

Crows Nest Over Station Development

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

Prepared for: Third .i Group

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1. Executive Summary

Stantec has been engaged by Third.i Group to undertake a Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) analysis for the Crows Nest Over Station development, site B. The report identifies potential threats to the space and provides recommendation for treatments that can be enacted to provide for the safety and security of persons and property.

1.1 Methodology

This CPTED report has primarily been based on the International CPTED Standard ISO 22341:2021, as well as multiple guidelines produced in each State of Australia, specifically NSW Police *Safer by Design*.

Please refer to Section 3 for a detailed explanation of the methodology followed when producing this report.

1.2 Findings

In total, fourteen (14) individual threat type were identified as possible, coming from the following threat sources:

- Opportunistic Crime.
- Premeditated Crime.
- Organised Crime.

Threat sources discounted were:

- Issue Motivated Groups.
- Terrorism.

In general, we found the overall design to follow good CPTED practices, addressing the key principles and incorporating natural design elements to ameliorate potential issues. The design incorporated:

- active spaces surrounding the building.
- extensive glazed facades to provide natural surveillance.
- provision of lighting throughout to supplement natural surveillance.
- open paths and clear vision to provide natural surveillance.
- multiple entries and paths to remove entrapment points.
- provision of multiuse spaces to support space management and social cohesion.

On analysis of the space, a total four (4) individual issues were identified that are advised to be treated. Please note that certain designs may not be able to be changed or remediated due to their usage and requirements of function. Thus, CPTED comments need to be balanced with the overall function of spaces to find the correct balance.

Please refer to Section 4 for complete information regarding the identified threats and locations.

1.3 Recommendations

The reader is to note that these are CPTED treatments only and should not limit the potential further application of electronic, physical, and operational security treatments.

Please refer to section 5 for complete information regarding treatment measures.



2. Introduction

2.1 Purpose of the Report

Stantec has been engaged by Third.i Group to undertake a Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) analysis, providing advice on crime prevention strategies in the construction of the new Crows Nest Over Station development, site B.

The intention of this report is to provide for the safety and security of persons at the Crows Nest Over Station development, site B by:


- identifying natural elements which will discourage crime and anti-social behaviour.
- identifying design elements that can be included/alterd in the design to enhance safety and security.

On completion of the report, the stakeholders are to provide direction as to what measures are to be included and what elements can be retained. Once directed, all designers will produce design documentation for tendering.

2.1.1 Document Hierarchy

The CPTED report is provided early in the design phase in order to provide context to more detailed design documentation. The following diagram identifies the intended precursors and consequents (note this is an example only and may differ in deliverables and responsibilities on a per project basis).

Figure 1 Document Hierarchy



2.2 Background

Crows Nest OSD - Site B is a 14 storey tower above the Crows Nest Metro Station.

The site area is 1872sqm. The concept approval includes a maximum height to the top of the service zone of RL 158m and includes a maximum residential FSR of 13,000m².

The Metro Station is comprised of 3 levels:

- **Ground Level - Hume Street** includes the OSD tower lobby, retail, and back of house spaces.
- **Level 01** includes a retail mezzanine, back of house, and a loading dock which is used for OSD garbage collection and is a future easement for rail authority access.
- **Level 02** contains plant rooms for the metro station.

The OSD car parking levels are located on level 5 and 6. These are naturally ventilated with 27 car spaces on level 5 and 28 car spaces on level 6. There is a total of 55 spaces.

Apartments are located from level 7 to 18. Level 19 and 20 contain penthouses.

A roof terrace on level 21 includes communal gardens and pools, as well as private penthouse terraces.

Level 7-8 : 10 apartments per floor

Level 9-18: 11 apartments per floor

Level 19: 8 apartments (5 x two storey)

Level 20: 3 apartments

Total number of apartments: 130



Figure 2 Proposed Site



2.3 Methodology

In the preparation of this report, the following process was undertaken:

- discussions with key stakeholders.
- review of the current security documentation created for the project.
- review of architectural design drawings and supporting documentation.
- site survey using online imaging tools.
- review of Australian terrorist data, local crime statistics, and supporting information.
- provision of a report for evaluation prior to proceeding to the next design stage.

2.4 Stakeholders

The following stakeholders/organisations participated and provided information for this report:

Table 1 Stakeholders

Stakeholder	Company	Role
Anna Limnios	Third.i Group	Development Manager



3. CPTED Principles

3.1 Summary

This section provides an overview of CPTED principles, and the methodology used to conduct the assessment. For those readers familiar with CPTED please refer to Section 4 for the CPTED assessment specific to this project.

3.2 Introduction

CPTED is a widely used tool for urban design, planning, and management to reduce crime and anti-social behaviour, which translates to an improved quality of life for the community via the reduction of insecurity/fear of crime.

CPTED is based on the principle of using the natural environment to reinforce territorial control and dissuade criminal/anti-social behaviour by providing constant natural surveillance. It primarily focuses on opportunistic crime in public spaces, but its principles can be applied to all sites and threat types, providing an active deterrent due to the chance of an offender being observed.

Prevention of crime within an enclosed space (e.g., an office building) is relatively straight forward and hard security measures can be layered based on the perceived risk. However, in public spaces, these types of controls are not able to be enacted due to the open nature and uncontrolled movement. Thus, CPTED seeks to provide a discouragement to crime/anti-social behaviour by enacting soft security controls, built into the environment such that they are not even perceived by the users but subconsciously change their behaviour.

The three underlying principles that support CPTED are:

1. Crime and anti-social behaviour are less likely to be committed if people are utilising the space – the presence of people (e.g., members of the public, working staff) within a space deters offenders due to their ability to intervene, call for assistance, and act as witnesses.
2. Crime and anti-social behaviour are less likely to be committed if the space is under direct observation from adjoining spaces – direct and indirect vision of a space from multiple vantage points discourages an offender from committing a nefarious act due to the likelihood of being observed. This process is termed 'passive surveillance', supported by 'active surveillance' which is equated to direct observation undertaken by a security guard or CCTV cameras.
3. Personal safety choices require multiple options and clear indicators – people moving through a space can avoid a potential crime or threatening situation by being provided with an environment that allows them to assess potential threats from a safe distance, and then alter their course if required.

It should be noted that CPTED is not a panacea for crime and is only one of numerous tools that need to be implemented in a holistic approach to create more healthy, safe, and liveable communities. CPTED is not a '*one size fits all*' bag of tricks that are applied to every project, but must be tailored to the space's specific environment, taking into account everything from geographical location to demographics of users.

Effective crime prevention requires an understanding of:

- the underlying causes of crime and anti-social behaviour within that space.
- current crime trends and sources within that space.
- the community's current sense of ownership, pride, and use of a space.
- active engagement with the community to build empowerment and ownership for their space.
- commitment from local government and law enforcement agencies to support and enact CPTED principles.
- honest performance measurement supported by data in order to reevaluate effectiveness and pivot.



3.3 Governing Standards and Guidelines

Though the concept of CPTED has been explored since the 1960's¹ it has not become a mainstream and quantified component of security design until more recently. The first standard was implemented in the European Union (CEN/TR 14383-2) in 2003. In 2021, the first international standard governing CPTED was released (ISO 22341:2021).

Within the Australian context, the State of New South Wales released the first definitive guidelines for CPTED under the *Safer by Design* program in the early 1990's², with subsequent updates to the *Crime Prevention Legislative Guidelines* of the *Environmental Planning and Assessment Act* (1979). A CPTED report within NSW is required to be completed by a qualified practitioner, having completed the NSW Police *Safer by Design* Course.

The Australian Capital Territory's requirements are quantified under the *CPTED General Code* published by the ACT Planning and Land Authority. It provides specific guidance on application of measures.

The Northern Territory's requirements are quantified under the *Community Safety Design Guide* published by the Department of Lands and Planning. It provides specific guidance on application of measures with examples scenarios.

Queensland (via the Queensland Police Service) have produced a set of guidelines, *CPTED Guidelines for Queensland*, first released in 2007. It provides specific guidance on application of measures with examples scenarios.

South Australia produced a CPTED guide in 2002 via Planning SA. These have then been adopted by local planning authorities, providing requirements to incorporate, but not a clear standard across the state.

Tasmania has not published guidelines that cover the state. Responsibility has been left to local councils and law enforcement to enact.

Victoria's CPTED requirements are quantified under the *Urban Design Guidelines* (Objectives 3.3.3 and 5.1.5)³, published by Planning Victoria (formerly the *Safer Design Guidelines for Victoria*). However, they cover only basic strategies and are considered of limited use.

Finally, Western Australia has been producing CPTED guidelines since the 1990's and are currently captured in the *Designing out Crime Planning Guidelines*, produced by the Western Australian Planning Commission. It provides specific guidance on application of measures with examples scenarios and performance criteria.

In light of the above commentary on the various standards, this CPTED report has been created based on utilising the best material from each of the following:

- International CPTED Standard ISO 22341:2021 – *Security and resilience – Protective security – Guidelines for Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design*.
- NSW Police – *Safer by Design*.
- Queensland Police Service – *CPTED Guidelines for Queensland*.
- NT Department of Lands and Planning – *Community Safety Design Guide*.
- Western Australian Planning Commission – *Designing out Crime Planning Guidelines*.

3.3.1 Reference Australian/International Standards

We have also utilised these supporting standards as references in the creation of the report:

- Australian Government - Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF).

¹ J. Jacobs. *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*. 1961

² NSW Police, https://www.police.nsw.gov.au/safety_and_prevention/policing_in_the_community/safer_by_design (accessed November 2023).

³ Planning Victoria. https://www.urban-design-guidelines.planning.vic.gov.au/?_ga=2.11419700.1488701421.1630546036-1334331127.1630546036 (accessed November 2023).



- Australian Government: Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy Plan.
- ANZCTC: Active Armed Offender Guidelines for Crowded Places.
- ANZCTC: Australia's Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism.
- ANZCTC: Hostile Vehicle Guidelines for Crowded Places: A Guide for Owners, Operators and Designers.
- ANZCTC: Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Guidelines for Crowded Places.
- ANZCTC: National Counter-Terrorism Plan.
- ANZCTC: National Guidelines for the Protection of Places of Mass Gathering from Terrorism.
- AS 4421: Guards and Patrols.
- Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission Organised Crime: in Australia.
- CEN/TR 14383-2:2007. Prevention of Crime - Urban Planning and Building Design.
- HB 89:2013: Risk Management - Guidelines on risk assessment techniques.
- HB 158:2010: Delivering assurance based on ISO 31000 - Risk management - Principles and guidelines.
- HB 167:2006: Security Risk Management.
- HB 327: Communicating and Consulting About Risk.
- HB 436:2013: Risk Management Guidelines - Companion to AS/NZS ISO 31000.
- ISO 31010:2009: Risk Management -- Risk assessment techniques.
- ISO IWA 14: Vehicle Security Barriers (Part 1-2).
- PAS 170: Vehicle security barriers. Low speed impact testing.


3.4 CPTED Process

The following diagram denotes the standard framework model from ISO 22341. The undertaking of a CPTED assessment generally has three feeders that must be understood by the entity, being:

- Basics principles of CPTED – understanding what the strategies are, how they are implemented, treatment types.
- Approach context – setting out the parameters/constraints in which the CPTED assessment is undertaken. This is wide ranging and different on every project, including items such as available finances, scope of work areas, local codes and guidelines, timing, etc.
- Environment context – what are the likely threats and vulnerabilities, local crime statistics, etc. This generally should be undertaken as part of a formal Security Risk Assessment (SRA).



Figure 3 CPTED Process⁴



Once the process is contextualised, the assessor should have a specific list of threats that need to be ameliorated. From this, appropriate treatments can be enacted.

It is recommended that by this stage, a Security Risk Assessment (SRA) should have already been performed to gather information about threats and vulnerabilities. If this assessment has not been conducted, it is advisable to carry out a project-specific SRA. This should be completed by an accredited Security Consultant.

3.5 Basic Principles

3.5.1 First Generation

CPTED principles originally were categorised as four key strategies:


- Natural Surveillance.
- Access Control.
- Territoriality.
- Space Management (Image and Milieu).

As CPTED has evolved, they are now often referred to as '*First Generation*' CPTED⁵. They are also commonly referred to as physical CPTED as they deal with tangible, physical elements.

⁴ ISO 22341:2021: *Security and Resilience – Protective Security – Guidelines for CPTED*. Figure 1

⁵ O. Newman. *Defensible Space – Crime Prevention through Urban Design*. 1972.

Figure 4 First Generation CPTED Strategies



3.5.1.1 Natural Surveillance

Criminal behaviour thrives in a space where there is minimal chance of observation. Arranging buildings and street furniture such that it does not hinder sight lines and provides open space dissuades criminal activity due to the natural passive surveillance created. In the image below, the open space and arrangement of outdoor seating ensures that all areas can be seen by a person standing at any point.

Figure 5 Natural Surveillance Example



The construction of large solid objects (e.g., shed) or intense vegetation results in blind spots. This not only increases the chance of criminal activity but encourage loitering by anti-social elements that wish to be unobserved.

3.5.1.2 Access Control

Access Control is the provision of various control measures to restrict access to a space. By defining a boundary that must be crossed, the space immediately makes clear its ownership, and by implication its rules of conduct that must be followed.

Access Control measures can be physical as well as psychological, with the use of symbols or landscape. Physical measures can take on many forms (e.g., gates, bollards, fences). They can also be human based such as security patrols and static security posts. While symbolic Access Control measures may not stop a physical attack, they are effective at reducing anti-social behaviour and assisting in the public defining the territoriality of the space.

The images below provide an example of how Access Control measures have been added to an open space to clearly define ownership and restrict passive movement. Notably the choice of measures has not restricted natural surveillance.

Figure 6 Access Control Example (Before and After)



3.5.1.3 Territoriality

Territoriality utilises human being's natural tendency to protect and respect a space they see as their own. Encouraging a sense of community and ownership of public spaces results in people caring for the area, as they would for their own home, in turn discouraging crime due to their greater interaction with the space.

Territoriality involves clearly distinguishing property as a defined space. This can include landscaping, fencing, art, and signage. The clear demarcation of spaces allows for an intruder to be easily identified, as well as actions that are outside of the accepted range.

Provision of constant maintenance makes the space attractive for public use as well as making it appear to be constantly frequented. This then reduces the fear of potential crime, and thus increases use, creating a positive feedback loop. By encouraging the use of a public space by approved groups and events, it discourages anti-social behaviour.

Figure 7 Territoriality Example




3.5.1.4 Space Management

Sometimes referred to as Image or setting, this concept extends to the physical appearance of a space and the feeling it instils in the user. A bright, open planned, well-maintained space where multiple members of the public are present will provide a safe and inclusive feeling in users. A dark, enclosed, empty space will instil the opposite, resulting in a fear of potential crime and subsequent avoidance. The '*Broken Window*' theory⁶ is a direct example of Space Management and used to great effect in New York City in the 1990s⁷. By fixing broken elements of local buildings that had fallen into decay, the community showed that criminal behaviour was not accepted within the public space.

In addition to the planning of the space and lighting, image programs including graffiti removal, litter clean ups, and beautification are fundamental to Space Management to create a '*neighbourhood*' feel. Once members of the public are drawn to a space, they are more likely to protect it (*Territoriality*) and interact with others (*Natural Surveillance*).

Figure 8 Space Management Example (Good vs Bad)



⁶ W & G Kelling. "*Broken Windows*". The Atlantic Monthly. (1982).

⁷ H.Corman. "*Carrots, Sticks, Broken Windows*". Journal of Law and Economics Vol.48 Pg. 43-50 (2005).

3.5.2 Second Generation


While the four key CPTED strategies are sound, they were not found to be as effective in certain instances, especially in lower socio-economic areas or poor social dynamic areas (e.g., crime ridden neighbourhood)⁸. It was recognised that fostering cultural and social pride amongst local users was necessary in order for them to undertake actions and self-policing.

In 1997, the concept of extending CPTED to include social concepts came to the fore and is now commonly referred to as 'Second Generation' CPTED⁹. They are also commonly referred to as social CPTED.

In addition to the original four strategies, the following were added:

- Social Cohesion.
- Community Culture.
- Connectivity.
- Threshold Capacity.

Figure 9 Second Generation CPTED Strategies



3.5.2.1 Social Cohesion

Social Cohesion strategies seek to bond residents/local users and promote positive interaction between all. By bringing together disparate persons and having them share common goals a greater sense of community is created and thus an interest in each other's safety is fostered. The 'Neighbourhood Watch' programme is a good example of Social Cohesion being used for the safety of all.

⁸ T.Mckay. *Behavioural Based Design*. 2009.

⁹ Cleveland and Saville. "CPTED and the social city: The future of capacity building". *The CPTED Journal* Vol.1 Iss.2 Pg. 43-50 (1996).

Social Cohesion strategies generally work best when created and implemented by local groups to take direct action related to specific issues in their area. Overarching social cohesion strategies can be enacted at a State and Federal level but generally will not have the required impact due to their broad range.

3.5.2.2 Community Culture

Where Social Cohesion is based on targeting specific issues, creating a common cause, Community Culture strategies operate at the macro level, focused on bringing residents/local users together to foster a community feeling. This creates a bond amongst people so they will be more likely to take an interest in each other's safety.

These connections sometimes relate to cultural events within the neighbourhood, art and music festivals, and placemaking activities that encourage people of all genders, ages, and ethnic backgrounds to interact.

3.5.2.3 Connectivity

While the benefits of Community Culture are clearly evident, then can result in insulated communities that are exclusionary. Thus, crime may simply move from one area to another by being pushed out, rather than solving the underlying issue. First Generation CPTED was often cited as causing this issue; for example, installation of blue lights around buildings to dissuade intravenous drug users resulted in the drug user simply moving to a different location, not in stopping the act.

Connectivity strategies seek to link communities (e.g., neighbourhoods, cultural groups) with adjoining communities via programmes which foster social cohesion and spread common values e.g., anti-social behaviour is not accepted in any area.

Connectivity strategies can be physical (such as linked walkways) or social (such as shared neighbourhood events). As well, connectivity strategies also link neighbourhoods to other levels of government, for example to obtain government funding grants to create new programs.

3.5.2.4 Threshold Capacity

Threshold Capacity relates to CPTED's initial ideas for creating diverse environment use i.e., activated spaces. The concept proposes public spaces that act as community centres, providing multiple services and activities for residents/local users, and thus ensuring they are always being used. However, it balances this with the predicted capacity limit of the space based on the human-scale. It is important to limit the overuse of a space for any one type of activity as this will lead to the potential creation of crime and anti-social behaviour, e.g., the awarding of multiple liquor licences on one street creates an alcohol intensive area, which has been shown to lead to increased assaults during night periods¹⁰. The building of too many dwellings in a constrained space creates a dense population which negatively impacts Social Cohesion.

3.6 Approach Context

Prior to an assessment being undertaken, an entity must list any parameters/constraints that the CPTED assessment will be undertaken within. This will provide both:

1. a working envelope for the assessors, letting them only focus on items that they can influence.
2. context to those reading the CPTED report to allow them to understand why certain threats/treatments were not considered, or why other limitations exist.

The approach context will vary depending on each CPTED project's specific context, but may include:

- design – the space may have already undergone a design process that cannot be changed, or its function requires specific design parameters that restrict treatment options.

¹⁰ Service Industry Legal Services: <http://sils.com.au/liquor-licence-freeze-in-parts-of-sydney/> (accessed December 2023).



- Ecological – the space may have underlying ecological aspects that either must be protected or cannot be encroached on, limiting certain treatments.
- finances – the entity may have limited finances available for remedial works, thus treatment options may be limited.
- legislative – restriction in terms of local codes, guidelines, or business rules may limit what treatment options can be applied.
- ownership – restrictions in terms of ownership of surrounding spaces (or easements) may limit the ability to install certain treatments.
- practical – practical limitations of the effectiveness of a treatment compared to its cost and impact in installation may render the treatment not viable (balanced cost-benefit analysis).
- scope – limitation in terms of the scope of the project or areas of work may limit the ability to install certain treatments.
- sustainability and resilience – are there limitation in the ability to enact treatments over the life of the space? Do they require constant supporting works to enact? Are they robust or will they fail easily if not protected?
- time – a time dependent aspect may be in place which limits the treatments able to be enacted before the space is functioning and works completed.

3.7 Environmental Context

An entity cannot create a meaningful CPTED assessment without a clear understanding of the underlying environmental context in which their space operates within, and the context of the external parameters which impact it.

Thus prior to the assessment being undertaken, stakeholders must first establish the local environmental context which will have impact, primarily in the following key areas:

- Identified assets.
- expected activities of the space.
- expected users of the space.
- potential threats (crime).

3.7.1 Identified Assets

Identified assets should clearly define what items are seeking to be protected. Stakeholders need to consider not only physical elements but psychological elements such as reputation and community feeling, per second generation CPTED principles.

Assets could include:

- members of the public, employed staff, security staff, visiting dignitaries.
- buildings, external amenities, landscaping, historic structures, endangered flora/fauna.
- community culture, spirit, sense of safety.
- business functions of occupied spaces, planned events.

3.7.2 Expected Activities

Expected use should clearly define what activities and/or events are intended to be undertaken at the space being protected. This should not only include specific built form activities but also possible secondary activities that can reasonably be assumed to occur (e.g., parkland being used as a farmers' market on a weekend morning).



For a new planned space, the expected use may be aspirational, denoting what is desired and will be actively prosecuted through opening events. For the revitalisation/revision of an existing space, historic data of usage should be consulted to confirm past practices, as well as aspirational uses on completion of the works.

3.7.3 Expected Users

Expected users should clearly define what persons will be expected to make use of the space at various times. Provision of greater granularity to quantify users will provide greater context to the space and allow for more appropriate threats and treatments to be determined. It may be determined that additional treatments are required due to increased usage during select periods or events.

For example, assessing that 10,000 people are expected to move through a given space every week does not allow for the same level of treatment planning as assessing that 1,000 people will move through the space on a weekday, with 2,500 expected on the weekend. Expanding on this, what if a music festival is held and 10,000 people attend the site in a 4-hour period, how would the space cope? Would additional temporary measures need to be enacted?

Further information such as age demographics, cultural backgrounds, socio-economic status, gender ratios, etc. will allow for greater nuances and a tailored approach to be made.

3.7.4 Potential Threats (Crime)

During threat identification, stakeholders should seek to identify the potential threats, as well as sources of the threat. In undertaking this analysis, consideration to these questions should be made:

1. who could potentially be a threat?
2. what has happened in the past that could happen again?
3. what new threat could happen?
4. where could it happen?
5. when could it happen?
6. how would the threat happen?

To assist with answering the above, the following should be referenced to provide greater information:

- historical records from the space (if existing).
- historical records from similar spaces.
- historical Local Crime Statistics (LCS) for the Local Government Area (LGA).
- historical crime statistics for Australia.

In the Australian CPTED context, threats generally come from one of the following actors:

- Opportunistic Crime.
- Premeditated Crime.
- Organised Crime Groups.
- Issue Motivated Groups.
- Terrorism.



3.7.4.1 Opportunistic Crime

Opportunist crimes encompass any action that is conducted on the spur of the moment, due to a potential interaction between individuals (e.g., a heated argument) or a momentary identified vulnerability that a person seeks to exploit (e.g., a laptop left unattended on a table in a café).

The use of LCS and the entity's historical site records provides the best metric for this type of threat actor.

3.7.4.2 Premeditated Crime

Premeditated crimes encompass any action that has been planned by an individual (or group). This type of crime generally will have a higher chance of success and potential not to be noticed dependent on the skill level of the assailants.

The use of LCS and the entity's historical site records provides the best metric for this type of threat actor. However, the factor of premeditation is not generally recorded making it difficult to identify.

3.7.4.3 Organised Crime Group

Organised crimes encompass any action that has been planned by a coordinated group primarily focused on criminal activity as a profession. This type of crime generally will have a higher chance of success and potential not to be noticed dependent on the skill level of the assailants.

An Organised Crime Group (OCG) is also seen to be more sophisticated, with greater resources and time. They are willing to enact a crime over a longer period allowing for surreptitious actions that may not be noticed for months/years past. OCGs can also undertake criminal actions via the use of coercion of an employee, manifesting as an Insider Threat.

The use of Australia wide crime statistics provides the best metric for this type of threat actor. Use of LGA will not provide any information in relation to the actor, only the individual crime.

3.7.4.4 Issue Motivated Groups

Issue motivated crimes encompass any action that has been planned by a coordinated group who have a particular cause(s) as their chief motivation e.g., environment. This differentiates them from an OCG whose specific motivation is financial gain.

Issue Motivated Groups (IMG) primarily enact criminal actions in the form of protests, trespassing, and anti-social behaviour. They can potentially escalate to physical altercations when challenged. More recently IMGs have also undertaken more surreptitious criminal activities (e.g., cybercrime) as a way to cause disruption to an entity they disagree with¹¹.

Historical records from similar sites provides the best metric for this type of threat actor, as will the use of Australia wide crime statistics in a more limited capacity.

3.7.4.5 Terrorism

Terrorism encompasses the use of violent actions by a person or group in order to achieve political, religious and or ideological aims. While the aims of terrorism may align with an IMG, the differentiator is that terrorists almost exclusively employ the use of extreme violence (and threat of) to achieve their goals, while IMGs have traditionally been associated with peaceful protests. However this dynamic has changed rapidly in the past few years with a rise of IMGs escalating their actions when their goals have not been achieved, and thus undertaking acts that would be defined as terrorism (e.g., eco-terrorism¹², BLM, ANTIFA¹³).

In light of these changes, intelligence agencies have taken to differentiating terrorist acts into Religiously Motivated Violent Extremism (RMVE) and Ideologically Motivated Violent extremism (IMVE). ASIO states "*Ideologically motivated violent extremism—and particularly nationalist and racist violent extremism—remains a threat to Australian security and its*

¹¹ Australian Cyber Security Centre. *Threat Report 2015*. Pg. 18.

¹² S P Eagan, *From Spikes to Bombs: The Rise of Ecoterrorism*, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Volume 9, Issue 1 (1996) Pg 1-18.

¹³ Yahoo News. <https://news.yahoo.com/six-antifa-extremists-arrested-charged-151301053.html> (November 2023)




adherents will continue to engage in offensive behaviours. But nationalist and racist violent extremist groups are more likely to focus on recruitment and radicalisation, rather than attack planning”¹⁴.

The current ASIO and ANZCTC assessment of the likelihood of a terrorist attack in Australia is ‘POSSIBLE’¹⁵, meaning that terrorist groups continue to possess the intent and capability to conduct a terrorist attack in Australia. Multiple terrorist attacks have occurred in Australia within the last 5-10 years (e.g., Bourke Street Nov. 2018¹⁶).

As part of the ANZCTC’s ‘Australia’s Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism’ policy document, a self-assessment tool is included which an entity is recommended to complete and undertake mitigation strategies as appropriate.

The use of Australia wide crime statistics provides the best metric for this type of threat actor.

Figure 10 Federal Government Public Alert System Levels



3.7.4.6 Potential Threat Summary

The table below provides an initial list of threats that are possible in a public space context. Each should be considered as to its applicability to the space based on the site’s specific context, with additional specific threats added as required.

¹⁴ Australian National Security. <https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/national-threat-level/current-national-terrorism-threat-level> (accessed November 2023)

¹⁵Australian National Security, <https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Securityandyourcommunity/Pages/National-Terrorism-Threat-Advisory-System.aspx> (accessed November 2023).

¹⁶News.Com, <https://www.news.com.au/national/victoria/car-on-fire-in-melbournes-bourke-st-mall/news-story/47635c260e97cf932516036aea0f336a> (accessed November 2023)



Table 2 Security Threat Identification

Threat ID	Threat Type	Opp. Crime	Premed. Crime	OCG	IMG	Terrorism
TH01	Anti-Social behaviour – Loitering/ nuisance actions	X			X	
TH02	Anti-Social behaviour – Begging	X	X			
TH03	Anti-Social behaviour - Drunkenness/ drug effected	X				
TH04	Arson	X	X	X	X	X
TH05	Assault against person (physical)	X	X			
TH06	Assault against person (sexual)	X	X			
TH07	Assault against person (act of indecency)	X	X			
TH08	Assault against person (verbal / harassment)	X	X			
TH09	Drug dealing		X	X		
TH10	Hostage taking / siege		X			X
TH11	Inter-gang violence	X	X	X		
TH12	Kidnapping		X	X		
TH13	Natural disaster	X				
TH14	Property damage	X	X		X	X
TH15	Protest				X	
TH16	Robbery	X	X	X		
TH17	Sabotage		X		X	
TH18	Terrorism – Armed assailant					X
TH19	Terrorism – Chemical attack					X
TH20	Terrorism – Placed IED					X
TH21	Terrorism – Person-Borne IED (PBIED)					X



Threat ID	Threat Type	Opp. Crime	Premed. Crime	OCG	IMG	Terrorism
TH22	Terrorism - Vehicle-Borne IED (VBIED)					X
TH23	Terrorism – Vehicle as a Weapon (VAW) attack					X
TH24	Theft (car)	X	X	X		
TH25	Theft (physical property)	X	X	X		
TH26	Trespassing	X			X	
TH27	Unauthorised access (physical)					
TH28	Vandalism, malicious damage	X	X		X	
TH29	Vehicle as a Weapon – accidental	X				

3.8 Methodology and Process

The methodology used to create a CPTED report entails the following primary steps:

- meet with all stakeholders to discuss the space requiring an assessment. The space’s intended usage and operating parameters are to be detailed. All issues/queries/concerns are to be recorded. The approach context should be discussed and agreed by all parties.
- review of the environmental context for the assessment.
- undertake a threat analysis, identifying threats and quantifying them. This should be captured within the project SRA.
- review and analyse of LGA crime statistics encompassing the space’s locale to identify the key security related threats that the site is exposed to.
- produce the CPTED report based on the stated guidelines and principles, including recommendations on treatments for the identified assets.
- undertake a CPTED workshop with the project stakeholder group to review the treatment strategies, and any residual risks. The CPTED report would then be updated to final for issue to the client.

Once complete, the CPTED report moves into the monitoring phase where it is regularly reviewed and updated by the relevant parties, particularly when any additional capital works projects are to be conducted or changes to the underlying assumption are made (e.g., operational change to the space, major incident occurring, new planned events, new demographics in the area). At a minimum, a CPTED report should be updated every 2 years if no other triggers lead to it being reviewed in the intervening time.

3.9 Treatments

The table below provides examples on various treatments that can be utilised in the planning of a public space, and details how they fit into the CPTED model.



Note this is a high-level list provided for information only and there are many more measures that can be applied based on the particular built element. They are not intended to be applied for every project or against every threat type.

Treatments and active security controls should be provided in a layered model, providing complimentary reductions in vulnerability.



Table 3 Treatment Examples

Space / Treatment Strategy	Natural Surveillance	Access Control	Territoriality	Space Management	Social Cohesion	Community Culture	Connectivity	Threshold Capacity
Amenities – Active graffiti removal and repairs	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Amenities – Adjacent high traffic areas	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Amenities – Placement to discourage loitering	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Amenities – Target hardening	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Amenities – Well-lit and in line of sight from all sides	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Balcony – facing public space	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Balcony – Encourage use	YES	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Community – Events	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Community – Local government engagement	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Community – Safety programmes	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Entrance – Adjoining facilities and amenities	YES	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Entrances – Clearly visible	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Entrance – Glazed	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Entrance – Lit	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO

Space / Treatment Strategy	Natural Surveillance	Access Control	Territoriality	Space Management	Social Cohesion	Community Culture	Connectivity	Threshold Capacity
Entrance – Secure	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Enforcement – Rules and signage	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Façade – Active graffiti removal and repairs	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Façade – Active street frontage	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Façade – Cleaning	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Façade – Habitable/active front rooms	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Façade – Lit	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Façade – Orientated to main street	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Façade – Points of interest	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Façade – Remove natural ladders/climbing points	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Façade – Secure	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Façade – Transparent	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Fencing – Low height	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Fencing – Permeable	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Help Points		YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO



Space / Treatment Strategy	Natural Surveillance	Access Control	Territoriality	Space Management	Social Cohesion	Community Culture	Connectivity	Threshold Capacity
Landscaping – Cleaning and maintenance	YES	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Landscaping – Low height	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Landscaping – Permeable vegetation	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Landscaping – Use as markers	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Lighting – Active maintenance and replacement	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Lighting – Maximise natural lighting	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Lighting – Throughout and uniform	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Lighting – Vandal resistant	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Maintenance and Cleaning – Active throughout	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Pathways – Alternate routes	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Pathways – Clear delineation	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Pathways – Clear sight along	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Pathways – Remove entrapment points	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Pathways – Territorial definition and boundaries	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Safety Audits – Regular	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO



Space / Treatment Strategy	Natural Surveillance	Access Control	Territoriality	Space Management	Social Cohesion	Community Culture	Connectivity	Threshold Capacity
Security Staff	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Security Post	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Signage	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Signage – Assistance	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Signage – Lit	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Signage – Simple and Legible	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Signage – Throughout	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Signage – Unobscured	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Spaces – Attractive design	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Spaces – Multi use	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Spaces – Night and Day activities	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Spaces – Territorial definition and boundaries	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO
Street Furniture – Vandal resistant	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Street Furniture – Line of sight from all sides	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Underpass – Lit	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO



Space / Treatment Strategy	Natural Surveillance	Access Control	Territoriality	Space Management	Social Cohesion	Community Culture	Connectivity	Threshold Capacity
Under pass – Through visibility	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Under cover structures – Lit	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Under cover structures – Target hardening	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Under cover structures – Well-lit and in line of sight from all sides	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Vehicle Security Barriers (VSB)	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Windows – Large unencumbered views	YES	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Windows – facing public space	YES	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO



4. Project CPTED Assessment

4.1 Approach Context

For this project, the approach context constraints are as follows:

Table 4 Approach Context Assessment

Context	Assessment
Design	<p>The project is currently at the SSDA lodgement stage.</p> <p>The finalised design incorporates retail tenancies, metro plant infrastructure, private car park, and residential apartments.</p>
Ecological	<p>The Crows Nest Over Station development Ecological Sustainable Design (ESD) will be managed through the following regulatory frameworks:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NSW Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979. • NSW Environmental Planning and Assessment regulation 2021. • Sustainable Buildings SEPP 2022. • ESP principles identified within the North Sydney Local Government Plan 2013. • ESD principles identified within the North Sydney Development Control Plan 2013. • National construction code 20222, Amendment 1. • NSW SEPP Building Sustainability Index.
Finances	<p>The overall budget for the project is ~ \$80.5m AUD.</p> <p>The inclusion of design elements to reduce the likelihood of criminal behaviour are assumed to be allowed for in the budget.</p>
Legislative	<p>Legislative implications are limited to the conditions outlined in the Development Application.</p>
Ownership	<p>There are no known issues associated with ownership of the surrounding spaces that limit the ability to install treatments for this project.</p>
Practical	<p>The practicality of treatments will need to be considered throughout all phases of the project. We have sought to tailor treatments commensurate with the residential/commercial style of this development.</p>
Scope	<p>The project is currently being reviewed by the NSW Design review panel and a State Significant Development application is planned to be lodged in Q3/Q4 2024.</p>
Sustainability and Resilience	<p>There are no limitations to the provision of treatments for this project in relation to sustainability and resilience considerations.</p>
Time	<p>There are no time constraints associated with the project that would prevent the implementation of treatments to reduce the likelihood of criminal behavior.</p>



4.2 Environmental Context

4.2.1 Development Assessment

The proposed development is seeking consent for the following:

Crows Nest OSD - Site B is a 14 storey tower above the Crows Nest Metro Station.

The site area is 1872sqm. The concept approval includes a maximum height to the top of the service zone of RL 158m and includes a maximum residential FSR of 13,000m².

The Metro Station is comprised of 3 levels:

- **Ground Level - Hume Street** includes the OSD tower lobby, retail, and back of house spaces.
- **Level 01** includes a retail mezzanine, back of house, and a loading dock which is used for OSD garbage collection and is a future easement for rail authority access.
- **Level 02** contains plant rooms for the metro station.

The OSD car parking levels are located on level 5 and 6. These are naturally ventilated with 27 car spaces on level 5 and 28 car spaces on level 6. There is a total of 55 spaces.

Apartments are located from level 7 to 18. Level 19 and 20 contain penthouses.

A roof terrace on level 21 includes communal gardens and pools, as well as private penthouse terraces.

Level 7-8 : 10 apartments per floor

Level 9-18: 11 apartments per floor

Level 19: 8 apartments (5 x two storey)

Level 20: 3 apartments


Total number of apartments: 130



Figure 11 Proposed view from Pacific Highway



Figure 16 Proposed Roof Terrace



4.2.2 Identified Assets

The first act of the environmental context is to identify the assets needing to be protected. For the Crows Nest Over Station development, we identified the following:

- Personnel assets including the members of the public, residents, employed staff, security staff, residential visitors, visiting professionals.
- Physical Assets including the building, car parks and public spaces around the facility, external amenities.
- Business Functions as they relate to completion of the space's primary role, retailers, occupied spaces.
- Metro plant infrastructure.

4.2.3 Expected Activities

The following table provides an overview of the expected activities for the space, per current information provided by the stakeholders. Note that only areas being assessed as part of this engagement are listed.

Table 5 Expected Activities

Context	Weekday (Day)	Weekday (Night)	Weekend (Day)	Weekend (Night)
Proposed Development (overall)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Retail tenancies • Residential • Residential amenities (shared) • Residential (entry) • Collaboration Space • General maintenance • Approved contractors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Retail tenancies • Residential • Residential amenities (shared) • Residential (entry) • Collaboration Space • General maintenance • Approved contractors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Retail tenancies • Residential • Residential amenities (shared) • Residential (entry) • Collaboration Space • General maintenance • Approved contractors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Retail tenancies • Residential • Residential amenities (shared) • Residential (entry) • Collaboration Space • General maintenance • Approved contractors
Ground Level (Hume Street)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Retail tenancies • Residential (entry) • Collaboration Space • General maintenance • Approved contractors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Retail tenancies • Residential (entry) • Collaboration Space • General maintenance • Approved contractors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Retail tenancies • Residential (entry) • Collaboration Space • General maintenance • Approved contractors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Retail tenancies • Residential (entry) • Collaboration Space • General maintenance • Approved contractors
Ground Level Pacific Hwy (Mezzanine)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Retail tenancies • Residential (entry) • Collaboration Space • General maintenance • Approved contractors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Retail tenancies • Residential (entry) • Collaboration Space • General maintenance • Approved contractors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Retail tenancies • Residential (entry) • Collaboration Space • General maintenance • Approved contractors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Retail tenancies • Residential (entry) • Collaboration Space • General maintenance • Approved contractors
Private Carpark	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Residential (entry) • General maintenance • Approved contractors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Residential (entry) • General maintenance • Approved contractors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Residential (entry) • General maintenance • Approved contractors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Residential (entry) • General maintenance • Approved contractors
Residential Tenancies (typical)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Residential apartments • General maintenance • Approved contractors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Residential apartments • General maintenance • Approved contractors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Residential apartments • General maintenance • Approved contractors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Residential apartments • General maintenance • Approved contractors
Roof Terrace	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Penthouse private terraces • Tenancies communal terrace • General maintenance (plant room) • Approved contractors (plant room) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Penthouse private terraces • Tenancies communal terrace • General maintenance (plant room) • Approved contractors (plant room) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Penthouse private terraces • Tenancies communal terrace • General maintenance (plant room) • Approved contractors (plant room) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Penthouse private terraces • Tenancies communal terrace • General maintenance (plant room) • Approved contractors (plant room)

4.2.4 Expected Users

The following table provides an overview of the expected users for each identified space, per current information provided by the stakeholders.

Table 6 Expected Users

Context	Weekday (Day)	Weekday (Night)	Weekend (Day)	Weekend (Night)
Proposed Development (overall)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Members of the public • Retail customers • Dining customers • Bar patrons • Maintenance personnel • Office workers • Residents • Staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Members of the public • Retail customers • Dining customers • Bar patrons • Maintenance personnel • Office workers • Residents • Staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Members of the public • Retail customers • Dining customers • Bar patrons • Maintenance personnel • Office workers • Residents • Staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Members of the public • Retail customers • Dining customers • Bar patrons • Maintenance personnel • Office workers • Residents • Staff
Ground Level (Hume Street)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Members of the public • Retail customers • Dining customers • Bar patrons • Maintenance personnel • Office workers • Residents • Staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Members of the public • Retail customers • Dining customers • Bar patrons • Maintenance personnel • Office workers • Residents • Staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Members of the public • Retail customers • Dining customers • Bar patrons • Maintenance personnel • Office workers • Residents • Staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Members of the public • Retail customers • Dining customers • Bar patrons • Maintenance personnel • Office workers • Residents • Staff
Ground Level Pacific Hwy (Mezzanine)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Members of the public • Retail customers • Dining customers • Bar patrons • Maintenance personnel • Office workers • Residents • Staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Members of the public • Retail customers • Dining customers • Bar patrons • Maintenance personnel • Office workers • Residents • Staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Members of the public • Retail customers • Dining customers • Bar patrons • Maintenance personnel • Office workers • Residents • Staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Members of the public • Retail customers • Dining customers • Bar patrons • Maintenance personnel • Office workers • Residents • Staff
Private Carpark	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Residents • General maintenance • Approved contractors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Residents • General maintenance • Approved contractors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Residents • General maintenance • Approved contractors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Residents • General maintenance • Approved contractors
Residential Tenancies (typical)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Residents • Approved visitors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Residents • Approved visitors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Residents • Approved visitors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Residents • Approved visitors
Roof Terraces	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Residents • Approved visitors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Residents • Approved visitors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Residents • Approved visitors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Residents • Approved visitors



4.2.5 Risk Assessment

Generally, an SRA will have been completed to inform the crime/anti-social related threats for a site. In this instance the CPTED assessment is provided outside of this process, and thus we have conducted a short form risk assessment to inform this report's findings. The reader is to note that this is not a complete SRA that has incorporated all contextual information and threat vectors. Thus, it is advised that a project specific SRA is undertaken, whether by the owning entity or by an accredited Security Consultant.

4.2.6 Potential Threats

Threats were assessed based on:

- assets needing protection.
- expected activities.
- expected users.
- past experience with similar sites.
- stakeholder engagement.
- local crime statistics.
- current national terrorism threat level.

Threat sources (actors) were assessed as being possible from:

- Opportunistic crime.
- Premeditated crime.
- Organised crime.

Threat sources discounted were:

- Issue Motivated Groups.
- Terrorism (see section below for how this was determined).

4.2.6.1 Local Crime Statistics

Crows Nest is located within the North Sydney LGA. The NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and research (BOSCAR) identify the following recorded incidents for the North Sydney LGA from July 2021 to July 2023.


The top 5 offences reported are:

- Malicious damage to property (1,996 incidents).
- Other stealing offences (1,921 incidents).
- Steal from retail store (1,633 incidents).
- Steal from motor vehicle (1,258 incidents).
- Non-Domestic violence related assault (1,061 incidents).

As indicated below, there has been an increase of 46.7% in theft from retail stores, a 40% increase in break and enter non-dwelling and 44.8% increase in robbery over the past 24 months. In reviewing the statistics, the likelihood of criminal activity occurring in the vicinity of the Metro project has to be considered when conducting the CPTED report.



Figure 17 Crime Statistics for the Local Government Area



4.2.6.2 Entity Historical Incident Data

As this is a new development, there is no historical data for analysis.

4.2.6.3 Terrorism Context

Were a terrorist attack to occur, it would likely result in multiple deaths or cessation of operations for week(s) due to investigations and repairs.

Although the current national threat level is at PROBABLE¹⁷, this CPTED assessment needs to take into consideration the likelihood of a threat occurring at this location based on how attractive a target it is compared to other sites.

The ANZCTC 'Australia's Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism' policy document provides an appendix to aid in estimating the attractiveness of a site to terrorist, under the 'Crowded Places Self-Assessment Tool'.

The tool lists nine criteria, with a score allocated to each. Based on the cumulative score recommendations are provided. A score of 40 or more recommends involvement of local law enforcement to discuss security issues at the site. A score of 39 or below recommends the entity review their security measures commensurate with their perceived risk, however it's unlikely a terrorist event would occur at this location.

The table below has been completed based on our assessment of the site. Note descriptors and scoring nomenclature are as published within the assessment tool.

Table 7 Crowded Place Self-Assessment Tool

Descriptor	Scoring							Assessed Score
The location is symbolic – historical, iconic, religious, cultural or political.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	3
	Not at All Symbolic			Extremely Symbolic				
The location attracts a large number of people at any one time.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	3
	Not at All Large			Extremely Large				
People gather at the location on a predictable basis.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	6
	Not at All Predictable			Extremely Predictable				
The density of people at the location is high.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	4
	Very Low Density			Extremely High				
The location has significant social importance for the nation, state or territory.	1	2	3	4	5			2
	V.Low Social Importance			Ext. High Social Importance				
If the location was interrupted in its function it would have a significant economic impact upon the nation, state or territory.	1	2	3	4	5			3
	V.Low Econ. Impact			Ext. High Econ. Impact				
According to a potential attacker, the protective security at the location (people, physical, or technical) would be able to detect, control, delay or stop their access.	1	2	3	4	5			2
	Always			N				
An offender would be able to enter, attack the location and leave without detection.	1	2	3	4	5			2
	Not at all Likely			E x				
An offender undertaking planning for an attack could easily access information about the location – online or elsewhere.	1	2	3	4	5			5
	Not at all Easy			Extremely E				
	Total							30

¹⁷Australian National Security, <https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/national-threat-level/current-national-terrorism-threat-level> (September 2024).

Based on our assessment, the site warrants a score of 30, meaning a terrorist attack is highly unlikely and additional treatments outside the norm should not be warranted. We have thus removed terrorist related threats from this assessment as their high consequence outcomes will skewer the assessment results.

4.2.7 Identified Threat Summary

In total, fourteen (14) individual threat types were assessed as possible per the table below.

Table 8 Threat Identification

Threat ID	Threat Type	Opp. Crime	Premed. Crime	OCG
TH01	Anti-Social behaviour – Loitering/ nuisance actions	X		
TH02	Anti-Social behaviour – Begging	X	X	
TH03	Anti-Social behaviour - Drunkenness/ drug effected	X		
TH04	Assault against person (physical)	X	X	
TH05	Assault against person (sexual)	X	X	
TH06	Assault against person (verbal / harassment)	X	X	
TH07	Drug dealing		X	X
TH08	Property damage	X	X	
TH09	Robbery	X	X	X
TH10	Theft (car)	X	X	X
TH11	Theft (physical property)	X	X	X
TH12	Unauthorised access (physical)	X	X	
TH13	Vandalism, malicious damage	X	X	
TH14	Vehicle as a Weapon – accidental	X		

4.3 Analysis of the Space

The development comprises a diverse array of offerings, including, retail tenancies, bar/dining area open to the public, collaborations spaces, cafes, and residential tenancies.

It is part of a major Sydney Metro development application which will consist of an additional Site A and Site C when completed.



4.3.1 Precinct Assessment

- The development site is located within the North Sydney LGA and is in the suburb of Crows Nest.
- The immediate vicinity of the location consists of small business, retail and commercial premises, multi-level residential apartments, and proximity to Crows Nest Train Station.
- The development has vehicular access to the Pacific Highway, Hume Place, and Clarke Lane, being seen as a congested space.
- Public transport hubs for both trains and buses are located adjacent. Passing foot traffic is thus considered to be higher than average.
- The development is located in close proximity to the Town Centre. Passing foot traffic is thus considered to be higher than average.
- The closest law enforcement service is the North Sydney Police Station approximately 1km away.
- The closest fire service is the Fire and Rescue NSW Crows Nest Fire Station approximately 200m away.
- The closest hospital emergency department service is Royal North Shore Hospital approximately 1.5km away.
- The socio-economic index for the surrounding area (City of Moreton Bay) lists 43.8% of households as being considered high-income households¹⁸. Thus, the residential population is not considered disadvantaged, though travelling persons may be.

4.3.2 Space Assessment

4.3.2.1 *Proposed development (overall)*

- provides a thoroughfare for movement.
- provides spaces for social interactions.
- provides public access to retail tenancies.
- provides restricted access to residential tenancies.
- provides access to back of house staff facilities.
- hosts a collaboration / workspace.
- provides external seated space as part of landscape design.

4.3.2.2 *Ground Floor - Hume Street*

- provides a thoroughfare for movement.
- provides spaces for social interactions.
- provides public access to retail tenancies.
- provides restricted access to residential tenancies.
- provides access to back of house staff facilities.
- hosts a collaboration / workspace.

¹⁸ Informed Decisions, <https://profile.id.com.au/north-sydney/household-income?WebID=130> (accessed February 2024)



4.3.2.3 *Ground Floor - Pacific Highway*

- provides a thoroughfare for movement.
- provides spaces for social interactions.
- provides public access to retail tenancies.
- hosts a collaboration / workspace.
- provides restricted access to residential tenancies.
- provides residential bike storage area.
- provides access to back of house staff facilities.
- provides access to resident waste disposal areas.

4.3.2.4 *Levels 2 & 3 – Carpark*

- provides residential access to the building.
- provides access to resident's car park.
- provides resident storage areas.

4.3.2.5 *Levels 4 – 16 – Residential apartments*

- private residential apartments.
- private penthouse terraces (Level 15 & 16).
- provides residential access to the building.
- provides access to resident's car park.

4.3.2.6 *Level 17 Penthouse terraces and communal terraces*

- provides spaces for social interactions.
- provides access to resident's car park.
- provides access to plant room.



4.4 Space Assessment

In general, we found the overall design follows good CPTED practices, addressing the key principles and incorporating natural design elements to ameliorate potential issues. The design incorporates:

- active spaces surrounding the building.
- extensive glazed facades to provide for natural surveillance.
- provision of lighting throughout to provide for natural surveillance.
- open paths and clear vision to provide for natural surveillance.
- multiple entries and paths to remove entrapment points.
- provision of multiuse spaces to support space management and social cohesion.

In undertaking our review, we identified the following areas that may be a potential concern. These items are considered minor and at the client's discretion.

Table 9 Space Assessment - Overall

Ref. No	Location	Issue/Threat
001	Perimeter	Obscured vision – Increased opportunity for vandalism to building

Table 10 Space Assessment - Carpark and Loading dock entry – Clarke Lane

Ref. No	Location	Issue/Threat
001	GF Carpark Entry	Obscured vision. Vehicles entry is obscured from oversight.



Ref. No	Location	Issue/Threat
002	GF Carpark Exit	Obscured vision. Vehicles exit is obscured from approaching pedestrians.
003	GF Loading Dock Entry	Obscured vision. Vehicles entry exit is obscured from oversight.



5. Recommendations

5.1 Proposed Treatments

The following table lists proposed treatments for each space to ameliorate the identified issue/threat. The reader is to note that these are CPTED treatments only and should not limit the potential further application of electronic, physical, and operational security treatments.

Table 11 Treatment Recommendations - Overall

Ref. No	Location	Issue/threat	Proposed Treatments
001	Perimeter	Obscured vision - Vandalism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implement active graffiti removal scheme. • Implement active security surveillance technology in support of natural (e.g., CCTV cameras). • Implement sufficient lighting along perimeter.

Table 12 Treatment Recommendations - Carpark and Loading dock entry – Clarke Lane

Ref. No	Location	Issue/threat	Proposed Treatments
001	GF Carpark Entry	Obscured vision – Unauthorised entry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implement active security surveillance technology in support of natural (e.g., CCTV cameras). • Implement sufficient lighting along perimeter.
002	GF Carpark Exit	Obscured vision – Pedestrians approaching	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implement active security surveillance technology in support of natural (e.g., CCTV cameras). • Implement signage to provide awareness of vehicles exiting. • Implement sufficient lighting along perimeter. • Implement vehicle security barriers to protect pedestrians.
002	GF Loading Dock Entry	Obscured vision – Vehicle Threat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implement active security surveillance technology in support of natural (e.g., CCTV cameras). • Implement sufficient lighting along perimeter.



6. References

6.1 Architectural Drawings:

Crows Nest Pre-Design Pack.

Project Consultant brief.

6.2 Documents:

ACIC. Organised Crime in Australia.

ACSC. Threat Report.

ANZCTC. Active Armed Offender Guidelines for Crowded Places.

ANZCTC. Australia's Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism.

ANZCTC. Hostile Vehicle Guidelines for Crowded Places.

ANZCTC. Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Guidelines for Crowded Places.

ANZCTC. National Counter-Terrorism Plan.

ANZCTC. National Guidelines for Protecting Critical Infrastructure from Terrorism.

ANZCTC. National Guidelines for the Protection of Places of Mass Gathering from Terrorism.

Australian Attorney-General's Department: Protective Security Policy Framework.

Australian Government. Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy Plan.

COAG Report. Australia's Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Strengthening Our Resilience.

Department of Defence, DSTO. Preventing and Profiling Malicious Insider Attacks.

Planning Victoria. Urban Design Guidelines. 2021.

Queensland Police Service. CPTED Guidelines for Queensland. 2021

NT Department of Lands and Planning. Community Safety Design Guide. 2010

Victorian Auditor-General's Office. Security of Government Buildings. 2019

Western Australian Planning Commission. Design out Crime Planning Guidelines. 2006

6.3 Standards:

AS/NZS ISO 22341:2021 – Security and resilience — Protective security — Guidelines for crime prevention through environmental design. 2021.

AS/NZS ISO 31000. Risk Management Guidelines. 2018.

AS 4421. Guards and Patrols. 2011.

CEN/TR 14383-2:2007. Prevention of Crime - Urban Planning and Building Design.

HB 167. Security Risk Management. 2016.



HB 89:2013 Risk Management - Guidelines on risk assessment techniques.

HB 158:2010 Delivering assurance based on ISO 31000 - Risk management - Principles and guidelines.

HB 167:2006 Security Risk Management.

HB 221:2004 Business Continuity Management.

HB 327 Communicating and Consulting About Risk.

HB 436:2013 - Risk Management Guidelines - Companion to AS/NZS ISO 31000.

IWA 14.1. Vehicle security barrier – Part 1: Performance requirements and vehicle impact test. 2013.

IWA 14.2. Vehicle security barrier – Part 2: Application. 2013.

PAS 68. Impact Test Specifications for Vehicle Security Barriers. 2013.

PAS 69. Guidelines for the specification and installation of vehicle security barriers. 2013.

PAS 170. Vehicle security barriers. Low speed impact testing. 2017.



7. Definitions

Acronym	Definition	Description
ACIC	Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission	-
ASIO	Australian Security Intelligence Organisation	-
CI	Critical Infrastructure	Those sites/buildings defined under the ' <i>National Guidelines for Protecting Critical Infrastructure from Terrorism</i> ' document published by the ANZCTC.
COAG	Council of Australian Governments	-
CPI	Consumer Price Index	Inflation figure.
CPTED	Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design	Crime prevention philosophy utilising passive design elements and the minimisation of opportunities for criminal behaviour.
EACS	Electronic Access Control System	Electronic system that restricts movement through selected points via the use of electronic locks and a proximity card.
HVM	Hostile Vehicle Mitigation	Measures enacted to stop/reduce the impact of a vehicle against a target.
IMG	Issue Motivated Group	Group of persons undertaking criminal activity to further a specific cause.
LCS	Local Crime Statistics	Summary of the crime statistics for the region in which the site is located, provided from official sources.
LGA	Local Government Area	Defined boundaries that encompass local councils.
OCG	Organised Crime Group	Group of persons undertaking criminal activity, primarily for financial gain.
PBIED	Person Borne Improvised Explosive Device	Person that carries explosives to use in a terrorist attack, generally as a suicide attack.



Acronym	Definition	Description
PSPF	Protective Security Policy Framework	Federal document governing physical security related matters for the protection of buildings and persons in the national interest.
SCR	Security Control Room	Dedicated room manned by security personnel which is the center of security operations for the area.
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures	A set of practices established by an entity which govern the responses and actions to be undertaken by Staff during various scenarios.
SRA	Security Risk Assessment	Document that outlines the possible security related risks and prioritise them for mitigation.
SMP	Security Management Plan	Document that outlines the approach to all security related issues across an entity or site.
Users	-	Defines any individual who utilises the Facility, including Staff, Visitors, Contractors, etc.
VAW	Vehicle as a Weapon	Use of a vehicle to harm/kill persons. Can be intentional or accidental.
VBIED	Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device	Vehicle that has been loaded with explosives for use in a terrorist attack.
VSB	Vehicle Security Barrier	Device used to separate vehicles from persons.



8. Explanatory Information

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