

JAMES MARSHALL & CO

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

Hunter Indoor Sports Centre

May 2025

1. INTRODUCTION

This Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) supports the Response to Submissions (RTS) and Amendment Report for State Significant Development Application (SSD- 65595459) for the proposed Hunter Indoor Sport Centre (HISC) at 2 Monash Road and 24 Wallarah Road, New Lambton. SSD-65595459 sought development consent for an indoor stadium, amenities and associated civil and landscaping works.

Consent is sought for the construction of the entire proposal, however, to provide flexibility, the amended proposal has been designed so that the project can be delivered in two construction and operational stages as set out below:

Stage 1

- 8 x sports courts, amenities to support the functioning of the complex including bathrooms, change rooms, lobby and foyer, retail tenancy and café. Mezzanine level:
- multi-purpose rooms and administrative space.
- Car park with 185 spaces, drop off spaces and bus parking.

Stage 2

- Extension to the eastern side of the building to add 3 x courts including show court with retractable grandstand seating for 2,500 people over the 2 adjacent courts.
- Extension to the southern side of the building to provide 1 x court plus high performance training area.
- Extension to the mezzanine to provide function rooms, administration space and training space/ gymnasium.
- Expansion of existing carpark to provide 240 spaces.

The site is identified in Figure 1 below and Figure 2 shows the proposed final stage of the development.



Figure 1: Subject Site



Figure 2: Overall Proposed Site Layout

The CPTED report is to be prepared in accordance with Newcastle City Council’s DCP 2023, Part C General Guidelines Section C7 Safety and Security, which outlines CPTED assessment requirements and considers other planning documents and strategies such as the Newcastle Safe City Plan 2017 – 2020, and Community Strategic Plan – Newcastle 2040.

2. Safer By Design

2.1 Overview

In April 2001, the then NSW Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources (Department of Planning and Environment) introduced Crime Prevention Legislative Guidelines to Section 79C (now Section 4,15) of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act, 1979. These guidelines require consent authorities to ensure that development provides safety and security to users and the community. If a development is thought to present a crime risk, the guidelines can be used to justify modification of the development on the grounds that crime risk cannot be appropriately minimised.

Councils and local police are encouraged to identify the types of development that will ‘typically’ require a crime risk assessment and prepare a consultation protocol. Protocols are location (need) based agreements which outline the types of development that will be jointly assessed, how construction will occur and timeframes for consultation. Subject to council direction, development types not listed in local consultation protocols will not require a formal crime risk (CPTED) assessment.

CPTED is a crime prevention strategy that focuses on the planning, design and structure of cities, communities and neighbourhoods. It reduces opportunities for crime by using design and place management principles that reduce the likelihood of essential crime ingredients (law, offender, victim or target, opportunity) from intersecting in time and space.

This is because predatory offenders often make cost benefit assessment of potential victims and locations before committing crime. CPTED aims to create the reality (or perception) that the costs of committing crime are greater than the likely benefits. This is achieved by creating environmental and social conditions that:

- Maximise risk to offenders (increasing the likelihood of detection, challenge and apprehension);

- Maximise the effort required to commit crime (increasing the time, energy and resources required to commit crime);
- Minimise the actual and perceived benefits of crime (removing, minimising or concealing crime attractors and rewards); and
- Minimise excuse making opportunities (removing conditions that encourage / facilitate rationalisation of inappropriate behaviour).

2.2 CPTED Principles

CPTED employs four key strategies which are outlined below:

2.2.1 Territorial re-enforcement

Community ownership of public space sends 'signals' to the community. Places that feel owned and cared for are likely to be used, enjoyed and revisited. People who have guardianship or ownership of areas are more likely to provide effective supervision and are more likely to intervene if crime is taking place, or if there is a risk of crime occurring. Furthermore, criminals rarely commit crime in areas where the risk of detection is high.

Territorial re-enforcement uses actual and symbolic boundary markers, spatial legibility and environmental cues to 'connect' people with space, to encourage communal responsibility for public areas and facilities, and to communicate to people where they should not be and what activities are appropriate.

2.2.2 Surveillance

People feel safe in public areas when they can see and interact with others, particularly people connected with that space, such as shopkeepers or adjoining residents. Criminals are often deterred from committing crime in places that are well supervised.

Natural surveillance is achieved when normal space users can see and be seen by others. This highlights the importance of building layout, orientation and location; the strategic use of design; landscaping and lighting – it is a by-product of well planned, well designed and well used space.

Technical / mechanical surveillance is achieved through mechanical / electronic measures such as CCTV; help points and mirrored building panels. It is commonly used as a 'patch' to supervise isolated, high risk locations.

Formal (or Organised) surveillance is achieved through the tactical positioning of guardians. An example would be the use of the on-site supervisors, e.g. security guards at higher risk locations.

2.2.3 Access control

Access control treatments restrict, channel and encourage people and vehicles into, out of and around the development. Way-finding, desire-lines and formal/informal routes are important crime prevention considerations as they minimise opportunities for people to wander in areas where they are not supposed to. Effective access control can be achieved by using physical and symbolic barriers that channel and group pedestrians into areas, therefore increasing the time and effort required for criminals to commit crime.

Natural access control includes the tactical use of landforms and waterways features, design measures including building configuration, formal and informal pathways, landscaping, fencing and gardens.

Technical / Mechanical access control includes the employment of security hardware.

Formal (or Organised) access control includes on-site guardians such as employed security officers.

2.2.4 Space / Activity Management

Space / Activity Management strategies are an important way to develop and maintain natural community control. Space management involves the formal supervision, control and care of the development. All space, even well planned and well-designed areas need to be effectively used and maintained to maximise community safety. Conversely, places that are infrequently used are commonly abused. There is also a high correlation between urban decay, fear of crime and avoidance behaviour. The recommendations below relate to the general surrounds and also the internal layout to the development.

The proposed development has been assessed against these four principles. Furthermore, personal safety has been considered given the nature of the development.

2.3 Authors Qualifications

The CPTED Report has been undertaken by James Marshall. James has over twenty years' experience in the community development and social planning sector and during this time held a number of senior management roles in both the welfare sector and in local government. With reference to specific experience relating to the undertaking of crime risk assessments and Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) some examples include;

- McCabe Park, Wollongong (crime risk assessment and subsequent redesign).
- Wollongong City Mall (crime risk assessment and redesign as well as policy development).
- Wollongong Youth Centre (crime risk assessment and subsequent redesign).
- Peace Park (Chinaman's Hollow) Cessnock (crime risk assessment in its development phase).
- Cessnock Civic precinct and main street upgrade (crime risk assessment in its development phase).
- Rotary Park, Kurri Kurri (crime risk assessment and redesign).
- ALDI Stores (Kurri Kurri, Taree, Muswellbrook and Mayfield).
- McDonalds Restaurants (Cessnock, Kurri Kurri, Dubbo, Tuncurry).
- Various aged care residential developments (Morisset, Whitebridge, Cessnock)
- KFC (Hunter Street Newcastle)
- New residential release areas including Manufactured Home Estates.
- Strategic site investigation and risk assessment (McDonald's, ALDI, private developers).
- Various open space assessments (Wollongong City Council, Cessnock City Council, Orange City Council; NSWLPMA).
- Coles Stores (various).
- Licensed premises such as the Lake Macquarie Yacht Club, Belmont 16 Footers and numerous 'Taverns'.
- Various service stations and ancillary retail.
- Live music venues.
- Public facilities such as the Newcastle Ocean Baths

These projects have involved the facilitation of a consultative approach with Council officers, NSW Police, business owners, users of the areas under review (target group focused), business chamber representatives etc. James understands the principles behind the crime risk assessment process, including the use of and application of crime statistics as well as the influencing factors of public safety and risk via urban design and use of public space.

James Marshall has also completed approved NSW Police Safer by Design training in 2012 as well as numerous short courses and programs on crime risk assessment and CPTED throughout his career.

3. Crime Characteristics

3.1 Newcastle Local Government Area (LGA) Crime Characteristics

Updated crime data for the Newcastle LGA (refer Table 1: data sourced from the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research for the period 2018 – December 2024) identifies that Assault (non-domestic violence); Robbery; Break and Enter (dwelling and non-dwelling) Motor Vehicle Theft; Stealing (from motor vehicle, retail store, dwelling, person) and Malicious Damage to Property and being crime areas ranked within the top 50 LGA’s in NSW up until June 2024.

Table 1: Reported Criminal Incidents 2018 – December 2024 Newcastle LGA.

| Criminal Incident | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | Jan 24 - Dec 2024 |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------------------|
| Assault - non-domestic violence related | 13 | 14 | 11 | 14 | 16 | 20 | 23 |
| Assault - domestic violence related | 63 | 54 | 66 | 58 | 56 | 61 | 64 |
| Sexual Offences | 56 | 43 | 50 | 49 | 49 | N/A | 38 |
| Robbery | 11 | 9 | 8 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 5 |
| Break and enter - dwelling | 28 | 20 | 21 | 25 | 23 | 19 | 22 |
| Break and enter - non-dwelling | 46 | 34 | 34 | 41 | 35 | 35 | 26 |
| Motor vehicle theft | 11 | 11 | 9 | 14 | 16 | 15 | 17 |
| Steal from motor vehicle | 4 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 3 | 3 |
| Steal from retail store | 9 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 4 | 4 |
| Malicious damage to property | 20 | 24 | 22 | 28 | 30 | 33 | 35 |

Source: BOCSAR May 2025

Crime where premises occur are also important factors to correlate crime risk. The crime by premises for the Newcastle LGA is shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Crime by Premises – Newcastle LGA to December 2024

| Premises type | Domestic violence related assault | Non-domestic violence related assault | Sexual offences | Robbery | Break and enter non-dwelling | Motor vehicle theft | Steal from motor vehicle | Steal from person | Malicious damage to property |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------|---------|------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|------------------------------|
| Adult entertainment | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Financial institution | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| Office | 0 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 18 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 24 |
| Personal services | 1 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 14 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 12 |
| Retail/wholesale | 21 | 138 | 12 | 13 | 140 | 19 | 28 | 15 | 131 |
| Carpark | 3 | 20 | 6 | 4 | 10 | 56 | 182 | 1 | 99 |
| Education | 1 | 26 | 37 | 0 | 40 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 64 |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------|-----|-----|-----|----|----|-----|-----|----|-----|
| Health | 7 | 57 | 13 | 0 | 14 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 27 |
| Industrial | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 36 | 4 | 12 | 0 | 10 |
| Law enforcement | 2 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| Licensed premises | 13 | 166 | 18 | 5 | 29 | 7 | 9 | 12 | 41 |
| Marine transport | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Outdoor/public place | 52 | 320 | 42 | 42 | 11 | 233 | 729 | 31 | 352 |
| Recreation | 0 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 39 | 3 | 8 | 0 | 9 |
| Religious | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| Residential | 692 | 363 | 364 | 19 | 11 | 310 | 720 | 10 | 865 |
| Rural industry | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Public transport | 5 | 62 | 10 | 8 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 7 | 56 |
| Utilities | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| Vehicle | 2 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 1 |
| Firearm premises | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Unknown | 2 | 1 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 16 | 0 | 3 |

Source: BOSCAR May 2025

3.2 Incidence of Reported Crime New Lambton January 2024 – December 2024

Reported crime in the New Lambton suburb for the 12 month period January to December 2024 is shown in Table 3. With the data in the Tables above, ‘hot spot’ maps show the areas / locations where crime is more likely to occur, as well as the incidence and type of crime so resources and strategies can be put into place to address specific issues. The hot spot maps for the area around the proposed development site are shown below in Figures 3 to 12.

| Category | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec |
|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Domestic violence related assault | 3 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 7 |
| Non-domestic violence related assault | 0 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 4 | 3 |
| Assault Police | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Sexual assault | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Sexual touching, sexual act and other sexual offences | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Robbery without a weapon | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Robbery with a firearm | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Robbery with a weapon not a firearm | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Break and enter dwelling | 6 | 2 | 9 | 4 | 2 | 6 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 3 |
| Break and enter non-dwelling | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|----|---|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Receiving or handling stolen goods | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Motor vehicle theft | 2 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 1 |
| Steal from motor vehicle | 5 | 4 | 12 | 6 | 23 | 6 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Steal from retail store | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| Steal from dwelling | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 |
| Steal from person | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Malicious damage to property | 3 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 5 | 1 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 5 |

Source BOCSAR May 2025




Figure 3: Incidents of Domestic assault from January 2024 to December 2024




Figure 4: Incidents of Non-Domestic Assault January 2024 to December 2024




Figure 5: Incidents of Robbery January 2024 to December 2024




Figure 6: Incidents of Break and Enter Dwelling January 2024 to December 2024




Figure 7: Incidents of Break and Enter Non Dwelling January 2024 to December 2024




Figure 8: Incidents of Motor Vehicle Theft January 2024 to December 2024




Figure 9: Incidents of Steal from Motor Vehicle January 2024 to December 2024




Figure 10: Incidents of Steal From Dwelling January 2024 to December 2024




Figure 11: Incidents of Steal from Person January 2024 to December 2024




Figure 12: Incidents of Malicious Damage to Property January 2024 to December 2024

4. HISC Operation Summary (Operational Management Plan)

The following details have been summarised from the Operational Management Plan as they are relevant to the utilisation of the facility.

4.1 Newcastle Basketball Event Details

Table 4 outlines the size and frequency of events at the HISC. Note that the event schedule is not finalised, but indicative calendar dates and frequencies have been identified.

Table 4: Event Details

| Event | Attendance | Dates | Frequency |
|--------------------------------------|-------------|---|-----------------|
| Regular Training, local Competitions | 18,000 | Year round | per week |
| School Gala Days | 300 | Year round | 20 x per annum |
| Waratah League | 500 – 800 | March – September Saturday /Sunday afternoons | per week |
| NBL1 | 1000 - 1700 | April – August Weekend | 16 per annum |
| Full House Event | 2500 | Weekend | 1 - 2 per annum |

Note: Event Details are to be confirmed

4.2 Hours of Operation

The HISC will operate within the following hours:

- 6:00am – 11:00pm Monday to Friday; and
- 6:00am – 11:00pm Saturday and Sunday.

Note: Hours of operation are inclusive of the time it takes to set up and pack up following activities.

The peak use of the HISC will be during the following times:

- Monday – Friday: 4:30pm – 9.30pm
- Saturday – Sunday: 10am to 5pm

Large mass participation events will be restricted to 8.00am to 6.00pm. Large spectator events will generally take place over weekend periods from Friday evening to Sunday evening.

4.3 Staffing Details

Staffing will comprise the following:

- Whilst the facility is in use, a BANL staff member will be on duty as required to address any concerns the players, spectators or other visitors or staff have.
- Cleaners will be hired (private contractors) as required to maintain internal areas of the facility.
- BANL will be responsible for managing all operational aspects of training and competitions held at the HISC including processing hire/bookings.
- When required for larger competitions/events, additional staffing (contractors) will be engaged who will be responsible for food and beverage service in the required function rooms.

- Other contractual service providers will be engaged by the relevant users of the facility including for ongoing maintenance services, security services and waste management.

4.4 Management of the Facility

BANL will be responsible for managing all operational aspects of basketball training and competitions held at the HISC. The team will work with other hirers on all aspects of their planning to ensure safe and efficient management of the site and the successful execution of their training and competitions.

4.4.1 Security Management

Player and patron safety will be integral to the way the facility is operated. General site security will be the responsibility of BANL who will provide 24-hour video surveillance of the site. BANL will also provide additional security as required on matchdays and for major events with security requirements tailored to specific event needs. The detailed design will ensure that lighting levels at night provide a safe environment for all users. In addition, during major events, a system will be deployed for incident reporting to ensure that all event and non-event incidents are recorded and acted upon by BANL.

At night, and when the facility is not in use, all building entries will be kept locked to prevent any unauthorised access.

4.4.2 Ongoing Maintenance

BANL will be on call to respond to any urgent building related maintenance matters out of hours. A team of venue staff will work from offices located within the facility located on the Mezzanine level.

Professional contractors will be appointed to service and maintain the facility. The lighting to entries will be maintained to ensure users can enter and exit in a safe and secure manner. The site manager will visit the property at key times during the day and undertake a visual inspection of the premises and major services. The external presentation of the premises is to be maintained to a high standard.

5. General Site Recommendations

5.1 Territorial re-enforcement

- Fencing along the northern boundary is required to create a formal boundary to adjoining private properties. Fencing along the western boundary is not possible as public access to Womboin Road needs to be maintained.
- Signage should be erected throughout the site in order to assist with wayfinding.
- Areas where access is prohibited or is private should be clearly signposted.

5.2 Surveillance

- Landscaping should not inhibit natural surveillance (block sight lines) or provide concealment and entrapment opportunities. When selecting and maintaining vegetation, consideration should be given to the possibility of areas becoming entrapment sites in the future. Shrubs should not be greater than 1 metre in height and the canopy of tall trees should be higher than 1.8 metres.
- The building design should not inhibit natural surveillance (block sight lines) or provide concealment and entrapment opportunities.
- Australian and New Zealand Lighting Standard 1158.1 – Pedestrian, requires lighting engineers and designers to consider crime risk and fear when selecting lamps and lighting levels.
- CCTV strategy is recommended (refer site specific recommendations).




Figure 13: Landscaping not to Inhibit Line of Sight.

5.3 Access control

- Gate to main carpark is recommended to prevent after hours vehicular access to the car park.
- All entry points (pedestrian and vehicle) should be clearly signposted to ensure that informal access points are not utilised as this will inhibit surveillance and therefore reduce opportunity for detection.
- Entry doors to have deadlocks, windows to be deadlocked to reduce opportunities for forced entry. All doors to be secured when not in use except the main access. Doors such as fire exits that are not used for general access to the facility should be fitted with an alarm that will activate when operated without authorisation. All doors should be monitored by CCTV.
- Clearly identify the areas that are private / out of bounds.
- HISC building to be secured after hours with back to base security.

5.4 Space / Activity Management

- It is assumed that the CRT/CNTRL is the office / admin and will monitor / be the point of contact for people accessing the facility. Minimum of two people here at event days.
- On site security are recommended during large events. Security to monitor access and egress onto the site by pedestrians (and motor vehicles) during large events.
- Staff to wear lanyards making them easy to identify.
- All patrons to access the building by the main entry (single entry point) so access can be monitored. The Operational management Plan to outline how details of participants attending programs / training etc will be recorded.
- Trades people accessing the building to follow sign in / sign out procedure and wear a lanyard or similar while working in and around the building.
- The area (including gardens, hard walls, fencing) should be well maintained. Any evidence of anti-social behaviour (e.g. graffiti, malicious damage, broken lights etc.) should be cleaned / fixed / replaced within 24 hours. A maintenance plan needs to be developed for the site.
- The garbage bin area to be secured and kept out of general sight.

5.5 Design Comments

In addition to the general design comments above, Stage 1 and Stage 2 design elements have been assessed against CPTED principles. Stage 1 comments are highlighted in Figures 14 – 16 and Figures 17 – 19 relate to Stage 2.



- Gate to the main carpark entrance enabling the carpark to be secured after hours.
- A fence along the northern boundary to create a formal boundary to adjoining private properties has been incorporated into the design and is consistent with CPTED principles. Fencing to the western boundary cannot be provided as public access along the existing pathway, up to Wombain Road needs to be maintained.
- Signage to be erected to assist with wayfinding into the facility.
- Public access into the facility via foyer entry only. Other access / egress points to be for emergency use only.
- Lighting plan has been developed which will assist with wayfinding and also promote safety within publicly accessible areas such as walkways and car parking areas.
- Park smarter signage (of similar) to be installed in the car park to reduce risk of steal from motor vehicle.
- Indicative CCTV locations marked ★

Figure 14: Stage 1 Site Plan




Figure 15: Stage 1 Ground Floor

Indicative CCTV locations marked ★

OMP to outline how access to first floor will be monitored during large events.

Staff to be based in the CRT/CNTRL area while the facility is open to monitor access, manage enquiries and provide overall supervision of the facility





Figure 16: Stage 1 First Floor

Indicative CCTV locations marked 

Administration areas appear isolated from other areas and there is no possibility for surveillance to the ground floor foyer / lobby area. Consider installing a CCTV link between the admin area and CRT / CNTRL so each area can be monitored.

If the Stage 1 first floor area is restricted to staff, and pre-booked functions, consider making access via lift and stairs secure to prevent general access. During event days when people may be accessing this area (by invite) a monitoring station may be required to prevent unauthorised access.





Figure 17: Stage 2 Ground Floor

Indicative CCTV locations marked 

Note comments in Figure 15 that are relevant to this area.

Restrict access to lobby area when not in use.

Rear courtyard to be secure after hours to prevent access into the area. Consider restricting access to business hours (i.e. no afterhours access).

All emergency exit doors to be alarmed to minimise opportunity for people to access / leave the building via these doors.




Figure 19: Stage 2 Carpark Comments


Refer comments Figure 14.

Gate to be installed at the main carpark entrance enabling the carpark to be secured after hours.

Park smarter signage (of similar) to be installed in the car park to reduce risk of steal from motor vehicle.

Signage to be erected to assist with wayfinding into the facility.

Lighting plan has been developed which will assist with wayfinding and also promote safety within publically accessible areas such as walkways and car parking areas.

Indicative CCTV locations marked 

6. Conclusion

James Marshall & Co has been engaged to prepare a CPTED assessment in relation to the proposed Hunter Indoor Sports Centre (HISC) on land known as 24 Wallarah Road & 2 Monash Road New Lambton. The proposed site layout has been reviewed against CPTED principles, SEAR's issued for the project, comments made in the Response to Submissions and in accordance with Newcastle City Council's DCP 2023, Part C General Guidelines Section C7 Safety and Security as well as crime characteristics for the area.

The recommendations and design strategies have been made to address the potential for the staged delivery of the HISC and ensure adequate CPTED measures are applied at both Stage 1 and Stage 2.

Access to restricted areas needs to be controlled, in particular the first floor area (if the general public are not permitted in this area). The administration areas on the first floor are isolated and there does not appear to be any way to monitor access during normal business hours (i.e. non-event days).

The CCTV layout is indicative of monitoring points. It is recommended that the facility is wired so additional CCTV can be installed or relocated depending on issues / risks that may be identified.

If the facility is to be licensed to sell alcohol, it will operate in accordance with its Liquor License. If this is the case, a Venue Safety Management Plan will need to be developed to reflect the conditions outlined in the Liquor License and cover the following areas:

- Responsible service of alcohol.
- Management of patrons queuing into the premises.
- Management of patrons within the licensed premises and their exit and dispersal from the area.
- Management of patrons who refuse to leave on request.
- Provision and management of security including patrol's (including surrounding area), response methods.
- Crime scene management procedure.
- Handling of complaints.
- Summary and compliance with license conditions.
- Notification of illegal activities including drugs (or suspected drugs) within the premises.
- Staff training in the above.
- Membership and participation in the Liquor Accord.

The remainder of the recommendations are consistent with general CPTED principles for such a facility.