

The Hon Paul Scully MP
Minister for Planning and Public Spaces
GPO Box 5341
Sydney NSW 2001

17th December 2025

Dear Minister Scully,

Re: Submission SSD-77825469

I am writing to provide a submission on SSD-77825469 for the proposed residential development on Pockley Avenue, Roseville. On the basis of coronial evidence, scientific modelling and NSW legal requirements, the proposal poses **foreseeable risks to life, legal compliance and governance integrity** if it proceeds without a full evacuation-capacity assessment aligned to future climate conditions.

Submission Highlights

- **Evacuation capacity already exceeded:** West Roseville has 766 dwellings and 1,239 car spaces, far above the 301–600 dwelling threshold for precincts with three exits.
- **Coronial findings warn of predictable failures:** The 2003 Canberra Firestorm and 2019–20 NSW Bushfires Coronial Inquiry show that limited exits, narrow roads, congestion, delayed evacuation and rapid deterioration of conditions lead to evacuation collapse and preventable fatalities.
- **Road network constraints match coronial risk factors:** Single-lane pinch points, parked-car choke points and only three viable exits replicate the conditions that coroners have identified as life-threatening during fast-moving fires.
- **Bushfire simulations confirm exposure:** The 2024 Ku-ring-gai simulation shows significant ember-attack exposure, with slope amplifying fire behaviour and reducing evacuation windows.
- **Legal obligations require action:** Under the EP&A Act, SSD Guidelines and TPP20-08, NSW must assess risks to human safety, cumulative impacts and site suitability.

Recommendations

1. Pause approval of SSD-77825469 until an independent, climate-aligned evacuation and bushfire risk assessment is completed.
2. Require full compliance with the EP&A Regulation 2021 and SSD EIS Guidelines, including cumulative traffic and human-safety impacts.
3. Undertake evidence-based evacuation modelling that includes real-world behavioural delays, bottleneck analysis, slope-driven ember attack and emergency-vehicle access.
4. Limit development intensity to recognised safe-evacuation thresholds for precincts with three exits.

Given these findings, approving additional density in West Roseville without rigorous assessment would expose residents to foreseeable danger and the NSW Government to significant legal and reputational risk. I respectfully request that approval be paused until these safety issues are resolved.

Yours sincerely,

Dr Tanya Fiedler

(Copied to the Hon. Matt Cross, Daniel Mookhey, Minister Courtney Houssos)

Climate, Bushfire and Evacuation Risk in West Roseville: Legal, Scientific and Governance Risks for NSW Government

SUBMISSION SSD-77825469

Executive summary

West Roseville’s BUSHFIRE EVACUATION CAPACITY IS ALREADY BEYOND SAFE LIMITS. Approving further development exposes the NSW Government to foreseeable, significant bushfire-related RISKS TO LIFE, LEGAL LIABILITY, and POLICY FAILURE under accelerating climate extremes.

Scientific evidence, coronial findings, NSW planning law and international legal guidance all confirm that the precinct’s **high dwelling density, narrow internal streets, and only three viable exits** create a predictable risk of **evacuation failure** during fast-moving bushfire events. The area already accommodates **766 dwellings and 1,239 car spaces—far above the 301–600 dwelling threshold** identified in peer-reviewed evacuation research.

The **2003 Canberra Firestorm** and **2019–20 NSW Bushfires Coronial Inquiry** both show how limited exits, bottlenecks, real-world delays, traffic congestion, poor visibility and rapidly deteriorating conditions lead to residents becoming trapped during evacuation, often with fatal consequences. These factors directly mirror conditions in West Roseville.

The **2024 Ku-ring-gai Council bushfire simulation** and climate projections demonstrate significant **ember-attack exposure**, slope-driven fire behaviour, and **reduced evacuation timeframes**, all of which amplify risk.

The **EP&A Act, SSD Guidelines** and **NSW Treasury’s TPP20-08** require NSW Government to evaluate risks to human safety and cumulative impacts.

1.1 Executive Summary Highlights

- The precinct already exceeds **safe evacuation thresholds** for areas with three exit roads.
- Coronial inquiries show that **evacuation failure** arises from bottlenecks, congestion, delays and fast-changing fire conditions—conditions present in West Roseville.
- Road geometry (single-lane pinch points, parked-car choke points) severely limits emergency access and evacuation flow.
- Climate projections and bushfire simulations confirm **high ember exposure** and **short evacuation windows**.
- NSW planning law requires **assessment of human-safety risks, cumulative impacts** and **site suitability** under natural hazards.
- ICJ findings reinforce obligations to assess **foreseeable climate-exacerbated harm** using **best-available science**.

1.2 Key Recommendations

1. **Pause approval** of SSD-77825469 until an independent, future-climate-aligned evacuation and bushfire risk assessment is completed.
2. **Require full compliance** with the EP&A Regulation 2021 and SSD EIS Guidelines, including cumulative traffic, bushfire, and human-safety assessments.
3. **Undertake best-practice evacuation modelling** that incorporates real-world behavioural delays, bottleneck analysis, slope-driven ember attack and emergency-vehicle access.
4. **Limit development intensity** to recognised safe-evacuation thresholds (301–600 dwellings), consistent with peer-reviewed research and coronial evidence.
5. **Embed climate-risk governance obligations**, including due-diligence and harm-prevention principles from the ICJ Advisory Opinion, into all planning decisions for the precinct.

Given these combined factors, the proposed development cannot safely proceed without independent modelling that reflects future climate conditions, coronial lessons and NSW legal duties.

2 Current and Escalating Bushfire Risk

2.1 Ember Attack Exposure and Bushfire-Prone Land Context

Although the development parcel itself is not mapped as Bushfire Prone Land (BPL), **multiple streets immediately surrounding Pockley Avenue, including Alexander Parade, Findlay Avenue and connecting lanes, are designated as BPL.** As the 2024 Ku-ring-gai Council bushfire simulation demonstrates¹, the development site lies clearly within an **ember exposure zone**, which is the leading cause of building loss in NSW bushfires^{2,3}.

During the 1994 Roseville fire, ember storms destroyed 12 homes and forced emergency closure of the lower end of Alexander Parade, cutting off Findlay Avenue. This historical event underscores that ember impact in this locality is not hypothetical.

2.2 Slope-Driven Fire Behaviour

The slope from the Pockley Avenue site towards adjoining bushland intensifies:

- flame height,
- speed of spread, and
- ember projection.

Planning NSW and the NSW RFS recognise slope as one of the most critical determinants of fire severity.⁴ This means that **even land technically outside mapped BPL can be highly exposed to bushfire attack via slope-enhanced ember transport.**

2.3 Non-Stationary Climate Intensifying Risk

The scientific consensus is clear: past climate patterns can no longer guide future risk assessments.⁵ Fire weather is trending beyond historical bounds.

Research finds accelerating fire-weather severity across southeast Australia,⁶ while NSW DCCEEW (2024) projects up to **37.2 additional days per year above 35°C**,⁷ a key driver of **catastrophic fire danger.**

Increasing extremes reduce evacuation windows, increase ember attack reach, and escalate the probability of firestorm conditions.

¹ https://www.facebook.com/story.php/?story_fbid=549581280725607&id=100070212184472&_rdr.

² Planning NSW (2020). Planning for Bushfire Protection 2019

https://www.planning.nsw.gov.au/sites/default/files/2023-03/planning-circular-ps-20-001-planning-for-bushfire-protection-2019.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com

³ Brown, D (2024). How a bushfire can destroy a home. <https://theconversation.com/how-a-bushfire-can-destroy-a-home-110795>

⁴ Planning NSW (2020). Planning for Bushfire Protection 2019

https://www.planning.nsw.gov.au/sites/default/files/2023-03/planning-circular-ps-20-001-planning-for-bushfire-protection-2019.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com

⁵ Milly et al (2008). Stationarity Is Dead: Whither Water Management? *Science* 319.

https://www.science.org/doi/epdf/10.1126/science.1151915?src=getft&utm_source=wiley&getft_integrator=wiley

⁶ Jones et al (2022). Global and Regional Trends and Drivers of Fire Under Climate Change. *Reviews of Geophysics* 60 (3) <https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1029/2020RG000726>

⁷ NSW DCCEEW (2024). Metropolitan Sydney Climate Change Snapshot.

<https://www.climatechange.environment.nsw.gov.au/sites/default/files/2024-08/NARClIM2-Snapshot-Sydney.pdf>

3 Evacuation Constraints and Traffic Safety Risks

3.1 Exceeding Safe Evacuation Thresholds

Research has identified a precinct with **three exit roads** should accommodate between **301 and 600 dwellings** for safe bushfire evacuation.⁸

West Roseville already contains:

- **362 existing dwellings,**
- **427 proposed dwellings,**
- **766 total dwellings,**
- **1,239 total car spaces.**

This significantly exceeds safe thresholds (see Figure 1). These figures do not include second vehicles per household or increased on-street parking.




Figure 1: Comparison of existing and proposed dwellings with safe evacuation thresholds

3.2 Traffic Bottlenecks and Road Narrowing

As illustrated in Figures 2, 3 and 4:

- **There are only three existing exits** to the Pacific Highway for residents west of the precinct (See Figure 2). MacLaurin Parade frequently **queues onto Pacific Highway** due to southbound congestion.
- Corona Avenue and parts of MacLaurin Parade frequently operate as **single-lane** due to parked cars.

⁸ Cova (2005). Public Safety in the Urban–Wildland Interface: Should Fire-Prone Communities Have a Maximum Occupancy? *Natural Hazards Review*. 6 (3) <https://ascelibrary.org/doi/full/10.1061/%28ASCE%291527-6988%282005%296%3A3%2899%29>

- Emergency vehicles must navigate **against evacuation flow**, a critical failure mode identified in multiple bushfire inquiries.




Figure 2: West-Roseville precinct enclosed by red, with three exits signposted



Figure 3: Traffic from MacLaurin Parade blocked from entering Pacific Highway by southbound traffic⁹

⁹ Photo courtesy Frank Walker

Figure 4: Effective one-way traffic flow on Corona Avenue¹⁰



The proposed new Pockley–Shirley Road link does not materially improve egress because:

- The Shirley Road/Pacific Highway intersection already requires **2–3 traffic cycles** to clear, and
- Findlay Avenue access is historically vulnerable to closure during fire events.

3.3 Research Supporting Evacuation Concerns

Wong et al. (2020) recommend placing congestion reduction measures close to the fire impact zone — an impossibility in West Roseville due to topography and limited egress.¹¹

Wolfshon & Marchive (2007) show that increased traffic volume must be matched by increased exit capacity or evacuation time.¹²

Neither condition is met here.

4 Coronial Evidence: Evacuation Failure, Congestion, and the Realities of Human Behaviour in Bushfire Emergencies

Across two major Australian bushfire inquiries, the **2003 Canberra Firestorm** and the **2019–20 NSW Bushfires Coronial Inquiry**, a clear, consistent pattern emerges: **communities with limited evacuation routes, narrow access points, or congested road networks face dramatically elevated risks during fast-moving bushfires**. The coronial evidence shows that evacuation failure is rarely caused by a single factor. Instead, it results from a **cascade of real-world constraints**, including human behaviour, road design, congestion, and rapid deterioration of fireground conditions.

4.1 Canberra Firestorm Inquiry (2003): Congestion, Panic, and Inadequate Routes

¹⁰ Photo courtesy Frank Walker

¹¹ Wong et al (2020). Review of California Wildfire Evacuations from 2017 to 2019. *University of California Institute of Transportation Studies*. <https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5w85z07g>

¹² Wolfshon & Marchive (2007). Emergency Planning in the Urban-Wildland Interface: Subdivision-Level Analysis of Wildfire Evacuations. *Journal of Urban Planning and Development*, 133 (1). <https://ascelibrary.org/doi/full/10.1061/%28ASCE%290733-9488%282007%29133%3A1%2873%29>

The Canberra Firestorm coronial inquiry¹³ documented in detail how **residents attempting to evacuate encountered blocked roads, gridlock, poor visibility, and rapidly changing fire conditions**, resulting in widespread panic and dangerous, last-minute escape attempts.

Residents described:

- roads choked with vehicles,
- congestion preventing forward movement,
- visibility collapsing under smoke and embers, and
- evacuation attempts breaking down into panic and confusion.

These accounts appear throughout, where residents recount being trapped in slow-moving or stationary traffic as embers fell, trees burned, and conditions deteriorated around them.

The Coroner explicitly found that the situation created **panic and confusion throughout the affected suburbs**, directly connected to the inability of the road network to safely absorb evacuation demand under firestorm conditions.

Compounding congestion was the fact that **conditions worsened far faster than residents expected**. CSIRO expert Phil Cheney warned that fires under extreme conditions could reach Canberra's suburbs from remote ignition points within just **two to three hours**, leaving minimal time to evacuate and forcing residents onto roads already experiencing bottlenecks and reduced visibility.

4.1.1 Planning relevance

The 2003 inquiry demonstrates that even in a well-resourced urban environment, **limited or funnelled evacuation routes become overwhelmed almost instantly** when large numbers of residents attempt to leave at once. Real-world behaviours—waiting, checking on neighbours, gathering belongings, hesitating—further compress the usable evacuation window and create dangerous congestion at precisely the moment road networks must perform flawlessly.

4.2 NSW Bushfires Coronal Inquiry (2019–20): Blocked Roads, Rapid Deterioration and Mobility Constraints

The NSW State Coroner's 2019–20 Bushfires Inquiry¹⁴ documents numerous instances where **residents died or narrowly escaped because evacuation routes became blocked or impassable**, or because rapidly worsening fire conditions overtook slow-moving or congested traffic.

Across multiple fire events, the Inquiry describes:

- roads blocked by **fallen trees**,
- **smoke and embers** making driving impossible,
- cars trapped on **narrow rural roads**,
- **visibility collapsing** without warning,
- severe congestion as residents attempted to flee simultaneously,

¹³ Doogan, M (2003) The Canberra Firestorm. Inquests and Inquiry into Four Deaths and Four Fires between 8 and 18 January 2003 <https://www.courts.act.gov.au/magistrates/about-the-courts/coroners-court/act-coroners-court-2003-bushfire>

¹⁴ O'Sullivan, T (2024) Inquests and inquiries into the 2019/2020 NSW Bushfire Season. Findings and recommendations. <https://coroners.nsw.gov.au/documents/reports/bushfires/2019-20-NSW-Bushfires-Coronal-Inquiry-Vol1.pdf>

- fatal outcomes when residents evacuated **too late** or became immobilised.

These patterns appear repeatedly in the case files, where **blocked or rapidly degrading roads prevented safe escape**.

The Inquiry notes that residents commonly left **later than recommended**, reflecting real-world behaviour during an unfolding crisis—checking on family, gathering essential items, attempting to defend homes before fleeing. Once on the road, many encountered **severe congestion, dead-ends, or hazardous road geometry**, resulting in immobility at precisely the moment mobility was needed to survive.

The Coroner emphasises how **fast-changing, extreme fire behaviour** created conditions where **roads that were passable minutes earlier became deadly**, with flames crossing roads, trees falling, and embers igniting adjacent vegetation. The season was described as **unprecedented in scale and intensity**, with fires spreading faster than authorities or residents could anticipate.

4.2.1 Planning relevance:

The NSW Coronial Inquiry reinforces that **evacuation modelling must reflect real human behaviour**—including hesitation, delays, and differing responses to warnings—and must acknowledge that road networks cannot be assumed to remain passable during extreme fire events. Narrow streets, limited exits, and high vehicle densities combine with real-world behavioural delays to produce lethal congestion when fires move faster than expected.

4.3 Combined Lessons for NSW Planning Authorities

Taken together, the coronial findings demonstrate that:

1. Limited exit routes create predictable bottlenecks

When many residents attempt to leave simultaneously, **single-lane or few-exit precincts** quickly reach gridlock.

2. Real-world behaviour compresses the evacuation window

People rarely evacuate instantly. Hesitation, communication with family, and attempts to defend property **create unavoidable delays**—delays that turn narrow roads into lethal chokepoints.

3. Rapidly changing fire conditions can make evacuation routes impassable within minutes

Roads can go from open to blocked in moments due to **falling trees, ember storms, flame contact, smoke collapse**, or failed visibility.

4. Mobility constraints kill

Congested, narrow, or blocked roads prevent escape and leave residents trapped in deteriorating conditions, as seen repeatedly in both inquiries.

4.3.1 Implication for West Roseville

These coronial findings directly mirror the vulnerabilities of the West Roseville precinct—**three exits, narrow internal streets, high vehicle density, and a topography exposed to ember attack**. As the inquiries show, road networks with these characteristics **cannot support safe, timely evacuation under extreme bushfire conditions**, especially when compounded by climate-driven increases in fire speed and severity.

5 NSW Legal Obligations: EP&A Act, SSD Requirements, Climate Risk Governance

5.1 Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979: s 4.15 Mandatory Considerations

Under s 4.15 of the *Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979* (EP&A Act), a consent authority must evaluate a development application having regard to the matters listed in s 4.15(1).¹⁵ These include:

- s 4.15(1)(b): “the likely impacts of that development, including environmental impacts on both the natural and built environments, and social and economic impacts in the locality”
- s 4.15(1)(c): “the suitability of the site for the development”
- s 4.15(1)(e): “the public interest”

Risk to people and property from **bushfire behaviour, ember attack, and evacuation constraints** is a clear component of the *likely impacts* (s 4.15(1)(b)) and the *public interest* (s 4.15(1)(e)).

Given the evidence that the West Roseville precinct already exceeds recognised safe evacuation thresholds, and contains documented constraints on evacuation routes, a determination made **without robust, future-climate-aligned bushfire and evacuation modelling** risks a failure to properly consider these mandatory matters under s 4.15(1)(b)–(e).

This creates vulnerability to challenge on the basis of failure to consider mandatory relevant matters.

5.2 SSD Guidelines – Preparing an Environmental Impact Statement (July 2022)

Under **clause 2.3 of the EP&A Regulation 2021**, an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for an SSD project *must be prepared having regard to the SSD Guidelines issued by the Planning Secretary*. The “State significant development guidelines – preparing an environmental impact statement” are expressly identified as part of these required guidelines.

The Guidelines require that an EIS for SSD:¹⁶

a) Provide a technically robust assessment of the project’s impacts

As stated in the Preface:

- EISs must “contain a technically robust assessment of the impacts of the project” and
- must “justify and evaluate the project as a whole, having regard to its economic, environmental and social impacts and the principles of ecologically sustainable development.”

b) Include an Assessment and Mitigation of Impacts section (s 3.7)

Section 3.7 – Assessment and mitigation of impacts requires the EIS to:

¹⁵ Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 No 203 (NSW)

¹⁶ DPIE (2022). State significant development guidelines – preparing an environmental impact statement Appendix B to the state significant development guidelines. <https://www.planning.nsw.gov.au/sites/default/files/2023-03/ssd-guidelines-preparing-an-environmental-impact-statement.pdf>

- present the *detailed assessment of the impacts*
- identify *potential environmental, social and economic impacts*
- describe *mitigation measures*
- and reflect the Planning Secretary's environmental assessment requirements (SEARs).

Bushfire behaviour, ember exposure, evacuation feasibility, and cumulative traffic constraints fall squarely within the categories of impacts that must be assessed.

c) Address cumulative impacts

The Preface and s 3.7 require the EIS to identify and assess **cumulative impacts**, including interactions with other developments or existing conditions.

d) Provide objective, evidence-based analysis

Section 2.3 requires that the EIS use:

- “*objective analysis and provide reasons and evidence to support any conclusions*”.

Compliance issue for SSD-77825469

Based on the Guidelines, the EIS for SSD-77829461 is deficient because it does not provide:

- a transparent, quantitative assessment of **bushfire risk, ember attack pathways, or evacuation feasibility**,
- a precinct-level assessment of **cumulative traffic** and **evacuation impacts**, or
- modelling that reflects **best-available science** (e.g., climate projections, slope-driven fire behaviour).

Accordingly, **the EIS does not meet the expectations set out in the SSD Guidelines** nor the standards required for evaluation under the EP&A Regulation 2021.

5.3 NSW Treasury Internal Audit and Risk Management Policy (TPP20-08)

The *Internal Audit and Risk Management Policy for the General Government Sector* (TPP20-08) is a **mandatory NSW Government policy**, issued under the Government Sector Finance Act 2018.

The Policy establishes **minimum standards for risk management**, internal control and assurance within NSW Government agencies.

a) Core obligation to maintain effective risk management systems

The Preface states that s 3.6 of the GSF Act requires agencies:

“to establish, maintain and keep under review effective systems for risk management, internal control and assurance” appropriate to the agency.

b) Principle 1: Risk Management Framework

The Policy sets out Principle 1:

“Effective risk management arrangements should support the agency in achieving its objectives by systematically identifying and managing risks.”

This includes identifying and managing:

- risks to safety
- risks to operational continuity

- risks arising from environmental or external conditions

c) Core Requirement 1.2 – Risk Management Framework

The Policy imposes a mandatory requirement that:

“The Accountable Authority shall establish and maintain a risk management framework that is appropriate for the agency. The Accountable Authority shall ensure the framework is consistent with AS ISO 31000:2018.”

Application to SSD Planning Context

Agencies involved in development assessment, including the Department of Planning and Environment and the Planning Minister, are bound by the Policy’s requirements to maintain systems for identifying, assessing and mitigating risks relevant to their objectives and functions.

Bushfire evacuation constraints, extreme weather amplification under climate change, and foreseeable threats to human safety constitute **material risks within the meaning of the Policy**.

Approving high-density development in a precinct with known evacuation limitations, without comprehensive risk assessment, is inconsistent with:

- The Policy’s required risk-management standards, and
- NSW Government’s broader risk-governance obligations (Principle 1; Core Requirement 1.2).

This creates an avoidable risk exposure for NSW Government.

6 Recommendations

1. **Pause SSD-77825469** until independent, future-climate-aligned modelling is undertaken for bushfire behaviour, ember attack, road network performance and evacuation feasibility.
2. **Require compliance with the EP&A Act, EP&A Regulation 2021 and SSD EIS Guidelines**, ensuring that cumulative traffic impacts, human-safety risks and natural hazard impacts are fully assessed.
3. **Undertake evacuation modelling based on best-available science**, incorporating:
 - real-world behavioural delays and congestion patterns observed in coronial inquiries,
 - slope-driven ember transport,
 - rapidly changing fireground conditions, and
 - emergency vehicle access under opposing traffic flows.
4. **Limit development intensity to safe-evacuation thresholds**, consistent with peer-reviewed research and coronial evidence demonstrating that precincts with three exits cannot safely support the current or proposed dwelling numbers.

7 Conclusion

The West Roseville precinct faces **compounding evacuation, bushfire and climate-risk constraints** that collectively exceed safe operating limits for a residential area. Coronial inquiries have shown—repeatedly and tragically—that **limited exits, narrow roads, real-world evacuation delays, traffic bottlenecks and rapid deterioration of conditions** create predictable, deadly failures during bushfire events. These are the same conditions present in West Roseville.

NSW planning law, SSD Guidelines and risk-management policy require the Government to identify and mitigate risks to human safety, properly evaluate impacts, and ensure the suitability of development sites under natural hazard conditions.

Proceeding with SSD-77825469 under current constraints would:

- expose residents to **foreseeable and potentially fatal evacuation failure**,
- breach NSW’s statutory obligations to consider risks to people and property,
- conflict with coronial findings that warn against unrealistic evacuation assumptions,
- undermine climate-risk governance requirements, and
- create material legal, financial and reputational risks for the NSW Government.

A precautionary, evidence-based decision requires **pausing approval** until independent modelling confirms that the precinct’s evacuation performance can support the proposed development safely under present and future climate conditions. Without this, approval would compromise safety, governance obligations and public trust.

8 Appendix 1: West-Roseville dwellings – SSDs and DAs, under construction and existing¹⁷

SUMMARY OF ADDITIONAL DWELLINGS – APPROVAL, UNDER CONSTRUCTION				
Location	Units in Development	Less Demolished	Equals Additional Units	Car Spaces
2,4,6,8,10,12,14,16 Pockley Ave	178	8	170	285
2,4 Larkin St & 1, 3 5 Pockley Ave	111	5	106	150
7,9,11 Pockley Ave	42	3	39	84
4A, 6A, 6, 8, 10 MacLaurin Pde	40	5	35	68
Roseville Memorial Club	33	0	33	57
1 – 3 Corona Avenue (just finished)	23	2	21	42
TOTAL ADDITIONAL DWELLINGS	427	23	404	686

SUMMARY OF EXISTING SINGLE DWELLINGS & UNITS			
Precinct	Single Dwellings & Units	Unit Car Spaces	Single Dwelling Cars
Nola Road Precinct excluding Nola Lane	56	93	6
Kings Avenue Precinct	26	41	10
MacLaurin Parade Precinct	7	0	8
Alexander Parade Precinct	37	0	72
Corona Avenue including Nola Lane Precinct	46	42	29
Pockley Avenue Precinct	2	0	4
Larkin Street Precinct (Car Spaces Estimated from Unit Numbers)	83	78	6
Findlay Avenue Precinct (Car Spaces Estimated from Unit Numbers)	105	30	134
TOTAL EXISTING DWELLINGS & UNITS	362	284	269

GRAND TOTALS				
	Dwellings	Unit Car Spaces	Single Dwelling Cars	Car Spaces + Cars
ADDITIONAL DWELLINGS UNDER CONSTRUCTION AND APROVAL	404	686	0	686
EXISTING DWELLINGS & UNITS	362	284	269	553
GRAND TOTALS	766	970	269	1,239

¹⁷ Many thanks to Frank Walker for compiling these figures