

WATERLOO METRO QUARTER OVER STATION DEVELOPMENT

**Environmental Impact Statement
Appendix FF – Security Risk Assessment Report**

SSD-79307746 Central Precinct

Detailed State Significant Development
Development Application

Prepared for **WL Developer Pty Ltd**

September 2025

Reference	Description
Applicable SSD Applications	SSD-10439 Central Precinct
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Document Number	WMQ-SITE-CNW-SC-RPT-009
Status	Final
Version	1
Date of Issue	September 2025
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1. Glossary and abbreviations

Reference	Description
ACHAR	Aboriginal Cultural Heritage Assessment Report
ADG	Apartment Design Guide
AHD	Australian height datum
AQIA	Air Quality Impact Assessment
BC Act	Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016
BCA	Building Code of Australia
BC Reg	Biodiversity Conservation Regulation 2017
BDAR	Biodiversity Development Assessment Report
CEEC	critically endangered ecological community
CIV	capital investment value
CMP	Construction Management Plan
Concept DA	A concept DA is a staged application often referred to as a 'Stage 1' DA. The subject application constitutes a detailed subsequent stage application to an approved concept DA (SSD 9393) lodged under section 4.22 of the EP&A Act.
Council	City of Sydney Council
CPTED	Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
CSSI approval	critical State significant infrastructure approval
CTMP	Construction Traffic Management Plan
DA	development application
DPIE	NSW Department of Planning, Industry and Environment
DRP	Design Review Panel
EP&A Act	Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979
EPA	NSW Environment Protection Authority
EPA Regulation	Environmental Planning and Assessment Regulation 2000
EPBC Act	Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999
ESD	ecologically sustainable design

Reference	Description
GANSW	NSW Government Architect's Office
GFA	gross floor area
HIA	Heritage Impact Assessment
IAP	Interchange Access Plan
LGA	Local Government Area
NCC	National Construction Code
OSD	over station development
PIR	Preferred Infrastructure Report
POM	Plan of Management
PSI	Preliminary Site Investigation
RMS	Roads and Maritime Services
SEARs	Secretary's Environmental Assessment Requirements
SEPP	State Environmental Planning Policy
SEPP 55	State Environmental Planning Policy No 55—Remediation of Land
SEPP 65	State Environmental Planning Policy No. 65 – Design Quality of Residential Apartment Development
SRD SEPP	State Environmental Planning Policy (State and Regional Development) 2009
SREP Sydney Harbour	State Regional Environmental Plan (Sydney Harbour Catchment) 2005
SSD	State significant development
SSD DA	State significant development application
SLEP	Sydney Local Environmental Plan 2012
Transport for NSW	Transport for New South Wales
TIA	Traffic Impact Assessment
The proposal	The proposed development which is the subject of the detailed SSD DA
The site	The site which is the subject of the detailed SSD DA
VIA	Visual Impact Assessment

Reference	Description
WMQ	Waterloo Metro Quarter
WMP	Waste Management Plan
WSUD	water sensitive urban design

2. Executive summary

This Security Risk Assessment Report has been prepared by Connley Walker Pty Ltd on behalf of WL Developer Pty Ltd (the applicant) to accompany a State Significant Development Application (SSDA) for the detailed Central Precinct SSD (SSD-79307746), located within the Waterloo Metro Quarter (WMQ) at 150 Cope Street, Waterloo. This SSD will replace the previous detailed approval applying to the Central precinct.

A separate Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Report has been documented (Document Reference: WMQ-SITE-CNW-SC-RPT-003) as contained in appendix P of the EIS.

This report concludes that the proposed Over Station Development – Central precinct is suitable and warrants approval subject to the implementation of the following mitigation measures. A review of the current design has been undertaken and a number of risk mitigation measures have been recommended.

Many security risks have been identified and are detailed within the body of this report. The general categories include:

- Abduction
- Anti-Social Behaviour
- Arson
- Assault
- Burglary
- Cyber Attack
- Hoax Bomb
- Hostile Vehicle Attack
- Illegal Dumping
- Robbery
- Terrorism
- Theft
- Theft with violence
- Vandalism / graffiti

CPTED and other security mitigations are identified within this report. Specific measures include:


Building 2 – Ground

CPTED measures include the addition of a sliding door to prevent pedestrian access (refer to plans in the body of the report), territorial reinforcement in the exit doors by sloping the concrete from the doors to the outside path to discourage use of these areas and surveillance via lighting.

Non-CPTED measures include CCTV coverage of all entrances, goods lift, and public areas and electronic access control or secure key for external entrances and goods lift.

3. Introduction

The figure below indicates the land to which this SSDA applies in relation to the overall WMQ site (shaded in Green).



This application seeks consent for the design, construction and operation of a 26 storey (including plant level) mixed use building within the Central Precinct (the site) of the WMQ estate.

The proposal comprises a Co-living housing tower above a three storey podium containing retail and community facility in the form of a childcare centre. Specifically, the proposal comprises:

- Ground level retail tenancies and community facility, and childcare, co-living, and shared basement access
- Community centre in the form of a childcare centre at Level 1 and Level 2
- A Co-living housing tower from Levels 3 to 24 comprising:
 - Self-contained co-living accommodation rooms across 20 levels, with capacity for around 500 rooms
 - Indoor and outdoor communal amenity at Levels 3 and 24
 - Communal space also provided on each accommodation level;
- Ground level vehicular access from Church Square shared zone to the shared basement, delivery of a pedestrian thoroughfare through the site, landscaping and public domain works.
- Indicative building signage zones

This application is submitted for concurrent assessment with a DA to amend the Waterloo Metro Over Station Development (OSD) Concept DA (SSD 9393) (the Concept DA) - referred to as the Second Amending Concept DA. The Second Amending Concept DA seeks consent to modify the existing concept approval as it relates to the Northern and Central Precincts, by amending the building envelopes to redistribute floor space to suit a new mix of land uses. This Central Precinct SSD will be consistent with the Concept DA as amended. Separately, a Detailed SSDA for the detailed design, construction and operation of the Northern Precinct (SSD-79307758) and a Section 4.55 Modification Application to modify the approved detailed Basement SSDA (SSD 10438), will be concurrently submitted with this application.

This report has been prepared in response to the following conditions of consent issued for the concept SSD DA (SSD 9393 as amended) for the OSD as summarised in the table below.

Item	Description of requirement	Section reference (this report)
B20	<p>SECURITY AND CRIME ASSESSMENT</p> <p>Future development applications shall be accompanied by a Security and Crime Risk Assessment prepared in consultation with NSW Police having regard to Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) Principles and NSW Police publication “Safe Place: Vehicle Management: A comprehensive guide for owners, operators and designers.” The future development is to have regard to the recommendations contained within the submission by NSW Police on the Concept SSD.1</p>	<p>7. Methodology</p> <p>10. Assessment and Findings</p> <p>11. Mitigation Measures</p>

Table 1 - Conditions of Concept Approval

4. The site

The site is located within the City of Sydney Local Government Area (LGA). The site is situated about 3.3 kilometres south of Sydney CBD and eight kilometres northeast of Sydney International Airport within the suburb of Waterloo.

The Waterloo Metro Quarter site comprises land to the west of Cope Street, east of Botany Road, south of Raglan Street and north of Wellington Street (refer to Figure 1). The heritage-listed Waterloo Congregational Church at 103–105 Botany Road is within this street block but does not form a part of the Waterloo Metro Quarter site boundaries.

The Waterloo Metro Quarter site is a rectangular shaped allotment with an overall site area of approximately 1.287 hectares.

The Waterloo Metro Quarter site comprises the following allotments and legal description at the date of this report. Following consolidation by Sydney Metro (the Principal) the land will be set out in deposited plan DP1257150.

- 1368 Raglan Street (Lot 4 DP 215751)
- 59 Botany Road (Lot 5 DP 215751)
- 65 Botany Road (Lot 1 DP 814205)
- 67 Botany Road (Lot 1 DP 228641)
- 124-128 Cope Street (Lot 2 DP 228641)
- 69-83 Botany Road (Lot 1, DP 1084919)
- 130-134 Cope Street (Lot 12 DP 399757)
- 136-144 Cope Street (Lots A-E DP 108312)
- 85 Botany Road (Lot 1 DP 27454)
- 87 Botany Road (Lot 2 DP 27454)
- 89-91 Botany Road (Lot 1 DP 996765)
- 93-101 Botany Road (Lot 1 DP 433969 and Lot 1 DP 738891)
- 119 Botany Road (Lot 1 DP 205942 and Lot 1 DP 436831)
- 156-160 Cope Street (Lot 31 DP 805384)
- 107-117A Botany Road (Lot 32 DP 805384 and Lot A DP 408116)
- 170-174 Cope Street (Lot 2 DP 205942).

The detailed SSD DA applies to the entire Waterloo Metro Quarter site. The site has an area of approximately 4830sqm (Southern Precinct), 5,700sqm (Basement), 2,460sqm (Central Precinct), and 5,120sqm (Northern precinct). The subject site comprises the following allotments and legal description at the date of this report.

Central Precinct DA:

- 130–134 Cope Street (Lot 12 DP 399757) (Part)
- 136–144 Cope Street (Lots A-E DP 108312) (Part)
- 85 Botany Road (Lot 1 DP 27454)
- 87 Botany Road (Lot 2 DP 27454)
- 89–91 Botany Road (Lot 1 DP 996765)

- 93–101 Botany Road (Lot 1 DP 433969 and Lot 1 DP 738891) (Part).

The boundaries of the overall site are identified at Figure 1, and the subject site of the detailed SSD DA is identified at Figures 2 and 3. The site is reasonably flat with a slight fall to the south.

The site previously included three to five storey commercial, light industrial and shop top housing buildings. All previous structures except for an office building at the corner of Botany Road and Wellington Street have been demolished to facilitate construction of the new Sydney Metro Waterloo station. As such the existing site is predominately vacant and being used as a construction site. Construction of the Sydney metro has been completed in accordance with critical State significant infrastructure approval (CSSI 7400).



Figure 1 - Aerial image of the site
Source: Urbis

The area surrounding the site consists of commercial premises to the north, light industrial and mixed-use development to the south, residential development to the east and predominantly commercial and light industry uses to the west.




Figure 2 - Waterloo Metro Quarter site, with sub-precincts identified
Source: WL Developer Pty Ltd

The Central Precinct SSSA also includes Grit Lane and Church Square.



Figure 3 – Grit Lane
Source: Bates Smart



Figure 4 – Church Square
Source: Bates Smart

5. Background

5.1 About Sydney Metro

Sydney Metro is Australia's biggest public transport project. Services started in May 2019 in the city's North West with a train every four minutes in the peak. A new standalone railway, this 21st century network will revolutionise the way Sydney travels.

There are four core components:

5.1.1 Sydney Metro North West

The first Sydney Metro project was completed, and passenger services commenced in May 2019 at 13 metro stations between Rouse Hill and Chatswood, with a metro train every four minutes in the peak. The new section of the metro line, 15.5 kilometers from Chatswood to Sydenham opened in August 2024.

5.1.2 Sydney Metro City & Southwest

Sydney Metro Southwest, T3 Bankstown line connecting Sydenham to Bankstown is under construction and is expected to start services late 2025.

Sydney Metro Southwest will update and convert 10 stations into metro standard at Marrickville, Dulwich Hill, Hurlstone Park, Canterbury, Campsie, Belmore, Lakemba, Wiley Park, Punchbowl, and Bankstown.

This metro line between Sydenham and Bankstown will operate fully segregated from the existing Sydney Trains railway. The T3 line west beyond Bankstown will continue to be operated by Sydney Trains.

5.1.3 Sydney Metro West

Sydney Metro West is a new underground railway connecting Greater Parramatta and the Sydney CBD. This once-in-a-century infrastructure investment will transform Sydney for generations to come, doubling rail capacity between these two areas, linking new communities to rail services and supporting employment growth and housing supply between the two CBDs.

The locations of seven proposed metro stations have been confirmed at Westmead, Parramatta, Sydney Olympic Park, North Strathfield, Burwood North, Five Dock and The Bays.

The NSW Government is assessing an optional station at Pyrmont and further planning is underway to determine the location of a new metro station in the Sydney CBD.

5.1.4 Sydney Metro Greater West

Metro rail will also service Greater Western Sydney and the new Western Sydney International (Nancy Bird Walton) Airport. The new railway line will become the transport spine for the Western Parkland City's growth for generations to come, connecting communities and travellers with the rest of Sydney's public transport system with a fast, safe and easy metro service.

The Australian and NSW governments are equal partners in the delivery of this new railway.

The Sydney Metro project is illustrated below.




Figure 5 - Sydney Metro alignment map
Source: Sydney Metro

5.2 Sydney Metro CSSI Approval (SSI 7400)

On 9 January 2017, the Minister for Planning approved the Sydney Metro City & Southwest - Chatswood to Sydenham project as a critical State significant infrastructure (CSSI) project (reference SSI 7400) (CSSI approval). The terms of the CSSI approval includes all works required to construct the Sydney Metro Waterloo Station. The CSSI approval also includes the construction of below and above ground works within the metro station structure for appropriate integration with the OSD.

The delineation between the approved Sydney Metro works, generally described as within the two ‘metro station boxes’ and surrounding public domain works, and the OSD elements are illustrated in Figure 5.




Figure 6 - CSSI Approval scope of works
Source: WL Developer Pty Ltd

6. Methodology

6.1 Engagement

Connley Walker Pty Ltd has been engaged to conduct a Security Risk Assessment of the Waterloo Metro Quarter site. A separate CPTED report has been documented. The report has been developed by professionally qualified security consultants. Connley Walker Pty Ltd holds a NSW Security Master Licence and the security consultants that prepared the review hold the required NSW Class 2A Security Consultant Licence.

6.1 References

The security risk assessment has been carried out in accordance with the requirements of the Australian Standard for Risk Management AS/NZS ISO 31000.

The NSW Police publication “Safe Place: Vehicle Management: A comprehensive guide for owners, operators and designers” provided additional input. This publication provides an overview of hostile vehicle management in risk situations for owners and operators responsible for management of public spaces and buildings.

The AS/NZS ISO 3100 methodology is based on assessing risks and mitigating them based on the level of risk, i.e.:

- Establish the context
- Risk assessment:
 - Risk identification
 - Risk analysis
 - Risk evaluation
- Risk treatment

To ensure consistency with the adjoining Waterloo Station Development, the Security Risk Assessment has used the methodology for analysing and assessing the risks that is used by Sydney Metro.

6.1 Consultation

Consultation with South Sydney Police was conducted to gain an understanding of the operational context and specific security threats. The input they provided relates to the entire development.

The items that they have raised are:

- The more CCTV the better as it is a significant deterrent.
- Provide signage for the CCTV.
- Extensive lighting is needed.
- Youths are at higher risk of robbery as they may not have sufficient situational awareness (e.g. looking down into an expensive phone). Signage may help.

- Police and emergency services need access to the building.
- Police and emergency services need to be given information about access points.
- A site visit by police and emergency services is recommended prior to opening.

The following methodology has been applied to rate the likelihood, consequences, and subsequent risk rating for identified security risks:

Health & Safety	Illness, first aid or injury not requiring medical treatment (C6)	Illness or minor injuries requiring medical treatment (C5)	Single recoverable lost time injury or illness, alternative / restricted duties, injury, or short term occupational illness (C4)	1 - 10 major injuries requiring hospitalisation and numerous days lost or medium-term occupational illness	Single fatality and / or 10 - 20 major injuries / permanent disabilities/chronic diseases	Multiple fatalities and / or >20 injuries / permanent disabilities / chronic diseases
Environment	No appreciable changes to environment or highly localised event or both. (C6)	Change from normal conditions within environmental regulatory limits and environmental effects are within site boundaries.	Short term or well-contained environmental effects or both. Minor remedial actions probably required.	Impacts external ecosystem and considerable remediation is required.	Long term environmental impairment in neighbouring or valued ecosystems. Extensive remediation required.	Irreversible large scale environmental impact with loss of valued ecosystems.
Physical Security	Uninsured loss of < \$100k Consequences of harm are nominal	Uninsured loss of \$100k - 1m Realisation of harm will be covered by usual allowances	Uninsured loss \$1m - \$10m Realisation of harm will impact on the organisations ability to function, but is recoverable with little effort	Uninsured loss of \$10m - \$50m Realisation of the harm will have a significant effect on operations and activities	Uninsured loss of \$50m - \$100m Realisation of the harm will have a major impact on Sydney Metro's ability to function and may lead to a prolonged period where the organisation cannot function. A major change in operations will be required	Uninsured loss of > \$100m Sydney Metro will cease to function for an extensive period if harm is realised
Structural Security	Negligible asset impact from weaponisation / blast effect	Minor asset impact from weaponisation / blast effect. Localised early repairable damage. Minor disruption to operations during repairs.	Moderated asset impact from weaponisation / blast effect. More widespread repairable damage. Moderate disruption to operations during repairs including longer term remedial works.	Major asset impact from weaponisation / blast effect. Damage affects most of the station resulting in closure for period until remedial works permit partial return of services.	Progressive collapse - desired sequential spread of damage / specified load resistance from initiating event is achieved. Most structural columns, walls, beams, transfer structures, connections and parts of floor diaphragms perform well under blast load, but local damage within the immediate blast area may be extreme. Glazing systems deform within desired standards performance limits e.g. 3- second design load. Hostile vehicle measures achieve desired impact resistance, encroachment and penetrative criteria.	Disproportionate collapse - Alternative path overloads leading to secondary collapse following damage caused by a blast event and the primary blast damage. Total failure of glazing systems Total breach of hostile vehicle measures.
IACS Cyber Security	Negligible or no impact on information systems, services, safety, environment, customers or users. Failure of or unauthorised access to a system that does not have a safety function.	Single system compromise. Effects of event are minimal, involving few if any of the cyber resources. Unauthorized access to non-sensitive information, minimum data integrity loss or minimum impact on service availability.	More than one system compromised. Effects of event are limited, involving some of the cyber resources. Unauthorized access across some systems. Limited disclosure of sensitive information, loss of data integrity or unavailability of essential services or assets.	Effects of event are wide-ranging, involving significant portion of the cyber resources. High disclosure of sensitive information, loss of data integrity or unavailability of critical services or assets. Failure of or unauthorised access to a system that places a demand on a high integrity layer of protection, including systems that are capable of manipulating this layer of protection. Failure of or unauthorised access to a low integrity layer of protection, including systems that are capable of manipulating this layer of protection.	Effects of event are extensive, involving most of the cyber resources. Severe disclosure of sensitive information, loss of data integrity or unavailability of critical services or assets. Failure of or unauthorised access to a high integrity layer of protection, including systems that are capable of manipulating this layer of protection. Failure of or unauthorised access to a layer of protection of undefined integrity, including systems that are capable of manipulating this layer of protection.	Effects of event are sweeping, involving almost all of the cyber resources. Severe disclosure of sensitive information, loss of data integrity or unavailability of critical services or assets. Failure of or unauthorised access to multiple high integrity layers of protection, including systems that are capable of manipulating this layer of protection. Failure of or unauthorised access to multiple layers of protection of undefined integrity, including systems that are capable of manipulating this layer of protection.
Risk Rating	Consequence					
A - Very High						
B - High	Insignificant	Minor	Moderate	Major	Severe	Catastrophic
C - Medium	C6	C5	C4	C3	C2	C1
Almost Certain L1	C	B	B	A	A	A
Likely L2	C	C	B	B	A	A
Possible L3	C	C	B	B	A	A
Unlikely L4	C	C	B	B	B	A
Rare L5	D	C	C	B	B	A
Almost unprecedented L6	D	D	C	C	B	B

The Likelihood measures of L1 to L6 are based on the following:

						Risk Rating	
						A - Very High	
						B - High	
						C - Medium	
Qualitative expectation	Expected to occur frequently during time of activity of project	Probability analysis	10 times or more every year	> 90%		Almost Certain	L1
	Expect to occur occasionally during time or activity of project		1-10 times every year	75-90%		Likely	L2
	More likely to occur than not during time of activity or project		Once each year	50-75%		Possible	L3
	More likely not to occur than occur during time of activity or project		Once every 1 - 10 years	25-50%		Unlikely	L4
	Not expected to occur during the time of activity or project		Once every 10 - 100 years	10-25%		Rare	L5
	Not expected to ever occur during time or activity or project		Less than once every 100 years	<10%		Almost unprecedented	L6

7. Assessment and findings

The following provides a review and analysis of relevant crime mapping based on statistics for the relevant local Government area in order to identify the key crime related risks that the Project Works are exposed to.

The following map shows the current hot spots for crime in Sydney. The Waterloo Metro Quarter site is shown to be within a high-density crime area.

Incidents of Assault (Non-domestic assault) from October 2018 to September 2019




Figure 7 – Crime hot spots
Source: Boscar

The site demographic and retail commercial premises which includes two pubs, may increase the level of risk at the development and potential for crime. Contributors to the increased level of risk include drug dealing due to the area demographic and potential late-night alcohol related incidents in the vicinity of the two pubs. Youths are at higher risk of robbery as they may not have sufficient situational awareness (e.g. looking down into phone). Signage may help.

The incidents of crime within the Sydney Local Government Area (which includes Waterloo) to premises that are relevant to the development for 2019, when the original CPTED review was carried out were as follows. These earlier statistics are provided as they show the incident rates for different types of premises in a way the current crime statistics do not.

Premises type	Domestic violence related assault	Non-domestic violence related assault	Sexual offences	Robbery	Break and enter non-dwelling	Motor vehicle theft	Steal from motor vehicle	Steal from person	Malicious damage to property
Office	2	31	5	0	61	4	10	2	68
Retail/wholesale	17	409	44	20	185	16	20	152	197
Carpark	3	16	4	0	28	31	232	0	168
Outdoor/public place	211	1,214	145	178	7	214	764	344	693
Residential	756	416	285	39	34	51	137	47	923
Total	989	2,086	483	237	315	316	1,163	545	2,049

Table 2 – Local relevant crime incidents
Source: Boscar

Since 2019, the figures have changed as shown in the following table:

Offence Category	2019 (Sydney LGA total)	2025 (Sydney LGA total)	Change	% Change
Domestic violence-related assault	979	1,203	+224	+22.9%
Non-domestic violence-related assault	2,674	2,866	+192	+7.2%
Sexual offences (combined)	728	930	+202	+27.7%
Robbery	223	220	-3	-1.3%
Break & enter non-dwelling	346	310	-36	-10.4%
Motor vehicle theft	465	509	+44	+9.5%
Steal from motor vehicle	1,257	847	-410	-32.6%
Steal from person	1,213	not available	—	—
Malicious damage to property	2,442	2,065	-377	-15.4%

Table 3 – Local relevant crime incidents

From these figures, it may be concluded that the residential areas within the surrounds of the development and the surrounding public areas are statistically at the highest risk of crime, however this risk is reduced given that no apartment is on ground level.

No local crime statistics are available for the Child Care Centre as this is not a classification referenced by BOSCAR.

The highest incidents being:

- Assault in an outdoor/public place or retail area.
- Steal from person in an outdoor/public place.
- Malicious property damage in an outdoor/public place.
- Break and enter in a retail space.

Theft from a motor vehicle in public spaces has not been considered as vehicle parking in public spaces is outside the development.

The following provides the identification and assessment of the security risks.

Reference number	Location	Risk Identification		Recommended security controls		Residual Risk Analysis		
		Security Hazard Event/Incident Description	Potential Consequence(s)	Recommended Security Control Measure/s	CPTED Measures.	Consequence	Likelihood	Risk Rating
WMQD-SecHA-01	Child care area	Abduction Of a child	1 - 10 major injuries requiring hospitalisation and numerous days lost or medium-term occupational illness (C3)	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident investigation. Electronic access control. CCTV of all child care areas. Access control to all child care areas.	Refer to CPTED Report	C3	L5	B
WMQD-SecHA-02	All public spaces	Anti-Social Behaviour Drug/ Alcohol use	Illness or minor injuries requiring medical treatment (C5).	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident investigation.		C5	L4	C
WMQD-SecHA-03	All public spaces	Anti-Social Behaviour Harassment, threatening behaviour and public nuisance	Illness, first aid or injury not requiring medical treatment (C6). Consequences of harm are nominal (C6).	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident investigation.		C6	L3	C
WMQD-SecHA-04	All public spaces	Anti-Social Behaviour Hostile Demonstrations	Realisation of harm will impact on the organisations ability to function, but it is recoverable with little effort (C4).	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces for incident investigation.		C4	L5	C
WMQD-SecHA-05	All public spaces	Anti-Social Behaviour Loitering	Consequences of harm are nominal (C6).	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident investigation.		C6	L1	C
WMQD-SecHA-06	All public spaces	Anti-Social Behaviour Misuse / Dealing of Drug / Substance	Consequences of harm are nominal (C6)	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident investigation.		C6	L1	C
WMQD-SecHA-07	All public spaces	Anti-Social Behaviour Protest/Campaigner / Unauthorised entry followed by protest	Realisation of harm will be covered by usual allowances (C5).	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident investigation. Access control of Building 1 entries that can be locked down.		C5	L6	D
WMQD-SecHA-08	All public spaces	Anti-Social Behaviour Skateboarding	Illness, first aid or injury not requiring medical treatment (C6). Consequences of harm are nominal (C6).	CCTV as a deterrent. Anti-skateboarding treatment applied to potential skateboard surfaces.		C6	L3	C
WMQD-SecHA-09	All public spaces	Anti-Social Behaviour Unruly / Offensive / Nuisance Behaviour	Illness, first aid or injury not requiring medical treatment (C6)	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and		C6	L1	C

Reference number	Location	Risk Identification		Recommended security controls		Residual Risk Analysis		
		Security Hazard Event/Incident Description	Potential Consequence(s)	Recommended Security Control Measure/s	CPTED Measures.	Consequence	Likelihood	Risk Rating
				for incident investigation.				
WMQD-SecHA-10	All public spaces	Anti-Social Behaviour Urinating / Defecating	Realisation of harm will be covered by usual allowances (C5).	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident investigation.		C5	L2	C
WMQD-SecHA-11	All public spaces	Anti-Social Behaviour Vagrarancy	Illness, first aid or injury not requiring medical treatment (C6). Consequences of harm are nominal (C6).	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident investigation. CPTED measures of any rough sleeping locations.		C6	L3	C
WMQD-SecHA-12	All public spaces	Assault Any form of sexual assault	Single recoverable lost time injury or illness, alternative / restricted duties, injury, or short term occupational illness (C4)	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident investigation. Electronic access control throughout.		C4	L4	B
WMQD-SecHA-13	All public spaces	Assault Domestic altercation	Illness or minor injuries requiring medical treatment (C5)	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident investigation.		C5	L2	C
WMQD-SecHA-14	All public spaces	Assault Physical assault resulting in death	Single fatality and/or 10- 20 major injuries (C2). Uninsured loss of \$50m – \$100m Realisation of the harm will have a major impact on Sydney Metro's ability to function and may lead to a prolonged period where the organisation cannot function. A major change in operations will be required (C2)	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident investigation.		C2	L5	B
WMQD-SecHA-15	All public spaces	Assault Physical assault resulting in injuries	Illness or minor injuries requiring medical treatment (C5)	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident investigation.		C3	L5	B
WMQD-SecHA-16	All public spaces	Assault Verbal assault	Illness, first aid or injury not requiring medical treatment (C6)	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident investigation.		C6	L1	C
WMQD-SecHA-17	Central and Southern Precincts	Burglary of apartments	Uninsured loss of < \$100k Consequences of harm	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident		C6	L2	C

Reference number	Location	Risk Identification		Recommended security controls		Residual Risk Analysis		
		Security Hazard Event/Incident Description	Potential Consequence(s)	Recommended Security Control Measure/s	CPTED Measures.	Consequence	Likelihood	Risk Rating
			are nominal (C6)	investigation. Electronic access control.				
WMQD-SecHA-18	Northern Precinct	Burglary of commercial offices	Uninsured loss of < \$100k Consequences of harm are nominal (C6)	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident investigation. Electronic access control.		C6	L2	C
WMQD-SecHA-19	Building management systems	Cyber Attack Cyber crime / Cyber attack against systems	Realisation of the harm will have a major impact on Sydney Metro's ability to function and may lead to a prolonged period where the organisation cannot function. A major change in operations will be required (C2) Effects of event are extensive, involving most of the cyber resources.(C2)	Consultation with Cyber consultant.		C2	L5	B
WMQD-SecHA-20	All precincts	Fire (Accidental) Inadvertant lighting of a fire	Uninsured loss of \$50m – \$100m (C2) Realisation of the harm will have a major impact on Sydney Metro's ability to function and may lead to a prolonged period where the organisation cannot function. A major change in operations will be required (C2)	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident investigation. Electronic access control.		C3	L5	B
WMQD-SecHA-21	All precincts	Fire (Arson / Intentional)	Uninsured loss of \$10m – \$50m (C3) Realisation of the harm will have a significant effect on operations and activities (C3)	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident investigation. Electronic access control.		C3	L5	B
WMQD-SecHA-22	All public spaces	Fraud Fraudulent personal injury claim	Uninsured loss of < \$100k (C6)	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident investigation.	REFER ABOVE	C6	L4	C
WMQD-SecHA-23	All precincts	Hoax Bomb Offender uses a hoax bomb or substance to disrupt, delay	Realisation of harm will have a significant effect on operations and activities (C3).	Procedural controls.		C3	L3	B

Reference number	Location	Risk Identification		Recommended security controls		Residual Risk Analysis		
		Security Hazard Event/Incident Description	Potential Consequence(s)	Recommended Security Control Measure/s	CPTED Measures.	Consequence	Likelihood	Risk Rating
		operatio and/or to obtain information around security procedures						
WMQD-SecHA-24	All public spaces	Illegal Dumping Fly tipping / Unlawful leaving of refuse	Realisation of harm will impact on the organisations ability to function, but is recoverable with little effort (C4)	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident investigation.		C6	L5	D
WMQD-SecHA-25	All public spaces	Malicious Damage Vandalism / graffiti	Uninsured loss < \$100k (C6). Realisation of harm will be covered by usual allowances (C5).	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident investigation.		C5	L5	C
WMQD-SecHA-26	All precincts	Other Attempted Self Harm / Suicide from heights	Single fatality and / or 10 - 20 major injuries / permanent disabilities (C2). Realisation of harm will have a major impact on Sydney Metro's ability to function and may lead to a prolonged period where the organisation cannot function. A major change in operations will be required (C2).	Electronic access control to ant roof spaces.		C2	L5	B
WMQD-SecHA-27	Northern precinct	Other Large scale physical altercation (gang-related, riot, or protest)	Realisation of the harm will have a significant effect on operations and activities (C3)	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident investigation.		C3	L6	C
WMQD-SecHA-28	All precincts	Other Unattended suspicious package	Realisation of harm will be covered by usual allowances (C5).	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident investigation.		C5	L4	C
WMQD-SecHA-29	All precincts	Robbery Theft with violence	Illness or minor injuries requiring medical treatment (C5).	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident investigation. Electronic access control.	REFER ABOVE	C5	L4	C

Reference number	Location	Risk Identification		Recommended security controls		Residual Risk Analysis		
		Security Hazard Event/Incident Description	Potential Consequence(s)	Recommended Security Control Measure/s	CPTED Measures.	Consequence	Likelihood	Risk Rating
WMQD-SecHA-30	All precincts	Terrorism Airborne Contaminants Chemical Attack	<p>Single fatality and / or 10 - 20 major injuries / permanent disabilities (C2).</p> <p>Realisation of harm will have a major impact on Sydney Metro's ability to function and may lead to a prolonged period where the organisation cannot function. A major change in operations will be required (C2).</p> <p>Major asset impact from weaponisation / blast effect. Damage affects most of the station resulting in closure for period until remedial works permit partial return of services. (C3)</p>	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident investigation.	REFER ABOVE	C1	L6	B
WMQD-SecHA-31	All precincts	Terrorism Airborne Contaminants Radiological / Nuclear Attack	<p>Multiple fatalities and / or over 20 injuries / permanent disabilities / chronic diseases (C1).</p> <p>Realisation of harm will have a major impact on Sydney Metro's ability to function and may lead to a prolonged period where the organisation cannot function. (C2)</p> <p>A major change in operations will be required (C2).</p> <p>Major asset impact from weaponisation / blast effect. Damage affects most of the station resulting in closure for period until remedial works permit partial return of services. (C3)</p>	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident investigation.	REFER ABOVE	C1	L6	B

Reference number	Location	Risk Identification		Recommended security controls		Residual Risk Analysis		
		Security Hazard Event/Incident Description	Potential Consequence(s)	Recommended Security Control Measure/s	CPTED Measures.	Consequence	Likelihood	Risk Rating
WMQD-SecHA-32	All precincts	Terrorism Terrorism Vehicle Borne IED / Left timed detonation VBIED Attack	Multiple fatalities and / or over 20 injuries / permanent disabilities / chronic diseases (C1). Uninsured loss of over \$100m (C1). Realisation of harm will have a major impact on Sydney Metro's ability to function and may lead to a prolonged period where the organisation cannot function. A major change in operations will be required (C2). Major asset impact from weaponisation / blast effect. Damage affects most of the Station resulting in closure for a period until remedial works permit partial return of services (C3).	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident investigation.	REFER ABOVE	C1	L6	B
WMQD-SecHA-33	All precincts	Terrorism Active Shooter / Marauding firearms attack (including use of stand-off weapons)	Multiple fatalities and / or over 20 injuries / permanent disabilities / chronic diseases (C1). Uninsured loss of over \$100m (C1). Realisation of harm will have a major impact on Sydney Metro's ability to function and may lead to a prolonged period where the organisation cannot function. A major change in operations will be required (C2).	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident investigation. Electronic access control.	REFER ABOVE	C1	L6	B

Reference number	Location	Risk Identification		Recommended security controls		Residual Risk Analysis		
		Security Hazard Event/Incident Description	Potential Consequence(s)	Recommended Security Control Measure/s	CPTED Measures.	Consequence	Likelihood	Risk Rating
WMQD-SecHA-34	All precincts	Terrorism Airborne Contaminants Biological Attack	Single fatality and / or 10 - 20 major injuries / permanent disabilities (C2). Realisation of harm will have a major impact on Sydney Metro's ability to function and may lead to a prolonged period where the organisation cannot function. A major change in operations will be required (C2). Major asset impact from weaponisation / blast effect. Damage affects most of the station resulting in closure for period until remedial works permit partial return of services. (C3)	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident investigation. Electronic access control.	REFER ABOVE	C1	L6	B
WMQD-SecHA-35	All precincts	Terrorism Hand Placed IED (Remote / Timed)	Multiple fatalities and / or over 20 injuries / permanent disabilities / chronic diseases (C1). Uninsured loss of over \$100m (C1).	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident investigation. Electronic access control.	REFER ABOVE	C1	L6	B
WMQD-SecHA-36	All precincts	Terrorism Hostile Vehicle Attack	Multiple fatalities and / or over 20 injuries / permanent disabilities / chronic diseases (C1). Uninsured loss of over \$100m (C1). Realisation of harm will have a major impact on Sydney Metro's ability to function and may lead to a prolonged period where the organisation cannot function. A major change in operations will be required (C2). Major asset impact from weaponisation / blast effect. Damage affects most of the Station resulting in closure for a period until remedial works permit partial return of services (C3).	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident investigation. HVM Barriers.	REFER ABOVE	C1	L6	B

Reference number	Location	Risk Identification		Recommended security controls		Residual Risk Analysis		
		Security Hazard Event/Incident Description	Potential Consequence(s)	Recommended Security Control Measure/s	CPTED Measures.	Consequence	Likelihood	Risk Rating
WMQD-SecHA-37	All precincts	Terrorism Lone Wolf Attack / Marauding bladed weapon attack (non-firearms, knives, etc)	Single fatality and / or 10 - 20 major injuries / permanent disabilities / chronic diseases (C2). Realisation of harm will impact on the organisations ability to function, but is recoverable with little effort (C4).	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident investigation.	REFER ABOVE	C1	L6	B
WMQD-SecHA-38	All precincts	Terrorism Person-borne IED (PBIED)	Multiple fatalities and / or over 20 injuries / permanent disabilities / chronic diseases (C1). Uninsured loss of over \$100m (C1). Realisation of harm will have a major impact on Sydney Metro's ability to function and may lead to a prolonged period where the organisation cannot function. A major change in operations will be required (C2). Major asset impact from weaponisation / blast effect. Damage affects most of the Station resulting in closure for a period until remedial works permit partial return of services (C3).	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident investigation.	REFER ABOVE	C1	L6	B
WMQD-SecHA-39	All precincts	Terrorism Person-borne IED (PBIED)	Person Borne Blast in Platform may cause local collapse of platform to zone immediately under detonation	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident investigation. Electronic access control.	REFER ABOVE	C1	L6	B
WMQD-SecHA-40	All precincts	Terrorism Siege / Hijacking Offenders use hostile force and/or weapons to take over the station and/or take hostages	Single fatality and / or 10- 20 major injuries / permanent disabilities / chronic diseases (C2). Realisation of harm will have a major impact on Sydney Metro's ability to function and may lead to a prolonged period where the organisation cannot function. A major change in operations will be required (C2).	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident investigation. Electronic access control.	REFER ABOVE	C2	L5	B

Reference number	Location	Risk Identification		Recommended security controls		Residual Risk Analysis		
		Security Hazard Event/Incident Description	Potential Consequence(s)	Recommended Security Control Measure/s	CPTED Measures.	Consequence	Likelihood	Risk Rating
WMQD-SecHA-41	All precincts	Terrorism Terrorism Vehicle Borne IED / Penetrative Vehicle Borne Explosive Attack	Multiple fatalities and / or over 20 injuries / permanent disabilities / chronic diseases (C1). Uninsured loss of over \$100m (C1). Realisation of harm will have a major impact on Sydney Metro's ability to function and may lead to a prolonged period where the organisation cannot function. A major change in operations will be required (C2). Major asset impact from weaponisation / blast effect. Damage affects most of the Station resulting in closure for a period until remedial works permit partial return of services (C3).	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident investigation. HVM Barriers.	REFER ABOVE	C1	L6	B
WMQD-SecHA-42	All precincts	Theft Material Theft / Unlawful taking of materials	Realisation of harm will impact on the organisations ability to function, but is recoverable with little effort (C4)	CCTV surveillance of all public spaces as a deterrent and for incident investigation. Electronic access control.	REFER ABOVE	C5	L5	C

8. Mitigation measures

The following security risk mitigation measures are recommended.

Building 2 – Ground (Central Precinct)




Figure 8 – Building 2 – Ground Level
Source: Bates Smart

Territorial Enforcement:

- Signage at all entries to indicate that CCTV Surveillance is in place.

Access Control:

- Electronic access control between public and private areas including lifts.

Natural Surveillance:

- It is recommended that the Dock Manager’s office be provided with maximum glazing to maximise viewing of the dock area.
- CCTV is recommended to provide the dock manager with full viewing of the dock.

Natural Surveillance:

- External lighting in pedestrian areas to AS1158.3.1:2005.
- CCTV coverage of all entrances, goods lift, and public areas.

Level 1 and 2 Child Care



Figure 9 – Building 2 – Level 1
Source: Bates Smart

Child care is provided on levels 1 and 2. Areas of interest are:

- The entries to both levels arrive at a reception point. This will need a method of access control to the two doors that enter the child care space and CCTV surveillance of the entire space.
- Outdoor play areas are provided on both floors. It is recommended that where any of these areas can be viewed from adjacent buildings, then suitable visual barriers be installed such as shade cloth.
- Complete surveillance using CCTV is recommended.

9. Conclusion

The implementation of the security risk mitigation measures outlined in this report will result in the remaining impacts associated with the proposed development to be appropriate and acceptable.

The CPTED mitigation measures are in line with the Crime prevention and the assessment of development applications Guidelines under section 79C of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 published by the NSW Department of Urban Affairs and Planning and with the requirements of City of Sydney DCP – Section 3.13.1 Crime prevention through environmental design – 2012.

The design has demonstrated consideration and implementation of CPTED principles through:

- Active spaces within the building have been located to maximise casual surveillance from outside the buildings via transparent glazing.
- Toilets are located and designed to maximise casual surveillance to facility entries.
- Blind-corners, recesses and other external areas that have the potential for concealment or entrapment have been minimised.
- Entries are clearly visible, unobstructed and easily identifiable from the street.
- Foyers enable surveillance from the public domain to the inside of the building at night.
- Residential accommodation entries have a clearly defined transitional space between public and private areas.
- Signage that clearly defines the purpose of areas.
- Appropriate lighting levels.
- Consideration of escape paths to avoid entrapment.

The fundamental four elements of CPTED of Surveillance, Access control, Territorial reinforcement and Maintenance have been detailed for each of the buildings.

In addition to CPTED measures, the following security risk mitigation measures are recommended:

- CCTV surveillance of:
 - All public spaces.
 - All building entries.
 - Lift lobbies.
 - Carpark.
 - Bicycle storage.
 - Within all lifts.
 - Concierge points.
 - Roof access points.
 - Plant room entries.
- Electronic access control located at:
 - Residential lobby entries.
 - Lifts.
 - Entries to building management areas.
 - Non-public entries.

10. Appendices

10.1 Appendix 1 – CONNLEY WALKER CREDENTIALS

Consultant that prepared this report – Simon Walker

Qualifications

Communications Engineering, RMIT University
Diploma of Security and Risk Management
Certificate IV in Security (Risk Management)
Certificate IV in Assessment and Training

Registrations and memberships

Fellow of Engineers Australia (FIE Aust.) (Member Number 960247)
Chartered Professional Engineer (CPEng)
Member of the College of Electrical Engineers (Aust.)
Member to the Australian Institute of Project Management (Member Number 47546)
Registered APEC Engineer (Registration Number 960247)
Registered Building Practitioner (Registration Number EE 21166)
Registered Professional Engineer QLD (Registration Number 21615)
Registered in the National Engineers Register (NER)
Registered International Professional Engineer (Australia)
SCEC Endorsed Security Zone Consultant (Registration Number: C0075)

Licences

ACT – Licensed security consultant (Licence Number 17722180 – Class 2A, C and D)
NSW – Licensed security consultant (Licence Number: 408837470 Class 2A)
QLD – Licensed security consultant (Licence Number: 32521139 Class 2)
SA – Exempt from a licence as an Engineer (Security and Investigation Industry Regulations Part 2, 5 (1) (b)).
TAS - Licensed Engineer (Building Services) – Tasmania (Licence number 363589169)
VIC – Registered security advisor (Registration No. 719-997-80S)
WA – Licensed security consultant (Licence Number: SG56167 Class 2 and 4)
(Note: No security licence is required for security consultants in TAS or NT).

Affiliations

Australian Standards – Represents Engineers Australia on Australian Standards for electronic security.

Publications

Operational risk management: Controlling opportunities and threats, 2001 ISBN 0957907400.
Hospital and Health Care Security in Australia, 2009 ISBN 978-0-9579074-1-6.
“Fortress or Sanctuary? Enhancing Court Safety by Managing People, Places and Processes” - Connley Walker partnered with the University of Western Sydney, WA Dept of the Attorney General, Family Court of Australia, Magistrates Court of Victoria, South Australia Court Administration Authority, MyriaD Consultants, PTW Architects, Lyons Architects, and NZ Ministry of Justice on the publication.

Papers

Security of multi-tenanted commercial buildings – BOMA, Perth, 1989.
Perimeter security technology, 1998.
Legal risks associated with CCTV use, 2000.
Biometric systems for correctional facilities, 2001.
Operational Risk Management – South Africa – 2003.
Computer Security – AIPS – 2005
Security Technology – Victoria Police - 2005
An enterprise wide operational risk management approach – CPA Australia, Melbourne 2005.
Prison perimeter security technology, 2006.

Security Clearance

NV1 (Secret Level)

Experience

Simon established Connley Walker Pty Ltd in 1996. Prior to Connley Walker, Simon worked in engineering and management roles with organisations in the business of electronic security, fire detection, government, and security consultancy.