environment,
in the very high
Mt Cook, always carry
s."

The conditions on Mt Cook were
a little unusual for the season, in
that there had been far less snow-
fall and the temperature was
warmer than normal, he said.

Timaru Herald, The Press

off for sex with killer

ving a house built for
" and "she wanted to
7 with him".

uesday, the NSW Civil
nistrative Tribunal
ergmeier used "fore-
anning and subter-
ceal the relationship
pervisors and "flaun-
rity system for the
er own personal grat-

August 2011 but
stayed in contact
with him, visit-
ing him at Man-
nus Correctional
Centre, having
close relation-
ships with his
family and
friends, and ap-
plying to be his
sponsor for day leave.

She continues to be in a relation-
ship with Client A, who was
paroled in March this year and
lives with Ms Bergmeier's mother.

The tribunal reprimanded Ms
Bergmeier in the strongest possible
terms, cancelled her registration as
a psychologist and banned her from
providing health services in both
the public and private sectors.



Bobbie Maree
Bergmeier

colleague's password
information into Cli-
e notes and falsely
ther psychologist as
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used the false name
s to take around 300
from him during the
ked at the prison.
aed from the job in

July 2014
WestConnex Drivers to pay for longer

doc/s

23

Gay reverses direction on M5 toll plan for new roads

■ Jacob Saulwick

Motorists across western Sydney
will likely be paying tolls for extra
decades to help fund new motor-
ways through Sydney's inner sub-
urbs and north.

Roads Minister Duncan Gay
confirmed on Wednesday that the
government would consider selling
the right to toll the M5 West near
Liverpool beyond 2026, when that
toll is set to expire.

The government has already
agreed to allow the owner of the
M7 motorway across Sydney's
west to charge tolls for another 11
years to help fund the NorthCon-
nex motorway, which is to be built
under Pennant Hills Road.

Fairfax Media revealed in April
the financing strategy for the
WestConnex motorway to run
largely through the inner west in-
cluded plans to sell the right to toll
the M5 West motorway until 2060
for \$1.7 billion.

At the time the government said
the report - based on a leaked
Macquarie Capital financing
strategy - was "wrong".

But speaking at a press confer-
ence with Premier Mike Baird on
Wednesday, Mr Gay confirmed
that allowing companies to charge
western Sydney motorists tolls for
a longer period was in the frame.

"As we look at financing options
in the future, that has to be one of
the options that could be con-
sidered," Mr Gay said, when asked
directly if he would consider selling
the right to toll the M5 motorway
beyond 2026.

The Labor opposition has criti-
cised the practice of selling the
rights to charge tolls on one motor-
way to help pay for others.

Opposition roads spokesman
Walt Secord has said it was unfair
that motorists on the M7 would



Fairfax Media reported the toll plan
in April.

have to pay tolls for longer to pay
for the NorthConnex motorway,
which they may not use.

"The state government and its
minister have an obligation to tell
the community what they will be
paying in tolls, how long they will
pay and where the extension of the
tolls will go," Mr Secord said.

Mr Gay was speaking at a press
conference to announce that a pro-
ject to widen the M5 West should
be finished by the end of the year.

Early stages of that project - a
third lane for a four-kilometre
stretch from the Camden Valley
Way to the George River Bridge -
should be open to motorists in the
next fortnight.

Mr Gay said extending the toll
on the M7 was not the same as
charging people on that road more
to pay for the NorthConnex.

The M7 toll was due to expire in
2037, but will be extended to 2048
to raise money for the North-
Connex.

"An extension is different to put-
ting an extra toll on," Mr Gay said.

"It is a rather cute thought that
we can build roads at no cost and
someone doesn't have to pay for
them."

----- Original Message -----

Subject: RE: EIS

Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2014 15:13:24 +1000

From: Enquiries NorthConnex <enquiries@northconnex.com.au>

To: Peter Waite <waitepeter2>

10 July 2014 about:blank
doc/s *24
60

Dear Mr Waite,

Thank you for your email.

Roads and Maritime Services have confirmed that hard copies of the EIS document will not be provided to individuals.

During the public exhibition period the EIS documents will be displayed in hard copy at a number of set and advertised locations.

In addition, the document will be provided on the project website as well as the Department of Planning and Environment's website, NorthConnex would be happy to provide a copy on CD, we will send this out after the EIS has been released. The EIS is due for release

If you have any further questions about NorthConnex please call the project information line on 1800 997 057. Further information can be found on our website.

Kind regards,

NorthConnex Project Team

www.northconnex.com.au

Project information line: 1800 997 057 (free call)

Email: enquiries@northconnex.com.au

Collection Statement

Transurban and the Westlink M7 shareholders respect people's privacy. Where you have provided your personal information to us in relation to a complaint about how your personal information has been handled. Our privacy policy is available on our website at www.transur

From: Peter Waite [waitepeter@bigpond.com]

Sent: Friday, 4 July 2014 5:19 PM

To: Enquiries NorthConnex

Subject: EIS

Hi Tim

When the EIS is available could I have a hard copy and CD as my old Mac computer will probably not be able to open it on NorthConnex website.

Hard copy is easier to cross reference sections with tags other information that may be available.

I notice the shop on the corner of Pennant Hills and Yarrara Road appears to be set up to be the NorthConnex office.

If it is, could the hard copy be left there for me and I could pay if there is a cost by cheque or bankcard.

Is there any indication when the EIS may be available?

Regards

Peter Waite

Questions for NorthConnex from Peter Waite

contact details on NorthConnex file

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Air pollution forum Hornsby 30 July 2014.

Address after 'capsgroup.org' and other air quality groups issues are satisfied

1: Why wasn't this statement in SKM report addressed in the EIS?

(SKM 2 day Value Man. Workshop No2 Record– 17/18 Sep. 2003 p5. RTA's Dr Kishan:

"there are not many examples in the world of tunnels 6-8 km long and certainly none in Australia. Therefore, if the project proceeds there will be a multitude of technical challenges to be addressed, not to mention the social challenges that would arise".

2: Has the "project and independent air quality specialists taken it into account" or will they, and when?

3: Apart from tunnel estimates, have vehicle emission estimates been made and assessed for increased and stationary traffic by say 2025, or another year, for the Pearce's Corner, Pacific Highway, Hornsby Hospital and M1 precinct?

4a: If not, will it be done?

4b: or explain why it will not be done?

4c: or why it is irrelevant to an adverse impact on this environment.

SEE OVER

5: Issues are too long and complicated for this forum

63

5: How will this 24/7 southbound traffic problem be overcome to reduce what should be unnecessary vehicle emissions especially in the AM peak hours?

A 3-lane choke point exists on the M1 before three lanes become four then five. (Two are Pacific Highway off ramps. The second added about three years ago.) As traffic increases, delays will increase. There are no simple plans, traffic projections or advice to indicate how the tunnel will reduce existing AM congestion.

I estimate about 60% of southbound traffic now goes onto Pennant Hills Road and 40% onto the Pacific Highway. AM traffic is often reported to be queued back to Bobbin Head Road and further North if there has been a break down or accident.

I am advised, large trucks on the 110 K M1 should be in the left two lanes. Those that go to Pennant Hills Road, will have to change into the two right hand lanes across the two tunnel lanes before that traffic goes into the tunnel in the one kilometre distance after the 80K speed limit. **Where is this issue addressed in the EIS?**

Reliance on existing traffic lights and sequences for Pennant Hills Road, Pearce's Corner, Pacific Highway, M1 and nearby lights already cannot handle peak traffic that will increase even if the tunnel is built. **Has this been addressed and resolved?**

The only traffic count references staff at "Pennant Hills Community Information Centre" could find is in "Volume 2, page 33, 3.2.5.2 Intersection traffic volumes December 2013 (outside of school holidays)" to understand traffic behaviour.

December traffic times can vary greatly and cannot be regarded as normal. Traffic counts in March April or September October would be more reliable provided they were done away from public, school holidays and when there was no breakdowns, road works or accidents.

Table 3.8 Totals "AM PH Rd M1: 4,510, PH Rd Pacific Hwy 4,510, M1 Pacific Hwy 4,690." Are these totals in one or both directions.

Page 48 Pacific Highway corridor 4,1,2.2 Table 4.6 sets out AM-PM average speeds indicate an unsatisfactory level of service. The tunnel will make little if any difference.

NorthConnex July 2014 EIS: "Further opportunity was provided for interested parties to provide input into the assessment of corridor alignment options through the Pearlman Review in 2007. As part of the review, the public were invited to make submissions on the 2004 report. A total of 53 submissions were received in early 2007, and each submitter was invited to present a submission at one of the three public meetings before the Hon Mahla Pearlman AO in June 2007. **Issues raised in submissions and through the public meeting were considered in formulating the recommendations of the 2007 Pearlman Review.**" p28 xxvi Whilst extract is correct, **this does not assist the credibility of the NorthConnex EIS.**

On **24 July 2014** I filed a request for "a simple sketch to show the lanes without any other detail, and how truck drivers will safely change from low speed lanes across high-speed lanes. " **When will reply be sent so I can complete my submission?**

SEE OVER for questions 1 - 4 to be resolved at the forum, or an EIS addendum

GIPA application re EIS submitted on 5 August 2014 questions 1 – 7. New 8 - 15

- Paper 2
1. Dated copy of authorisation for completed EIS to be printed
 2. Dated copy of authorisation for EIS to be released
 3. Date EIS publicly released
 4. Provisions for when third North lane tunnel is operating north of the tunnel
 5. How the estimated 40% of PM traffic from the Pacific Highway and Pennant Hills Road is able to join peak hour when there is 100% tunnel traffic?
 6. Provision in Acts or regulations permitting an incomplete EIS to be released for public comment
 7. Provisions in Acts or regulations etc permitting fundamental problems be submitted to M/s X. X, manager Department of Planning and Environment for her team to assess the above without them being in the authorised EIS

NEW QUESTIONS

- Paper 2
8. Existing Pennant Hills Road M1 entry has a long lay-by used by truck drivers to check their loads, change tyres, carry out repairs or have designated driving breaks. Wide loads are often there for days. **Will this lay-by still be available, or what provision is being made for these trucks.**
 9. **Or is the intent to force trucks to use the tunnel then divert to the Pacific Highway Berowra lay-by contrary to the stated objective to remove trucks 24/7?**
 10. DOTARS engaged Masson Wilson Twiney (MWT) to review SKM's calculations. MWT's 22 March 2007 Executive Summary "page vii" concluded:
"Beyond 2021, when capacity of a six lane F3 is likely to be exceeded in peak periods, a type C (western F3-M7) option may become a justifiable project, depending upon the manner in which Sydney, the Central Coast and Lower Hunter develop. Consequently, a decision will be required about a long-term solution to traffic capacity in the Sydney Orbital to Central Coast corridor. This will revolve around:
 - *An eight-lane F3. How will this be done and who will pay?*
 - *A Type C option (western) No comment*
 11. *Both will require augmentation in the Sydney road network."* **What plans have been made for these 'augmentation works'?**

12. When will they be identified?

13. When will they be done?

14. Who will pay?

15. Does a cost-benefit analysis exist? If so, where is it in the EIS, Or, if not, WHY?

SMH 6 August 2014 page/s: 7 *Transurban keeps its tax burden low*
21 and 26 *Transurban's tolled gold*
26 and 28 *Cruising to even greater profit*

Transurban's PR experts are setting up governments to take the blame if the unsolicited offer is rejected. The EIS is based on flawed assumptions which I will disclose after I receive a reply to my GIPA application to determine if the EIS should be withdrawn.

Please do not let me hear anyone say "why weren't we told"

Peter Waite

Barry O'Farrell MP

State MP for Ku-ring-gai



6 August 2014

65

Mr Peter Waite
28 Warne Street
PENNANT HILLS NSW 2120

Dear Mr Waite

Peter

Thank you for your email dated 2 August 2014 concerning the NorthConnex Environmental Impact Statement.

I have read your email and have noted your concerns.

I have written directly to Hon Pru Goward MP, the Minister for Planning, asking for her advice on the issues you have raised.

I will be back in touch when I hear back from the Minister.

Yours sincerely

Barry O'Farrell

Working for our community



8 Aug 2014

66

Better now than later

Scrap the M1-M2 tunnel

A wise decision by the Minister NOT to approve the project 'without development consent. Clause 94 of State Environmental Planning Policy (Infrastructure) 2007.'

On the 25 October 2013 the project was declared by Ministerial Order to be State significant infrastructure and critical State significant infrastructure under sections 115U (4) and 115V of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979. As such, Roads and Maritime is seeking approval for the project under Part 5.1 of that Act. (EIS volume 1A xxiii)

By accepting 'Transurban's unsolicited offer' the Minister ignored

1. Canberra directed SKM to recommend a short-term option
"SKM 2002 VM Workshop No2 Record p22"
2. RTA directed SKM not to recommend a western option
SKM Dural 28 August 2003 "Focus Group Meeting Notes"
3. 'Executive Summary' 'What is proposed?' 'Roads and Maritime Services (RMS) is proposing to construct and operate (repeated for emphasis) "OPERATE" a tolled motorway linking the M1 Pacific Highway at Wahroonga to the Hills Motorway at West Pennant Hills.'
(EIS vol. 1A at xxi)
4. Who is 'NorthConnex' and what legal authority does it actually have?

If RMS cannot be trusted, who can?

A 'costly farce' questioning our government's credibility BY letters, emails, phone discussions, and an amicable meeting in the Minister's office on 13 December 2012. I warned the Minister's senior media adviser why Transurban's offer should be rejected. His office has all the documents I am referring to.

Promises made at that meeting and phone commitments were not kept.

Will NorthConnex advise the Minister to scrap the project?

Read on for more flaws; NorthConnex EIS; "What alternatives were considered:

"The project has a long history of identification and evaluation of alternatives and options commencing with the F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study (SKM 2004) (the 2004 report) through to the recent design and construct tender process" (xxiii) and is misrepresented!

Another misrepresentation: 'Sinclair Knight Mertz (SKM) 2004 Main Report p1 par 1 . . . report on a study to identify preferred options for a new National Highway link through northern Sydney between the F3 Sydney to Newcastle Freeway and the Sydney Orbital.'

Not convinced? I have nine more pages of hard evidence as to why the tunnel should be *scrapped*

Peter Waite, Pennant Hills

Questions for 8 Aug Pennant Hills last "NorthConnex Community drop in session"

66

GIPA (FOI) 5 August application (list) for documents about the EIS; 1-7, New 8-15

1. Copy of authorisation for completed EIS to be printed?
2. Copy of authorisation for EIS to be released?
3. Date EIS publicly released?
4. What space is made for the third north lane tunnel to M1 when required?
5. How will traffic from the Pacific Highway and Pennant Hills Road join peak hour traffic when the 3 tunnel lanes may be at capacity on the M1 3 lanes by 2021?
6. Provision in Acts or regulations permitting an incomplete EIS to be released for public comment?
7. Provisions in Acts or regulations etc permitting 'NorthConnex' to submit new or revised plans to the Department of Planning and Environment to assess without the public knowing or being able to make further submissions?

NEW QUESTIONS as at 8 August 2014

8. Existing Pennant Hills Road M1 entry has a long lay-by used by truck drivers to check their loads, change tyres, carry out repairs or have designated driving breaks. Wide loads are often there for days. Will this lay-by still be available, or what provision is being made for these trucks?
9. Is the intent for trucks to use tunnel and go via the Pacific Highway to Berowra lay-by contrary to objective to remove trucks from residential areas 24/7?
10. DOTARS engaged Masson Wilson Twiney (MWT) to review SKM's calculations. MWT's 22 March 2006 Executive Summary "page vii" concluded:
"Beyond 2021, when capacity of a six lane F3 is likely to be exceeded in peak periods, a type C (western F3-M7) option may become a justifiable project, depending upon the manner in which Sydney, the Central Coast and Lower Hunter develop. Consequently, a decision will be required about a long-term solution to traffic capacity in the Sydney Orbital to Central Coast corridor. This will revolve around":
 - An eight-lane F3.' How will this be done and who will pay?
 - A Type C option (western)' When will it be done?
11. *Both will require augmentation in the Sydney road network."* What plans have been made for these 'augmentation works'?

12. When will the works be identified?

13. When will the works be done?

14. Who will pay for the works?

15. Does a cost-benefit analysis exist? If so, where is it in the EIS? Or, if not, WHY?

SMH 6 August 2014 page/s: 7 'Transurban keeps its tax burden low' GREAT!

21 - 26 'Transurban's tolled gold' Well done!

26 - 28 'Cruising to even greater profit' at taxpayers cost!

August 2014 geotech works leaflet: p2 *'(should the NorthConnex project be approved).'*

I believe Transurban's PR team may have set up the government to take the blame if their offer is rejected. I also believe the EIS is based on flawed assumptions that are impossible to prove until all relevant documents are made public in a new EIS.

Politicians, please do not ask 'why weren't we told'

Peter Waite, Pennant Hills

I thank you for contacting the NorthConnex project team

67/11

Subject: Thank you for contacting the NorthConnex project team
From: Enquiries NorthConnex <enquiries@northconnex.com.au>
Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2014 19:58:12 +1000
To: Peter Waite <waitepeter@bigpond.com>

Thank you for contacting the NorthConnex project team, and your interest in the project.

Due to the number of highly technical enquiries received, and the time required to respond, we are aiming to respond to all emails within 5-10 business days.

For any urgent matters please do not hesitate to call the project information line on 1800 997 057 (free call).

Regards,

NorthConnex Project Team

www.northconnex.com.au

Project information line: 1800 997 057 (free call)

Email: enquiries@northconnex.com.au

NorthConnex

Please consider the environment before printing this email

Collection Statement

Transurban and the Westlink M7 shareholders respect people's privacy. Where you have provided your personal information to us in relation to the NorthConnex project, your personal information will be used solely for the purpose of providing you with information regarding the NorthConnex project, including to send you project and community updates.

We may be disclose your personal information to other Transurban Group entities and third parties working with us on the NorthConnex project for this purpose. Otherwise Transurban and the Westlink M7 shareholders will not disclose your personal information without your consent unless authorised or required by law. We will always take steps to ensure your personal information is kept secure and is handled in a way that is consistent with the Australian Privacy Principles.

Our privacy policy explains how we collect, use and disclose personal information, including how to contact us with access or correction requests or if you wish to make a complaint about how your personal information has been handled. Our privacy policy is available on our website at www.transurban.com/privacy or you can ask one of the project information representatives to send you a copy by mail.

Privileged/Confidential information may be contained in this message. If you are not the addressee indicated in this message (or responsible for delivery of the message to such person), you may not copy or deliver this message to anyone. In such a case, you should destroy this message and kindly notify the sender by reply e-mail or by telephone on (03) 9612-6999 or +61 3 9612-6999.

Please advise immediately if you or your employer does not consent to Internet e-mail for messages of this kind.

Opinions, conclusions and other information in this message that do not relate to the official business of Transurban Limited or any companies within the Transurban Group shall be understood as neither given nor endorsed by them.

67/2

UNSOLICITED PROPOSALS

How can the Premier resolve this?

NSW Government guide for submission and assessment 2014 (2012) PROBITY:

NorthConnex EIS Main volume 1A Table 6.5 Interagency meetings 26 June 2013 item 222.

"Interagency regulatory meeting No.1 was held with the Environment Protection Authority, the Department of Planning and Infrastructure (now the Department of Planning and Environment) and NSW Health. The purpose of the meeting was to introduce the project discuss the planning approvals process and identify likely key environmental issues."

"The unsolicited proposals process in NSW, as outlined in Unsolicited Proposals: Guide for Submission and Assessment (NSW Government, 2014) (revised and updated since its original publication in 2012), is a consistent, transparent and streamlined approach for the receipt, assessment and determination of unsolicited proposals that may be developed and submitted by the private sector for works and/ or activities that would have historically been conducted by Government. Unsolicited proposals and the guidelines that govern their assessment and published on the NSW Government website (<http://www.nsw.gov.au/your-government/unsolicited-proposals>). The unsolicited proposal received by Government from Transurban and the Westlink M7 Motorway Sponsors in relation to the NorthConnex project has been conducted strictly in accordance with published guidelines that govern unsolicited proposals."

Probity in NSW State guide at 3.5 as referred to by NorthConnex, which is only a name and not a legal entity.

The EIS states the Minister is the proponent, not Transurban and Westlink.

Extracts:

Government seeks to conduct its commercial dealings with integrity. The assessment of Unsolicited Proposals must be fair, open and demonstrate the highest levels of probity consistent with the public interest. . . .

Maintaining impartiality a clearly defined separation of duties and personnel between the assessment and approval functions.

Maintaining accountability and transparency Accountability and transparency are related concepts. The demonstration of both is crucial to the integrity of the assessment. Accountability requires that all participants be accountable for their actions.

Transparency refers to the preparedness to open a project and its processes to scrutiny' debate and possible criticism.

Maintaining confidentiality there is a need for high levels of accountability and transparency . . . at least for a specified time. That time has long passed.

4.9 Probity adviser may be appointed for large-scale projects or where probity risk is considered to be important – usually at Stages 2 and 3 of the assessment process.

6 PROCESS FLOWCHART does not make provision for an EIS or community consultation.

QUESTION

As Transurban and RTA officers have been involved in the EIS, property acquisitions, responding to technical enquiries, they cannot be seen to be openly complying with the PROPOSALS NSW Government guide for submission and assessment 2014 (2012 updated)?

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By accepting 'Transurban's unsolicited offer' the Minister ignored:

1. Canberra directed SKM to recommend a short-term option
"SKM 2002 VM Workshop No2 Record p22"
2. RTA directed SKM not to recommend a western option
SKM Dural 28 August 2003 "Focus Group Meeting Notes"
3. Executive Summary 'What is proposed?' 'Roads and Maritime Services (RMS) is proposing to construct and operate a tolled motorway linking the M1 Pacific Highway at Wahroonga to the Hills Motorway at West Pennant Hills. (EIS vol.1A xxi4. Who is 'NorthConnex' and what legal authority does it actually have? At the Pennant Hills 8 August 2014 Community drop in session, a Transurban and NorthConnex officer both admitted 'NorthConnex' is only a name with no legal rights.

The Pearlman report was based on DOTARS engaged Masson Wilson Twiney (MWT) to review SKM's calculations. MWT's 22 March 2007 Executive Summary "page vii" concluded:

"Beyond 2021, when capacity of a six lane F3 is likely to be exceeded in peak periods, a type C (western F3-M7) option may become a justifiable project, depending upon the manner in which Sydney, the Central Coast and Lower Hunter develop. Consequently, a decision will be required about a long-term solution to traffic capacity in the Sydney Orbital to Central Coast corridor. This will revolve around':

- An eight-lane F3.'
- A Type C option (western)'

Both will require augmentation in the Sydney road network."

The Minister made a wise decision not to approve the project 'without development consent. Clause 94 of State Environmental Planning Policy (Infrastructure) 2007.'

On the 25 October 2013 the project was declared by Ministerial Order to be State significant infrastructure and critical State significant infrastructure under sections 115U (4) and 115V of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979. As such, Roads and Maritime is seeking approval for the project under Part 5.1 of that Act. (EIS volume 1A xxiii)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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The 'Review of Future Provision of Motor ways in NSW December 2005 Infrastructure Implementation Group, The Premier's Department' 64 page booklet states on page 51 "**Commercial-in-Confidence material**" at point 4 'In the event of disagreement between an agency and the "preferred tenderer" or a member of the public as to what should be disclosed (for example) there may be some disagreement as to what constitutes intellectual property or commercial-in-confidence material) the agency must seek the advice of : The Chairman State Contract Control Board.'

Why did the Minister for Roads and Ports office fail to release details that should be in the public arena? Under the Government Information Public Access Act (old FOI) I twice applied for details of Transurban's unsolicited offer and was thwarted each time. As yet few know what transpired.

If the government ignores my request to abandon the tunnel, it should be rejected by the Department of Planning as it would not meet their guidelines. Sam Haddad director general of Planning & Environment. SMH 20 July 2010

- **"Getting it right on development projects . . . Giving the Department of Planning a role in assessing larger, more complex development applications ensures that all concerned parties have their voices heard . . ."**
- **The department continues to strengthen its checks and balances to ensure probity and transparency of process and outcomes. . . ."**

Will NorthConnex advise the Minister to scrap the project?

I was not applying for the Transurban's commercial in confidence tender. Noting how many Labor and Liberal politicians, including Barry O'Farrell, have been caught out by ICAC, it is in the public interest that the State prove to the electorate at large that the process is open and transparent now to save wasting the Department of Planning's time and resources.

Read on for more flaws; NorthConnex EIS: "What alternatives were considered:
"The project has a long history of identification and evaluation of alternatives and options commencing with the F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study (SKM 2004) (the 2004 report) through to the recent design and construct tender process" (xxiii) and is misrepresented!

Another misrepresentation: 'Sinclair Knight Mertz (SKM) 2004 Main Report p1 par 1 . . . report on a study to identify preferred options for a new National Highway link through northern Sydney between the F3 Sydney to Newcastle Freeway and the Sydney Orbital.'

Not convinced? I have nine more pages of hard evidence as to why the tunnel should be scrapped." This submission has another XXX pages

Questions for 8 Aug Pennant Hills last "NorthConnex Community drop in session"

GIPA (FOI) 5 August application (list) for documents about the EIS; 1-7, New 8-15

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5. How will traffic from the Pacific Highway and Pennant Hills Road join peak hour traffic when the 3 tunnel lanes may be at capacity on the M1 3 lanes by 2021?
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NEW QUESTIONS as at 8 August 2014

8. Existing Pennant Hills Road M1 entry has a long lay-by used by truck drivers to check their loads, change tyres, carry out repairs or have designated driving breaks. Wide loads are often there for days. **Will this lay-by still be available, or what provision is being made for these trucks?**
9. **Is the intent for trucks to use tunnel and go via the Pacific Highway to Berowra lay-by contrary to objective to remove trucks from residential areas 24/7?**
11. Referred to the MWT report for the Pearlman revalidation of SKM's report.
12. When will the works be identified?
13. When will the works be done?
14. Who will pay for the works?
15. Does a cost-benefit analysis exist? If so, where is it in the EIS? Or, if not, WHY?

Collectively the State and NSW Federal MPs should be discussing this with their electorates before the next elections so that the community can decide what they want.

SMH 6 August 2014 page/s: 7 'Transurban keeps its tax burden low' GREAT!

21 - 26 'Transurban's tolled gold' Well done!

26 - 28 'Cruising to even greater profit' at taxpayers cost!

August 2014 geotech works leaflet: p2 '(should the NorthConnex project be approved).'

When read in their entirety, the enclosed copies of these articles about Transurban make it very clear that their goal is to increase its profits at the expense of the taxpayers. Why won't the State finance from loans and build infrastructure to pay off the loans and keep the profit to build more infrastructures?

I believe Transurban's PR team has set up the government to take the blame if their offer is rejected. I also believe the EIS is based on flawed assumptions that are impossible to prove until all relevant documents are made public in a new EIS. Politicians, please do not ask 'why weren't we told'.

Transurban's staff should never have been allowed to be part of the NorthConnex public information team as they have a clear conflict of interest.

SKM's 28 August 2003 Dural Focus Group "**Meeting notes**" were NOT included in their 11 volume 2004 report. Before the meeting started the SKM project manager took me aside and advised "SKM had been directed not to recommend options B or C".

PP then intimated to meeting "SKM would be recommending **one** of 'Four Feasible Type A options' (p2) . . . at **"3 Questions** from the group point 4 is "Need for change in attitude by government" Reply: "JB (RTA) "this is a transport study and

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RTA/DoTARS cannot dictate policy to DIPNR.”) P3 “4 Summary comments from community group representatives . . . “. SKM meeting notes made it very clear the majority opinion at Dural was that type C routes were the best option. Obviously this could not be in the EIS unless the meeting notes were available. PP is now retired.

What right do public servants have to dictate federal and state policy? **This became a political matter in 2003, again in 2012 and still continues.** Refer pages 9/10.

“Feedback received from the community and stakeholders was summarised and addressed in the 2004 report. The outcomes and recommendations of the 2004 report were informed by the community and stakeholders views on alternatives and corridor alignment options.”

In 2006 a public meeting at Pennant Hills attended by about 250 people including then MPs Hopwood, **O’Farrell**, Tink, councillors present and the public unanimously voted for a western option. Days later Hopwood, O’Farrell and Tink called for an inquiry after they realised SKM had been directed to recommend one “short-term option A” route.

Hopwood 2007 media release: “A compelling case for a second crossing of the Hawkesbury River” because bushfires closed the railway line, F3 and Pacific Highway for three days in January.

Then MPs Richardson, Williams and Hartcher supported the F3 – M7 link in August 2007. Collectively, this shows six MPs, some councillors and about 245 people supported a western option instead of a tunnel. How many more did who didn’t attend?

Pearlman Inquiry; The community did not know that in January 2007 Minister Lloyd agreed with Hills Motorway request for a review of SKM’s findings claiming there were discrepancies in the SKM report and the “link” should join the M2 further east.

DOTARS engaged **Masson Wilson Twiney (MWT)** to review SKM’s calculations. **MWT’s** 22 March 2006 Executive Summary concluded:

“Beyond 2021, when capacity of a six lane F3 is likely to be exceed in peak periods, a type C (western F3-M7) option may become a justifiable project, depending upon the manner in which Sydney, the Central Coast and Lower Hunter develop. Consequently, a decision will be required about a long-term solution to traffic capacity in the Sydney Orbital to Central Coast corridor. This will revolve around:

- *An eight-lane F3*
- *A Type C option (western)*

Both will require augmentation in the Sydney road network.” What plans have been made for these ‘augmentation works’ and when will they be identified and done?

“Measures to improve train accessibility from the Central Coast to Sydney and land use measures, among others, may defer the need for a long-term option, depending on their success. Conversely, faster than forecast travel demand may require a long-term option sooner.” **What measures have been taken to address these issues”**

Did NorthConnex know the MWT study existed and review it?

2 day Value Management Workshop No2 Record – 17/18 SEPTEMBER 2003 is selectively referred to in the EIS. Someone chose not to refer to the following extracts:

PRECIS: Participants (pA-2): DOTARS 3, RTA 7, RailCorp 3 Dept Infrastructure, Planning, Natural Resources 2, State Rail 1 NSW EPA 2, NSW National Parks 1, DEM(Aust) PL 1, SKM 10, Tierney Pike Kirkland 2, Total 32 (part time 4)

P1 "Key outcome Type A superior to Type B or C. Purple 'A' best tolled or untolled."

Page 5. Dr Kishan reports **"there are not many examples in the world of tunnels 6-8 km long and certainly none in Australia. Therefore, if the project proceeds there will be a multitude of technical challenges to be addressed, not to mention the social challenges that would arise"**. This statement is cause for deep concern and should have been addressed by the Minister before he accepted Purple A Option.

Page 7 indicates about 3 vehicles in 5 (60%) from the F3 travel down the Pacific Highway whilst the percentages indicate only 40% travel to the City and North East.

The same page indicates 57% of heavy vehicles have origins/destinations that would use Pennant Hills Road. (I.E. about 43% use Pacific Highway) This coincides with the figures given out at the Community Consultative meeting at Galston in August 2003.

Page 10/12 Six extracts from 30 questions/statements:

1. "20 year study too short for scale of project" "
2. "Do both options A& C need to be looked at for short/ling term option?"
3. "Type C needs to be convincingly rejected before any Type A Options can be seriously addressed."
4. "What value is placed on a second (strategic) Hawkesbury crossing?"
5. "**Peak hour congestion is predicted on Type A in as little as 10 years.**"

Page 22; 3.13.1: **"Following lengthy discussion, the instruction from DOTARS was that the Australian Government felt that examination of longer terms options was out side the scope of the Link study . . . "** This was contrary to SKM's instructions for a National Highway. Refer SKM Main report par 1.

This workshop raised some serious concerns over the proposed tunnel option. P10 53: "By building this new link there would be a redistribution of up to 20% of traffic in the corridor that would provide benefits throughout the rest of the northern network". This is misleading because the chosen route will have little if any affect on traffic on the Pacific Highway north or south of the F3.

Pages 11, 12 also raise traffic issues that have not been addressed in the study. In particular the last two on page 11. "Project justification is essential. Type C needs to be convincingly rejected before any of the type A Options can be seriously addressed. In considering the Type C scenario in comparison to type A, the following needs to be addressed - what value is placed on another crossing of the Hawkesbury River?"

That was nearly 11 years ago. **Where did NorthConnex address this in the EIS?** Selective editing to justify Transurban's offer indicates bias or lack of knowledge on the author/s and also those who checked the validity of the EIS for a \$3 plus billion project before it was published.

February 1994: "Community Bulletin Liverpool-Hornsby Highway Study" suggested a western (C type route). In 2002 SKM appointed. Pennant Hills Thornleigh Liberal Party Branch decided its concerns be known via as coming from the **'Concerned Citizens Group'**.

"In October and November 2013, four community information sessions were held to provide up to date information about the status of the project and the design and construct tender process . . . "

NorthConnex EIS extracts from the Pearlman report (concluded at iii):

"I have given due consideration to the MWT "interim report – F3 to Sydney Orbital Corridor Review (March 2006)" and concluded the following:"

1. "That the assumptions and data used in the SKM 'F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study 2004' were valid and reasonable at that time of the study;"
2. "that there have been changes affecting land use and traffic flows since the SKM Study's publication, but that these changes reinforce the selection of the preferred route; and"
3. "that the SKM Study recommendations progress as follows"
 - "a) the preferred route follow a Type A corridor Purple option be progressed to the next stages of investigation including detailed concept design and financial assessment and environmental impact assessment; and"
 - "(b) a type C corridor be planned now."

And why did NorthConnex omit this paragraph from its page iii references?:

"The NSW Government indicated in its submission to Review its intention to develop a discussion paper on the connect of the F3 to M2 and/or M7. I am confident that my Review has undertaken a sufficiently rigorous analysis of the proposed connect to both inform and direct any future NSW Government investigations. I would encourage both the Australian and NSW Governments to proceed directly with the next stages of a Type A Purple option link connecting the F3 to M2." **Has this discussion paper been produced and public comment sought?**

5 Public Input 5.1 Introduction page 75. "I deal here with issues raised in the public submissions and at the meeting in public."

NB: "From the submissions it is apparent that the community is concerned about effective transport planning in Sydney, and has made informed and knowledgeable comment about the planning process." **The time is long past for informed public being ignored and treated with contempt by politicians and bureaucrats.**

"Many of the issues raised in submissions were also raised during the community consultation process undertaken by SKM and SKM did in fact consider these concerns. But it is important to note that the SKM Study was a strategic study, designed to select a preferred route. The detailed assessment and design of the preferred route was a matter for a later stage. SKM envisages further refinement at stages extending beyond the SKM study and, as SKM said, members of the public will have further opportunity to express their concerns at these stages." P75 **NorthConnex; when was this done?** "Like SKM, I recommend that, if the preferred route is to proceed, the issues that I outline below should be carried through for consideration during the development of a concept proposal and the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)."

"By way of introduction, it should be noted that, of the 53 submissions received, the largest number came from persons in the Pennant Hills area. Figure 18 shows the location of those persons and organisations making submissions."

"Also by way of introduction, it is useful to note the preferences expressed by those persons and organisations making submissions for a preferred route. As figure 19 shows, most of the persons and organisations favoured a Type C corridor. Of these that accepted a Type A corridor, most preferred the purple option. However, the preferences varied." Correct but misleading. SKM directed not to recommend "C"

"Figure 18 – Number of submissions received by suburb;" (Précis table totals)
Pennant Hills 10, Chatswood 8. Sydney 5, Glenorie 4 five, two and sixteen at 1. (p76)

"Figure 19 – Preferred options indicated in the submissions;"

Type C 19, Type A Purple 8, Type A Yellow 7, Type A now and then type C 2, Type A all 1, Type B or C 1, Rail option 2, Not specified" 9. p76

"Appendix 2 - Individuals and Organisations that appeared Before the Chair at the Meetings in Public **Monday 18 (19 & 20) June**" p93/94 **"Mr Peter A Waite OAM JP, Organisation name N/A"** as I believed it would be inappropriate to disclose the "Concerned Citizens Group" was the "Liberal Party Pennant Hills Thornleigh branch".

Pearlman hearing transcript DOTARS representative at the hearing; **"MS RIGGS: I did hear Mr Waite say in his remarks to you that the terms of reference for the SKM study were changed halfway through the study and I simply have to refute that. The terms of reference for that SKM study were embodied as an appendix to the contract between the RTA and SKM at the time SKM took on that work. They were not changed during the course of that study."**

[REDACTED]

"We have, as a result of a request from Ms Armitage during the course of last week, provided you with a copy of the terms of reference."

"MS PEARLMAN: Yes. I knew that we had asked for it. I haven't yet seen those terms of reference, but that is important, because that submission has been raised by Mr Waite and at least one other person, so it is important that I look at that."

By the end of day one MS Pearlman realised no one including herself, knew the real purpose of the inquiry was Hills Motorway's attempt to gain more profit at less cost.

Pearlman Appendix 4: F3-M7 Corridor Selection – History p97/98 has a "Time Frame and Decision or Process" lists 17 references from 1980s to 19 February 2007.

December 2000 and two 4 January 2001 references include a similar phrases that show in a space of six weeks how terminology varies and disputes can be created:

"1999 . . . National . . . Standard Highway between WSO or M2 and the "F3 Freeway",

"2001 . . . interim National Highway from the F3 to the WSO or M2" and

"2001 . . . link from the F3 to the WSO or M2 to relieve pressure on Pennant Hills Road and to complete the National Highway through Sydney."

Why didn't NorthConnex quote from the MWT report?

Was community input sought after Transurban's unsolicited proposal was received, NorthConnex was created, an agreement made to accept the offer or the EIS was planned?

OR were sham 'spin doctor' meetings orchestrated in 2013 and 2014 to enable NorthConnex to claim there was "genuine community consultation"?

SKM's 2004 Working paper 2 – "Engineering Design and Costing report (p2) for a 3-lane tunnel was \$2.0 - \$2.2 billion." **Can NorthConnex can do it ten years later for \$2.65 billion? Or are there loopholes to gouge out more money?**

MP Judy Hopwood's 22 January 2007 Media Release "A compelling case for a second crossing of the Hawkesbury River" when bushfires closed the rail line, F3 and Pacific Highway for three days proved how vulnerable what are collectively the nations most important strategic routes, and why a second Hawkesbury crossing is essential.

NorthConnex: p25 (xxiii) *"What alternatives were considered? "The project has a long history of identification and evaluation of alternatives and options commencing with the F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study (SKM) (the 2004 report) through to the recent design and construct tender process for the project", still has to be proved.*

How can this be correct? *"Analysis conducted as part of the 2004 report determined that broad corridor type A best satisfied the planning and project objectives."*

"Options review" *"A review of the options analysis presented in the 2004 report was undertaken in 2007 by the Honourable Marla Pearlman AO (Chief Judge of the NSW Land and Environment Court) at the request of the Australian Government."*

The 2007 review concluded that the purple corridor alignment option should be the preferred route and should progress to the next stage of design and development.

"Tender process" *"A competitive design and construct tender process was undertaken in order to identify an innovative, cost effective and environmentally-responsive design within the purple corridor as identified and endorsed by the 2004 report and the 2007 Pearlman Review respectively" based on flawed assumptions.*

"The preferred tenderer was chosen after a thorough evaluation of the three tender submissions. The tender evaluation process provided a balanced consideration of engineering design requirements, project costs (including upfront capital expenditures and ongoing operational expenditure), and environmental and social impacts."

SKM's 2004 Forecast Traffic Volumes and costings

A NorthConnex officer stated at a Hornsby meeting: *"SKM's traffic projections were higher than had occurred"*. **Where is the evidence?**

I understand the RTA or agent supplied SKM traffic counts. An RTA officer's name appears in several places in the SKM study. Further, the 2007 Pearlman Inquiry to validate SKM's report had the benefit of a detailed 22 March 2007 study by Masson Wilson Twiney. **Why wasn't this disclosed in the EIS?**

SKM working paper No. 2

Following are extracts from an extensive 100 page costings paper. At 8.3 p75 "Pennant Hills and North Rocks Road intersection would have to be upgraded."

Stage 4 (2021-2026) "Construct climbing lanes in both directions to accommodate slow moving traffic . . ."

Stage 5 (Beyond 2026) ". . . **Tolling the F3 could also be considered as a measure** (on then F3). **Alternatively, widen to 8 lanes in each direction. (or) Alternatively develop a new transport corridor.**"

Table 3.1 F3 Capacity Considerations suggests "**fourth 'climbing lanes' would be required by 2011**". That was over 3 years ago. Now this is often a major problem.

5. Cost Estimates for the above works in 6.2. "between \$2.6 and \$3.6 billion."

6.2 Alternative Second Route ". . . **A number of alternatives for a second route** have been prepared as part of the F3 to Sydney Orbital Link Study. **These alternatives generally link to areas in western Sydney rather than to Wahroonga.**"

"The cost estimates **for the routes investigated** are between \$2.6 and \$3.6 billion. The alternative routes do, however, provide a total capacity of 5 lanes in each direction between Sydney and Gosford." How does the NC tunnel increase M1(F3) capacity?

It does not appear any investigations have been made to establish if bridges across the Hawkesbury at Mooney Mooney, and or the Mooney Mooney Creek can be widened, or if new bridges would be required. Further, there is no indication of how widening of the M1 could be carried out without closing one existing lane in each direction for several years to carry out the works. This won't happen. Another solution is required.

7. Further Considerations following the F3- Sydney Orbital Link Study

"A fuller investigation is required to assess requirements after 2012. Furthermore, a review of widening requirements should be undertaken upon the decision on the F3 – Orbital Link and investment program on the main North rail line."
Has this been done, and if so, what did the investigation determine?

Parliamentary Secretary for Ministers Berejucklian, Transport and Minister Gay, Roads and Ports; MP Ray Williams wrote on 14 November 2013, "**an Outer Sydney orbital west of St Marys is listed in the Draft 2012 NSW Long Term Transport Master Plan to connect the Central Coast, Western Sydney and Wollongong.**" Did the government or NorthConnex ever consider that? If not, why?

Is there an AM peak-hour southbound traffic problem be overcome?

NorthConnex FactSheet - July 2014; **ARTISTS IMPRESSION:**

- Northern ventilation outlet Permanent features p2; lists items 2 -8 for northbound traffic.

South bound twin lanes at Burns Road, item 1, shows a 'Maintenance bay' lane commencing left off the tunnel lane where there is a 'light green nature strip' between the tunnel and Pennant Hill Rd lanes, then over or under the open tunnel lanes to the Pacific Hwy Pennant Hills Rd twin lanes becoming third lanes for un-identified distance.

There is no indication of where the two sets of twin lanes commence before the vegetation shown on the tip of the diagram which does not have any identification shown.

How will the lead into the tunnel from the F1 be built, that is not shown on any of the EIS documents staff at the Pennant Hills shop front could find, and still allow the four south bound lanes to the Pacific Highway and Pennant Hills Road operate 24/7?

After the 28 July 2014 meeting at Hornby RSL and my visit to the Pennant Hills shop front on 31 July I make some précised observations:

Until resolved, I do not want the following taken as being a complaint against any person or persons including the Minister, Transurban, NorthConnex, contractors, person or persons.

*1. Email replies to questions about issues do not identify the date or time the issue was received. This means if there are more than one email recipients may not know to which matter it referred. This happened to me on 31 July and is part of the reason for this letter/email.

*2. Staff indicated Lend Lease prepared, and is still preparing NorthConnex plans and Lend Lease should accept responsibility for any errors. I do not accept that.

*3. My concerns with "South bound AM peak traffic problems" are not addressed, and

*4. All adequate design works for the EIS have not been completed, and

*5. All land required for acquisition has not been identified, and

*6. NorthConnex can still make changes to the EIS, and

*7. NorthConnex **FactSheet**- July 2014; ARTISTS IMPRESSION: Northern ventilation outlet Permanent features p2; lists items 2 -8 for northbound traffic incorrectly shows the intersections of 'Bareena Avenue/Fern Avenue Hornsby' and Woonona Avenue Hornsby. These should be shown as being nearly opposite each other. What is shown as Fern Avenue is probably Lochville Streets Hornsby and Wahroonga that was divided when the F3 was built.

Fact Sheet **Item 1**, South bound lanes at Burns Road shows a 'Maintenance bay' lane commencing left off the tunnel lane where there is a 'light green nature strip' between the tunnel and Pennant Hill Rd lanes, then over or under the open tunnel lanes to the Pacific Hwy Pennant Hills Rd two lanes and 3rd lane for an un-identified distance.

There is no indication of where the two sets of lanes commence before the vegetation shown on the tip of the diagram that does not have enough detail shown.

*8. How will the lead into the tunnel from the F1 be built? Staff at the Pennant Hills shop front could not find this on any of the EIS documents suggesting I ask for an answer at the 9 August Pennant Hills consultative meeting. Please arrange for this to be done in the opening presentation.

*9. How will the tunnel open section be built and still allow the existing four south bound lanes to the Pacific Highway and Pennant Hills Road operate 24/7?

*10. The DoP will determine the application including additions and amendments. How can the EIS be modified after it has been published and not start the process again?

*11. EIS page i: "**Prepared by AECOM Australia Pty Ltd** (Phone 8934 0000 PO Box QVB PO Box Q410, QVB PO NSW, 1230) © **AECOM Australia Pty Ltd (AECOM)**. All rights reserved.

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How then can anyone "rely on what is AECOM's EIS" without AECOM's permission?

COMMENT AECOM's statement makes it clear the only material used is what "Roads and Maritime Services" provided.

I do not know if any third party such as myself has applied to AECOM to refer to its EIS, and I do not intend to apply.

Whilst accepting AECOM is protecting itself against any claims that may be made, it does not exonerate "Roads and Maritime Services".

In my opinion the EIS should be withdrawn for "Roads and Maritime" and Transurban to make public all of their papers for the community to know all of the "FACTs" and then republish the EIS with relevant amendments and additions including *Transurban's negotiations with Roads and Ports*, assuming they would still want to continue.

When website M1TunnelVision.org goes online it will show how AECOM had been misled by "Roads and Maritime" and probably others with vested interests.

CONCLUSION On 15 July I received the North Connex EIS CD by post and immediately downloaded it and read Vol 1A pages 1 and 23 to 33. They contained sufficient evidence to consider with documents I have held up from the 1990's to 2007, that indicates the tunnel should be scrapped as it will not solve many major problems that already exist and can only get worse until a second Hawkesbury River crossing is built to national highway standards as was intended 11 years ago to relieve some of the major problems technical experts had clearly identified.

Air pollution. Apart from tunnel estimates, have vehicle emission estimates been made for increased traffic, and stationary traffic by 2025 for the Pearce's Corner, Pacific Highway, Hornsby Hospital and M1 precinct? If not, will it be done, or explain why will not be done, or this is irrelevant to an impact on this environment.

Issues discussion paper about SKM study and other matters I prepared for a **10 March 2005** meeting of Pennant Hills District Civic Trust and 'Concerned Citizens Group' (Pennant Hills Thornleigh Liberal Party). Philip Ruddock MP, Mr Cory (DOTARS), Jones, Waite and 12 Trust Executives attended it. My paper set out issues.

My 21st March 2005 10 page letter to DOTARS Ed Cory, Attn Jennie Breen re F3 – Sydney Orbital Connection sets out many disputed issues. Then further discussions between DOTARS Ed Cory and Waite were held in Canberra when I went there in May 2005 in a further attempt to establish if the selection process for the recommended route,

purple Option A was compromised by inaccurate number counts and projections, and partial influences by officers of NSW and Federal Government agencies.

[REDACTED]

Later at Ruddock's direction, Lloyd arranged a meeting for Jones, Waite and Swalwell with SKM, DOTARS and the RTA for 5 November 2005. DOTARS and the RTA advised no evidence was available to prove the best route was chosen. Some the many issues at that meeting were;

1. Meeting notes and ten-page 21 March 2005 letter to DOTARs Cory's assistant.
2. Letter to Lloyd requesting answers to 'Concerned Citizens Group' requests.
3. 16 Nov 2004 letter to Hon P Ruddock MP.

This meeting quickly became very heated and lasted nearly four hours. It became clear DOTARs and RTA lied to their ministers, SKM, Pennant Hills residents and community

SUMMARY

CONCLUSION

The State should take notice of this submission and:

1. reject Transurban's tunnel,
2. prepare a study for a second Hawkesbury River crossing six lane National Highway without any tunnels to link with the M7, with
3. provision for the National Highway to be part of the "*an Outer Sydney orbital west of St Marys*" as outlined in the "*Draft 2012 NSW Long Term Transport Master Plan to connect the Central Coast, Western Sydney and Wollongong*"
4. that will provide the basis of a more practical route to the future Badgerys Creek airport, for Sydney, central, south coast and western regions.

OR

maybe go back as the opposition next year

I have reported some of these issues with evidence for over 10 years.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Taxi driver 26 July 2014. "*A new tunnel won't solve the truck problem. The M4 problems in particular are because a few motorists that are very scared of big trucks in tunnels often slow down or swerve. That is what disrupts and slows traffic.*" Is this fact?

Please advise if any clarification or documents are required.

FORMAT PROBLEM IN LINE ABOVE STILL TO BE RESOLVED

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Peter Waite, Pennant Hills

Hornsby Councillor 1980 to 1987, Pennant Hills resident 57 years, Epping 25 years.

File

12 AUG 2014

**APPLICATION FOR ACCESS UNDER THE
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION (PUBLIC ACCESS) ACT 2009 NO 52 Sections 41 & 42**

Applicant

Surname

WAITE

Mr

Given Names

PETER ANDREW

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(a) AGENCY

Minister for Roads and Freight
Level 35 Governor Macquarie Tower
1 Farrer Place
SYDNEY, NSW 2000

(d) Postal Address

28 WARNE ST PENNANT HILLS NSW 2120

Phone Number

9484 3471

Details of Application: Make public on the 'NorthConnex' website all of the Transurban unsolicited offer to build the M1 – M2 tunnel. Further to my 5 August 2014 GIPA application it is noted that on page 256 item 3 of Volume 1A is this statement:

"The unsolicited proposals process in NSW, as outlined in Unsolicited Proposals: Guide for Submission and Assessment (NSW Government, 2014) (revised and updated since its original publication in 2012), is a consistent, transparent and streamlined approach for the receipt, assessment and determination of unsolicited proposals that may be developed and submitted by the private sector for works and/ or activities that would have historically been conducted by Government. Unsolicited proposals and the guidelines that govern their assessment and published on the NSW Government website (<http://www.nsw.gov.au/yourgovernment/unsolicited-proposals>). The unsolicited proposal received by Government from Transurban and the Westlink M7 Motorway Shareholders in relation to the project has been conducted strictly in accordance with published guidelines that govern unsolicited proposals." (I gave a 'NorthConnex (Transurban) officer the attached 1 page summary (with 39 page attachment) after the 6pm Thornleigh presentation to have processed. Also emailed RTA)

The February 2014 State 'UNSOLICITED PROPOSALS GUIDE FOR SUBMISSION AND ASSESSMENT' at 3.5 (page 6/7 and 4.9 page 11) refers to probity. Extracts attached.

3.6 "Maintaining confidentiality, 'at least for a specified period of time', has long passed.

In 2012 I twice sought details of the unsolicited offer under the GIPA Act and was thwarted when they were not produced and had to withdraw my ADT 9 September 2013 application 133265 because of technical issues, not merit. I request copies of:

1. Negotiated contract between the Minister and Transurban and other parties.
2. Instructions to involved ministerial staff, 'NorthConnex' staff, contractors, agencies and advisers to ensure they are required to comply with the provisions of the State policy for Unsolicited proposals noting 'NorthConnex' is not a legal entity.
3. Where the EIS advises how to access the SKM 2004 report, and
4. SKM's 2003 unpublished 'Dural 28 August 2003 Focus Group Meeting Notes,' and
5. Mason Wilson Twiney Report – F3 to Sydney Orbital Corridor Review March 2006, and
6. Pearlman 2006 report, and transcript of hearing.
7. Taxpayers, State and Federal funds for cost to date of negotiations and contributions that have been made or are TO BE MADE by Transurban and any other sources.

In accordance with S 54 Public Interest considerations: I waive any rights I may have as disclosure is in the widest public interest to ensure the EIS is open and Transparent and the requested material also be included on the 'NorthConnex' website at no cost to me.

(c) FEES AND CHARGES \$30 No discount is requested - Cheque attached.

Applicant's signature

Date: 12 August 2014 (concerned people BCC email)

Agency Use Only

Received on...../...../.....

Acknowledgement sent on...../...../.....

Thank you for contacting the NorthConnex project team

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Subject: Thank you for contacting the NorthConnex project team
From: Enquiries NorthConnex <enquiries@northconnex.com.au>
Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2014 14:27:11 +1000
To: Peter Waite <waitepeter@bigpond.com>

Thank you for contacting the NorthConnex project team, and your interest in the project.

Due to the number of highly technical enquiries received, and the time required to respond, we are aiming to respond to all emails within 5-10 business days.

For any urgent matters please do not hesitate to call the project information line on 1800 997 057 (free call).

Regards,

NorthConnex Project Team

www.northconnex.com.au

Project information line: 1800 997 057 (free call)

Email: enquiries@northconnex.com.au

NorthConnex

Please consider the environment before printing this email

Collection Statement

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SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Dick Smith and Graham Turner –

National Press Club 13 August 2014. ABC ch 2, 12.30 -1.30pm

Whilst Dick Smith is well known, and recognised for his contributions to industry and society, Graham Turner is not as well known in the wider community.

Graham went to a one-teacher school in the country for eight years and had the same teacher. He then worked on farms and trained as a vet to be able to treat animals and save having to call out a vet from the nearest town. He then changed directions and started what is now the highly successful Flight Centre and is still managing director.

The theme of their address was why globally all first world governments and business people need to change their attitudes to perpetual growth because any thinking person knows it is unsustainable.

Whilst many nations are still third world and over half of the global population live in poverty, the aboriginal and an increasing number of Australians are living in poverty and dysfunctional situations where percentage wise the number in jail is far above the average, and few care.

Australia is in an unusual situation as it is a small nation isolated on the world's largest island. Dick and Graham in their own way succinctly explained the position has been reached where if politicians keep increasing the number of migrants, the populations in our eight capital cities, without massive increases of infrastructure, Sydney would be like Shanghai within 20 years with traffic, air pollution 24/7 and massive increases of sickness caused by stress and associated illnesses and death at an earlier age.

As one example, they both made the point that Australia should not allow successful Indians to migrate to Australia for a better life style. Their position was that they should be using their skills in India to create systems that will help those living in poverty to have a better life and access to health care and education as the 'well off' in Australia should also be doing.

Whilst it will be said this has nothing to do with the M1 – M2 tunnel; I believe it does. The State government has admitted there is a need and published a draft plan in 2012 for a second Hawkesbury River route from about Camden to the Central Coast further west than the 2001 Terms Of Reference for what became the Sinclair Knight Mertz (SKM) report that was compromised by directions of unknown public servants, politicians, ministers or lobbyists for as yet unknown reasons. Planning and postulating is one thing, successful outcomes are what really matter. The proposed tunnel was never a good project. It should be scrapped.

Whilst planning is not an exact science, it does not mean illogical pipe dreams should be adopted because a politician or entrepreneur have secret agendas such as has been seen ICAC expose over the last three years and has still not finished.

The wider community is now asking, who will be next, and whom can we trust? This is a deplorable situation for any nation to be in. How can it be corrected is the most important problem for every MP and councillor to resolve by proving they can be trusted.

Peter Waite

Audit chief Tony Shepherd pushed traffic forecasts on Lane Cove Tunnel

Tony Shepherd previously ran the consortium that won the right in 2003 to build the Lane Cove Tunnel.

JACOB SAULWICK

Tony Shepherd, one of the key business advisers to the Abbott and Baird governments, was one of a group of "big wigs" trying to drive up traffic forecasts on the ill-fated Lane Cove Tunnel project, the Supreme Court has heard.

Mr Shepherd now chairs the WestConnex Delivery Authority, the organisation in charge of building the biggest motorway project in the country's history, and was the head of the Prime Minister's National Commission of Audit.

But in a former role as an executive at Transfield Holdings, Mr Shepherd ran the consortium that won the right in 2003 to build the Lane Cove Tunnel – a project now the subject of a \$144 million legal battle between one of its investors and traffic forecasters.

According to documents read into court by counsel for AMP, the manager of two funds that lost money on the project, Mr Shepherd was one of several executives on the project in late 2002 trying to make the traffic figures more optimistic.

"I feel another loss coming on." Mr Shepherd was quoted as writing to a colleague in late 2002, just months after Transfield had lost a separate bid to win the rights to build the M7 motorway through western Sydney.

According to AMP, which is suing forecasters Parsons Brinckerhoff and Booz Allen Hamilton for \$144 million, one of the ways Mr Shepherd's consortium avoided "another loss" was by inflating the number of motorists they said would drive through the tunnel.

In notes of a meeting she took with "big wigs" working on the consortium, one of the forecasters for Parsons Brinckerhoff, Gillian Akers, recorded the pressure they were applying to "pump up the base" forecasts for the tunnel.

Ms Akers recorded Ray Wilson, working for construction company Thiess, as saying they needed to "get the traffic high then get the banks to build it".

Mr Shepherd, meanwhile, was "very upset by lack of growth 2006-2011" and wanted to "get to the bottom of it", according to Ms Akers' notes.

"What else can we do to the network to get more traffic on the network into the tunnel?" AMP's counsel Tony Bannon quoted the meeting notes as saying.

The consortium had an incentive to push up traffic forecasts for the Lane Cove Tunnel to lure investors, and also to be able to promise a large payment to the state government.

The promise of this payment would help the consortium win the bid to build the tunnel, which opened in 2007 with traffic figures drastically below forecast.

In another email quoted in front of Supreme Court Judge Michael Pembroke on Tuesday, Mr Shepherd wrote to consortium members that "at a minimum" they should try to sell investors on the basis of the upside, or more optimistic, forecasts.

Ms Akers and Parsons Brinckerhoff did manage to increase the traffic forecasts, despite several warnings by another employee, Raymond Golzar.

One of the ways they did so was by discarding modelling they had earlier performed for periods out of peak hour.

Instead, Parsons Brinckerhoff used only modelling results for the morning and afternoon peak hours, and applied an "expansion factor" to project how many cars would use the road in off-peak periods.

But according to a file note of a conversation read by Mr Bannon, when an AMP executive asked Ms Akers about modelling off-peak times, he was told the "middle of the day not modelled".

Parsons Brinckerhoff received a \$333,000 success fee for working on the project.

ABN Amro, the investment bank working on the project, and Transfield sold their investments in the Lane Cove Tunnel before it opened. The tunnel entered receivership in 2010 and was bought out by Transurban.

The trial continues. Underlining Waite emphasis.

Web site copied - heading altered to print edition 18 AUG 2014

SMH: AUGUST 18, 2014 The Lane Cove Tunnel fiasco has shown the problems that occur when governments do not properly oversee infrastructure delivery.

Penny wise, pound stupidity to cut engineers out of road building

CHRIS WALTON

Evidence from the Lane Cove Tunnel case in the Supreme Court last week provides the community with a rare insight into the behind-the-scenes machinations of infrastructure selection, development and delivery in Australia.

So far, we've heard that Prime Minister Tony Abbott's close adviser Tony Shepherd was involved in driving up traffic forecasts, that incentives were used to lure investors and that large payments were made back to the NSW government – all to keep politicians, construction companies, investors and consultants happy.

Where were the community's needs or views in all of this? With so many competing and hidden agendas you could be forgiven for thinking you were reading a run-down of the next episode of Utopia, the ABC's latest satire on nation building.

However, problems in infrastructure development are no laughing matter, particularly given our governments' drive to define their legacies by the number of ribbons they cut and the size of the projects they build.

How can politics and big business be at the controls of infrastructure development while the community that will ultimately pay for and use it is completely shut out?

One positive that has come from the Lane Cove Tunnel fiasco is that the public has been shown the problems that occur when governments do not properly oversee infrastructure delivery. While it can be argued the Lane Cove Tunnel was an outsourced private sector project, the government at all times still had a fundamental responsibility to ensure the project was developed and managed in the best interests of taxpayers and the community at large.

The problem is that successive governments have cut so much engineering and technical expertise from government agencies such as Roads and Maritime Services they simply no longer have the capacity to hold the private sector to account. Governments have effectively become cashed-up, uninformed purchasers while big business fat cats look to where they can find profits.

Without enough of this expertise, governments are wasting huge sums of money. The imperative to fix this problem is the magnitude of this waste.

As a nation this year we will spend \$32.9 billion on infrastructure, with \$20 billion of that to be spent on roads. Recent data from Deloitte Access Economics found on average major infrastructure projects blow out by 12.7 per cent. This means governments will waste \$4.18 billion this year.

If our governments made a comparatively minute investment in engineering and technical expertise, much of this waste could be mitigated. Imagine what we could build with another \$4.18 billion?

It is penny wise and pound stupid to cut the engineers who will achieve best value for the taxpayer. It is like renovating your house without a plan and giving the builder a blank cheque.

Multiple parliamentary inquiries and reports, industry stakeholders and even members of governments (granted, sometimes only in private) agree about what is needed to stop this gargantuan waste.

There are five things:

1. Rebuild engineering expertise in governments – where engineers are obliged to get the best value for the public.
2. Invest in long-term planning, strategy and capacity building in infrastructure.
3. Build engineering skills across the private and public sectors.
4. Recognise and accept the advice of technical experts – the people that know how to scope, build and design infrastructure.

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5. Lock in capital and maintenance funding.

It's clear that we cannot loosen the grip that politics and business have on infrastructure.

However, given the economic imperative to build productivity in our economy and our community's need for better infrastructure, surely it is time governments took a first step and equipped themselves with appropriate levels of engineering and technical capacity.

If it means better, cheaper infrastructure, they have a responsibility to have the best engineering expertise for our roads.

Chris Walton is chief executive of Professionals Australia, an association that represents 25,000 engineers working across the public and private sector to deliver infrastructure.

72/1

Subject: RE: FORMAL EIS procedural complaint
From: Enquiries NorthConnex <enquiries@northconnex.com.au>
Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 14:31:58 +1000
To: Peter Waite <waitepeter@bigpond.com>

Dear Mr Waite

I am writing to advise you that your email below, making a formal EIS procedural complaint, forwarded to the Minister for Roads, will be responded to via the Minister's correspondence protocol.

Regards,
NorthConnex Project Team
www.northconnex.com.au
Project information line: 1800 997 057 (free call)
Email: enquiries@northconnex.com.au

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From: Peter Waite [waitepeter@bigpond.com]
Sent: Friday, 1 August 2014 10:16 AM
To: Enquiries NorthConnex
Cc: Duncan Gay; Advocate letters; Barry O'Farrell; Bill Aitken <"Bill Aitken ">, Hills ShireTimes <editor@hillsshiretimes.com.au>, Hornsby Advocate <letters@hornsbyadvocate.com.au>, Matthew Kean <hornsby@parliament.nsw.gov.au>, Philip Ruddock <philip.ruddock.mp@aph.gov.au>, Steve Russell <srussell@hornsby.nsw.gov.au>, Greg Smith <epping@parliament.nsw.gov.au>
Subject: FORMAL EIS procedural complaint

Hi Tim,

Following Tuesday nights meeting and my visit to the Pennant Hills shop front yesterday I make the following observations:

Until resolved I do not want this taken as being a complaint against any person or persons including the Minister, Transurban, NorthConnex or any contractors or person/s.

*1. Email replies to questions about issues do not identify the date or time the issue was received. This means if there are more than one email. recipients may not know to which matter it referred. This happened to me yesterday and is part of the reason for this email.

*2. Staff stated Lend Lease prepared, and is still preparing documents for NorthConnex

and Lend Lease must accept responsibility.

*3 My concerns about the "South bound AM peak traffic problems" are wrong.

*4 All design works have not been completed.

*5 All land required for acquisition has not been completed.

*6 NorthConnex can still make changes to the EIS.

*7 NorthConnex FactSheet- July 2014; ARTISTS IMPRESSION:

. Northern ventilation outlet Permanent features p2; lists items 2 -8 for northbound traffic.

The intersections of 'Bareena Avenue/Fern Avenue Hornsby' and Woonona Avenue Hornsby should be shown as being nearly opposite each other. What is shown as Fern Avenue is probably Lochville Streets Hornsby and Wahroonga that was divided when the F3 was built.

Item 1, South bound twin lanes at Burns Road shows a 'Maintenance bay' lane commencing left off the tunnel lane where there is a 'light green nature strip' between the tunnel and Pennant Hill Rd lanes, then over or under the open tunnel lanes to the Pacific Hwy Pennant Hills Rd twin lanes third lane for an un-identified distance.

There is no indication of where the two sets of twin lanes commence before the vegetation shown on the tip of the diagram which does not have any identification shown.

How will the lead into the tunnel from the F1 be built? Staff at the Pennant Hills shop front could not find this on any of the EIS documents suggesting I ask for an answer at the 9 August Pennant Hills consultative meeting. Please arrange for this to be done in the opening presentation.

*8. How will the tunnel open section be built and still allow the existing four south bound lanes to the Pacific Highway and Pennant Hills Road operate 24/7?

*9. The DoP will determine the application including additions and amendments.

*10. EIS page i: Prepared by AECOM Australia Pty Ltd

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COMMENT AECOM's above statement makes it very clear the only material under discussion

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is what "Roads and Maritime Services" has provided. I suggest no third party has applied to AECOM to refer to its EIS.

72/1

Whilst accepting that AECOM is only protecting itself against any claims that may be made, it does not exonerate "Roads and Maritime Services".

In my opinion the EIS should be immediately withdrawn for "Roads and Maritime" and Transurban to make public all of their papers for the community to know all of the "FACTS" and then republish the EIS with relevant amendments and additions.

When my website M1TunnelVision.org is online it will show how AECOM had been misled by "Roads and Maritime" and probably other people with a vested interest.

CONCLUSION The day I received the EIS CD by post and down loaded Vol 1A pages 1 and 23 to 33 contained sufficient evidence to consider with documents I have held up from the 1990's to 2007, is that the tunnel should be scrapped because it will not solve many major problems that exist and can only get worse until a second Hawkesbury River crossing is built to national highway standards as was intended 11 years ago in 2001.

Peter Waite

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Subject: RE: EIS
From: Enquiries NorthConnex <enquiries@northconnex.com.au>
Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 14:39:02 +1000
To: Peter Waite <waitepeter@bigpond.com>

72/2

Hi Peter,

Thank you for your email of 5 August, advising NorthConnex that you have delivered a copy of your GIPA application to the NorthConnex community information centre for our information.

Regards

NorthConnex Project Team
www.northconnex.com.au
Project information line: 1800 997 057 (free call)
Email: enquiries@northconnex.com.au

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From: Peter Waite [waitepeter@bigpond.com]
Sent: Tuesday, 5 August 2014 2:49 PM
To: Enquiries NorthConnex
Subject: EIS

Hi Tim,

Called at Pennant Hills office about 2.05 pm and it was closed. I thought the times were from 10 to 4pm Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday.

In an attempt to clarify the legal procedures for EIS procedures, and not that of staff who may not have the technical knowledge and experience, I slid a copy of my GIPA application to Minister Gay for the following information with three pages of attachments I cannot copy and email.

NorthConnex staff should be able to copy and email the attachments when they are next there. Alternatively they will also be in Minister Gay's office to copy if NorthConnex require them..

It may take some time to filter through to NorthConnex if Minister Gay's staff do not have the information I believe they should already have. In itself that creates a problem because it is Gay's EIS, not Transurban or NorthConnex.

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Whilst 20 working days are allowed for the information to be supplied, I am of the opinion it could be made available at the Pennant Hills 8 August information meeting so that the community can be informed about the legal processes.

Please let me know if you require any further information.

Regards

Peter Waite

I request access to approved documents / diagrams etc for:

- "This Environmental Impact Statement" prepared by AECOM, dated July 2014:
- 1. Dated copy of authorisation for completed EIS to be printed
- 2. Dated copy of authorisation for EIS to be released
- 3. Date EIS publicly released
- 4. Provisions for when third North lane tunnel is operating north of the tunnel
- 5. How the estimated 40% of PM traffic from the Pacific Highway and Pennant Hills Road is able to join peak hour when there is 100% tunnel traffic?
- 6. Provision in Acts or regulations permitting an incomplete EIS to be released for public comment
- 7. Provisions in Acts or regulations etc permitting fundamental problems be submitted to [REDACTED] manager Department of Planning and Environment for her team to assess the above without them being in the authorised EIS

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72/3

Subject: RE: M1 - M2 proposed tunnel
From: Enquiries NorthConnex <enquiries@northconnex.com.au>
Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 14:39:35 +1000
To: Peter Waite <waitepeter@bigpond.com>

Hi Peter,
Thank you for a copy of your flyer, provided on 8.8.14 for our information.

Regards,
NorthConnex Project Team
www.northconnex.com.au
Project information line: 1800 997 057 (free call)
Email: enquiries@northconnex.com.au

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From: Peter Waite [waitepeter@bigpond.com]
Sent: Friday, 8 August 2014 5:40 PM
To: Enquiries NorthConnex; Matthew Kean
Subject: M1 - M2 proposed tunnel

Hi

Attached is my 2 page paper for tomorrow's Community drop in session from 2 to 5pm at Pennant Hills Community Centre.

Have copied 50 copies to hand out.

Looking forward to hear what all the experts have to say.

Regards

Peter Waite

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72/3

for messages of this kind.

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72/4

Subject: RE: EIS PROBITY
From: Enquiries NorthConnex <enquiries@northconnex.com.au>
Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2014 14:50:01 +1000
To: Peter Waite <waitepeter@bigpond.com>

Dear Mr Waite

I am writing to advise you that your email regarding EIS probity, forwarded to the Minister for Roads, will be responded to via the Minister's correspondence protocol.

Regards,
NorthConnex Project Team
www.northconnex.com.au
Project information line: 1800 997 057 (free call)
Email: enquiries@northconnex.com.au

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From: Peter Waite [waitepeter@bigpond.com]
Sent: Monday, 11 August 2014 7:57 PM
To: Enquiries NorthConnex; Barry O'Farrell; Greg Smith; Duncan Gay; Matthew Kean; Ray Williams <"Ray Williams ">
Cc: Advocate letters; Bill Aitken <"Bill Aitken ">, Hills ShireTimes <editor@hillsshiretimes.com.au>
Subject: EIS PROBITY

Hi Tim, BCC concerned residents

At 6pm tonight I attended a NorthConnex presentation at the Pennant Hills Thornleigh Uniting Church I attend.

Candice, Malcolm and Richard represented NorthConnex.

As usual references were made to the Lend Lease misleading artist's fancy impressions of intersections instead of the actual road designs.

At the conclusion as he was leaving I gave Richard, who is employed by Transurban, a copy of my one page paper shown below.

Attached were Barry O'Farrell's 6 August 2014 letter advising he was contacting Prue Goward about my 2 August 2014 email to him about the NorthConnex EIS.

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Also attached were 39 pages of evidence proving the 2004 SKM report was compromised because SKM was directed reportedly by the then Premier not to recommend the western connection.

In 2006 MPs O'Farrell, Tink, Hopwood all supported the western option. In 2007 Richardson, Williams and another one did the same on the basis of the strategic benefit if the F3, Pacific Highway and rail line was closed for 3 days because of a bushfire.

Also the Pearlam report was only to revalidate the SKM 2004 report. It was not to decide if any other option should be recommended as NorthConnex has assumed.

The attached documents, and many more were sent to Minister Gay's office in 2012 when I advised him to be careful.

This is now clearly a political problem to be resolved. As the senior RTA representative I suggests you should immediately ensure Minister Gay is advised of this as quickly as possible.

Please let me know if you require further information or clarification.

Regards

Peter Waite

UNSOLICITED PROPOSALS How can the NorthConnex resolve this?

NSW Government guide for submission and assessment 2014 (2012) PROBITY:

NorthConnex EIS Volume 1A Table 6.5 Interagency meetings 26 June 2013 page 222. "Interagency regulatory meeting No.1 was held with the Environment Protection Authority, the Department of Planning and Infrastructure (now the Department of Planning and Environment) and NSW Health. The purpose of the meeting was to introduce the project discuss the planning approvals process and identify likely key environmental issues. "

P248 'Process - Appropriateness of the unsolicited proposal process with NSW Government and Transurban. - The unsolicited proposals process in NSW, as outlined in Unsolicited Proposals: Guide for Submission and Assessment (NSW Government, 2014) (revised and updated since its original publication in 2012), is a consistent, transparent and streamlined approach for the receipt, assessment and determination of unsolicited proposals that may be developed and submitted by the private sector for works and/ or activities that would have historically been conducted by Government. Unsolicited proposals and the guidelines that govern their assessment and published on the NSW Government website (<http://www.nsw.gov.au/your-government/unsolicited-proposals>). I do not agree that: The unsolicited proposal received by Government from Transurban and the Westlink M7 Motorway Sponsors in relation to the NorthConnex project has been conducted strictly in accordance with published guidelines that govern unsolicited proposals."

Probity in NSW State guide at 3.5 as referred to by NorthConnex, which is only a name and not a legal entity. (Two NorthConnect officers agreed I am right on 8 August 2014)

The EIS states the Minister is the proponent, not Transurban and Westlink.

EXTRACTS:

Government seeks to conduct its commercial dealings with integrity. The assessment of

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Unsolicited Proposals must be fair, open and demonstrate the highest levels of probity consistent with the public interest. . . .

Maintaining impartiality a clearly defined separation of duties and personnel between the assessment and approval functions.

Maintaining accountability and transparency Accountability and transparency are related concepts. The demonstration of both is crucial to the integrity of the assessment. Accountability requires that all participants be accountable for their actions.

Transparency refers to the preparedness to open a project and its processes to scrutiny' debate and possible criticism.

Maintaining confidentiality there is a need for high levels of accountability and transparency . . . at least for a specified time. That time has long passed.

4.9 Probity adviser may be appointed for large-scale projects or where probity risk is considered to be important – usually at Stages 2 and 3 of the assessment process.

6 PROCESS FLOWCHART does not make provision for an EIS or community consultation.

Peter Waite, Pennant Hills 11 August 2014

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Clover Moore is only half the story: shadowy panel devouring Sydney land

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Alex Mitchell | Aug 20, 2014 1:58PM | [EMAIL](#) | [PRINT](#)

An Orwellian five-member panel will be making planning decisions surrounding Sydney public land in future. Cui bono? NSW political reporter **Alex Mitchell** reports.

Get used to the name of the entity known as UrbanGrowth NSW, because you will be hearing a lot more about it over the next few years.

It is the Orwellian body created by the New South Wales Coalition government to control the levers of urban planning and development. It has a five-member board to administer multibillion-dollar projects that will devour public land and public spending while delivering massive profits to construction companies and their investors.

Already UrbanGrowth NSW has its hands all over prime Sydney Harbour land near Balmain, called Bay Precinct, the Parramatta CBD and the historic centre of Newcastle.

The state-owned corporation was established in 2012 by then-planning minister Brad Hazzard, a Manly solicitor recently elevated to Attorney-General and Justice Minister.

New Planning Minister Pru Goward, a former ABC presenter and John Howard's handpicked Anti-Discrimination Commissioner, is now in charge of the body whose mission statement reads like something scripted by Rob Sitch, of *Hollowmen* and *Utopia* fame.

According to the official website, its task is "to drive urban transformation that will underpin the future prosperity of urban and regional centres across NSW. We collaborate with government, private and community stakeholders to create a united vision of a project, building a strong sense of placemaking in the renewal process and enabling its delivery."

In future, major urban projects will be discussed and decided by UrbanGrowth's cabinet-appointed board members without obstruction from meddlesome councillors, MPs, public servants, community groups or environmentalists.

"If the Coalition succeeds in rigging the ballot in favour of the business community in Sydney's CBD, why not elsewhere?"

Just as James Packer collared a high rollers' casino site from the Barangaroo Delivery Authority and VicUrban delivered the construction boom at Melbourne Docklands, so UrbanGrowth is poised to make super profits for developers, fund managers and overseas investors in urban centres in NSW.

It is fulfilling the catchcries of the Baird (and Abbott) governments: "We're open for business", "We want to be remembered for building infrastructure" (i.e. any infrastructure at any cost, regardless of its community or cultural value) and "we know best what should be built, where and by whom".

Accompanying the pro-development push are authoritarian changes to the local government electoral system, starting with greater voting entitlements for big businesses in the City of Sydney.

Premier Mike Baird has given support to legislation proposed in the upper house by the reactionary Shooters Party to arm big business with two votes while ordinary citizens receive one, an objective long advocated by shock jock Alan Jones and *The Daily Telegraph*.

Sydney lord mayor Clover Moore, an independent, has become the centre of attention, as she claims the proposal to give businesses two votes is aimed specifically at her. But this is only half-true: Moore's days are numbered anyway, and if she doesn't resign at the next council election in 2016, when she will be approaching 70, she faces almost certain defeat.

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Major CBD redevelopments in Sussex Street, Chinatown, Haymarket and Millers Point, all blue-chip sites for profit-hungry developers, are the primary considerations in the push for a pro-business Sydney City Council.

Will the embarrassing departure of Newcastle lord mayor Jeff "The Developer" McCloy following cash campaign donations he made to Liberal MPs at the 2011 state election lead to a greater voting entitlement for businesses in Newcastle as well? If the Coalition succeeds in rigging the ballot in favour of the business community in Sydney's CBD, why not elsewhere?

Balmain MP Jamie Parker, the former mayor of Leichhardt and the first Green in the Legislative Assembly, has condemned UrbanGrowth's compulsory purchase powers and its lack of transparency.

He has asked why there are no community representatives on the five-member board, which consists of chairman John Brogden, a former NSW opposition leader, Matthew Quinn, former managing director of Stockland (2000-2013), Robert Hamilton, co-founder of the Mirvac Group, Bonita Boezeman, executive with Time Warner for 23 years, and chief executive David Pitchford, chief operating officer of the Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games and ex-general manager of the mega-development called Palm Jumeirah in Dubai.

"The names don't fill me with confidence," Parker told *Crikey*. "They are a who's who of big-time developers and their friends."

Architects, town planners and community groups are waiting for John Robertson's opposition to commit to scrapping UrbanGrowth NSW and the proposed pro-business City of Sydney voting system.

Outline of Representation Crisis in NSW Arising from Land Use and Transport Interaction Planning Mainly for Sydney 19 August 2014

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The Liberal Coalition landslide election victory at the Mar 2011 NSW Elections resulted from promises to

- Return planning powers on land use to local government councils and shires
- Build the NorthWest Rail Line (NWRL) as an integrated Heavy Rail project
- Undertake an inquiry into the NSW Planning system
- Generally clean up Corruption of Process in NSW which has evolved since 1995 under Labor Party Gov

To confirm intention to pursue a better planning system for NSW a Planning System Review was started in Jul 2011 conducted by former parliamentarians Tim Moore (Liberal) and Ron Dyer (Labor). Too much Corruption of Process had evolved under the previous Labor Gov to facilitate unwanted high density development in sensitive high standard living areas including the Sydney Upper North Shore Liberal Party support heartland. Terms of reference required consideration of a statutory framework for a new system that focused upon

- Process for community consultation dealt with in an open and transparent manner
 - Defining the role and accountability for all NSW Gov development approval agencies
 - Providing a decision making framework on environmental, economic and social needs
 - Establishment of clear and simple processes embodied in legislation for clear community understanding
 - How best to use information technology to easily inform all stakeholders
- Community concern that local government approval authorities using discretionary powers under DCP and other planning instruments tended to favour development interests at the expense of community interests

It now appears that the Moore and Dyer Review based on good intentions to honour an election promise has been cast aside due to the following factors which have emerged for the running of government in NSW.

- The emergence of lobbyists and political facilitators (including former parliamentarians) who work for construction and other development interests to create job creating projects, often based upon questionable cost benefit analysis and other reports purchased from consultants to justify a project.
- Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) ignoring social impact costs such as noise (causing sleep disturbance health problems), pollution, reduced home values from urban degradation and productivity impacts from congestion.
- Concern in both major political parties to protect construction industry jobs with no outcome analysis.

Recent disclosures at NSW ICAC proceedings and perceived failure of the political class dominating the government through major party structures have created a **political crisis based on the following perceptions**

- The presentations of the political class are diverging more and more from the expected requirements of the voters they have been elected to a position of trust to represent in the process of government decision making.
- When designing policy for presentation to voters, government regards voter expectations as being a nuisance which must be contained or ignored as confirmed by the attitudes of the current Federal Gov key ministers to the Fed budget voter reaction.
- Outcome analysis being given little or no priority when formulating policy decisions to confirm in the minds of voters that the political class ignores the need to provide protection and certainty for the management of their individual and family needs.
- The political class (dominated by both major parties) being seen as comprising out of touch individuals who will say anything to get elected and break all key promises when elected to run government

What can voters do about the political crisis we now face ?

- Use Optional Preferential Voting (OPV) campaigns to promote replacement of major party candidates at the Mar 2015 NSW Elections by minor party and independent candidates
- Educate voters that they may use Optional Preferential Voting (OPV) to ignore casting any vote for major party candidates and still cast a valid vote. They only need put a preference number beside the candidates they want. OPV is embodied in the NSW Constitution. There must be a referendum to change this voting system.

We the people have the voting power to remove major party candidates who have betrayed us.

EXAMPLE OF HOW SOME PROPONENTS and OBJECTORS EXAGGERATE SUBMISSIONS IN THEIR ATTEMPTS TO JUSTIFY THEIR OPPOSING POSITIONS.

It will be shown that all of the issues I am raising up to 2013 have already been submitted the Minister's office and other agencies including Hornsby Council. [REDACTED]

Whilst AECON produced the EIS it is not know what information AECON was supplied. One source is Lend Lease who was the successful tenderer to build the tunnel if consent is obtained. However there are hidden conditions I again applied for under the GIPA Act (FOI) on 12 August 2014 after two failed attempts in 2012 and 2013.

I am trying to be impartial by identifying issues in the EIS I believe misrepresent fact, and or assumptions without supporting detail in the EIS that refers to studies such as Terms of Reference:

- 4 January 2001, 'TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR A STUDY FOR THE ROUTE OPTIONS FOR THE NATIONAL HIGHWAY THROUGH NORTHERN SYDNEY.' The three page TOR sets out a wide parameter of issues to be addressed. [REDACTED]
- The 2002/2004 SKM F3 – orbital route detailed report, and 2007 Pearlman Inquiry findings that revalidated the compromised SKM report cannot be relied on by **NorthConnex** as a reliable basis for the EIS. *NorthConnex* staff have admitted that *NorthConnex* is only a name and has no legal status whatsoever.

It is also know an RTA and Transurban managers are identified as being from *NorthConnex*. [REDACTED]

SKM's September 2002 Value Management Workshop #2 record extracts page 10, '2.6 A 20 year study period is too short for the scale of the project'. That was 12 years ago. If correct, and the proposed tunnel is built it may well be out of date by 2022. Pages 22/23 'Following lengthy discussion, the instruction from DOTARS was that the Australian Government **felt** that examination of longer term options was outside of the link.

As someone who has taken an interest in politics and corruption for over 65 years I believe I have a good knowledge about how to 'rort the system' if I chose. To become a successful builder, developer and property investor I operated within the law and rejected offers to help the client and myself to dodge taxation, other laws and regulations.

I suspect I was investigated three times by the ATO because complainants could not understand how my wife and I could have been so successful. My policy was if I made a mistake and could not fix it without a client knowing, I would explain what the problem was and how I proposed to have it rectified at no cost, or a discount if they agreed to a solution that involved altering the design.

We were never out of work, and had a list of clients who were prepared to wait for us because they knew we were honest and reliable. **What more could anyone want?**