



HARRIS CRIME PREVENTION SERVICES

crime risk reviews | security master planning | designing out crime | 'safe place' management
www.harriscrimeprevention.com.au t: (02) 9804 8771 Security Master Licence 407778164

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) Consultancy

FINAL REPORT

Application Number: SSD 66876472
Project Name: Adaptive Reuse of the Former Berrima Gaol
Applicant: Blue Sox Group
Location: 2-4 Argyle Street and 30 Wingecarribee Street
Berrima NSW (Lot 102 DP1283819 [102/1283819])



for Blue Sox Group

20th August 2025

Leon Harris: Dip. Sec. Studies, Cert IV Sec. (Risk Mgt), Cert IV (Work Health and Safety)
Don Robertson: BA (Crim.), MA (Ed.), Grad. Dip (Environ. Studies), PhD (Aviation Sec.)

Commercial-In-Confidence

TO BE RELEASED AS CONTROLLED COPIES ONLY

Unauthorised copying prohibited

Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	3
ES1 Engagement Purpose and Development Overview	3
ES2 CPTED Aim, Outcome, Definitions and Principles	4
ES3 Anti-Social and Criminal Risks to the Development: Summary	4
ES4 CPTED Applications – Conclusions and Recommendations	5
ES5 Instrument Compliance – Conclusions and/or Recommendations	8
ES6 OVERALL CPTED ASSESSMENT SUMMARY	8
THE REPORT	9
Preamble and the Harris Crime Prevention Consultancy	9
1 Report Structure	9
2 Harris Engagement and Development Overview	10
3 CPTED – Aim, Outcome, Definitions and Principles	10
4 NSW Department of Planning, Housing and Infrastructure Compliance	11
5 The Report's Informing and Supporting Instruments	12
6 Scope, Outcomes and Stakeholders	13
7 The Site, Community and Crime Context, Police Information, Crime Data and Assessed Risks	14
8 Police Information, Crime Data and Assessed Risks	18
9 CPTED-Applied Risk Mitigation Architecture to Ensure 'Welcoming-and-Safe-Place' Outcomes	20
10 Informing Legislation, Regulation, Planning and/or Policy Instrument Compliance	38
11 Supporting Planning and/or Policy Instruments	39
12 OVERALL CPTED ASSESSMENT SUMMARY	41
13 References	41
14 Supporting Appendices 1 and 2	43

**Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) Consultancy
in relation to the Adaptive Reuse of the Former Berrima Gaol,
termed the 'Berrima Quarter', Argyle Street Berrima NSW**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
(extracted from the report)

ES1 Engagement Purpose and Development Overview

This report has been prepared by Harris Crime Prevention Services to accompany a State Significant Development Application (SSDA) by Blue Sox Group for the adaptive reuse of the former Berrima Gaol (the development or project). The heritage listed development footprint (termed the Berrima Quarter) is located at Old Hume Highway (Argyle Street) Berrima NSW.

Blue Sox Group expresses the development vision as: *"an adaptive reuse strategy to incorporate a hub of venues and offerings designed to bring together the community and attract visitors to the region through intimate dining experiences, a wellness retreat, function rooms, gallery & retail, public bar and bespoke high-quality accommodation for those wanting to stay overnight and use the township of Berrima as a base for touring the region."*

Harris supports this vision by assessing, affirming and recommending relevant architectural elements aimed at ensuring a 'welcoming-and-safe-place' outcome for all stakeholders. The acknowledged framework and methodology for this outcome is Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). The report details:

- (i) how CPTED principles are, or should be, applied
- (ii) whether their application complies with State and local government requirements, and
- (iii) the crime prevention advantages for the development's on-going 'welcoming-and-safe-place' reputation.

The report is a prerequisite under the Planning Secretary's Environmental Assessment Requirements (SEARs) within the NSW Planning, Housing and Infrastructure issued for the project (SSD 66876472), March 2024. The development comprises:

- two storey hotel buildings with 55 suites (49 outside the gaol and 6 inside)
- entry forecourt, concierge, function rooms, restaurant and bar, meeting rooms, internal courtyards, wellness centre, gym, amenities, offices
- 195 car spaces across 3 levels (2 below ground basement levels and one ground level)
- loading dock, stores and back-of-house zones including the lift foyers
- multipurpose space (below on-grade carpark, working gardens
- lighting, landscaping, signage.

Specifically, the development's CPTED solutions should focus on:

- (i) inter and intra-site spatial purposes and connectivity clarity
- (ii) stakeholder operational knowledge of built form, public and private spaces
- (iii) safe pedestrian and vehicle wayfinding certainty to, from and throughout the site
- (iv) the security of critical and utilities infrastructure.

The (CPTED) consultancy's assessment, conclusions and recommendations in relation to the above are based on five CPTED principles.

ES2 CPTED Aim, Outcome, Definitions and Principles

CPTED Aim and Outcome

The 'welcoming-and-safe-place' aim and outcome for all stakeholders is defined by Harris as: *'built form and public space environments where crime prevention has been a consideration of concept, master-planning, design development and construction processes to ensure a development's overall (safe and secure) reputation'*.

CPTED Principles

We define CPTED as: *'applying aspects of architecture, engineering and technology to all urban development proposals (projects) as an intentional environmental, welcoming-and-safe-place, crime prevention strategy'*.

Our report's analyses, conclusions and recommendations are based on five acknowledged CPTED principles, adapted by Harris from the Moffatt (1983) CPTED framework as:

- Principle 1 Territorial definition – clarity about spatial identify, separation, boundaries and purposes
- Principle 2 Natural surveillance – architecture facilitating strong sightlines for ground plane basement and/or upper-level observation and surveillance
- Principle 3 Access control – access-egress definitions - who goes where, when and why
- Principle 4 Activity support – the influences of (external) lighting, landscaping and signage
- Principle 5 Target hardening – adding specific and robust architecture and technology.

ES3 Anti-Social and Criminal Risks to the Development: Summary

The assessed crime risks, while mostly within the low range, should never be underestimated. Even the most minor offences occurring within or near the development, can have major consequences.

Assessment is based on four risk categories: 'low' (L), 'moderate' (M), 'high' (H) and 'extreme' (E). Risk categories, levels and consequences are framed by AS/ISO 31000:2018, *Risk Management Guidelines* (refer Matrix **Appendix 2**).

Anecdotal understanding, site knowledge, local police information and BOCSAR data confirm the mostly predictable crime categories likely to 'target' the development as:

- (i) intimidating anti-social behaviour towards staff, guests, visitors and contractors, (L)
- (ii) physical and/or sexual assaults against the (i) above categories, including at night, (L)
- (iii) damage to, or theft of, stakeholder (including guests and visitors) property, (L- M)
- (iv) damage to, theft from and theft of, vehicles, bicycles, motor bikes and scooters, (L-M)
- (v) attempted unauthorised access to any development spaces, (L)
- (vi) damage to external facades, plant, infrastructure, landscaping, signs, fixtures or fittings, (L)
- (vii) drug use or drug dealing surrounding (contextual) at or around the footprint, (L-M)
- (viii) arson or explosions, (L)
- (ix) injury or death to persons, damage to, or destruction of, property, from targeted and potentially, terrorist-style or 'hostile vehicle' attacks. (L)

Potential for anti-social and criminal behaviour also relates to the 'newness' of the development. In our experience, would-be offenders will always 'test' new developments to look for weaknesses in security design and operations. CPTED solutions aim to reduce or eliminate 'security breach' opportunities.

ES4 CPTED Applications – Conclusions and Recommendations

CPTED Principle 1 Territorial Definitions Conclusions and/or Recommendations

The uniqueness and vision for the development has enabled CPTED architecture to be defined as a series of distinctive sub-precincts, specifically, the walled gaol, the external guest accommodation, the extensive hard and soft landscaped spaces and vehicle parking arrangements. Harris affirms the integrity of each and of the holistic 'knowledge' certainty safely guiding all stakeholders to and throughout the footprint. This integrity is borne out by the following assessment summary.

Each sub-precinct has clear spatial separation and purpose clarity, an important Principle 1 (foundational) requirement. Their design intentions are unmistakable and each facilitates directional wayfinding, ensuring unambiguous and safe understanding of locations and operational objectives.

In CPTED and definitional terms, there are no confusing spatial purposes. Spatial separation provides safe wayfinding confidence via entrances, pathways, landscaping, internally defined function and guest accommodation, the riverbank, basement parking, lifts and internal stairways. The Overall design features clearly defined circulation 'corridors' to enhance wayfinding certainty.

Bulk and general waste collection, loading, property and general storage, loading and associated offices are securely located throughout both basements. Procedures must be strictly followed as to deliveries, waste storage and collection. Externally located utilities infrastructure, must be secured to avoid tampering and/or damage opportunities with meter taps, pipes, pumps and valves.

Design Development (DD) drawings will reinforce the safe circulation and activation on all levels.

Pedestrian and vehicle access and circulation throughout landscaped spaces, the basement and at-grade carparking blends purpose with function flexibility.

In CPTED Principle 1 terms, the (combined) definitional elements present a coordinated and integrated 'whole'. They lay the foundation for positive crime risk mitigation measures for the development site. They support the Blue Sox marketing and crime prevention (security) objectives. In turn, these objectives should mean a 'welcoming-and-safe-place' operational reputation – one which will be sustained and supported by the appropriate application of Principles 2 to 5.

CPTED Principle 2 Natural Surveillance Conclusions and/or Recommendations

Within the gaol, guests and other public circulation is observable from the suites, the main entry, courtyard spaces, wayfinding corridors, event and dining areas, thereby promoting natural surveillance. Any potential back-of-house zones and 'blind' corners will require targeted lighting, video surveillance and/or access-restricting barriers to minimise concealment or entrapment risks.

Externally there are multi-angle passive (natural) surveillance opportunities due to proximate and distant sightline strength.

The riverbank architecture and associated landscaping must encourage wide-angle observations towards the river and bushland. Surveillance of that public space will be possible for users of the space and by hotel guests able to view activity from balconies or terraces.

Surveillance options at and along the northern and western gaol walls should be explored to pre-empt possible targeting of those perimeters.

The development's overall design elements therefore maximise and promote natural surveillance via strong proximate and distant ground plane sightlines.

Technical surveillance (refer Principle 5) will augment natural surveillance limitations especially within the basement, including loading, waste storage, collection, internal utilities infrastructure and other back-of-house zones.

We conclude that design development of current drawings should meet natural surveillance objectives; that is, to generate whole-of-site surveillance opportunities to deter and/or prevent damage to property, and/or harm to all stakeholder-users of the site.

CPTED Principle 3 Access Control Conclusions and/or Recommendations

Harris concludes that there will be controlled access to all security-related spaces throughout site. This includes guests, visitors, staff, contractors and emergency personnel.

All staff and contractors must be 'security cleared' and will only gain access to designated areas by access control technology. Staff and contractor IDs should be regularly validated.

Access control technology should apply to all access to all back-of-house zones, including waste collection and storage, staff offices, amenities, the loading and delivery zone, plant and other utilities infrastructure.

The disabled bathroom access behind the car garage is a vulnerable space. It should be locked at night with staff providing access on request. Another vulnerable space, the Glass House should also be locked at night.

Ensuring these protocols, procedures and restrictions will ensure compliance with this CPTED principle and should ensure on-going safe (secure) operations for all user stakeholders. The objective is to 'block' (deter and/or prevent) unauthorised access throughout the site.

It is essential that all physical and electronic access control systems be monitored and maintained to ensure performance capability.

It is also essential that access restrictions be fully understood and complied with by all persons occupying or accessing all secure areas.

CPTED Principle 4 Activity Support Conclusions and/or Recommendations

Lighting: Our assessment focus has been on external wayfinding, social gathering, gaol and basement lighting.

CPTED-relevant lighting is applicable to the gaol and basement entry portals – pedestrian and vehicle – and to all external spaces where circulation is 'free-flowing', for example within and around open landscaped spaces and general pedestrian ground plane circulation between the gaol site and riverbank suites.

Pole mounted wayfinding lighting will comply with relevant pathway and related lighting standards. However, we recommend above-standard installations for the immediate spaces surrounding the basement and gaol entrances, specifying wide beam angles, maximising throw, spill, and, where desirable, internal or external wall 'washing'. Maximising non-glare illumination provides appropriate wayfinding illumination benefits.

We also recommend high illumination (lux level) level lighting for all basement back-of-house zones, including entrance doorways to plant, lift foyers, disabled parking bays, storage and loading areas.

Lighting around terraced outdoor and balcony areas, while aesthetically oriented, should, where possible avoid colour temperature clashes with external lighting.

Note our recommendation to avoid any bollard installations.

Landscaping: CPTED landscaping solutions should:

- (i) eliminate possible concealment or entrapment within or around plantings,
- (ii) ensure location sightline continuity.

JMD's master plan drawings appear consistent with these objectives.

Signage: All signage at entry points, vehicle parking and pedestrian wayfinding pathways should consider first-time guests, visitors, casual staff and contractors, ensuring that intended destination points are clearly indicated. All signs should be disability inclusive and where practical back-lit. Pictorial signs should be considered.

Note: Inter-disciplinary coordination of these three 'support elements' is essential to enhance the overall safety (security) of the development and its stakeholders. Design development should detail these inter-disciplinary solutions.

CPTED Principle 5 Target Hardening Conclusions and/or Recommendations

We recommend investigating installation of an IP Network surveillance system covering, pedestrian and vehicle entry points, vehicle parking, all vulnerable building entrances, back-of-house locations, along each walled building perimeter and at or near (external) utilities installations. The system should specifically cover:

- (i) the main and western entry doors/gates
- (ii) vulnerable spaces, including back-of house zones within the gaol
- (iii) external walled perimeters with capability to 'sight' the vulnerable wall points
- (iv) the basement entrance, internal basement 'corners', lift lobbies, internal lift level displays, disabled bays, plant and storage doorways, pedestrian and service corridors, stairwells and exist doors, loading and delivery zone
- (v) around exposed (external) utilities infrastructure.

The video system should be capable of mobile 'live-feed' viewing by designated staff, and/or otherwise digitally stored.

We also recommend a 'front-of-house' security office and systems control room adjacent to the concierge (reception) space. This recommendation also prominently promotes the control room as a visible 'security' and 'help' office/hub.

Help points should be considered within the basements, adjacent to disabled parking bays and lift foyers.

From a crime prevention perspective, the above treatments are not 'invasive'. We believe that design development drawings can specify combination solutions without creating a sense of fortressing.

ES5 Instrument Compliance Conclusions and/or Recommendations

Harris Crime Prevention Services' consultants are confident that the development proposed as the 'Berrima Quarter', Berrima NSW (SSD-66876472), has consistently applied, or will apply during design development, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design principles, to comply with the following State instruments.

- (i) the NSW Department of Planning, Housing and Infrastructure – Planning Secretary's Requirements, March 2024
- (ii) accompanying legislation and/or regulations and crime prevention Guidelines (2001) derived from S 4.15 of the NSW Environment Planning and Assessment (EPA) Act, 1979, as amended
- (iii) guidelines outlined in the Crime Prevention and the Assessment Applications, under Section 79C of the EPA Act.

In assessing compliance, we have also referenced

- (iv) Wingecarribee Shire Council's Community Safety Plan 2013-2020+
- (v) The NSW Police Crime Prevention (Safer-By-Design) Guidelines – Revision 2020.

Our consultation with the design team reassures us that the 'welcoming-and-safe-place' outcomes for all stakeholders, guests, visitors, contractors and the wider Berrima community, will be met. This outcome is front and centre of the team's vision for the development.

Harris is therefore assured that occupancy and operational 'safe-place' (operational security) protocols for the development will continue in furthering the long-term safety (security) objectives.

Subject to continued intentional compliance of CPTED measures throughout design development-detail documentation, Harris supports consent by the Department of Planning, Housing and Infrastructure, as that consent relates to considering or fulfilling CPTED conditions.

ES6 OVERALL CPTED ASSESSMENT SUMMARY

Application of CPTED Principles to Relevant Design Elements

In our professional opinion, the assessed drawings, associated documentation and client consultation relating to the Berrima Quarter development (SSD-66876472) by the Blue Sox Group, have met, or will meet during design development-detail processes, the desired outcomes for preventing anti-social and criminal behaviour.

We have noted (Section 11.4) that the development's incorporation of CPTED principles complies with the State Government's 'social impact' and 'public interest' requirements, under S 4.15 of the NSW Environmental Planning and Assessment Act, 1979, as amended, with the Act's regulatory Crime Prevention and Assessment Application Guidelines, with the NSW Planning Secretary's Environmental Assessment Requirements and with the Wingecarribee Shire Council's Community Safety and Crime Prevention Plan.

The consultants conferred with the Crime Prevention Officer at Goulburn and Inspector at Moss Vale Police Stations, confirming our assessment of a (mostly) 'low' to 'moderate' external and internal risk environments. We have referenced, relevant parts of the drawings against the Police CPTED Guidelines.

From a CPTED perspective, the development's design team have consciously and deliberately sought interdisciplinary solutions throughout drawing documentation development, with a view to maximising 'welcoming-and-safe-place' design and operational objectives.

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) Consultancy in relation to the Adaptive Reuse of the Former Berrima Gaol, termed the 'Berrima Quarter', Argyle Street Berrima NSW

THE REPORT

Preamble and the Harris Crime Prevention Consultancy

This report has been prepared by Harris Crime Prevention Services to accompany a State Significant Development Application (SSDA) by Blue Sox Group for the adaptive reuse of the former Berrima Gaol (the development or project). The heritage listed development footprint (termed the Berrima Quarter) is located at Old Hume Highway (Argyle Street) Berrima NSW.

Blue Sox Group expresses the development vision as: *"an adaptive reuse strategy to incorporate a hub of venues and offerings designed to bring together the community and attract visitors to the region through intimate dining experiences, a wellness retreat, function rooms, gallery & retail, public bar and bespoke high-quality accommodation for those wanting to stay overnight and use the township of Berrima as a base for touring the region."*

Harris has been engaged to support this vision by assessing, affirming and recommending relevant architectural elements aimed at ensuring a 'welcoming-and-safe-place' outcome of all stakeholders. The acknowledged framework and methodology for this outcome is Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). The report details:

- (i) how CPTED principles are, or should be, applied
- (ii) whether their application complies with State and local government requirements, and
- (iii) the crime prevention advantages for the development's on-going 'welcoming-and-safe-place' reputation.

1 Report Structure

The report is structured as:

Section 1	report structure
Section 2	Harris engagement and development overview
Section 3	CPTED – aims, outcomes, definitions and principles
Section 4	NSW Department of Planning, Housing and Infrastructure compliance
Section 5	the report's informing and supporting instruments
Section 6	scope, outcomes and stakeholders
Section 7	the site, community and crime risk context,
Section 8	police information, crime data and assessed risks
Section 9	CPTED-applied risk mitigation to ensure 'welcoming-and-safe-place' outcomes
Section 10	informing legislation, regulation, planning and/or policy instrument compliance
Section 11	supporting planning and/or policy instruments
Section 12	overall CPTED assessment summary
Section 13	references
Section 14	supporting appendices 1 and 2

2 Harris Engagement and Development Overview

Harris has been engaged to support the development vision (Preamble). Our aforementioned 'welcoming-and-safe-place' aim/outcome is underpinned by five CPTED principles.

The Harris report is a prerequisite under the Planning Secretary's Environmental Assessment Requirements (SEARs) within the NSW Planning, Housing and Infrastructure issued for the project (SSD 66876472), March 2024.

The development comprises:

- two storey hotel buildings with 55 suites (49 outside the gaol and 6 inside)
- entry forecourt, concierge, function rooms, restaurant and bar, meeting rooms, internal courtyards, wellness centre, gym, amenities, offices
- 195 car spaces across 3 levels (2 below ground basement levels and one ground level)
- loading dock, stores and back-of-house zones including the lift foyers
- multipurpose space (below on-grade carpark), working gardens
- lighting, landscaping, signage.

The practical implications of Blue Sox Group's vision are expressed as: *"Plans for re-imagining future uses of the site will create new economic and social opportunities for the region whilst embracing and celebrating the history and core heritage values of the place. We are ever mindful of the importance and significance of the site to the people of Berrima and the Southern Highlands and our efforts towards transitioning the site to its next phase of life will be a collaborative journey we wish to share with the community."*

Note 1 Harris' consultancy services are provided independently; i.e. we are not affiliated with, nor receive benefits from, any organisation that supplies security hardware, installs security systems, monitors alarm systems or provides guarding/patrol services. This independence is critical to the way we approach security solution options and recommendations.

Note 2 The scope excluded the development/provision of a technical security brief, security systems design and specifications or lighting brief and specifications.

Note 3 The commentary, assessment, conclusions and recommendations outlined in the report are based on information provided to Harris Crime Prevention Services at the time of this assignment.

Disclaimer: While our research and experience suggest CPTED can be adopted to reduce opportunities for crime, it is not possible to guarantee that actual crime will be reduced or eliminated if these suggestions and/or recommendations are implemented.

3 CPTED – Aim, Outcome, Definitions and Principles

3.1 CPTED Consultancy Aim and Definitions

The overarching CPTED aim and outcome is for the development to become a 'welcoming-and-safe-place' for all stakeholders. Harris defines 'welcoming and safe place' as: *'built form and public space environments where crime prevention has been a consideration of concept, master-planning, design development and construction processes to ensure a development's overall (safe and secure) reputation'.*

The aim and outcome extends to hotel, restaurant and function/event spaces for guests, casual visitors, permanent and casual staff, operations and maintenance contractors. Specifically, the development's CPTED elements should focus on:

- (i) inter and intra-site spatial purposes and connectivity clarity
- (ii) stakeholder operational knowledge of built form, public and private spaces
- (iii) safe pedestrian and vehicle wayfinding certainty to, from and throughout the site
- (iv) the security of critical and utilities infrastructure.

3.2 CPTED Principles

We define CPTED as: *'applying aspects of architecture, engineering and technology to all urban development proposals (projects) as an intentional environmental, welcoming-and-safe-place, crime prevention strategy.'*

Our report's analyses, conclusions and recommendations are based on five acknowledged CPTED principles, adapted by Harris from the Moffatt (1983) CPTED framework as:

- Principle 1 Territorial definition – clarity about spatial identify, separation, boundaries and purposes
- Principle 2 Natural surveillance – architecture facilitating strong sightlines for ground plane basement and/or upper-level observation and surveillance
- Principle 3 Access control – access-egress definitions - who goes where, when and why
- Principle 4 Activity support – the influences of (external) lighting, landscaping and signage
- Principle 5 Target hardening – adding specific and robust architecture and technology.

4 NSW Department of Planning, Housing and Infrastructure Compliance

The NSW Department of Planning, Housing and Infrastructure (DPHI) has issued planning requirements through the Planning Secretary (SEARs), pertinent to this report, as the works are for recreation facilities (major) and have an estimated development cost that exceeds the \$30 million threshold pursuant to Clause 13 of Schedule 1 of the *State Environmental Planning Policy (Planning Systems) 2021*.

This report assesses the design team's compliance responses to the Secretary's requirements issued 1/3/2024, for the SSD 66876472. A summary of how and where in this report, CPTED architectural elements have, or will be, incorporated throughout the project's design concept and development, is listed as **Table 1**.

The report's CPTED conclusions and recommendations are based on the SEARs-stated design compliance requirements as:

- (i) Demonstrate how the proposed development complies with the Planning Secretary's requirements pursuant to Section 7, specifically: *"Address how Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles are to be integrated into the development, in accordance with Crime Prevention and the Assessment of Development Applications Guidelines"*
- (ii) Demonstrate compliance through the application of CPTED principles to relevant elements of the development's design.

Table 1 Secretary's (SEARs) Environmental Assessment Requirements Relevant to the Berrima Hotel and Tourist Facility Development

ITEM	SEARS REQUIREMENTS	RELEVANT REPORT SECTIONS DETAILING MITIGATION SOLUTIONS
01	SEARs CPTED Requirements - Principle 1 Territorial Definition - spatial identify, separation, boundaries and purposes	Section 9.1.1 to 9.1.7
02	SEARS CPTED Requirements - Principle 2 Natural Surveillance - architecture facilitating strong sightlines for ground plane, basement and/or upper-level observation and surveillance	Section 9.2.1 to 9.2.6
03	SEARS CPTED Requirements - Principle 3 Access Control - access-egress definitions - who goes where, when and why	Section 9.3.1 to 9.3.9
04	SEARS CPTED Requirements - Principle 4 Activity Support - the influences of (external) lighting, landscaping and signage	Section 9.4.1 to 9.4.7
05	SEARS CPTED Requirements - Principle 5 Target Hardening - adding specific and robust architecture and technology	Section 9.5.1 to 9.5.6

5 The Report's Informing and Supporting Instruments

5.1 Informing Instruments

Our analyses, conclusions and recommendations are therefore informed and/or supported by:

- (i) the NSW Environmental Planning and Assessment Act, 1979, S 79C, as amended
- (ii) Crime Prevention and the Assessment of Development Applications, S 79C Guidelines
- (iii) NSW Planning Secretary's Assessment Requirements
- (iv) Wingecarribee Shire Council
- (v) NSW Police CPTED 'Check List'
- (vi) data from the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR)

5.2 Supporting Instruments

- (i) AS/ISO 31000:2018, *Risk Management Guidelines*, which provides a helpful framework to identify and manage any organisational risks, include crime risks
- (ii) ISO 22341:2021 *Security and Resilience – Protective Security – Guidelines for Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design*, which provides an acknowledged international CPTED framework.

5.3 Appendices

The report has two (supporting) appendices:

- | | |
|------------|--|
| Appendix 1 | NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR) - reported crime statistics for Berrima suburb over five years, January 2020 to December 2024 |
| Appendix 2 | The Risk Management Standard AS/ISO31000:2018 (the Standard), its relevance to the development. |

6 Scope, Outcomes and Stakeholders

6.1 Consultancy Scope

Our consultants have:

- (i) clarified/met with the architect/client regarding the CPTED-related elements as those elements support the specific crime prevention objectives
- (ii) identified CPTED applications regarding safe day-night intra-footprint connectivity and interconnectivity between the development's internal and external development footprint, surrounding streetscapes, nearby residential streets, adjacent businesses and other attractions/places of interest
- (iii) undertaken site and context visits to better understand the crime risks and interface between the development and its current surroundings
- (iv) affirmed and/or recommended architectural elements based on CPTED principles and outcomes, including spatial definition, natural and technical (CCTV) surveillance, access control, lighting, landscaping, signage and target hardening
- (v) obtained and assessed the latest relevant crime statistics and input from local police
- (vi) provided a CPTED report incorporating the Scope.

6.2 Consultancy Outcomes

Harris believes that the development should 'model' a welcoming-and-safe-place reputation which would:

- (i) enhance the architectural integrity and security objectives of the development
- (ii) holistically protect all assets – people, property, systems and infrastructure
- (iii) reinforce the site's implementation of site-wide CPTED design and management solutions
- (iv) meet the expectations of secondary stakeholders, e.g. insurers, auditors, and,
- (v) comply with the requirements of Section 4.15 of the EPA Act, with the security (crime prevention) requirements the NSW Department of Planning, Housing and Infrastructure and the requirements of NSW Police.

6.3 Key Stakeholders

Key stakeholder groups are:

- (i) Blue Sox Developments (Group)
- (ii) guests, visitors, staff and contractors
- (iii) the Berrima business and residential communities
- (iv) NSW Police
- (v) Wingecarribee Shire Council

While each stakeholder will have different community safety expectations, their broad expectations are similar in that personal and property safety is a 'given' of the designing-out-crime objectives.

7 The Site, Community and Crime Context, Police Information, Crime Data and Assessed Risks

7.1 The Site Footprint

The site footprint incorporates the former Berrima Gaol including external land fronting the Wingecarribee River and three adjoining streets. Berrima is an historic village and the Gaol is the most prominent structure within it. Its closure decades ago has all but 'locked' it away from a curious local and tourist public – until the current 'unlocking' proposal.

As outlined in the report's Preamble, the Blue Sox vision sensitively (and safely from our perspective) revitalises the site. *"Our vision for the site is an adaptive reuse strategy to incorporate a hub of venues and offerings designed to bring together the community and attract visitors to the region through intimate dining experiences, a wellness retreat, function rooms, gallery & retail, public bar and bespoke high-quality accommodation for those wanting to stay overnight and use the township of Berrima as a base for touring the region."*

A similar perspective is: *"To breathe new life into the former gaol, to respect the rich cultural history, celebrate the heritage significance and make Berrima Quarter a welcoming place for locals and visitors."* (SDRP-1244), Session No.2.

In line with the Harris engagement and adapted definition of CPTED, we would add the word 'safe' to the vision as a 'welcoming-and-safe-place'.

The development presents a unique opportunity to engage guests, visitors, staff and the local community in understanding and respecting a knowledge of rich and colourful correctional history, while enjoying the contemporary benefits of the site's *"new life"*.



Image 1 the development site within the outside the correctional facility walls – NSW Government



Image 2 one of two 'original' entrances to the Berrima Gaol - Harris



Image 3 Argyle Street - Gaol forecourt, governors' residence and streetscape – Harris




Image 4 southern portion of the site, a former orchard, facing the river - Harris



Image 5 and adjoining the southern wall to form part of the development – Harris



Image 6 the northern Gaol wall fronting Wilshire Street - Turner

7.2 The Community and Crime Risk Contexts

Berrima is profiled as a charming historic location in the Southern Highlands. It is known for its well-kept streetscapes, parklands, retail precincts, tourist accommodation, scenic Wingecarribee River walks and its many examples of Georgian architecture. The most prominent architectural example is the gaol and adjacent 'justice' buildings.

Tourism is an all-year-round income generator, more so in autumn, spring and summer. Tourists visiting Berrima are also like to visit other Southern Highlands attractions including wineries and the nearby towns of Bowral, Mittagong and Moss Vale.

There is a strong community welcoming spirit. Residents and commercial-retail owner-operators are keen to preserve this spirit and to 'block' any anti-social and/or criminal activity throughout the village. There is no evidence of graffiti or other property damage. Resident and commercial-retail streetscapes indicate total village stewardship.



Image 7 attractive main street (Argyle Street) motel accommodation - Harris



Image 8 nearby well-presented main street commercial premises - Harris



Image 9 Argyle street retail precinct typical of attractive presentation - Harris



Image 10 neatly presented residential street adjacent to the northern wall - Harris

The two crime risk factors to consider are within the development site itself and potentially the whole village (town) precinct. *Internal* factors consider the risks pertinent to the various 'within wall' built form and landscaped spaces and to all who access those spaces. *External* factors extend to the outer-development footprint and to the adjacent community context.

Predicting when, where, what, how and why internal and external risks can become threats and incidents may be generally influenced by:

- (i) the surrounding context's potential to 'attract' opportunities for anti-social or criminal behaviour,
- (ii) time of day or night and weather conditions for such opportunities,
- (iii) the emotional 'state' and motive of a person intending to commit an offence,
- (iv) the intended targets – people and/or property, and
- (v) how easy or difficult it is to unlawfully gain access to targets.

In our view, these 'conditions' and the negative behaviours applying to them are less likely, given the positively assessed contextual elements, police information and reported crime data.

The following police information and statistical data indicates negligible anti-social behaviour or criminality in and around Berrima. However, the development will bring increased visitor numbers to Berrima businesses with the potential to increase (crime) risks given this changed (visitor) scenario.

8 Police Information, Crime Data and Assessed Risks

8.1 Local Police (Crime Risk) Information

According to the local Police Inspector attached to Moss Vale Police Station (Hume District), there are no crime 'red flags' to report. The small community is focussed on maintaining this reputation. This includes the local businesses who mainly cater for year-round tourism.

The Inspector confirmed that the surrounding residential neighbourhoods are 'settled' with residents taking care of frontages, streetscapes and dwellings, all of which translates into a sense of community (neighbourhood) stewardship. There are the occasional traffic-related infringements occurring from time to time.

8.2 NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR) Data

The BOCSAR data of reported crime for Berrima suburb backs police information and our own contextual assessment. The data is published to indicate trends in various offence categories over a 5-year (year-on-year) period January 2020 to December 2024. **Appendix 1** details this latest data.

Overall, the data suggests 'stability' or 'no change' in reported crime categories over the five years. As confirmed by local police (Hume Police District), Berrima has a negligible crime profile, as does the nearby suburb of New Berrima. It is considered a 'safe community' according to the data.

8.3 The Harris-Assessed Crime Risk Summary


The assessed crime risks, while mostly within the low range, should never be underestimated. Even the most minor offences occurring within or near the development, can have major consequences.

Assessment is based on four risk categories: 'low' (**L**), 'moderate' (**M**), 'high' (**H**) and 'extreme' (**E**). Risk categories, levels and consequences are framed by AS/ISO 31000:2018, *Risk Management Guidelines* (refer Matrix **Appendix 2**).

Anecdotal understanding, site knowledge, local police information and BOCSAR data confirm the mostly predictable crime categories likely to 'target' the development as:

- (i) intimidating anti-social behaviour towards staff, guests, visitors and contractors, (**L**)
- (ii) physical and/or sexual assaults against the (i) above categories, including at night, (**L**)
- (iii) damage to, or theft of, stakeholder (including guests and visitors) property, (**L-M**)
- (iv) damage to, theft from and theft of, vehicles, bicycles, motor bikes and scooters, (**L-M**)
- (v) attempted unauthorised access to any development spaces, (**L**)
- (vi) damage to external facades, plant, infrastructure, landscaping, signs, fixtures or fittings, (**L**)
- (vii) drug use or drug dealing surrounding (contextual) at or around the footprint, (**L-M**)
- (viii) arson or explosions, (**L**)
- (ix) injury or death to persons, damage to, or destruction of, property, from targeted and potentially, terrorist-style or 'hostile vehicle' attacks. (**L**)

Potential for anti-social and criminal behaviour also relates to the 'newness' of the development. In our experience, would-be offenders will always 'test' new developments to look for weaknesses in security design and operations. CPTED solutions aim to reduce or eliminate 'security breach' opportunities.



9 CPTED-Applied Risk Mitigation Architecture to Ensure 'Welcoming-and-Safe-Place' Outcomes

Resulting from our site visits, the surrounding context and assessed crime risks, the appropriate application of CPTED principles for compliance and welcoming-and-safe place outcomes is essential.

9.1 CPTED Principle 1

Territorial Definition: clarity about spatial identity, separation, boundaries and purposes

General Explanation

Defining territorial boundaries, spatial separation and purposes are the elements of this first CPTED principle. The aim is to maximise built form and public domain 'knowledge certainty' for all who have day-night access to a site.

Stakeholder, occupant, visitor, emergency response or contractor knowledge (identification) of territorial sub-spaces increases destination and circulation confidence; (for example, design of mixed-use spaces including, building entrances, public, communal, sporting, retail, commercial, residential, industrial, social gathering, wayfinding and vehicle access spaces).

When spaces become clearly defined collective 'places', form and function are easily identified. This removes confusion of purpose, enhances safe circulation and ensures alertness to any surrounding risks or threats.

9.1.1 Application – Defining the Built Form Footprint, Purposes and Spatial Separation

There are three major built form precinct zones – the walled gaol, the hotel suites along the riverbank and the multi-level at grade and basement carpark. From a CPTED perspective all three demonstrate design footprint clarity, purpose and separation. The added, and supported, CPTED element is the zonal connectivity and interfaces, providing opportunities for safe (secure) day-night circulation between each and, from each, to the external landscaped spaces including both historic residences.




Image 11 indicative zonal definitions and functional spatial interfaces - Turner

The SDRP-1224 report indicates that the design team is refining options for (safe) zonal connectivity. This involves determining ways in which culture and heritage will be reflected in built form and landscaping processes. These determinations should retain or enhance purpose and spatial definitions.

The heritage building character will be retained within the gaol in redefining development purpose opportunities. Hotel suites, open spaces aim to maximise safe and certain circulation and activation.

Existing hard surface and landscaped courtyards will appropriately remain as defined enabling guests and visitors to (safely and securely) simultaneously experience heritage, culture, recreation and hospitality. Internal wayfinding and destination certainty inside the walls is assured.

In our view, the internal and external zones generate a permeability and legibility which are not compromised by the various zonal purposes.

Whole-of-site definitional 'knowledge' is enhanced by these two CPTED-important characteristics. They assist safe wayfinding and provide directional destination and circulation confidence for regular and 'first time' guests and visitors. Internal and external wayfinding will be enhanced by creative landscaping, lighting and signage (**refer Principle 4**), ensuring consistent and safe day-night intra-site movement-to-locations.

9.1.2 Application – Defining the Surrounding Open Space Functions (Purposes)

The definitional clarity continues outside the walls, as does circulation, wayfinding and destination certainty. Certainty applies to the river frontage and associated land, the external hotel suites, the at-grade carpark and associated landscaping, the Argyle Street frontage and landscaped entry setbacks.

Work is proceeding as to the eventual design and layout of the river frontage suites to ensure safe wayfinding to, along and from that important bushland setting.

Definitional sightlines are essential along the southern wall pathway to provide wayfinding certainty to the at-grade carpark and associated (Wingecarribee Street) landscaping, to the river front suites and to Argyle Street. It is also essential that on-going design planning avoids 'blind' corners, likely to conceal or entrap.

9.1.3 Application – Ground Level Pedestrian Entry, Wayfinding and Circulation

Design encourages safe exploratory entry to the internal footprint. Entry definitions are important aimed at reducing movement 'pinch points'.

Subject to heritage considerations, we favour a creative (wow factor) entry option, to provide necessary width and therefore strong sightlines to promote comfortable and safe circulation towards the internal function spaces, social gathering, heritage 'gallery', courtyard and guest accommodation.

Wayfinding legibility continues to these 'destinations', affording safe (secure) pedestrian movement throughout the gaol. All pedestrian entry points (including the 'secret door' options) and 'connectors' to, from and around the entire gaol footprint ensure safe intra-site circulation.

Courtyards invite exploration and the function rooms/restaurants provide seamless connectivity with adjacent courtyard gathering spaces and hotel suites. The between-entry gates, entry foyer, guard tower, service corridors and direct links to the pre-function 'gathering' spaces bring natural light legibility for safe circulation.

Public toilet (bathroom) facilities at Gaol level (and where else located) should reflect current and preferred security-safety designs; designs that are routinely specified, for example, in newer shopping malls and in open public domain. This architecture promotes doorless and curvilinear, or similar, entry elements, while retaining necessary privacy. The aim is to prevent opportunities for concealment or entrapment.



Image 12 strong wayfinding pathway (between entrance gates) - Turner



Image 13 corridor-courtyard safe 'open' circulation - Turner

9.1.4 Application – At-Grade Vehicle Parking

At-grade parking has been designed to blend with informal social gathering spaces. There is definitional clarity, facilitating multi-angle observation within that zone, ideal from a natural surveillance perspective.

The concept indicates mainly low 'transparent' planting clearly identifying parking bays, easily observable from stepped entry and informal gathering landscaping.

Parking around the pavilion and pedestrian connection with the main entrance promotes safe wayfinding.



Image 14 at-grade vehicle parking with blended landscaping - JMD



Image 15 impression of the clearly defined pavilion at-grade carpark - Turner

9.1.5 Application – Basement Vehicle Parking and Back-of-House Zones

The upper and lower basements are clearly defined and the approach is easily observable.

The (recessed) off-street driveway is accessed from Wingecarribee Street with two-way driveway and ramping catering for (a) loading and collection areas and, (b) all other basement parking requirements and, (c) back-of-house zones.

Entry is legible and, with support lighting (**Principle 4**), will create appropriate vehicle circulation to each clearly defined zone and purpose. Pedestrian walkways provide appropriate wayfinding to bays, lift lobbies and storage facilities.

We recommend that the proposed roller-door operate as a two-way entry-exit installation. This minimises the possibility of tailgating or attempted unlawful vehicle or pedestrian entry. Boom gates for ramping and driveway access to the lower basement are an additional (vehicle) access control measure.

Disabled parking bays are appropriately located directly opposite the internal hotel guest lift lobbies. Lifts to the external hotel suits do not, at this stage have nearby disabled parking. Provision should be made for these spaces. All parking bays are clearly designated.

There are adequate pedestrian sightlines to lift lobbies and to all back-of-house zones. Fire stairs are appropriately indicated. Lighting is key to safe movement within the basements (Principle 4)

9.1.6 Application – General and Waste Storage and Collection

Operationally, there are secure general and waste storage areas. All back-of-house service and plant rooms must be secured at all times, as must the loading dock and waste collection points. It is essential that loading and collection zones enforce strict operational procedures for all contractors. Waste storage and collection areas should be included in the fire detection and suppression system.

(In our experience, waste storage rooms and collection points are treated too 'casually' leading to unsecured clutter and intended or unintended arson opportunities).




Image 16 lower basement indicating loading and back-of-house zones - Turner

9.1.7 Application – Utilities Infrastructure

Protecting all utilities infrastructure is critical. Defining and securing mechanical plant, electricity distribution sub-boards, hydrant booster pumps, gas and water meters is essential to prevent potential vandalism. Internally (located) plant is secure. External plant, meter, booster and hydrant systems should be enclosed or 'caged' to deter unauthorised access, tampering with, or damage to, valves, meters and pipes.

We strongly advise screening as per **Images 18 and 19**. Exposed installations are becoming increasing (obvious) targets. Screening removes the unsightly aesthetics (**Image 17**) and, more appropriately secures, or at least conceals installations from potential interference-damage.



Image 17 typically exposed pumps and meters to potential 'interference' and damage
- Harris



Image 18 and 19 improved signed and enclosed installations
- Harris

CPTED Principle 1 Territorial Definitions Conclusions and/or Recommendations

The uniqueness and vision for the development has enabled CPTED architecture to be defined as a series of distinctive sub-precincts, specifically, the walled gaol, the external guest accommodation, the extensive hard and soft landscaped spaces and vehicle parking arrangements. Harris affirms the integrity of each and of the holistic 'knowledge' certainty safely guiding all stakeholders to and throughout the footprint. This integrity is borne out by the following assessment summary.

Each sub-precinct has clear spatial separation and purpose clarity, an important Principle 1 (foundational) requirement. Their design intentions are unmistakable and each facilitates directional wayfinding, ensuring unambiguous and safe understanding of locations and operational objectives.

In CPTED and definitional terms, there are no confusing spatial purposes. Spatial separation provides safe wayfinding confidence via entrances, pathways, landscaping, internally defined function and guest accommodation, the riverbank, basement parking, lifts and internal stairways. The overall design features clearly defined circulation 'corridors' to enhance wayfinding certainty.

Bulk and general waste collection, loading, property and general storage, loading and associated offices are securely located throughout both basements. Procedures must be strictly followed as to deliveries, waste storage and collection. Externally located utilities infrastructure, must be secured to avoid tampering and/or damage opportunities with meter taps, pipes, pumps and valves.

Design Development (DD) drawings will reinforce the safe circulation and activation on all levels.

Pedestrian and vehicle access and circulation throughout landscaped spaces, the basement and at-grade carparking blends purpose with function flexibility.

In CPTED Principle 1 terms, the (combined) definitional elements present a coordinated and integrated 'whole'. They lay the foundation for positive crime risk mitigation measures for the development site. They support the Blue Sox marketing and crime prevention (security) objectives. In turn, these objectives should mean a 'welcoming-and-safe-place' operational reputation – one which will be sustained and supported by the appropriate application of Principles 2 to 5.

9.2 CPTED Principle 2 Natural Surveillance: architecture facilitating informal observation

General Explanation

The principle of natural (aka informal or casual) surveillance encourages (i) the observation of built form and public domain spaces and purposes by user/stakeholders and (ii) the observation and notation within or around spaces of usual or unusual activity and behaviour, potentially (or actually) leading to anti-social or criminal threats and incidents.

Natural surveillance is purposeful observation. Maximum surveillance impact requires sightline certainty, facilitated by clear proximate-distant and longitudinal-latitudinal fields. The aim is to know who or what is within a surveillance field and to observe specific unlawful action or intent.

Legible and permeable architecture should ordinarily promote natural surveillance in and around clear reference fields. CPTED surveillance-focused architecture adds a crime prevention 'layer' to legible and permeable circulation and activation creativity.

9.2.1 Application – External Surveillance of the External Walled Perimeter

The Wilshire Street wall and north-western wall corner will benefit from passive surveillance by Wilshire Street residents. The (northern) wall does not lend itself to concealment along the entire length.

Appropriate lighting, video surveillance, staff presence and hotel guest day-night circulation will also provide passive surveillance, thereby potentially deterring anti-social or criminal behaviour. The eastern and southern walls are integral to the development are generally absorbed into landscaping including wayfinding pathways.

We acknowledge that the 'unused' spaces around these perimeter walls have been 'respected' in terms of graffiti or other damage. However, the development brings a new 'chapter-of-interest' by potential offenders targeting, for example, the riverbank suites and/or guest occupants of those suites.

9.2.2 Application – Surveillance Along the River Front Precinct

Design should determine effective natural (and technical) surveillance options for the design development of the riverbank suites and public circulation of that sub-precinct's riverside bushland.

9.2.3 Application – Surveillance of the Gaol Internals

The 'value' of surveillance opportunities in such an active context cannot be underestimated from a CPTED perspective. Evidence-gathering from observed unusual or inappropriate behaviour will be enhanced because of the pedestrian circulation strength of ground plane sightlines, due to the day-night circulation of hotel guests, staff and visitors to cultural, heritage, conference and dining events. Reviewed drawings confirm this conclusion. In tighter back-of-house zones within the walls, observation/surveillance will be less likely.

There are vulnerable 'blind spots' internally, especially around the tower and behind existing courtyard-facing structures. Technical surveillance in these zones is therefore recommended (**Principle 5**) and/or access barriers limiting public access.

9.2.4 Application – Surveillance of the Surrounding Open (Landscaped) Space

JMD's concept drawings indicate a planting mix covering public spaces surrounding the eastern and southern walls, including the stepped at-grade carpark, garden 'wraps', pathways, and the likely multi-purpose (flexible) social gathering areas. The indicative mix should maximise wayfinding, social gathering and at-grade parking sightlines to provide day-night 'welcoming-and-safe-place' outcomes.

9.2.5 Application – At-Grade and Basement Vehicle Access Surveillance

The surveillance 'quality' lighting for basement vehicle entry, loading, plant, storage, and other back-of-house zones locations is critical. Surveillance sightlines will be governed by that quality. **Principle 4** outlines external lighting recommendations for pedestrian wayfinding, entry gates and parking zones.



Image 20 indicative at-grade carpark layout maximising sightlines and minimising concealment – Turner citing Capa California Signum Architecture

9.2.6 Application – Plant and Utilities Infrastructure Surveillance

We are advised that all plant, utilities infrastructure, general and waste storage will be internally contained, or externally secured, thereby reducing unlawful interference temptations. External installations should be easily observed and not obscured by other structures or landscaping.

CPTED Principle 2 Natural Surveillance Conclusions and/or Recommendations

Within the gaol, guests and other public circulation is observable from the suites, the main entry, courtyard spaces, wayfinding corridors, event and dining areas, thereby promoting natural surveillance. Any potential back-of-house zones and 'blind' corners will require targeted lighting, video surveillance and/or access-restricting barriers to minimise concealment or entrapment risks.

Externally there are multi-angle passive (natural) surveillance opportunities due to proximate and distant sightline strength.

The riverbank architecture and associated landscaping must encourage wide-angle observations towards the river and bushland. Surveillance of that public space will be possible for users of the space and by hotel guests able to view activity from balconies or terraces.

Surveillance options at and along the northern and western gaol walls should be explored to pre-empt possible targeting of those perimeters.

The development's overall design elements therefore maximise and promote natural surveillance via strong proximate and distant ground plane sightlines.

Technical surveillance (refer Principle 5) will augment natural surveillance limitations especially within the basement, including loading, waste storage, collection, internal utilities infrastructure and other back-of-house zones.

We conclude that design development of current drawings should meet natural surveillance objectives; that is, to generate whole-of-site surveillance opportunities to deter and/or prevent damage to property, and/or harm to all stakeholder-users of the site.

9.3 CPTED Principle 3 Access Control: who goes where, when and why

General Explanation

Access control is a consequential extension of defining territory (Principle 1) and natural surveillance (Principle 2). Open and/or restricted access must be: (a) readily identified through the appropriate built form (approach) architecture, (b) supported by electronic access control systems (eacs) and (c) able to prevent and/or identify unauthorised access.

9.3.1 Application – Site Access Protocols

Underpinning all access control measures is the requirement for appropriate access control systems and protocols controlling access to back-of-house rooms and offices, hotel suites, event and dining spaces, basement zones and plant-utilities installations. This includes staff, maintenance contractors, delivery drivers and emergency personnel.

Maintenance and other contractors accessing plant, delivery and collection zones must be 'cleared' to first enter these zones and then to enter all secured sub-zones and rooms. There should be regular contractor ID checks. Protocols must be enforced.

9.3.2 Application – Controlled Access to, and Protection of, Heritage Elements

It is critical that the many heritage items 'accessible' to arriving hotel guests and the visiting public have controlled (restricted) access. For example, the existing 'holding cells' between the Governor's house and the carpark will be open during the day but will need to be closed and locked each night. (Video surveillance of key heritage elements should be mandatory. (Refer 9.5.1)

9.3.3 Application – Controlled Access to the 'New' Gaol Wall and Main Entry

Guests and visitors will have open access through this entry during daylight hours. Once locked overnight, hotel guests will enter and exit via the main front gate house and/or via the existing back gate (door). Access control measures for guests will be determined during design development. The main front gaol doors at the gate house (existing timber doors) will be closed and locked after hours.

9.3.4 Application – After-Hours Access to Basement Car Parking

Drawings indicate a 'closed in' carpark staircase leading down to the basement levels, achieved by glazing including a glass door at ground level, thereby removing basement 'openness' to unauthorised access. We support the after-hours basement access via lift and stairs, using security swipe cards. This should be integrated into the overall access control system.

9.3.5 Application – Vehicle Access to Basements Including Back-of-House Locations

Controlled entry to the basements is a two-step process. For guests, staff, contractors and visitors there is (secure) roller door access and, for the lower basement, boom gate access control. Basement passenger and goods lifts will operate on security technology 'authority'.

All back-of-house basement zones, and rooms require authorised (technology) access. Only designated staff, emergency services personnel, delivery and maintenance contractors should be permitted to access their designated zones.

The disabled bathroom access behind the car garage is a vulnerable space. It should be locked at night with staff providing access on request. Another vulnerable space, the Glass House should also be locked at night.

Basement plant room or stairwell doors must not be left open or ajar under any circumstances. The vulnerability of these basement features cannot be underestimated.

All basement and ground level waste collection points must be secured and assigned spaces that are free of clutter which will help minimise the low-risk likelihood and consequences of spontaneous combustion or arson.

9.3.6 Application – Gaol Back-of-House Access

All back-of-house zones within the gaol require the same access control technology and protocols as for the basement. Given the predicted day-night circulation and activation within the walls, the likelihood of relaxing agreed access control procedures and protocols has the potential to compromise the overall operational security regime, especially when unexpected activity or management pressures arise.

9.3.7 Application – Hotel Accommodation

We understand that guest and visitor access to internal and external hotel suites, lifts, basement carparks and designated recreation areas will form part of the whole-of-site access (security) control system

9.3.8 Application – Vehicle Entry and Parking

Security clearances and restricted access is required to all back-of-house and designated spaces. Operations management should devise strict procedures and ensure compliance by all users, no matter their status and user frequency. There should be regular ID checks.

9.3.9 Application – Utilities Infrastructure Access

Should design development include some externally, and ideally screened utilities infrastructure, including the electricity kiosks, meters and any booster pumps or hydrants, they should be (proximately) observable. Any surrounding landscaping should not, at maturity, obscure observation (surveillance) clarity. Strict access control protocols must be observed for contractors or emergency personnel.

CPTED Principle 3 Access Control Conclusions and/or Recommendations

Harris concludes that there will be controlled access to all security-related spaces throughout site. This includes guests, visitors, staff, contractors and emergency personnel.

All staff and contractors must be 'security cleared' and will only gain access to designated areas by access control technology. Staff and contractor IDs should be regularly validated.

Access control technology should apply to all access to all back-of-house zones, including waste collection and storage, staff offices, amenities, the loading and delivery zone, plant and other utilities infrastructure.

We support the 'closed in' carpark staircase design which removes unauthorised access to basements, including the after-hours basement access via guest swipe cards (or similar technology).

The disabled bathroom access behind the car garage is a vulnerable space. It should be locked at night with staff providing access on request. Another vulnerable space, the Glass House should also be locked at night.

Ensuring these protocols, procedures and restrictions will ensure compliance with this CPTED principle and should ensure on-going safe (secure) operations for all user stakeholders. The objective is to 'block' (deter and/or prevent) unauthorised access throughout the site.

It is essential that all physical and electronic access control systems be monitored and maintained to ensure performance capability.

It is also essential that access restrictions be fully understood and complied with by all persons occupying or accessing all secure areas.

9.4 CPTED Principle 4 Activity Support: influences of (mainly external) lighting, landscaping and signage

General Explanation

Activity support applies (external) lighting, landscaping and signage architecture to a footprint's form and function design, 'supporting' definitional clarity, passive and technical surveillance and access control (Principles 1 to 3).

External (and where appropriate internal) lighting should reflect 'purpose' consistency: wayfinding, destination, social gathering and decorative-aesthetic spaces.

Each requires differing luminaire styles, lighting types, spread, throw, spill, wash and lux levels, to accord with lighting Standards and architectural briefs.

CPTED lighting applications can (should) often exceed those Standards and briefs so as to highlight spaces and circulation - activation 'corridors'.

Differential lighting should avoid cross-over colour (temperature) clashes to enhance surveillance identification of property and people. All external lighting should optimise sightline legibility, to facilitate proximate-distant wayfinding and destination confidence.

Landscaping should combine aesthetics and purpose with an intent to prevent concealment or entrapment.

Signage supports wayfinding and destination certainty, access limiting (controlling), warning and emergency awareness. It should have day-night visual impact.

9.4.1 Application – Lighting Consistency, Colour and ‘Corridors’

All lighting should eliminate dark gaps and should maximise throw (beam) angles, spill and wash where appropriate, eliminating (approach) glare to achieve safe proximate and distant wayfinding, surveillance and, where necessary, identification.

In colour temperature terms, the white-natural light spectrum at 4000 Kelvin has advantages over blue, orange or yellow colour output. Yellow, orange and blue renditions distort natural colour profiles and features. White light installations strengthen contrasting colours and identify individual (personal) features more distinctly.

We do not recommend any bollard lighting within, or external to, the gaol walls. Bollards create glare and tend to interrupt sightline or way-finding certainty, Bollards are also prone to damage can become hazards and can often be ‘buried’ by mid height landscaping.

9.4.2 Application – Internal Wayfinding Lighting

Sensitively lighting the ‘revealed’ gaol’s restoration and all that this vision offers, will have a brief that does justice to the internal architecture. We understand this will involve a range of heritage-preferred luminaires coupled with the latest LED patterns. (We would be willing to workshop some ideas to reflect the aesthetic lighting objectives with the crime risk mitigation objectives.)

It is important that all internal wayfinding and location lighting maximise directional and destination sightlines, even in a comparatively small (internal) footprint. Images 22 and 23 are indicative of ‘secondary’ zones ‘ripe’ for inclusion in a coordinated lighting master plan.

Wayfinding (‘corridor’) lighting should eliminate dark gaps and should maximise throw (beam) angles, spill and wash where appropriate, eliminating (approach) glare to achieve safe observation (and surveillance) of intended destinations within each of the internal exploratory and functional spaces.

Internal lighting of walled areas should be replaced with (where possible) recessed under-eave luminaires or overhead poles to create the recommended ‘down light’ impact.

Consideration should be given to applying overhead or on-wall lighting at each corner of the site to externally ‘wash’ each wall, where the luminaires will sensitively and aesthetically highlight key perimeter points.



Images 21 - 22 current 'sterile' and tower zones requiring a total lighting wayfinding 'makeover'
- Turner

9.4.3 Application – External Wayfinding and Social Gathering Lighting

There are three complementary considerations. The first is to light all access pathways to and through the eastern street-facing open (landscaped) areas as well as guiding guests and visitors through the new front gate. The second is to light the southern passive gathering and at-grade carpark spaces. The third is to light the approaches to, and surrounds of, the riverbank suites.

All three should comprise overhead (pole) lighting for all pathways, including those to and from the riverbank suites, and lighting the carpark zone.

Additional destination (mood) lighting should complement the wayfinding options but should not clash colour-clash where possible to maximise sightline opportunities. All lighting covering the external footprint should eliminate dark wayfinding gaps.

9.4.4 Application – Basement Lighting


It is critical to treat the basements as front-of-house welcoming spaces. The off-street approach, ramping, internal driveways and parking spaces should therefore be well lit, not just minimally lit to comply with a Standard. There should be no dark gaps anywhere, lighting design should feature wall-washed LED fittings with complementary lighting across all other zones.

The enclosed staircase to the basement will require specific wayfinding lighting; potentially a recessed treatment within the stair balustrade to complement top-of-stair entry with wall or overhead luminaires.

The loading dock, waste collection points, corridors, the lift lobbies, disabled bays, stairwells and entrances to all back-of-house rooms, should have additional lux levels to highlight the most vulnerable spaces.



Image 23 example of preferred LED overhead and wall entry lighting - Harris



Images 24 and 25 continuation of recommended 'no dark gaps' basement overhead and wall washed lighting to promote proximate-distant object clarity for maximum surveillance - Harris

9.4.5 Application – Lighting At and Around Hotel Suites

It is essential to 'blend' security lighting with mood (aesthetic) lighting at, and surrounding, the external hotel suites. Wayfinding, under-balcony, under croft and, where appropriate, facade security lighting should follow our recommended 4000 Kelvin temperature. The aim is to highlight design visibility and to eliminate wayfinding and destination gaps.



Image 26 external hotel suites indicating balconies and open undercroft (concealed left) – Turner



Image 27 rear door (gate) entry from Wilshire Street end pathway around the hotel suites requiring lighting, landscaping, signage and video surveillance treatment - Turner

9.4.6 Application – Landscaping

From a CPTED perspective landscaping provides ‘welcoming’, ‘calming’ and (obviously) aesthetic elements of a safe environment. JMD’s master plan envisages:

“A cohesive public realm which combines the formality of the European village character with ornamental local species that deeply speak the place. Internal gardens and courtyards which are immersive to the different characters of the precinct and reflect the colonial and First Nations stories through the reuse of material and planting. A landscape embracing the endemic Snow Gum Scrubland meadow and healing the riverine edge post-remediation. A precinct with multipurpose spaces that are flexible to individual uses, and reflective of the transitional landscape from east to west.”

Drawings maximise diversity, facilitating safe wayfinding and social gathering destinations. Low plantings to built form approaches and entrances and along the graded exploratory pedestrian pathways should prevent concealment or entrapment.

Where tree and deeper shrub plantings are proposed for social gathering, wayfinding around-the walled perimeters, street frontages, the at-grade carpark and around/along the riverbank suites, they should not obscure sightlines. Master plan drawings indicate extensive grassed areas, again to support safe wayfinding and gathering.



Image 28 master plan view of proposed green space coverage options - JMD design

9.4.7 Application – Signage

All heritage, general and warning (access control) signage should clarify wayfinding and appropriate destination points throughout the internal and external footprint. Signage styles should reflect the development's sensitive and unique status. It should be consistent, informing and safely guiding to desired destinations.

Access-restriction signs must be clearly readable and/or visually convey meaning for guests, visitors, staff and contractors. Contractors accessing basement areas will require appropriate ID and must follow (access control) protocols (**Principle 3**). Emergency (including fire and exit) signage is of course subject to codified compliance.

To assist with whole-of-site wayfinding, signs should ideally be colour coordinated, legible and visually 'readable', especially at night, to cater for human height differences and should be disability inclusive, thereby minimising directional uncertainty or confusion.

CPTED Principle 4 Activity Support Conclusions and/or Recommendations

Lighting: Our assessment focus has been on external wayfinding, social gathering, gaol and basement lighting.

CPTED-relevant lighting is applicable to the gaol and basement entry portals – pedestrian and vehicle – and to all external spaces where circulation is 'free-flowing', for example within and around open landscaped spaces and general pedestrian ground plane circulation between the gaol site and riverbank suites.

Pole mounted wayfinding lighting will comply with relevant pathway and related lighting standards. However, we recommend above-standard installations for the immediate spaces surrounding the basement and gaol entrances, specifying wide beam angles, maximising throw, spill, and, where desirable, internal or external wall 'washing'. Maximising non-glare illumination provides appropriate wayfinding illumination benefits.

We also recommend high illumination (lux level) level lighting for all basement back-of-house zones, including entrance doorways to plant, lift foyers, disabled parking bays, storage and loading areas.

Lighting around terraced outdoor and balcony areas, while aesthetically oriented, should, where possible avoid colour temperature clashes with external lighting.

Note our recommendation to avoid any bollard installations.

Landscaping: CPTED landscaping solutions should:

- (i) eliminate possible concealment or entrapment within or around plantings,
- (ii) ensure location sightline continuity.

JMD's master plan drawings appear consistent with these objectives.

Signage: All signage at entry points, vehicle parking and pedestrian wayfinding pathways should consider first-time guests, visitors, casual staff and contractors, ensuring that intended destination points are clearly indicated. All signs should be disability inclusive and where practical back-lit. Pictorial signs should be considered.

Note: Inter-disciplinary coordination of these three 'support elements' is essential to enhance the overall safety (security) of the development and its stakeholders. Design development should detail these inter-disciplinary solutions.

9.5 CPTED Principle 5

Target Hardening: adding specific and robust architecture and technology

General Explanation

Target hardening is often called 'situational' crime prevention. It aims to reinforce other CPTED principles and to proactively 'strengthen' form, infrastructure, structures, fixtures, fittings and furniture in and around identified vulnerable spaces. Target hardening design is an added crime risk defence layer. CPTED design measures aim to increase the efforts intending offenders must expend attempting to damage property and/or harm or injure people.

Target hardening can apply additional physical, mechanical, structural and electronic treatments to deny or limit access. Electronic alarms or surveillance cameras are the more common target hardening measures. However, the Principle's design goal is to avoid place 'fortressing'.

9.5.1 Application – Integrated Security Systems and Security Office

Access control and video surveillance systems should, where possible be coordinated/integrated, located and managed within a fit-for-purpose room. Ideally this location would be in the room to the right of the main entrance – adjacent to the concierge (reception) space. This recommendation also prominently promotes the control room as a visible 'security' and 'help' office/hub.




Image 29 suggested gate house security control room (hub) including integrated systems management - Turner

9.5.2 Application – Video Surveillance Installations

In our view, strategically located (and sympathetically designed to the architecture) video (network) surveillance technology should be considered for all vulnerable locations. An advanced IP-based video surveillance system should be capable of mobile 'live-feed' viewing by designated staff, and/or otherwise digitally stored. 'Vulnerable locations' includes key heritage elements/items within and external to, the whole site.

The system should provide situational awareness and, hopefully deterrence. Although it may not appear necessary, given the 'newness' of the development and increased pedestrian circulation around the northern and western walls, we recommend video monitoring of both. Once installed, a proactive systems maintenance program is essential.

Both basements should be included in a whole-of-site video surveillance master plan.

9.5.3 Application – Guest, Visitor, Staff and Contractor ID

Principle 3 – Access Control – recommended strict entry security and movement clearances and ID checking for every person entering designated vulnerable zones or rooms for whatever purpose.

9.5.4 Application – Help Points

Help points should be considered adjacent to basement disabled parking bays and lift foyers.

9.5.5 Application – Graffiti Potential

The gaol wall facades could now become prime targets for 'tagging', especially, the Wilshire Street wall. While no masonry coatings can guarantee protection from graffiti damage, we recommend investigating and applying the latest protective material that could be applied to a 'heritage' façade. If possible, probable or desirable, any recommended coatings should also facilitate ease of graffiti removal.

9.5.6 Application – Emergency Assembly Areas

These will be code-defined. It is essential that they be 'clutter' free, that is, zones where robust or 'loose' outdoor furniture or waste bins etc. are not in these areas. It is also essential for movement safety that external lighting apply high and focussed lux levels at these assembly areas.

Emergency vehicle parking should be available at these areas.

CPTED Principle 5 Target Hardening Conclusions and/or Recommendations

We recommend investigating installation of an IP Network surveillance system covering, pedestrian and vehicle entry points, vehicle parking, all vulnerable building entrances, back-of-house locations, along each walled building perimeter and at or near (external) utilities installations. The system should specifically cover:

- (i) the main and western entry doors/gates
- (ii) vulnerable spaces, including back-of house zones within the gaol
- (iii) external walled perimeters with capability to 'sight' the vulnerable wall points
- (iv) the basement entrance, internal basement 'corners', lift lobbies, internal lift level displays, disabled bays, plant and storage doorways, pedestrian and service corridors, stairwells, exit doors, loading and delivery zone
- (v) around exposed (external) utilities infrastructure.

The video system should be capable of mobile 'live-feed' viewing by designated staff, and/or otherwise digitally stored.

We also recommend a 'front-of-house' security office and systems control room adjacent to the concierge (reception) space. This recommendation also prominently promotes the control room as a visible 'security' and 'help' office/hub.

Help points should be considered within the basements, adjacent to disabled parking bays and lift foyers.

From a crime prevention perspective, the above treatments are not 'invasive'. We believe that design development drawings can specify combination solutions without creating a sense of fortressing.

10 Informing Legislation, Regulation, Planning and/or Policy Instrument Compliance

10.1 The NSW Department of Planning, Housing and Infrastructure

The Planning Secretary's (CPTED) requirements for SSD-69627466 relate to the development's Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) – Requirement 2 (Built Form and Design Quality): *"Address how Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles are integrated into the development, in accordance with Crime Prevention and the Assessment of Development Applications Guidelines."*

The development must meet the Planning Secretary's Environmental Assessment Requirements (SEARS) and, in our opinion, does – refer to our Section 11.4 summary. Refer also to our earlier summary of the specific CPTED mitigation strategies – Section 3 Table 1.

10.2 Environmental Planning and Assessment Act, 1979 (as amended)

Consideration of crime prevention for mid to large scale developments in New South Wales derives from Section 4.15 (1) (b) and (e) of the NSW Environment Planning and Assessment (EPA) Act, (as amended).

The Act allows provision for State and local government instruments to regulate or codify issues pertaining to the evaluation of environmental impacts of developments. Social *"impacts"* (b) and *"the public interest"* (e) fall within this Section. Under the heading 'Evaluation', Section 4.15 (1) states:

“In determining a development application, a consent authority is to take into consideration such of the following matters as are of relevance to the development the subject of the development application:

- (b) the likely impacts of that development, including environmental impacts on both the natural and built environments, and social and economic impacts in the locality,*
- (c) the suitability of the site for the development,*
- (d) any submissions made in accordance with this Act or the regulations,*
- (e) the public interest.”*

In the case of ‘green’ or ‘brown’ field developments, interpretation of “*the public interest*” includes stakeholder proponents, post-development occupants and, by extension, the wider community.

Local Government authorities in NSW are required to consider the various impacts within S.4.15 when evaluating developments. Councils recognise the importance of mitigating anti-social and criminal behaviour within their constituencies. Many have incorporated the CPTED framework into Development Control Plans and/or Crime Prevention Plans, requiring crime prevention considerations as a specific development consent condition.

The *public interest* interpretation aims to ensure CPTED-relevant architecture creates and promotes ‘safe place’ outcomes, i.e. to prevent anti-social and/or criminal behaviour which could put at risk people and property associated with a new development footprint.

Ordinarily, the *public interest* is limited to a development footprint. However, public space approaches to, or ‘edges’ of, a development’s surrounds, may be considered as an extension of the social and public interest impacts (S.4.15 (b) and (e)).

In our opinion, the proposed development has considered the “social” and “public interest” requirements of this Section and the 2001 regulatory CPTED Guidelines.

10.3 Crime Prevention and the Assessment of Development Applications

The EPA 2001 Guidelines state the objectives as:

“Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) seeks to influence the design of buildings and places by:

- increasing the perception of risk to criminals by increasing the possibility of detection, challenge and capture*
- increasing the effort required to commit crime by increasing the time, energy or resources which need to be expended*
- reducing the potential rewards of crime by minimising, removing or concealing ‘crime benefits’*
- removing conditions that create confusion about required norms of behaviour.”*

The Guidelines outline how these objectives are to be met, by undertaking a crime risk analysis which informs the application of CPTED principles to relevant design elements.

We conclude that these Guidelines have been, or will be, considered at design development.

11 Supporting Planning and/or Policy Instruments

Our report’s analysis, conclusions and recommendations have been informed by the following.

11.1 Wingecarribee Shire Council (WSC)

Although a NSW Government approval process for this development, it is relevant to note WSC’s support for CPTED. The Council has implemented a Community Safety Plan since 2013 and is to release an up-dated version in 2025.

The Plan covers a range of crime prevention issues, including the role of CPTED in conducting community safety audits and stipulates that relevant developments within the Shire must apply CPTED principles as part of any development approval process. Under Section 4.2 of the Plan, Council notes this latter requirement. Council “1. *Assesses relevant development applications in accordance with CPTED and 2. Includes CPTED in all Council Main Town Development Control Plans (DCPs)*”.

This additional support for the SEARs requirements is welcome confirmation of State and local government recognition of CPTED’s relevance to this development.

11.2 NSW Police CPTED Guidelines

The NSW Police have developed their own CPTED (or Safer-By-Design) guidelines which were revised in 2020. Relevant items in the guidelines have been reviewed. This report has been undertaken with reference to those relevant items.

11.3 Supporting International Standards

There are no (crime) risk and mitigation absolutes or guarantees. However, there are two International Standards relevant to the application of CPTED. AS/ISO 31000:2018, *Risk Management Guidelines*, provides a helpful framework to identify and manage any organisational risks, include crime risks.

A more recently, and relevant, gazetted Standard is ISO 22341:2021 *Security and Resilience – Protective Security – Guidelines for Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design*. It provides a CPTED framework.

11.4 Instrument Compliance Conclusions and/or Recommendations

Harris Crime Prevention Services’ consultants are confident that the development proposed as the ‘Berrima Quarter’, Berrima NSW (SSD-66876472), has consistently applied, or will apply during design development, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design principles, to comply with the following State instruments.

- (i) the NSW Department of Planning, Housing and Infrastructure – Planning Secretary’s Requirements, March 2024
- (ii) accompanying legislation and/or regulations and crime prevention Guidelines (2001) derived from S 4.15 of the NSW Environment Planning and Assessment (EPA) Act, 1979, as amended
- (iii) guidelines outlined in the Crime Prevention and the Assessment Applications, under Section 79C of the EPA Act.

In assessing compliance, we have also referenced

- (iv) Wingecarribee Shire Council’s Community Safety Plan 2013-2020+
- (v) the NSW Police Crime Prevention (Safer-By-Design) Guidelines – Revision 2020.

Our consultation with the design team reassures us that the ‘welcoming-and-safe-place’ outcomes for all stakeholders, guests, visitors, contractors and the wider Berrima community, will be met. This outcome is front and centre of the team’s vision for the development.

Harris is therefore assured that occupancy and operational ‘safe-place’ (operational security) protocols for the development will continue in furthering the long-term safety (security) objectives.

Subject to continued intentional compliance of CPTED measures throughout design development-detail documentation, Harris supports consent by the Department of Planning, Housing and Infrastructure, as that consent relates to considering or fulfilling CPTED conditions.

12

OVERALL CPTED ASSESSMENT SUMMARY

Application of CPTED Principles to Relevant Design Elements

In our professional opinion, the assessed drawings, associated documentation and client consultation relating to the Berrima Quarter development (SSD-66876472) by the Blue Sox Group, have met, or will meet during design development-detail processes, the desired outcomes for preventing anti-social and criminal behaviour.

We have noted (Section 11.4) that the development's incorporation of CPTED principles complies with the State Government's 'social impact' and 'public interest' requirements, under S 4.15 of the NSW Environmental Planning and Assessment Act, 1979, as amended, with the Act's regulatory Crime Prevention and Assessment Application Guidelines, with the NSW Planning Secretary's Environmental Assessment Requirements and with the Wingecarribee Shire Council's Community Safety and Crime Prevention Plan.

The consultants conferred with the Crime Prevention Officer at Goulburn and Inspector at Moss Vale Police Stations, confirming our assessment of a (mostly) 'low' to 'moderate' external and internal risk environments. We have referenced, relevant parts of the drawings against the Police CPTED Guidelines.

From a CPTED perspective, the development's design team have consciously and deliberately sought interdisciplinary solutions throughout drawing documentation development, with a view to maximising 'welcoming-and-safe-place' design and operational objectives.

13 References

Blue Sox – Turner, Architectural Design Report, July 2025,

JMD Design, Landscape Master Plan Drawings, July 2025,

Moffatt, R, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design – A Management Perspective, Canadian Journal of Criminology, Vol 25, 1983,

NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, *Crime Statistics for the suburb of Berima, NSW*, January 2020 to December 2024,

NSW Department of Planning, Infrastructure and Housing, Secretary's Requirements, 1st March 2024,

NSW Department of Planning and Environment, *Section 4.15, (b) and (e) Environmental Planning and Assessment Act, 1979, as amended*,

NSW Department of Planning and Environment, Crime Prevention and the Assessment of Development Applications, 2001,

NSW Police, *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (Safer-By-Design) 'Check List'*, Revision 2020,

Standard AS/ISO 31000:2018, *Risk Management Guidelines*,

Standard ISO 22341:2021 *Security and Resilience – Protective Security – Guidelines for Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design*.

Turner Studio – JMD, Landscape Master Plan and Indicative 'Mark Up' Drawings, July 2025,

Turner Studio, GA Drawing Set Revision F, July 2025,

Turner Studio, State Design Review Panel (SDRP-1244), April 2025,

Turner Studio, Accommodation Typologies, Revision A, 15th March 2024.

14 Supporting Appendices 1 and 2

APPENDIX 1 CRIME STATISTICS FOR THE SUBURB OF BERRIMA NSW

The following crime statistics are supplied by the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. They are indicative of reported crime only and can only be taken as a guide to actual crime (reported and unreported) occurring in Berrima suburb over the (reported) 5-year period, January 2020 to December 2024.

NSW Crime Statistics January 2020 to December 2024 - Berrima (Suburb)											
	5 Year Trend to December 2024	Year to Dec 2020 Count	Year to Dec 2020 Rate	Year to Dec 2021 Count	Year to Dec 2021 Rate	Year to Dec 2022 Count	Year to Dec 2022 Rate	Year to Dec 2023 Count	Year to Dec 2023 Rate	Year to Dec 2024 Count	Year to Dec 2024 Rate
Homicide	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.
Assault - domestic	n.c.	1	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	1	n.c.	0	n.c.
Assault - non Domestic	n.c.	1	n.c.	0	n.c.	2	n.c.	2	n.c.	1	n.c.
Sexual assault	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	1	n.c.	2	n.c.	0	n.c.
Sexual touching, sexual act & other sexual offences	n.c.	0	n.c.	2	n.c.	0	n.c.	1	n.c.	0	n.c.
Robbery without weapon	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.
Robbery with a firearm	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.
Robbery with weapon not a firearm	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.
Intimidation, stalking & harassment	n.c.	1	n.c.	2	n.c.	1	n.c.	0	n.c.	1	n.c.
Other offences against the person	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.
Break & enter dwelling	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	1	n.c.
Break & enter non dwelling	n.c.	1	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	3	n.c.	0	n.c.
Motor vehicle theft	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	1	n.c.
Steal from motor vehicle	n.c.	1	n.c.	1	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.
Steal from retail store	n.c.	2	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.
Steal from dwelling	n.c.	2	n.c.	0	n.c.	1	n.c.	1	n.c.	1	n.c.
Steal from person	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.
Liquor offences	n.c.	0	n.c.	1	n.c.	5	n.c.	0	n.c.	1	n.c.
Disorderly conduct	n.c.	0	n.c.	1	n.c.	1	n.c.	0	n.c.	1	n.c.
Disorderly Conduct (criminal intent)	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.
Disorderly conduct (trespass)	n.c.	0	n.c.	1	n.c.	1	n.c.	0	n.c.	1	n.c.
Disorderly conduct (offensive conduct)	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.
Drug offences	n.c.	4	n.c.	5	n.c.	2	n.c.	4	n.c.	7	n.c.
Malicious damage to property	n.c.	1	n.c.	2	n.c.	1	n.c.	3	n.c.	3	n.c.
Prohibited and regulated weapons offences	n.c.	1	n.c.	1	n.c.	0	n.c.	4	n.c.	4	n.c.
Arson	n.c.	2	n.c.	0	n.c.	0	n.c.	1	n.c.	3	n.c.

APPENDIX 2 THE RISK MANAGEMENT STANDARD

While there are absolutes or guarantees around risk and risk mitigation, the International Standard – AS/ISO 31000:2018 provides a helpful framework to identify and manage *any* organisational risks, including crime risks.

Identifying and mitigating crime risks is a legitimate application of the Standard. The Standard provides a theoretical and practical framework whereby contexts, risks, levels and consequences can be identified and managed.

The Standard defines generic risk as... *“the effect (impact) of uncertainty on objectives”* (AS/ISO 31000 Clause 2.1). The Standard’s objective is to identify and remove or manage the uncertainty so as not to negatively impact on organisational objectives.

Harris has adapted and applied the Standard by defining (crime) risks within the **context**, assessing **risk levels** and affirming and/or recommending appropriate CPTED treatment.

The collective term ‘**risk**’ has been more widely defined as: *...‘the likelihood of something untoward happening and the consequence(s) if one or more risks become threats or incidents.’*

Threats and incidents are progressive in their definitions. If risks remain unidentified and untreated (unmanaged), they can rapidly and easily become threats or incidents.

A ‘**threat**’ may be defined as *‘unacceptable and escalating behaviour stemming from one or more ‘uncontrolled’ risks, which if not urgently managed, is likely to lead to harm or damage with negative consequences or outcomes.’*

An ‘**incident**’ may be defined as *‘an uncontained threat with likely negative harm or damage consequences.’*

2.1 A (Crime) Risk Management Matrix

CPTED solutions should ‘match’ the adapted Standard’s risk levels and categorised behaviours. Recommendations and/or affirmation of architectural solutions are proposed against this backdrop. This table identifies typical risk levels applicable to this specific development.

<i>Low Level Risks</i>	disturbances, intimidation, and aggressive behaviour towards individuals or groups; graffiti and other minor property damage to the façades or street fixtures, fittings, paving, luminaires, plantings and signage
<i>Moderate Level Risks</i>	escalating intimidating or threatening behaviour leading to assault, and/or damage to personal property; unauthorised access, damage to and/or theft of property from the building, vehicles and/or vehicle theft
<i>High Level Risks</i>	‘moderate level’ crime risks escalated to intentional (planned) personal harm and /or damage to building facades and structures and/or property including plant and associated utilities infrastructure
<i>Extreme Level Risks</i>	immediate and dangerous threats to people and/or property, including the building and contents, vehicles, and/or nearby structures and/or utilities infrastructure, including bomb threats and hostile vehicle penetration

It is worth reiterating that even low risk levels can have serious consequences if not addressed.