WATERLOO COLLECTIVE | mirvac JOHN HOLLAND

WATERLOO METRO QUARTER OVER STATION DEVELOPMENT

Environmental Impact Statement
Appendix P – CPTED Report

SSD-79307746 Central Precinct

Detailed State Significant Development
Development Application

Prepared for **WL Developer Pty Ltd**

September 2025

Reference	Description
Applicable SSD Applications	Central Precinct SSD-79307746
Author	Connley Walker Pty Ltd Simon Walker
Reviewed	Connley Walker Pty Ltd Ben Connley-Walker
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1. Glossary and abbreviations

Reference	Description
ACHAR	Aboriginal Cultural Heritage Assessment Report
ADG	Apartment Design Guide
AHD	Australian height datum
AQIA	Air Quality Impact Assessment
BC Act	Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016
BCA	Building Code of Australia
BC Reg	Biodiversity Conservation Regulation 2017
BDAR	Biodiversity Development Assessment Report
CEEC	critically endangered ecological community
CIV	capital investment value
CMP	Construction Management Plan
Concept DA	A concept DA is a staged application often referred to as a 'Stage 1' DA. The subject application constitutes a detailed subsequent stage application to an approved concept DA (SSD 9393) lodged under section 4.22 of the EP&A Act.
Council	City of Sydney Council
CPTED	Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
CSSI approval	Critical State significant infrastructure approval
CTMP	Construction Traffic Management Plan
DA	Development application
DPIE	NSW Department of Planning, Industry and Environment
DRP	Design Review Panel
EP&A Act	Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979
EPA	NSW Environment Protection Authority
EPA Regulation	Environmental Planning and Assessment Regulation 2000
EPBC Act	Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999
ESD	Ecologically sustainable design

Reference	Description
GANSW	NSW Government Architect's Office
GFA	gross floor area
HIA	Heritage Impact Assessment
IAP	Interchange Access Plan
LGA	Local Government Area
NCC	National Construction Code
OSD	Over station development
PIR	Preferred Infrastructure Report
POM	Plan of Management
PSI	Preliminary Site Investigation
RMS	Roads and Maritime Services
SEARs	Secretary's Environmental Assessment Requirements
SEPP	State Environmental Planning Policy
SEPP 55	State Environmental Planning Policy No 55—Remediation of Land
SEPP 65	State Environmental Planning Policy No. 65 – Design Quality of Residential Apartment Development
SRD SEPP	State Environmental Planning Policy (State and Regional Development) 2009
SREP Sydney Harbour	State Regional Environmental Plan (Sydney Harbour Catchment) 2005
SSD	State significant development
SSD DA	State significant development application
SLEP	Sydney Local Environmental Plan 2012
Transport for NSW	Transport for New South Wales
TIA	Traffic Impact Assessment
The proposal	The proposed development which is the subject of the detailed SSD DA
The site	The site which is the subject of the detailed SSD DA
VIA	Visual Impact Assessment

Reference	Description
WMQ	Waterloo Metro Quarter
WMP	Waste Management Plan
WSUD	water sensitive urban design

2. Executive summary

This report has been prepared by Connley Walker Pty Ltd on behalf of WL Developer Pty Ltd (the applicant) to accompany a State Significant Development Application (SSDA) for the detailed Central Precinct SSD (SSD-79307746), located within the Waterloo Metro Quarter (WMQ) at 150 Cope Street, Waterloo. This SSD will replace the previous detailed approval applying to the Central precinct.

This report concludes that the proposed Over Station Development in the Central precinct is suitable and warrants approval subject to the implementation of mitigation measures provided in this report. A review of the current design has been undertaken and a number of risk mitigation measures have been implemented.

Building 2 – Ground

Recommended measures include CCTV coverage of all entrances, goods lift, and public areas and electronic access control or secure key for external entrances and goods lift.

The implementation of the security risk mitigation measures outlined in this report will result in the residual impacts associated with the proposed development to be appropriate and acceptable.

The CPTED mitigation measures are in line with the Crime prevention and with the requirements of City of Sydney DCP – Section 3.13.1 Crime prevention through environmental design – 2012. The measures comply with the Crime Prevention and the Assessment of Development Applications Guidelines.

3. Introduction

The figure below indicates the land to which this SSDA applies in relation to the overall WMQ site (shaded in Green).



This application seeks consent for the design, construction and operation of a 26 storey (including plant level) mixed use building within the Central Precinct (the site) of the WMQ estate.

The proposal comprises a Co-living housing tower above a three storey podium containing retail and community facility in the form of a childcare centre. Specifically, the proposal comprises:

- Ground level retail tenancies and community facility, and childcare, co-living and shared basement lobbies
- Community centre in the form of a childcare centre at Level 1 and Level 2
- A Co-living housing tower from Levels 3 to 24 comprising:
  - Self-contained co-living accommodation rooms across 20 levels, with capacity for around 500 rooms
  - Indoor and outdoor communal amenity at Levels 3 and 24
  - Communal space also provided on each accommodation level;
- Ground level vehicular access from Church Square shared zone to the shared basement, delivery of a pedestrian thoroughfare through the site, landscaping and public domain works.
- Indicative building signage zones

This application is submitted for concurrent assessment with a DA to amend the Waterloo Metro Over Station Development (OSD) Concept DA (SSD 9393) (the Concept DA) - referred to as the Second Amending Concept DA. The Second Amending Concept DA seeks consent to modify the existing concept approval as it relates to the Northern and Central Precincts, by amending the building envelopes to redistribute floor space to suit a new mix of land uses. This Central Precinct SSD will be consistent with the Concept DA as amended. Separately, a Detailed SSDA for the detailed design, construction and operation of the Northern Precinct (SSD-79307758) and a Section 4.55 Modification Application to modify the approved detailed Basement SSDA (SSD 10438), will be concurrently submitted with this application.

This report has been prepared to respond to Item 8 of the Planning Secretary's Environmental Assessment Requirements (SEARS) issued by Department of Planning, Infrastructure and Housing (DPHI) on 13 February 2025. Specifically, this report has been prepared to respond to the SEARs requirements summarised below.

Item	Description of requirement	Section reference (this report)
Public space	Public Space Plan (as part of the Design Report) CPTED Report) Address how Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles are to be integrated into the development, in accordance with Crime Prevention and the Assessment of Development Guidelines.	7. Methodology 10. Assessment and Findings 11. Mitigation Measures

Table 1 - SEARs requirements

This report has also been prepared in response to the following conditions of consent issued for the amended concept SSDA (SSD 10441) for the OSD as summarised in the table below.

Item	Description of requirement	Section reference (this report)
B17	SECURITY AND CRIME ASSESSMENT Future development applications shall be accompanied by a Security and Crime Risk Assessment prepared in consultation with NSW Police having regard to Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) Principles and NSW Police publication “Safe Place: Vehicle Management: A comprehensive guide for owners, operators and designers.” The future development is to have regard to the recommendations contained within the submission by NSW Police on the Concept SSD.1	7. Methodology 10. Assessment and Findings 11. Mitigation Measures

Table 2 - Conditions of Concept Approval

4. The site

The site is located within the City of Sydney Local Government Area (LGA). The site is situated about 3.3 kilometres south of Sydney CBD and eight kilometres northeast of Sydney International Airport within the suburb of Waterloo.

The Waterloo Metro Quarter site comprises land to the west of Cope Street, east of Botany Road, south of Raglan Street and north of Wellington Street (refer to Figure 1). The heritage-listed Waterloo Congregational Church at 103–105 Botany Road is within this street block but does not form a part of the Waterloo Metro Quarter site boundaries.

The Waterloo Metro Quarter site is a rectangular shaped allotment with an overall site area of approximately 1.287 hectares.

The Waterloo Metro Quarter site comprises the following allotments and legal description at the date of this report. Following consolidation by Sydney Metro (the Principal) the land will be set out in deposited plan DP1257150.

- 1368 Raglan Street (Lot 4 DP 215751)
- 59 Botany Road (Lot 5 DP 215751)
- 65 Botany Road (Lot 1 DP 814205)
- 67 Botany Road (Lot 1 DP 228641)
- 124-128 Cope Street (Lot 2 DP 228641)
- 69-83 Botany Road (Lot 1, DP 1084919)
- 130-134 Cope Street (Lot 12 DP 399757)
- 136-144 Cope Street (Lots A-E DP 108312)
- 85 Botany Road (Lot 1 DP 27454)
- 87 Botany Road (Lot 2 DP 27454)
- 89-91 Botany Road (Lot 1 DP 996765)
- 93-101 Botany Road (Lot 1 DP 433969 and Lot 1 DP 738891)
- 119 Botany Road (Lot 1 DP 205942 and Lot 1 DP 436831)
- 156-160 Cope Street (Lot 31 DP 805384)
- 107-117A Botany Road (Lot 32 DP 805384 and Lot A DP 408116)
- 170-174 Cope Street (Lot 2 DP 205942).

The detailed SSDA applies to the Central Precinct (the site) of the Waterloo Metro Quarter site. The site has an area of approximately 2,460sqm. The subject site comprises the following allotments and legal description at the date of this report.

Central Precinct

- 130–134 Cope Street (Lot 12 DP 399757) (Part)
- 136–144 Cope Street (Lots A-E DP 108312) (Part)
- 85 Botany Road (Lot 1 DP 27454)
- 87 Botany Road (Lot 2 DP 27454)
- 89–91 Botany Road (Lot 1 DP 996765)

- 93–101 Botany Road (Lot 1 DP 433969 and Lot 1 DP 738891) (Part).

The boundaries of the overall site are identified at Figure 1, and the subject site of the detailed SSD DA is identified at Figures 2 and 3. The site is reasonably flat with a slight fall to the south.

The site previously included three to five storey commercial, light industrial and shop top housing buildings. All previous structures except for an office building at the corner of Botany Road and Wellington Street have been demolished to facilitate construction of the new Sydney Metro Waterloo station. As such the existing site is predominately vacant and being used as a construction site. Construction of the Sydney metro was completed in accordance with critical State significant infrastructure approval (CSSI 7400).

Figure 1 - Aerial image of the site
Source: Urbis

The area surrounding the site consists of commercial premises to the north, light industrial and mixed-use development to the south, residential development to the east and predominantly commercial and light industry uses to the west.



Figure 2 - Waterloo Metro Quarter site, with sub-precincts identified
Source: WL Developer Pty Ltd

The Central Precinct SSDA also includes Grit Lane and Church Square.

Figure 3 – Grit Lane
Source: Bates Smart

Figure 4 – Church Square
Source: Bates Smart

5. Background

5.1 About Sydney Metro

Sydney Metro is Australia's biggest public transport project. Services started in May 2019 in the city's North West with a train every four minutes in the peak. A new standalone railway, this 21st century network will revolutionise the way Sydney travels.

There are four core components:

5.1.1 Sydney Metro North West

The first Sydney Metro project was completed, and passenger services commenced in May 2019 at 13 metro stations between Rouse Hill and Chatswood, with a metro train every four minutes in the peak. The new section of the metro line, 15.5 kilometers from Chatswood to Sydenham opened in August 2024.

5.1.2 Sydney Metro City & Southwest

Sydney Metro Southwest, T3 Bankstown line connecting Sydenham to Bankstown is under construction and is expected to start services late 2025.

Sydney Metro Southwest will update and convert 10 stations into metro standard at Marrickville, Dulwich Hill, Hurlstone Park, Canterbury, Campsie, Belmore, Lakemba, Wiley Park, Punchbowl, and Bankstown.

This metro line between Sydenham and Bankstown will operate fully segregated from the existing Sydney Trains railway. The T3 line west beyond Bankstown will continue to be operated by Sydney Trains.

5.1.3 Sydney Metro West

Sydney Metro West is a new underground railway connecting Greater Parramatta and the Sydney CBD. This once-in-a-century infrastructure investment will transform Sydney for generations to come, doubling rail capacity between these two areas, linking new communities to rail services and supporting employment growth and housing supply between the two CBDs.

The locations of seven proposed metro stations have been confirmed at Westmead, Parramatta, Sydney Olympic Park, North Strathfield, Burwood North, Five Dock and The Bays.

The NSW Government is assessing an optional station at Pyrmont and further planning is underway to determine the location of a new metro station in the Sydney CBD.

5.1.4 Sydney Metro Greater West

Metro rail will also service Greater Western Sydney and the new Western Sydney International (Nancy Bird Walton) Airport. The new railway line will become the transport spine for the Western Parkland City's growth for generations to come, connecting communities and travellers with the rest of Sydney's public transport system with a fast, safe and easy metro service.

The Australian and NSW governments are equal partners in the delivery of this new railway.

The Sydney Metro project is illustrated below.



Figure 5 - Sydney Metro alignment map
Source: Sydney Metro

5.2 Sydney Metro CSSI Approval (SSI 7400)

On 9 January 2017, the Minister for Planning approved the Sydney Metro City & Southwest - Chatswood to Sydenham project as a critical State significant infrastructure (CSSI) project (reference SSI 7400) (CSSI approval). The terms of the CSSI approval includes all works required to construct the Sydney Metro Waterloo Station. The CSSI approval also includes the construction of below and above ground works within the metro station structure for appropriate integration with the OSD.

The delineation between the approved Sydney Metro works, generally described as within the two 'metro station boxes' and surrounding public domain works, and the OSD elements are illustrated in Figure 5.



Figure 6 - CSSI Approval scope of works
Source: WL Developer Pty Ltd

6. Methodology

6.1 Engagement

Connley Walker Pty Ltd has been engaged to conduct a CPTED review of the Waterloo Metro Quarter site. A separate Security Risk Assessment report has been documented. The report has been developed by professionally qualified security consultants. Connley Walker Pty Ltd holds a NSW Security Master Licence and the security consultants that prepared the review hold the required NSW Class 2A Security Consultant Licence.

6.2 Consultation

Consultation with South Sydney Police was conducted to gain an understanding of the operational context and specific security threats. The input they provided relates to the entire development.

The items that they have raised are:

- The more CCTV the better as it is a significant deterrent.
- Provide signage for the CCTV.
- Extensive lighting is needed.
- Youths are at higher risk of robbery as they may not have sufficient situational awareness (e.g. looking down into an expensive phone). Signage may help.
- Police and emergency services need access to the building.
- Police and emergency services need to be given information about access points.
- A site visit by police and emergency services is recommended prior to opening.

6.3 References

This Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) report has been developed with reference to the Crime prevention and the assessment of development applications Guidelines under section 4.15 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 published by the NSW Department of Urban Affairs and Planning and reference to City of Sydney DCP – Section 3.13.1 Crime prevention through environmental design – 2012. This report also responds to Item 8 of the Planning Secretary's Environmental Assessment Requirements (SEARS) issued by Department of Planning, Infrastructure and Housing (DPHI) on 13 February 2025.

The NSW Police publication “Safe Place: Vehicle Management: A comprehensive guide for owners, operators and designers” provided additional input. This publication provides an overview of hostile vehicle management in risk situations for owners and operators responsible for management of public spaces and buildings. Accordingly, it is addressed in the Hostile Vehicle Management consultant’s report.

In summary, these guidelines explain how CPTED can be used to influence the design of buildings and places by:

- Increasing the perception of risk to criminals by increasing the possibility of detection, challenge, and capture.
- Increasing the effort required to commit crime by increasing the time, energy or resources which need to be expended.
- Reducing the potential rewards of crime by minimising, removing or concealing 'crime benefits.
- Removing conditions that create confusion about required norms of behaviour.

Specific provisions of the City of Sydney DCP – Section 3.13.1 Crime prevention through environmental design – 2012 guide are to incorporate:

> *(1) Active spaces and windows of habitable rooms within buildings are to be located to maximise casual surveillance of streets, laneways, parking areas, public spaces and communal courtyard space.*
>
> *(2) In commercial, retail or public buildings, facilities such as toilets and parents rooms are to be conveniently located and designed to maximise casual surveillance to facility entries.*
>
> *(3) Minimise blind-corners, recesses and other external areas that have the potential for concealment or entrapment.*
>
> *(4) Building entries are to be clearly visible, unobstructed and easily identifiable from the street, other public areas and other development. Where practicable lift lobbies, stairwells, hallways and corridors should be visible from the public domain.*
>
> *(5) Ground floors of non-residential buildings, the non-residential component of mixed use developments, and the foyers of residential buildings, are to be designed to enable surveillance from the public domain to the inside of the building at night.*
>
> *(6) Pedestrian routes from car parking spaces to lift lobbies are to be as direct as possible with clear lines of sight along the route.*
>
> *(7) Where dwelling units have individual main entries directly from a public space, the entry is to include a clearly defined transitional space between public and private areas.* (It is noted that no apartments have direct street / ground floor access).
>
> *(8) Building details such as fencing, drainpipes and landscaping are to be designed so that illegitimate access is not facilitated by the opportunity for foot or hand-holds, concealment and the like.*

CPTED is based on the following four elements:

- Surveillance
- Access control
- Territorial reinforcement
- Maintenance

Surveillance

Surveillance, both natural and through technology, increases the perceived opportunity to commit an offence by improving the visibility of potential offenders to the general public. Natural surveillance occurs by designing the placement of physical features, activities and people in such a way as to

maximize visibility of the space and its users, fostering positive social interaction among legitimate users of private and public space. Potential offenders feel increased scrutiny, and thus inherently perceive an increase in risk. This perceived increase in risk extends to the perceived lack of viable and covert escape routes.

Examples of natural surveillance include:

- Clear vision of areas without hidden spaces.
- Landscaping or architecture that does not provide any hidden spaces or places where a person may become entrapped.
- Provision of clear rubbish bins in public spaces such that an explosive device could not be hidden.
- Avoidance of concealed or isolated pedestrian routes.
- Architectural design that encourages pedestrians to use high visibility pathways.
- Provision of glazing instead of solid walls.
- Natural lighting.
- Avoidance of entrapment areas such as recessed doorways.
- If entrapment areas cannot be removed, then closing them afterhours.
- Incorporation of escape routes in a design.

Examples of technical surveillance measures include:

- Closed Circuit Television (CCTV).
- Lighting that is suitable for CCTV.
- Lighting to AS1158.3.1:2005.
- Lighting of building entrances.
- Lighting directed onto areas accessed by people.

Access control

Access control, both natural and through technology, limits the opportunity for crime by taking steps to clearly differentiate between public space and private space. By selectively placing entrances and exits, fencing, lighting and landscape to limit access or control flow, natural access control occurs.

Examples of natural access control include:

- Physical elements (doors, walls, windows etc.) selected to prevent unauthorised access to an area.
- Locating pedestrian pathways to direct movement to authorised spaces only.
- Physical barriers to prevent unauthorised entry to areas such as carparks.
- Effective keying system (e.g. minimal number of levels in the master key system).

Examples of technical access control include:

- An Electronic Access Control System (EACS).
- Boom gates.

- Biometric systems.
- Vehicle numberplate recognition systems.
- Electronic keying systems.
- Skateboard deterrent devices.
- Outdoor benches with multiple armrests to prevent lying down.

Territorial reinforcement

Territorial reinforcement promotes social control through increased definition of space and improved proprietary concern. An environment designed to clearly delineate private space does two things. First, it creates a sense of ownership. Owners have a vested interest and are more likely to challenge intruders or report them to the police. Second, the sense of owned space creates an environment where "strangers" or "intruders" stand out and are more easily identified.

Examples of territorial reinforcement include:

- Fences.
- Signage.
- Landscaping that clearly shows public, semi-public, and private space.

Maintenance

Maintenance is an expression of ownership of property. Deterioration indicates less control by the intended users of a site and indicate a greater tolerance of disorder. The Broken Windows Theory is a valuable tool in understanding the importance of maintenance in deterring crime. Broken Windows theory proponents support a zero-tolerance approach to property maintenance, observing that the presence of a broken window will entice vandals to break more windows in the vicinity. The sooner broken windows are fixed, the less likely it is that such vandalism will occur in the future. Vandalism falls into the broken windows category as well. The faster the graffiti is painted over, the less likely one is to repeat because no one saw what has been done. Having a positive image in the community shows a sense of pride and self-worth that no one can take away from the owner of the property.

To assist in the maintenance of graffiti damage, a number of anti-graffiti coatings are available to the designers. These coatings are available for surfaces such as concrete, brick and masonry surfaces, painted surfaces, metals and bluestone, sandstone, granite etc.

7. Assessment and findings

The following provides a review and analysis of relevant crime mapping based on statistics for the relevant local Government area in order to identify the key crime related risks that the Project Works are exposed to.

The following map shows the current hot spots for crime in Sydney. The Metro Quarter Site is shown to be within a high-density crime area.



Figure 7 – Crime hot spots
Source: Boscar

The site demographic and retail commercial premises which includes two pubs (Cauliflower Hotel – cnr Botany Rd and Wellington St, and the Abbotts Hotel – cnr Botany Rd and Raglan St) may increase the level of risk at the development and potential for crime. Contributors to the increased level of risk include drug dealing due to the area demographic and potential late-night alcohol related incidents in the vicinity of the two pubs. Youths are at higher risk of robbery as they may not have sufficient situational awareness (e.g. looking down into phone). Signage may help.

The incidents of crime within the Sydney Local Government Area (which includes Waterloo) to premises that are relevant to the development for 2019, when the original CPTED review was carried out were as follows. These earlier statistics are provided as they show the incident rates for different types of premises in a way the current crime statistics do not.

Premises type	*Domestic violence related assault*	*Non-domestic violence related assault*	*Sexual offences*	*Robbery*	*Break and enter non-dwelling*	*Motor vehicle theft*	*Steal from motor vehicle*	*Steal from person*	*Malicious damage to property*
Office	2	31	5	0	61	4	10	2	68
Retail/wholesale	17	409	44	20	185	16	20	152	197
Carpark	3	16	4	0	28	31	232	0	168
Outdoor/public place	211	1,214	145	178	7	214	764	344	693
Residential	756	416	285	39	34	51	137	47	923
Total	989	2,086	483	237	315	316	1,163	545	2,049

Table 3 – Local relevant crime incidents
Source: Boscar

Since 2019, the figures have changed as shown in the following table:

Offence Category	*2019 (Sydney LGA total)*	*2025 (Sydney LGA total)*	*Change*	*% Change*
Domestic violence-related assault	979	1,203	+224	**+22.9%**
Non-domestic violence-related assault	2,674	2,866	+192	**+7.2%**
Sexual offences (combined)	728	930	+202	**+27.7%**
Robbery	223	220	−3	−1.3%
Break & enter non-dwelling	346	310	−36	−10.4%
Motor vehicle theft	465	509	+44	**+9.5%**
Steal from motor vehicle	1,257	847	−410	**−32.6%**
Steal from person	1,213	*not available*	—	—
Malicious damage to property	2,442	2,065	−377	**−15.4%**

Table 4 – Local relevant crime incidents

From these figures, it may be concluded that the residential areas within the surrounds of the development and the surrounding public areas are statistically at the highest risk of crime, however this risk is reduced given that no apartment is on ground level.

No local crime statistics are available for the Child Care Centre as this is not a classification referenced by BOSCAR.

The highest incidents being:

- Assault in an outdoor/public place or retail area.
- Steal from person in an outdoor/public place.
- Malicious property damage in an outdoor/public place.
- Break and enter in a retail space.

Theft from a motor vehicle in public spaces has not been considered as vehicle parking in public spaces is outside the development.

The following provides an assessment of the Central Precinct against the CPTED Principles. Section 8 sets out proposed mitigation measures. The CPTED principle of Maintenance is an operational management responsibility.

The CPTED Maintenance requirement is to be addressed as part of the day to day operational management of the site. This will include removal of graffiti and repairs to building damage. Maintenance may also be assisted through the use of anti-graffiti coatings applied to the lower levels of the building exterior.

Building 2 (Central Precinct)
Surveillance
Natural surveillance of the Community / Child Care Entrance is available from Botany Road. Natural surveillance of the Residential Entrance and retail spaces is provided from Botany Rd., Church Square, Raglan Walk, Cope Street Plaza and Grit Lane. The retail premises / active frontages along the ground floor contribute to good natural surveillance by attracting people to the area.

Grit Lane and Church Square both provide a busy retail and pedestrian environment. These offer good natural surveillance of streets and laneways as natural surveillance is directly linked to the number of people in the area.

The co-living areas include common areas shared by residents. These increase security by providing additional natural surveillance so long as they are frequently occupied. For this to occur it is necessary for them to include features that attract people to them.

Access control
It is expected that an electronic access control system and a suitable keying system will be installed throughout the building to ensure that no person has access to an area that they are not authorised to enter and that no unauthorised person has access to the building afterhours. This is to include lift access. Access to the re-entry to the building from fire stairs is to be designed so that illegitimate access is not facilitated.

Once installed, an electronic access control system can be programmed to allow individual tenants to access areas. Access of co-living tenants to areas such as level 3 and 24 will then be able to be programmed by building management as required.

Territorial reinforcement
The only areas where territorial reinforcement may be an issue is along Raglan Walk and Church Square. These are areas where people may loiter. Overt CCTV surveillance and security signage will assist in mitigating any loitering issues.

8. Mitigation measures

The following CPTED Risk mitigation measures are recommended.

Building 2 – Ground (Central Precinct)

Ground Floor



Figure 8 – Building 2 – Ground Level
Source: Bates Smart

The ground floor of Building 2 has entries for Share Basement Lobby, Child Care, Carpark entry to Basement and lift lobby. The bus stop located adjacent to the pedestrian entries will increase pedestrian numbers and therefore also increase natural surveillance. Complete CCTV coverage of the entries and lobbies is recommended.

Level 1 and 2 Child Care

Figure 9 – Building 2 – Level 1
Source: Bates Smart

Child care is provided on levels 1 and 2. Areas of CPTED interest are:

The entries to both levels arrive at a reception point. This will need a method of access control to the two doors that enter the child care space and CCTV surveillance of the entire space.

Outdoor play areas are provided on both floors. It is recommended that where any of these areas can be viewed from adjacent buildings, then suitable visual barriers be installed such as shade cloth.

Complete surveillance using CCTV is recommended.

9. Conclusion

The implementation of the CPTED mitigation measures outlined in this report will result in the residual impacts associated with the proposed development to be appropriate and acceptable.

The CPTED mitigation measures are in line with the Crime prevention and the assessment of development applications Guidelines under section 4.15 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 published by the NSW Department of Urban Affairs and Planning and with the requirements of City of Sydney DCP – Section 3.13.1 Crime prevention through environmental design – 2012.

The design has demonstrated consideration and implementation of CPTED principles through:

- Active spaces within the building have been located to maximise casual surveillance from outside the buildings via transparent glazing.
- Blind-corners, recesses and other external areas that have the potential for concealment or entrapment have been minimised.
- Entries are clearly visible, unobstructed and easily identifiable from the street.
- Foyers enable surveillance from the public domain to the inside of the building at night.
- Signage that clearly defines the purpose of areas.
- Appropriate lighting levels.

The fundamental four elements of CPTED of Surveillance, Access Control and Territorial Reinforcement have been detailed for the Central Precinct.

The CPTED Maintenance requirement is to be addressed as part of the day to day operational management of the site. This will include removal of graffiti and repairs to building damage. Maintenance may also be assisted through the use of anti-graffiti coatings applied to the lower levels of the building exterior.

In addition to CPTED measures, the following security risk mitigation measures are considered appropriate:

- CCTV surveillance of:
    - All public spaces.
    - All building entries.
    - Lift lobbies.
    - Carpark.
    - Bicycle storage.
    - Within all lifts.
    - Concierge points.
    - Roof access points.
    - Plant room entries.
- Electronic access control located at:
    - Lifts.
    - Entries to building management areas.
    - Non-public entries.

A Security Risk Assessment has been provided (Reference: WMQ-SITE-CNW-SC-RPT-009, Security)

10. Appendices

10.1 Appendix 1 – CONNLEY WALKER CREDENTIALS

Consultant that prepared this report – Simon Walker

Qualifications

Communications Engineering, RMIT University
Diploma of Security and Risk Management
Certificate IV in Security (Risk Management)
Certificate IV in Assessment and Training

Registrations and memberships

Fellow of Engineers Australia (FIE Aust.) (Member Number 960247)
Chartered Professional Engineer (CPEng)
Member of the College of Electrical Engineers (Aust.)
Member to the Australian Institute of Project Management (Member Number 47546)
Registered APEC Engineer (Registration Number 960247)
Registered Building Practitioner (Registration Number EE 21166)
Registered Professional Engineer QLD (Registration Number 21615)
Registered in the National Engineers Register (NER)
Registered International Professional Engineer (Australia)
SCEC Endorsed Security Zone Consultant (Registration Number: C0075)

Licences

ACT – Licensed security consultant (Licence Number 17722180 – Class 2A, C and D)
NSW – Licensed security consultant (Licence Number: 408837470 Class 2A)
QLD – Licensed security consultant (Licence Number: 32521139 Class 2)
SA – Exempt from a licence as an Engineer (Security and Investigation Industry Regulations Part 2, 5 (1) (b)).
TAS - Licensed Engineer (Building Services) – Tasmania (Licence number 363589169)
VIC – Registered security advisor (Registration No. 719-997-80S)
WA – Licensed security consultant (Licence Number: SG56167 Class 2 and 4)
(Note: No security licence is required for security consultants in TAS or NT).

Affiliations

Australian Standards – Represents Engineers Australia on Australian Standards for electronic security.

Publications

Operational risk management: Controlling opportunities and threats, 2001 ISBN 0957907400.
Hospital and Health Care Security in Australia, 2009 ISBN 978-0-9579074-1-6.
"Fortress or Sanctuary? Enhancing Court Safety by Managing People, Places and Processes" - Connley Walker partnered with the University of Western Sydney, WA Dept of the Attorney General, Family Court of Australia, Magistrates Court of Victoria, South Australia Court Administration Authority, MyriaD Consultants, PTW Architects, Lyons Architects, and NZ Ministry of Justice on the publication.

Papers

Security of multi-tenanted commercial buildings – BOMA, Perth, 1989.
Perimeter security technology, 1998.
Legal risks associated with CCTV use, 2000.
Biometric systems for correctional facilities, 2001.
Operational Risk Management – South Africa – 2003.
Computer Security – AIPS – 2005
Security Technology – Victoria Police - 2005
An enterprise wide operational risk management approach – CPA Australia, Melbourne 2005.
Prison perimeter security technology, 2006.

Security Clearance

NV1 (Secret Level)

Experience

Simon established Connley Walker Pty Ltd in 1996. Prior to Connley Walker, Simon worked in engineering and management roles with organisations in the business of electronic security, fire detection, government, and security consultancy.