

18 June 2018

NSW Government Planning and Environment 320 Pitt Street Sydney NSW 2000

RE: Victoria Cross Over Station Development (SSD8874)

A crime prevention assessment has been requested for the above development, located on the south east corner of Miller and Berry Streets in North Sydney. The proposed development will be constructed above the Victoria Cross metro station which is currently still under construction. The building will consist of 40 commercial storeys and a four level car park. Note that the assessment provided does not include the metro station itself which is also not included in the above development application.

The development is within the North Sydney central business district, comprising of many multi storey commercial and residential buildings. The high density living and close proximity to rail makes the area vulnerable to mail theft. Commercial break and enters and bicycle theft are also prominent crimes in the area. Additionally, the development will be above an expectedly busy rail station and therefore is a potential target for a terrorist attack.

Attached is a report containing recommendations using the Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) strategies.

NSW Police would like to thank you for your interest in improving the security of your building and in preventing crime in our community. Should you require any further information on the subjects covered by this assessment, we encourage you to contact us further.

Kind regards,

Senior Constable Jenni Brown Crime Prevention Officer

North Shore Police Area Command

Chatswood Police Station 63 Archer Street Chatswood 2067

Telephone 02 9414 8499 Facsimile 02 9414 8411 ENet 68499



North Shore Police Area Command

Victoria Cross Over Station Development

Disclaimer

The New South Wales Police have a vital interest in ensuring the safety of the members of the community and their property. By using the recommendations contained in this evaluation, any person who does so acknowledges that:

- It is not possible to make areas evaluated by the NSWP absolutely safe for members of the community or their property.
- It is based upon the information provided to the NSWP at the time the evaluation was made.
- This evaluation is a confidential document and is for use by the consent authority or organisations referred to on page 1 only.
- The contents of this evaluation are not to be copied or circulated otherwise than for the purposes of the consent authority or organisation referred to on page 1.

The NSW Police hopes that by using the recommendations contained in this document, criminal activity will be reduced and the safety of members of the community and their property will be increased. However, it does not guarantee that all risks have been identified, or that the area evaluated will be free from criminal activity if its recommendations are followed.

Introduction

North Shore Police have been asked to comment on a development application for the Victoria Cross Over Station Development. An onsite assessment was not possible due to the building being in the planning and development stage. Other similar developments in the North Sydney CBD area are affected by crimes such as commercial break and enters, retail theft and bicycle theft from bicycle storage areas in car parks.

Using Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) strategies, the below suggestions have been made in order to reduce opportunities for crime.

Recommendations

The following Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) treatment options should be considered to reduce opportunities of crime:

- 1. The building should be clearly identified with signage that is visible from the street. This will enable all emergency services to locate the premises.
- 2. Surrounding shrubs and gardens should be maintained to reduce opportunity for concealment.
- 3. Appropriate signage should be erected inside and around the perimeter of the entire property to warn of security treatments in place e.g. "This site is under 24 hour video surveillance".
- 4. An electronic surveillance system should be included to provide maximum surveillance of all areas of the building including entry/exit points. The system should be capable of recording high-quality images of events. The recording equipment should be locked away to reduce the likelihood of tampering. Monitors should be placed in the store/office areas to allow staff to view all areas under camera surveillance.
- 5. CCTV cameras should be installed to cover the front entrance, any mail box areas, lobby and lift areas, especially on the ground floor, the entrance to the car park, bicycle storage area and retail areas.
- 6. All CCTV cameras installed should be of a good resolution and accompanied with good lighting.
- 7. All recording made by the CCTV system must be stored for at least 30 days and ensure that the system is accessible by at least one member of staff at all times it is in operation, and provide any recordings made by the system to a police officer or inspector within 24 hours of any request by a police officer or inspector. The CCTV cameras will need to be placed in suitable locations to enhance the physical security and assist in positively identifying an individual, who may be involved in criminal behaviour.

- 8. The CCTV footage should also cover the car parking facilities. "Park Smarter" signage should be displayed within this area to warn/educate motorists to secure their vehicles and not leave valuable items visible in their cars. The car park will also need to have adequate lighting.
- 9. Lighting in and around the building should comply with Australian Standard AS: 1158 and should provide for adequate, uniform illumination. External lighting should be of a 'white light' source. Note that high or low pressure sodium 'orange' lighting is not compatible with quality surveillance systems. Internal lighting should be controlled from 'Staff only' areas, away from public access. If this is not possible, use tamper-resistant switches. Luminaries (light covers) should be designed to reduce opportunities for malicious damage. Internal after-hours security lighting should provide adequate illumination to allow inspection by security patrols.
- 10. Lighting around the building should be positioned in a way to reduce opportunities for offenders to commit crime i.e vandalism and graffiti. The lighting will need to be sufficient to enable people to identify signs of intoxication and anti social behaviour. The lighting will also need to be sufficient to support images obtained from any CCTV footage. Please note that some low or high pressure lighting is not compatible with surveillance systems.
- 11. All staff only areas should be clearly marked as such and physical barriers such as doors and gates should be erected to prevent unauthorised entry.
- 12. Doors should be of solid construction, and should be fitted with quality deadlock sets that comply with the Building Code of Australia and Australian Standards Lock Sets AS:4145.
- 13. Windows should also be of solid construction. These windows should be fitted with quality window lock sets that comply with the Australian Standards Lock Sets AS:4145. Glass within doors and windows should be reinforced to restrict unauthorised access. The glass can be either fitted with a shatter-resistant film or laminated to withstand physical attacks.
- 14. An emergency control and evacuation plan should be implemented within the building. Management and staff should be trained in the execution of the plan in emergency situations.
- 15. Any wheelchair access points should at no time be blocked nor impede access to anyone with a disability.
- 16. Fire exits should be monitored to ensure they are not left ajar outside office hours and become access points for break and enters.
- 17. Bicycle storage racks should be placed inside a locked area that is covered by a CCTV camera and has lots of natural surveillance.
- 18. In case of any terrorist attack targeting the train station, using a vehicle borne improvised explosive device the walls and structure between the car park and train station should be reinforced.

19. Contact names and phone numbers for building security staff should be provided to North Shore Police as soon as possible.

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) is a crime prevention strategy that focuses on the planning, design and structure of cities and neighbourhoods. It reduces opportunities for crime by using design and place management principles that reduce the likelihood of essential crime ingredients from intersecting in time and space.

Criminals often make cost-benefit assessments of potential victims and locations before committing crime. CPTED aims to create the reality (or perception) that the costs of committing crime are greater than the likely benefits. This is achieved by creating social and environmental conditions that:

- Maximise risk to offenders (increasing the likelihood of detection, challenge and apprehension);
- Maximise the effort required to commit crime (increasing the time, energy and resources required to commit crime);
- Minimise the actual and perceived benefits of crime (removing, minimising or concealing crime attractors and rewards); and,
- Minimise excuse-making opportunities (removing conditions that encourage/facilitate rationalisation of inappropriate behaviour).

CPTED employs four key strategies. These are Surveillance, Access Control, Territorial Reinforcement and Space/Activity Management.

Surveillance

Natural surveillance (NS) is achieved when normal space users can see and be seen by others. NS highlights the importance of building layout, orientation and location; the strategic use of street design; landscaping and lighting. Natural surveillance is a byproduct of well-planned, well-designed and well-used space.

Formal, or Organised Surveillance (FS), is achieved through the tactical positioning of on-site guardians. An example would be the placement of an estate supervisor's office next to a communal area. Technical Surveillance (TS) is achieved through mechanical/electronic measures such as CCTV, help-phones and mirrored building panels. Technical surveillance is commonly used as a "patch" to supervise isolated, higher-risk locations.

There is a proven correlation between poor street lighting, fear of crime, the avoidance of public places and crime opportunity (Painter, 1997). Australia and New Zealand

Pedestrian Lighting Standard 1158.3.1 now requires lighting engineers and designers to factor-in crime risk and fear when choosing luminaries/lighting levels.

Access Control

Access control measures restrict, channel and encourage people, bicycles and motor vehicles into, out of and around targeted sites. Way finding, desire-lines and formal/informal routes are important crime prevention considerations.

Access control is used to increase the time and effort required to commit crime and to increase the risk to criminals. *Natural Access Control (NAC)* measures include the tactical use of landform and waterways, design measures including building configuration, formal and informal pathways, landscaping, fencing and gardens. *Mechanical/Electronic Access Control (MEAC)* measures include security hardware and *Formal* or *Organised Access Control (FAC)* measures include on-site guardians such as employed security personnel.

Territorial Reinforcement

Criminals are more likely to be deterred by the presence of people who are connected with and protective of a place than by people who are just passing through it. *Territorial Reinforcement (TR)* employs actual and symbolic boundary markers, spatial legibility and environmental cues to 'connect' people with space, to encourage communal responsibility for public areas and facilities, and to communicate to people where they should and should not be, and what activities are appropriate.

Space and Activity Management

Space management involves the formal supervision, control and care of the public domain. All space, even well planned and well-designed areas need to be effectively used and maintained to maximise community safety. Places that are infrequently used are commonly abused. Space and activity management strategies are an important means of developing and maintaining *natural* community control.

Occupational Health & Safety Act 2000 – No. 40

Part 2. Duties relating to health, safety and welfare at work – Division 1 – General Duties - Duties of Employers

An employer must ensure the health, safety and welfare at work of all the employees of the employer.

That duty extends (without limitation) to the following:

(a) ensuring that any premises controlled by the employer where the employees work (and the means of access to or exit from the premises) are safe and without risk to health.

- (b) ensuring that any plant or substance provided for use by the employees at work is safe and without risks to health when properly used,
- (c) ensuring that systems of work and the working environment of the employees are safe and without risks to health,
- (d) providing such information, instruction, training and supervision as may be necessary to ensure the employee's health and safety at work,
- (e) providing adequate facilities for the welfare of the employees at work.

Others at workplace

An employer must ensure that people (other than the employees of the employer) are not exposed to risks to their health or safety arising from the conduct of the employer's undertaking while they are at the employer's place of work.

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