

PCU069512

THE SECRETARY

DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT

GPO BOX 39, SYDNEY NSW 2001

POSITIVE SUBMISSION

THE JUPITER WIND FARM


PROJECT SSD 13_6277

DR JIM WARNER

"CUBA" BORO

VIA BRAIDWOOD

NSW 2622



"Cuba", Boro,

via Braidwood,

NSW 2622

TUESDAY 14TH
February 2017

The Secretary

NSW Department of Planning and Environment

GPO Box 39, Sydney, NSW 2001

Dear Sir/Madam,

I refer to your calling for written positive submissions for the Jupiter Wind Farm Project SSD 13_6277.

Please find enclosed the Submission with one attachment.

Yours faithfully,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "James Warner".

Dr Jim Warner

B.A.(hons)Syd, B.Sc.(econ)Lond, B.D.(hons)MCD, Ph.D.ACU, Dip. Wool Classing (OC)Argyll TAFE

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JUPITER WIND FARM PROJECT

SSD 13_6277

DR JIM WARNER

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DEDICATION

This submission is dedicated to the anamnesis (the not-forgetting) of the work of Kenneth Boulding (1910-1993), who coined the term “spaceship earth” and who, in his “Economy of Love and Fear” (1), estimated that, even in an advanced economy, forty percent of economic activity did not take place within a formal market, i.e. it constituted one way transfers.

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I INTRODUCTION

This submission will endeavour to present a positive understanding of the implications of the Jupiter wind farm project. It will do this by utilizing a particular ethical framework. This framework is a secularized adaptation of Soren Kierkegaard's "stages of existence" with the sequential use of utility, deontology and virtue. It will also reference ethical, economic and environmental issues. Kierkegaard (1813-1855) was both philosopher, ethicist and theologian. This Kierkegaardian framework should strictly speaking be referred to as quasi-kierkegaardian insofar as not all of his thought is utilized and it is possible to argue that some aspects of his work have been excluded. Nonetheless, the quasi-kierkegaardian framework, hereafter QKF, owes a substantial debt to him. The strength of the QKF is that it provides a means of locating significant rival ethical approaches (utility, deontology and virtue) within a coherent framework. To the best of my knowledge this submission is a singular example of the use of this framework and there appears to have been no particular precedents in the Australian or overseas literature.

The sources of information and data used for this submission derive from the wind farm industry and in particular, from EPYC. However this has occasionally been augmented by material from the general media, both Australian and overseas and similarly from environmental economics publications and also general economics and ethics published material. It should be noted that particular references are given at p. 13 and a bibliography can be found at p. 15. There is also an attachment that gives a general introduction to the work of Soren Kierkegaard.

At this point it is necessary to divulge an interest in the Jupiter wind farm project. This writer and his family signed a contract with EPYC in 2013 for the family property to host Jupiter wind turbines.

II RELEVANT BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE OF THE WRITER

This submission draws on knowledge and perspectives that have been gained during the course of the writer's working life, viz.:

A student, researcher and teacher of economics (including environmental economics) for the previous fifty years at universities, government agencies and the Australian Senate.

A student, researcher and teacher of ethics for the previous fifty years at primary, secondary and tertiary educational institutions and church organizations.

A research officer and acting secretary of Australian Senate Select and Standing Committees for several years.

A rural landholder for thirty-seven years.

A primary producer for thirty-seven years.

III ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES AND THE JUPITER PROJECT

As stated in the Introduction, for the purposes of this submission I will utilize the particular ethical and existential perspectives of the philosopher Soren Kierkegaard, who has been described as a “unique but vastly influential philosopher” (2) He has been regarded as the progenitor of the philosophy of existentialism where existence can assume a primacy within ethics. His existential ethical perspectives to be used are the three stages of existence, namely the aesthetic stage of existence, the ethical stage of existence and last, the religious stage of existence. I have argued that these three ethical stages can be approximated or replicated within a secular environment, because, first, although Kierkegaard had considerable stature as a Christian thinker, as his significant impact on Karl Barth and the theology of Neo-Orthodoxy demonstrated, the majority of Existentialists were not committed Christians. By way of illustration, Martin Buber (1878-1965) was Jewish, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) was an atheist, and Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) was a Marxist. Second, existential philosophy had run a wide gamut but it did share some common themes, viz. truth, freedom, decision making, choice, responsibility, conscience (all the preceding themes share much with ethical theory), and also despair, guilt, alienation, authenticity, finitude and death (all these preceding themes share much with psychology) (4). Third, John Macquarie re-iterated the view that “had Kierkegaard lived a hundred years later, that is in our day, when a system is conceived in rather more modest terms than then.....he would at once have been able to offer the Hegelian system competition in the form of a system of existential dialectic” (5). As befits Kierkegaard, the secondary literature available on his ‘three stages of existence’ is considerable even if it is diverse in approach, in a sense he has been redeemed by his later followers. The sources for the ‘The Three Stages’ are found largely in his “Either/Or” and “Stages on Life’s Way” (6). The relationship between the stages is of “central importance in understanding his (S.K.’s) whole authorship” (7) The ‘stages’ are not so much stages as a “progressive deepening of life” (8), i.e. a dynamic process of adjustment to existence, in particular the transition from the aesthetic stage, when it ends in despair, to the ethical stage, and from the ethical stage, when it also ends in despair, to the religious stage. Kierkegaard often uses the virtue of love as the “focus for looking at the relationship between the stages” (9) i.e. the aesthetic stage is love as desire and pleasure with self-orientation, the ethical stage is reciprocal love with bonds, or ethical duty (10) and the religious stage subordinates all temporal ends and focusses on the eternal, where the person moves “absolutely towards absolute ends and relatively towards relative ends. Here, love becomes love of neighbour which is also non-preferential (11). To re-iterate, first, the aesthetic stage can be seen in a secular context as an ethics of utility, as a system of costs and benefits. Similarly, the ethical stage can be seen as deontology, a system of duties and rights. Last, the religious stage can be seen as the ethics of virtue where the character of the human person is central.

A UTILITY

The derivation of this utilitarian ethical approach (England in the 18th/19th Century, Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, John Stuart Mill) ran in tandem with Nineteenth Century post-classical economic theory. For the purposes of this submission the ethics of utilitarianism can be subsumed within an economic approach, i.e. economic benefits.

ECONOMIC BENEFITS

The concept of economic benefits is reiterated continuously through industry documents. The following listing is an itemized summary of benefits and is indicative of a positive approach.

THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF THE JUPITER PROJECT

i FINANCIAL BENEFITS

Employment: Estimated employment positions construction phase = 300

Estimated employment positions operational phase = 32 (12)

Note: there is an explicit monetarization of \$318m in the EPYC Jupiter EIS (13). However there appears to be no mention of an employment multiplier for these benefits.

Energy generation: 1100 GWH (Est. to supply the needs of 150,800 homes, no monetarization available) (14)

“Significant” revenue streams: Hosts \$12,000 per turbine?? Neighbours, Community no monetarized amount. (15)

Reduction of financial risk: contractual known revenue streams (16)

Agricultural land usage: efficient usage from additional revenue reduction of risk(not monetarized) (17)

ii ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS

CO2 Emission reduction: est. 900,000t GHG pa (18)

Reduction of global warming: no adverse effect on human health, livestock or birdlife. (19)

Preservation of scarce resources: e.g. wind turbines do not use water, cf. coal. (20)

iii RELEVANT SIGNIFICANT DYNAMIC ECONOMIC CONCEPTS:

There are several economic concepts that have a relevant role in providing a more accurate and detailed understanding of the positive contribution of the Jupiter Project

MULTIPLIERS

In the Inter-War period of the Twentieth Century Richard Kahn developed the powerful economic concept of the Multiplier which was adopted by John Maynard Keynes (Lord Keynes) in his seminal and ground-breaking work of 1936 "The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money" (21). This provided the corpus for Macroeconomics and several components of Macroeconomics surfaced in other areas of economics. In particular, the Employment Multiplier has made a significant contribution to applied economics. My first significant encounter with the Employment Multiplier occurred with the Australian Senate Select Committee on the Live Sheep Trade. If I can recall briefly (and hopefully correctly) this happened when the Secretary of the AMIEU (Australian Meat Industry Employees Union) had commissioned an economic/econometric analysis of the live sheep trade, in particular, the negative cost/benefit aspects of the trade for the domestic meat industry (22). The AMIEU number crunching arrived at a figure for the employment multiplier within the domestic Australian meat industry of a factor of four, i.e. for every job created within the meat industry another four jobs were created elsewhere, usually in regional and rural Australia. To put this in perspective, and if I recall correctly, the then employment multiplier for the Australian motor industry was approximately two. The Multiplier is an economic mechanism that keeps on giving, so to speak. I suspect that there are several multipliers at work with the Jupiter Project. I would hope that somewhere, somehow, a cost benefit analysis is available and could elaborate on the workings of these Multipliers.

EXTERNALITIES

For several decades within the field of Environmental Economics the concept of Externalities has been utilized. Just as there are positive and negative multipliers, there are positive and negative externalities. The concept was first adopted largely with negative externalities where the theory held that if some adverse outcome from a production process (say toxic gases from some smelting process) and if the financial costs of that adverse outcome could not be recovered from within the market for that product,

then that cost became an externality. Ostensibly, the cost could not be recovered, however it is usually possible now to recover the cost through political/legal action, i.e. through a deontological approach.

With recent wind energy projects some discussion has been generated about the possible negative externality of visual disamenity or visual disutility. Just as there is the adage that beauty is in the eye of the beholder, so logically there is the converse that ugliness is also in the eye of the beholder. It is a relativist phenomenon, not an absolute one. This position was echoed in the 1950's reaction to modern art "I may not know much about art but I know what I like". This comment is relativist insofar as it eschews various logical and relevant approaches that constitute the discipline of Aesthetics which is derived from a tradition that goes as far back as classical Hellenistic civilization and the arguments of Plato and Aristotle. The focus for the Jupiter Project is to deal with the unknowing endorsement of a relativist position.

It is useful here to invoke a shadow argument. In moral philosophy there is the cause celebre of moral relativism. One philosophical opinion had it that it was one of the most absurd arguments to have been advanced, even in moral philosophy. This source also gave a useful historical example. The Conquistadores were referred to as a "morally unpretentious collection of bravos", but they were all appalled completely by the Aztec practice of human sacrifice (23). That is to say that ethics matters and further, bad ethical arguments matter even more. The argument against moral relativism is succinct and significant. If it is argued that human sacrifice was morally acceptable for Aztecs but was morally unacceptable for Conquistadores, then we have an example of moral relativism. However, why was human sacrifice not morally unacceptable for both Conquistadores and Aztecs, or conversely, acceptable for both groups. The problem is that there is an overarching argument in the shadows. The immediate relativist argument is backed up by a second level ABSOLUTIST argument in the shadows, that moral relativist arguments are always acceptable, i.e. absolute, whereas absolutist arguments are never acceptable. Perhaps we could coin a phrase, "I may not know much about ethics but I know what I like".

There is also another externality that has surfaced, the possible change in land values surrounding wind turbine projects. A common assumption is that surrounding land values will automatically decline. However this raises two problems. First, the Jupiter project makes provision for "buffering", or voluntary benefit sharing plans, insofar as it is planned to make gratis payments to neighbouring landholders in order to alleviate this externality. Second, there is evidence that for different types of rural land surrounding turbine projects there are different outcomes. I understand that at least one survey has been done which produced some evidence that although some subdivisional land was susceptible to fluctuation, broadacre agricultural land was not.

However, there is a relevant and more personal example. For the last 36 years our family has lived in proximity to a 330kv transmission line that traverses our property. The previous owner was paid a completely insignificant monetary amount at the time of construction and we have received no financial compensation during the entire period of our tenure on the property, save for the good will and decency of the staff of the NSW Electricity Commission and their successors. This is despite the now commonly understood health hazards of living in proximity to 330KV transmission lines or their visual disamenity. This example illustrates the significant disjunction between the economic consideration and treatment of 330kv power lines on the one hand and wind turbines on the other.

THE "NEW" ECONOMY

The term "New Economy" for the purposes of this submission refers to the Australian economy during the inter-war period particularly with regard to the development of the National Grid and parallel development of the new consumer economy and in particular the manufacture and consumption of electrical goods. Contemporary with these developments was the emergence of university economists and economic historians (e.g. Giblin and Shan) who espoused neo-classical economics and who also, apart from teaching and researching saw it as their duty to engage in economic policy debate from a neo-classical perspective, in particular on the perennial issue of tariff reduction. However this somewhat doctrinaire perspective was disadvantaged in that Giblin et al. appeared to have been oblivious to some aspects of the new economy. This was an era of Imperial Preference and Keynesian theory was in its infancy only for the later years of the Thirties, it would be more accurate to think of it as in some sort of intellectual development in utero. Nonetheless, the economic reality in the Twenties of the new economy, national grids and new patterns of consumption was becoming more apparent despite the limitations of neo-classical theory. The neo-classical theorists had been keeping their eye on the ball but it was the wrong ball. The reality was a powerful new synergy of infrastructure and technology and of a value-added dynamic, in a sense a domestic economic reality that despite the exigencies of the Thirties became a continuing reality. There are obvious parallels with the wind turbine and other alternative energy technologies and deployments of Today. The new Australian wind turbine sector is dependent not only on value added dynamics for its growth with the fabrication, labour and ancillary technology components, but also imported components. The key term here is "value-added" which can provide not only domestic Australian employment and generate wider domestic economic activity but may also provide a platform for linked export industries. Further, the term "value added" has a similar connotation to "value-capture" and it may prove possible that wind turbine and other alternative forms of energy production and their forward and backward linkages may become a valuable part of a new synthesis of industrial technology, institutions and infrastructure.

THE RESOURCE CURSE

This economic concept goes by various names, e.g., the resource curse hypothesis, the Dutch disease, and the Gregory hypothesis. It takes a cyclical view of the resources sector. A prominent developer and exponent of the concept is Professor Bob Gregory of the Australian National University who has made it known in various quarters within Australia. Briefly, a minimalist model of the concept utilizes three economic sectors. The domestic sector is immune to fluctuations in the national currency because all financial transactions are undertaken in the national currency within the national boundaries. The two other sectors, the leading export sector and the trailing export sector are the source of the resource curse insofar as the leading sector's success in boosting exports creates demand for the national currency and ultimately the trailing sector is disadvantaged because it now cannot compete successfully with the leading sector with the rise in the national currency and the "bidding" for the factors of production of capital and labour. This process has been endemic within the Australian colonial economy through to the new millennium Australian economy and is usually most notable during the playing out of the resources cycle within the mining sector and its old rival, the agricultural sector. The position of the wind turbine industry provides a more optimistic variation on this theme. Wind power is environmentally sustainable and benign and appears, of itself, to provide the possibility of engendering technology shifts within the industry, e.g. more efficient turbines, infrastructure etc. The eighteenth century energy industries (e.g. coal) do not appear to share in this technology benefit and also appear to be more susceptible to cyclical fluctuations.

MARGINAL ANALYSIS

The development of marginal analysis was a significant outcome of the work of neo-classical economists in the late nineteenth century (along with utility and a market theory of value, i.e. demand and supply). In particular, the Cambridge economist Alfred Marshall, developed the microeconomic theory of the firm, especially the interaction of marginal cost with marginal revenue. Later, in certain economic applications, marginal revenue morphed into marginal benefit (it is used routinely in benefit cost analysis). It is also used in environmental economics. In particular, the Jupiter Wind Farm has been required by the State of NSW to conform to the State planning requirements and other directives. In determining the viability and relevance of the Project, marginal analysis would be an important perspective, not only for accuracy of benefits and costs and other variables and the estimation of the viability of the Project but also, not least, the probity of the Project.

B DEONTOLOGY

The Greek word “deon” is translated as “duty”. The deontological approach mainly utilizes the concepts of duties and rights and their interaction, for example, if a person has a right not to be harmed (for whatever reason) then another person who associates with the right-bearing person has a duty to not harm them. This ethical approach is associated with the great eighteenth century philosopher of the German enlightenment, Immanuel Kant. There is a close relationship between deontology and law, although the former derives largely from philosophical enquiry and the latter derives largely from jurisprudence, common law and Roman law and both make reference to social context and institutions, e.g. Parliament. This document before you, this submission on wind farms to the NSW Department of Planning and Environment, is an example of aspects of deontology at work within a legal, political, social, cultural and institutional process and conforms to the institutional requirements of the State of NSW.

THE JUPITER PROJECT AND DEONTOLOGY

Deontological considerations, both duties and rights, occur frequently within the debate on wind turbines. Listed below is a list of relevant duties and rights that is by no means exhaustive.

DUTIES

Common duty of care: stated at (24), (25).

: violation (26).

: inappropriate right (27)

International duty: conformation to international agreements (28)

Environmental duty: to maintain the environment, preserve scarce resources (29)

: prevention of global warming (30)

: reduction of pollution with production of clean energy (31)

Non-violation of duty: turbines are not a detriment to human health, livestock or wildlife (32)

: wind turbines have no water usage whereas other technologies, e.g. coal, (33)

RIGHTS

Community rights: procedures, misrepresentation (34), (35).

Non-violation of rights: agriculture can co-exist with wind turbines (36).

Invalid right: claim to veto project is invalid (37).

RIGHTS TALK AND DUTIES

As can be seen from the preceding list, there is a simple citing of "duties" and "rights", however rights/duties can be either moral rights/duties or legal rights/duties or both. The large problem is how moral rights/duties are derived, do they fall from the sky? First, there is an argument for rights from self-evidence, cf. the American Declaration of Independence. Second, John Locke advanced an argument from a state of nature and invoked a law of nature which affects all, and, as Locke would have it, that law is reason and teaches all the correct moral rules (38). Third, Immanuel Kant argued that "equal respect for rational agents generates moral rules and rights" (39). Fourth, there is an argument related to Kant's "rational individuals who are concerned to promote their interests (who) would choose to adhere to some set of moral rules" (40). Fifth, there is a utilitarian argument that "correct moral rules maximize total welfare" (41). However, to return to the distinction between moral and legal rights, conversely, valid/invalid legal rights/duties can be determined usually by normal legal processes. Further, a moral right/duty can acquire more substance by acquiring partial consideration as a legal right/duty. The example of the success of the anti-slavery movement in its striving for legal sanctions against slavery in both Great Britain and later in the United States is a telling example.

C VIRTUE

Virtue ethics is a classical ethical theory that traces its origins to Homeric virtue and the life of the warrior hero. With Aristotle, Plato and other classical Greek worthies there was a shift of focus from the warrior and virtue to the just and good person of the "polis" (the Greek city state e.g. Athens). A central concept of virtue is character, i.e. the state of character of the human person. One linked key Aristotelian concept found in the *Nicomachean Ethics* is that of "eudaimonia". This has been translated by some as "happiness" but this is misleading. The term literally means "good spiritedness". Most recent translations have shifted to the idea of "flourishing" or "well being". There is also the linked concept of "telos", i.e. the end or perhaps the *raison d'être* of the human person. Effectively, virtue had been the leading, central ethical theory in European thought until it died out at the end of the Eighteenth Century. The novelist Jane Austen was the last exponent of the Virtue tradition. It is embedded in "Pride and Prejudice" where Miss Elizabeth Bennet is exceedingly vexed by not being able to determine the character (read virtue/vice) of Mr Darcy. The problem is, in fact, his pride and her prejudice. In 1981, Alasdair MacIntyre launched "After Virtue" (42), a prodigious work that re-established the claim of virtue theory to relevance in ethical thought. Virtue is concerned with the character of the human person, i.e. the philosophical and psychological understanding of the human person seen through the working of "hexis/habitus", in a sense the disposition of the human person for virtue, but more accurately, the state of character of the human person for virtue and/or vice. Recently there has been two shifts in emphasis with virtue theory. First, there has been more attention paid to the emotional and interior life of the human person and also the biological basis for behavior for the moral subject. Second, there has been more attention given to the social context for the life of virtue. Both these new developments have been given some attention in the following final sections below.

THE JUPITER PROJECT AND VIRTUE

INDIVIDUAL VIRTUE, INTENTION AND ACCURACY IN COMMUNICATION

There has been concern about the possibility of inaccurate details of consultative arrangements being communicated under anonymity which jeopardizes the effectiveness of the resolution of problems associated with the planning for the Jupiter Project. (43)

VIRTUE AND COMMUNITY

EPYC has voluntarily provided assistance with community projects. (44)

There is the suggestion for and the example of provision for enhanced mobile telephone operation. (45)

VIRTUE AND CONSULTATIVE INSTITUTIONS

There have been concerns expressed about the incidence of misinformation spread by third parties with regard to EPYC's voluntary consultations with the Community. (46)

There have been concerns expressed about the role of external interest groups in the consultation process. (47)

There have been concerns about the unrepresentative nature of formal community representation. (48)

VIRTUE AND CONCERN FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS

There is concern for future generations with the prospect of global warming and climate change. Wind power is a very welcome prospect. (49)

VIRTUE AND KIERKEGAARD

With our pursuit of understanding of the QKF, we now reach a moment of truth. It becomes difficult to accept some of Kierkegaard's arguments. In particular there is the argument for the teleological suspension of the ethical (telos=end) in "Fear and Trembling". Briefly, it dramatically recounts the position of Abraham in following the commandment of God to kill his own beloved son Isaac. This potential act would be a complete transgression of the ethical order for the sake of a telos, or end, completely outside it, i.e. God's command. At this point many commentators have taken issue with Kierkegaard. A former leading Anglican theologian, John Macquarie, who was interested in many facets of existentialism, saw this teleological argument as problematic (50). Anthony Kenny also scrutinized the argument from many perspectives and raised several issues (51). It brings us to Kierkegaard's prioritizing of faith in the religious stage. Here we are not concerned with the content of faith, but with faith as faith. However he never addresses one dimension of faith, i.e. faith is one of the three theological virtues, along with hope and love and this brings us to the topic of the recovery of virtue. Suffice it to say that the recovery has led to many new paths of enquiry into virtue such as virtue epistemology, a path that is outside our purview.

However, there is another path which is within our purview. Earlier, when discussing the three stages of existence, they were referred to as a progressive deepening of life (52). This leads to a different area of enquiry of psychology, psychiatry and spirituality and in particular the work of Jack Dominian, a consultant psychiatrist, and E.H. Erikson, a psychologist. Erikson links the various stages of development of children, adolescents and adults with "certain virtues" (53). For example, when a child's capacity to trust is greater than its fear of mistrust then it acquires the capacity to hope. Dominian then links this with the theological virtue of hope and argues further that spirituality has an infrastructure which is psychological. The process of the child acquiring capacities (e.g. the will, the role of truth, purpose-the courage to envisage and pursue valued goals, sense of being loved unconditionally etc.) finally attains the capacity to develop ego integrity in the face of despair. These concepts and terms are very similar to those of the three stages of existence such as the renunciation of things temporal, non-preferential love, the recognition of the ubiquity of sin and failure and suffering and the priority of truth.

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ATTACHMENT

KIERKEGAARD – EXISTENCE, ETHICS AND FAITH (AN INTRODUCTION)

JIM WARNER 1979 FOR PRIVATE CIRCULATION

Both the existentialism of Jean Paul Sartre and the crisis theology of Karl Barth derive in part from the work of Søren Kierkegaard. He stands at the cross-roads between an atheistic existentialism and a theology divorced from philosophical analysis. S.K. is pivotal and seminal for Twentieth Century thought, but also vexatious.

- Kierkegaard was the sanest man of his generation.....
- Kierkegaard was a schizophrenic.....
- Kierkegaard was the greatest Christian of the century.....
- Kierkegaard's aim was the destruction of the historic Christian faith.....
- He did not attack philosophy as such.....
- He negated reason.....
- He was a voluntarist.....
- Kierkegaard was the Knight of Faith.....
- Kierkegaard possessed the truth.....
- Kierkegaard was one of the damned..... (1)

This conflict of opinion has extended to existentialism which has earned for itself a significant following among European writers such as Camus and Sartre but has earned the condemnation of a Papal Bull and the disdain of an analytical philosopher such as John Passmore;

"Professional philosophers, for the most part, dismiss it with a contemptuous shrug..... it stands, to British philosophers, for Continental excess and rankness." (2) In short, British analytical philosophers have not been spellbound by SK although he is of cardinal importance for atheistic existentialists and neo-orthodox theologians and is an intriguing example of the relation of philosophy to theology.

He is not a clear straight-forward thinker but poetic, paradoxical and ironic with an intense psychological insight. Dr Allan Loy remarked that long walks and the distractions of the market-place are a necessary relief to a dosage of Kierkegaard. One of the main reasons for the difficulties of understanding that he presents is

his use of pseudonymous authorship, literary preoccupations, his melancholia and his development of his private language because of the inadequacies of the Danish of his day. He was a giant among his countrymen.

His life was, in a sense, provincial but reflected profound psychological tensions combined with religious passion and intellectual daring. He was an abnormal personality. It is relevant to recount a few significant developments in his life.

He was born in 1813 to Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard and his second wife Ane Lund Kierkegaard. She played a minor part in SK's life but his father was afflicted by guilt at having seduced and made pregnant his former wife's maid so shortly after his first wife's death. His father was also torn by guilt at having cursed God in his adolescence, an act that induced severe depression bordering on the psychotic in his later life. The family did suffer, four of its members being killed within two years. SK inherited this melancholy and guilt and in obscure references in the Journals mentioned his 'thorn in the flesh', 'fundamental injury', 'spot' and 'misrelationship between soul and body'.

All this was compounded by his engagement to Regine Olsen at the age of 27 and his decision to break it off just after one year had elapsed. His motives were complex and tortured and much of his 'aesthetic' work was influenced by the ideal of marriage and commitment. He never married and died at the age of forty-two. His life was anything but Tolstoyan in his domestic circumstances.

In his relation to society he was influenced by two events. The first was the 'Corsair' affair in 1846 when SK deliberately provoked the editor of a scandal sheet to mercilessly ridicule him to the extent that "Don't be a Søren" was an admonishment used by Copenhagen mothers to their children. He reacted to this predictably with comments about the "trampling geese", (the common people), and the failure of the church to bear witness to integrity and truth.

The second event also occurred in 1846 but was overshadowed by the 'Corsair' affair. A Bornholm priest named Adler had been sus-

pendent for declaring that he had received special revelation from Christ. SK was tempted to publish on this question but felt it would be unfair to Adler. The two questions of revelation and church authority continued to preoccupy him for the rest of his life.

In his interior life SK was decidedly Tolstoyan. In 1835 he spent a summer holiday at Gillileje and in this prolonged contact with the Danish countryside and people he experienced a heightened self-consciousness and resolved to 'find the truth which is true for me , and to find the idea for which I can live and die.' (3) Again on the 19th May 1838 he wrote in his Journal, "There is an indescribable joy which glows through us as unaccountably as the apostle's outburst is unexpected.... a gust of the tradewind which blows from the Groves of Mamre to the eternal habitations." (4) But the experience that was to fundamentally alter his life came ten years later on 19th April 1848. "My whole being is changed. My reserve of shut-up-ness is broken. I must speak.... Lord give thy grace." (5) And he did speak for the next seven years. He dispensed with the pseudonymous authorship and became an open and forcible Christian author and advocate.

His life was modest but not insipid and coloured completely all of his work. The problem for us, as it was for his teacher in divinity, Professor Müller, is "What in the world are we going to do about Søren?" (6) We could do no worse than to follow SK's dialectic of the aesthetic, ethical and religious (A and B) stages. In Stages on Life's Way (7) he gives a complete account, if oblique, of his "spheres of existence." The aesthetic is the pleasurable, momentary uncommitted despairing mere indulgence of feeling ($\chi\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\varsigma$). The ethical is characterized by a $\tau\epsilon\lambda\omicron\varsigma$, a set purpose and the attempts to live by it, committed to it and commanded to do it with the implication that the source of the commandment is God. Religiousness A is the recognition of the limitations of ethics and the primacy of Grace but it is essentially religiosity not complete faith. Religiousness B is the starkness of the passion and the atonement, of the certitude of redemption, unashamedly Christo-

centric. These stages will now be examined in greater detail.

The aesthetic is the 'ground floor' of SK's work. In "Either/Or" (8) the first volume contains reflections by 'A' on the purely aesthetic life. In the second 'B' presents the ethical. But what are the characteristics of SK's thoughts on the 'aesthetic'? They were inevitably formed in reaction to Hegel and via Hegel, Kant. Hegel believed that a logical system was able to include all reality within its categories. But SK objects that if this system cannot uncover truth then it has become a waste of time. He maintains that as an inescapable fact of existence man is torn between a longing for satisfaction, the aesthetic, which it is impossible to satisfy and his own finite restricted existence. Man discovers from his own experience his participation in both temporality and eternity "The existing subject is eternal but qua existing temporal" (9). A logical system is ignorant of man's quality of "existence".

This is developed as a caution on theoretical systems and objective truth. They attempt to be final and fixed but existence is temporal and in change and never complete. (10) "An existential system cannot be formulated. Does this mean that no such system exists? By no means; nor is this implied in our assertion. Reality itself is a system - for God, but it cannot be a system for any existing spirit. System and finality correspond to one another, but existence is precisely the opposite of finality. It may be seen from a purely abstract point of view, that system and existence are incapable of being thought together." (11)

But our immersion in existence also means that objective enquiry can only approximate an answer to a question. At the level of the mundane and scholastic careful scrutiny is to be advocated (12) but objective enquiry is never finished. In fact one more detail may reverse all of the previous scholarly research. This is the anguish of the scientific method which can never more than approximate a correct answer. It would be interesting to pursue this question in relation to induction, paradigms and the principle of falsification but space prohibits this. SK's twist on scientific method is that objective

enquiry cannot provide the answers for questions of existence. As an illustration he gives the fact that critical biblical research is inconclusive for personal religious faith. "As soon as subjectivity is eliminated, and passion eliminated from subjectivity, and the infinite interest eliminated from passion, there is in general no decision at all, either in this problem or any other. All decisiveness, all essential decisiveness is rooted in subjectivity." (13) If objective method succeeds in destroying the question it is the method that is wrong.

Now we have reached the point of reckoning for natural theology. SK dismisses any proof for the existence of God. (14) What can "God" mean to existent beings under temporality and finitude? Intellect is engaged in paradox, craving for the unknowable, struggling to get beyond itself. The end object of this satisfaction sought through destruction can be labelled "God". "So let us call this unknown something the God. It is nothing more than the name we assign it. The idea of demonstrating that this unknown something (the God) exists could scarcely suggest itself to the Reason." (15). Consequently God is identified negatively as 'Wholly Other'. If this is so, the futility of attempting to demonstrate his existence is clear. Either He is fictitious which dismissed valid proof of his existence or He is not fictitious but unknowable and prevents knowledge through the proofs. This is SK at his paradoxical best. He presses the point. Paradox stresses the importance of passion and subjectivity. Intellectual passion is stimulated by paradox and God is the "absolute" paradox of the mind. Moreover the great paradox is the Wholly Unlike becoming Wholly Like while remaining Wholly Unlike. This is precisely the scandal of the incarnation. "The Reason, in its paradoxical passion, precisely desires its own downfall. But this is what the Paradox also desires, and thus they are at bottom linked in understanding." (16)

SK in his attack on objective methods develops the idea of truth as subjectivity. Objective truth "forgets" about the thinker particular existence is of no consequence to such truth since it

is true all the same. Subjective truth is appropriated by the individual, with an awareness of his role in cognition. Again, in objective truth all that is important is that the content of a proposition is true, the cognitive relation is unimportant.(17) In subjective truth it is important to consider what binds the thinker to what is known. "When the question of the truth is raised subjectively, reflection is directed subjectively to the nature of the individual's relationship; if only the mode of this relationship is in the truth, the individual is in the truth even if he should happen to be thus related to what is not true."(18) SK then applies this concept of truth to belief in God in a straightforward simple way. It should be mentioned that the problem of the existence of God is continually invoked as SK was working in the shadow of Hegel and before Nietzsche. His argument runs;— God does not lend himself to objective techniques and is not a phenomenal object and "Therefore exists only for subjectivity in inwardness"(19) This will be taken up later.

But subjective truth presents its own problems. Fanaticism is the directing of interest in the eternal to simple objects of approximation.(20) This is avoided by giving commitment only to appropriate objects of faith, objects that could not be known by "approximation" or theoretical means. Madness is explained thus "In a merely subjective determination of the truth, madness and truth become in the last analysis, indistinguishable, since they both have inwardness".(21) If truth is not appropriated it can lead to babbling and inanities which are objectively true but irrelevant such as the madman who says "Bang, the earth is round!" every time a ball in his back coat pocket strikes his behind.(22)

Thus SK has brought us to the precipice by his displacement of reason and the offer of an inward-turning subjective truth. By these arguments he has destroyed the aesthetic sphere. The refusal to choose, to be committed, to assume a position has been remorselessly discounted. Despair is the birthpang of a new stage, the ethical.

It must be said at the outset that he would claim there are not so much ethics but ethical tasks. He has antipathy to all abstract

ethical discussion and dismissed naturalistic and positivistic ethics(23). "All is lost for ethics, and it has contributed to the loss of all".(24) He breaks with ethics because ethics cannot answer the questions he poses i.e. paradoxes. But SK attempts to find a new basis for ethics, not within natural theology or metaphysics but within the nature of man seeking existence, the existential imperative. The individual has been forced by despair to choose, with an underlying mood of deliberate and sustained engagement. "But what is it I choose? Is it this or that? No I choose absolutely and the absoluteness of my choice is expressed precisely by the fact that I have not chosen this or that. I choose the absolute. And what is the absolute? It is I myself in my eternal validity."(25) Absolute? What he appears to mean is that the individual makes this choice when there is no longer any object left for him to choose because, in despair, everything has lost its value. But when he decides to become committed he must choose a point of commitment. This cannot be outside him, as all externals are worthless but must be inward, his own self, the only absolute left, not an ideal self but the only self which for him is actually existent "but I do not create myself, I choose myself. Therefore while nature is created out of nothing, while I myself as an individual personality am created out of nothing, as a free spirit I am born of the principle of contradiction or born of the fact that I choose myself. (26)

The nub of all this for SK is that ethics inevitably arises from inwardness, from the depths of personality whose end is in itself. Ethics is existential, and is confronted by life itself in a process of conflict of universals. First there are universals of duty to family and duty to society, of conscience and demands of public life etc. The guilt and moral tensions of the individual in society undermine his sense of ethics. But secondly there is the clash of ultimate universals. His new commitment has generated a sense of right and wrong with feelings of guilt and virtue. But since he is seeking the virtue which is himself, which is beyond him, he is unable to avoid the sense of responsibility for it and attendant guilt. This com-

pounds itself as his passion to exist clashes with the 'universal' of ethics.

"The ethical as such is the universal, it applies to everyone, and the same thing is expressed from another point of view by saying that it applies every instant." (27)

If he asserts his individuality he sins because he has deviated from the universal. If he does not assert his individuality he again sins because he is not 'manifesting' himself. Guilt will continue to shadow him although he has pursued ethical ends in hope of a fuller existence. But he senses his responsibility for the situation and once again slips into despair. He is convinced he needs virtue i.e. the capacity to be ethical but SK refutes this. What is needed is faith and that is another sphere of existence, the religious sphere.

As mentioned earlier, Religiousness A is a general religiosity. Religiousness B is Christianity with the offensive paradox of the God-man. SK attacks Religiousness A because it is the dark religion of the common man, of the natural and the supernatural, claiming a sufficiency and finality which distracts man into illusions about God and about himself. But more importantly Religiousness A never brought a new man into existence in spite of its claims but converse weakened him with false hope, defenceless before the new inhuman systems of thought. He includes within Religiousness A Romantic religiousness, Philosophical religiousness as in Hegel, Christian religiousness of the established churches and, surprisingly, mystica religiousness. He conducted many bitter attacks on the forms of religiosity in his later years but what is more relevant to his argument is the nature of Religiousness B.

This is the suicidal leap across the 'guilt threshold' by means of Faith. Christ and the atonement follow from this leap but this category of faith needs to be scrutinized. Faith is an act of will, the ultimate volitional act. SK uses as illustration Abraham being commanded to sacrifice Isaac to God in Genesis 22ff. It is a 'teleological suspension of ethics', not a denial, through faith. Abraham is ethically guilty as he will be an accessory to the murder of his son. Further he is not compelled by external circumstances, the murder

will be purely private. But he did it "For God's sake, and (in complete identity with this) for his own sake. He did it for God's sake because God required this proof of his faith; for his own sake he did it in order that he might furnish the proof. The unity of these two points of view is perfectly expressed by the word which has always been used to characterize this situation: it is a trial, a temptation (Fristelse). A temptation -but what does that mean? What ordinarily tempts a man is that which would keep him from doing his duty, but in this case the temptation is itself the ethical..... which would keep him from doing God's will."(25)

Abraham abandons ethical certainty for a new certainty. Abraham has faith. "This is the paradox which keeps him upon the sheer edge and which he cannot make clear to any other man, for the paradox is that he as the individual puts himself in an absolute relation to the absolute"(29)

Justification comes not because he is the universal, but because he is an individual because what happened within himself. By breaking the law he has fulfilled the law. The individual stands before God alone. Abraham is the paradigm for any individual who finds himself at the boundaries of ethics. It is also an example of absolute duty to God which transcends the ethical, rather than adherence to a framework of duties which obscure God.

This conforms with the journey of the Individual towards 'authentic selfhood', his self is held together in choosing, in a tenseness of will.

The example of Abraham demonstrates faith as absolute trust, in distinction to belief in propositions or duty for duty's sake. Faith is belief and trust to an absolute degree which is evoked and sustained by the God-Man.

The God-Man comes completely incognito, even faith could not recognize it. Because of this, Christ cannot be cited in argument, he is ambiguous, the God-Man. But more than this, he is paradox which confounds reason. He is eternal but temporal. This offence is resolved either in offence or faith. We are commanded by Christ himself to accept his atonement. The individual has made the leap and is forgiven. Man is unlike God because of his sinfulness -

the loss of real being by his own error - his need is authentic existence. But existence is only a precondition, it is existence in Christ. The Knight of Faith must fulfill the commands of charity and trust in His existence. "I, Johannes Climacus..... have heard tell of a highest good in prospect, which is called an eternal blessedness, and that Christianity will bestow this upon me on condition of adhering to it - now I ask how I am to become a Christian." (30) He replies "In relation to an eternal happiness as the absolute good, pathos is not a matter of words, but of permitting this conception to transform the entire existence of the individual" (31)

Existence is sweet to SK but objections to his thought are varied and considerable. Is the dialectic of "either/or" forced? Is there no redeeming value in human personality and especially human reason per se? Is isolation the fate of humanity at the expense of communication and interaction? Is subjective truth in some way blighted, with the object of commitment a vagary? Is Christianity made a relative and not absolute end? Does Christianity become an objective truth, no longer an aspect of inwardness?

This essay began by noting the variety of reactions to SK. This account of his thought has, it is hoped, helped to explain that reaction. But his contribution is his originality and unique psychological insight into the problems of existence, faith, ethics and Christ, and for that he has been remembered.

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