



CRIME RISK ASSESSMENT

Alexandria Health Centre
28-32 Bourke Road, Alexandria NSW 2015

The identification of crime risks and to minimize opportunities for crime to occur
concerning the construction and operation of Alexandria Health Centre
28-32 Bourke Road Alexandria, NSW 2015

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1. Introduction

1.1. Background

By way of background, NEAL Consulting Solutions Pty Ltd has been engaged by NBRS + Partners Pty Ltd (the client) to provide a Crime Risk Assessment (CRA) concerning a State Significant Development Application (SSDA) sought for a concept proposal for the Alexandria Health Centre comprising a multi-purpose Hospital anchored by a mental health hospital at 28-32 Bourke Road, Alexandria NSW 2015.

Specifically, the application seeks concept approval for:

- In principle arrangements for the demolition of existing structures on the site and excavation to accommodate a single level of basement car parking (partially below ground level).
- A building envelope to a maximum height of 45 m (RL 53.41) (including architectural roof features and building plant).
- A maximum gross floor area of 11,442.20 sqm, which equates to a maximum FSR of 3.85:1
- Indicative use of the building as follows:
 - Mental health hospital at levels 5-7.
 - Medical centre uses at levels 1-4; and
 - Ground level reception/lobby and pharmacy.
- Principles for future vehicular ingress and egress from Bourke Road along the site's western frontage.
- Subject to agreement on a public benefit offer to be submitted with this application, the proposal includes the indicative dedication of the following land to Council as envisaged by the Draft Sydney Development Control Plan 2012 – Southern Enterprise Area Amendment (Draft DCP):
 - A 2.4m wide strip of land along the site's frontage to Bourke Road for the purpose of footpath widening
 - A 3m wide lane along the site's western boundary contributing towards a 6m wide lane (it is noted that the concept proposal will allocate an additional 3 m strip of land within the site along the western boundary to enable two-way vehicle movement into and out of the site).
 - A 3m wide lane along the site's southern boundary, contributing towards a 9m wide lane.

Figure 1 below depicts the proposed development site at 28-32 Bourke Road, Alexandria.

Figure 1:



Figure 2 depicts the basement level car park and the ground level external car park and the building level.

Figure 2:





Figure 3 depicts the ground level of the Hospital with the new laneway providing vehicle access to the rear of the site from Bourke Road and the entry and exit vehicle driveway to the basement level car park.

Figure 3:



2. Crime Risk Assessment

2.1. Overview

The Crime Risk Assessment (CRA) process is largely concerned with crime rates and statistics for the local suburb and local government area and the application of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) measures to the proposed built environment.

CPTED is a situational crime prevention strategy that focuses on the design, planning, and structure of cities and neighbourhoods. It aims to reduce opportunities for crime by employing design and place management principles that minimise the likelihood of essential crime ingredients from intersecting in time and space.

The consideration of the magnitude of crime with the type of crime likely to be committed in the area (crime amount and type) will determine the choice and appropriate mix of CPTED strategies deemed relevant for this assignment.

2.2. Purpose

The purpose of this report is to identify the opportunities for crime to occur at the development and to provide a series of recommendations designed to mitigate these hazards.

This CRA assignment represents a systematic evaluation of the potential for crime in the area. It indicates the likely magnitude of the crime and the type of crime likely to be committed in the area.

This assessment has been undertaken in line with the NSW Government's broad approach to reducing crime through better design and the guidelines under section 4.15 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 No 203 which is designed to assist local councils to consider and implement CPTED principles when assessing Development Applications (DAs).

2.3. Methodology

The 'Safer by Design' crime risk assessment methodology (as adopted and taught by the NSW Police Force) has been used for this assessment. Based upon these guidelines, the assessment has used qualitative and quantitative measures of the physical environment (current and planned) to create a contextually adjustable approach to the analysis and treatment of crime opportunities.

In terms of the assessment process, the overall CPTED rating for the assignment was determined through the identification of an overall Crime Risk Rating (CRR). The CRR was determined based on the assessed likelihood and the associated consequences of identified crimes occurring in the City of Sydney Local Government Area (LGA) and the suburb of Alexandria.

A site opportunity assessment for the assignment was conducted across seven CPTED principles which provided a range of site opportunity scores that enabled the completion of the site opportunity assessment rating. Local crime statistics were obtained from the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR) website and modus operandi information was assessed by NEAL Consulting Solutions.

A site visit to 28-32 Bourke Road Alexandria was conducted by Security Consultant David Neal between 2.00 pm and 3.00 pm on Tuesday, 24 May 2022. The inspection was conducted during the hours of daylight. The weather conditions were overcast with rain showers and the ground surface was wet at the time. Several photographs were also taken of the site and the surrounding area (see **Appendix C**).

2.3.1. NSW Police Force – Mascot Police Station – Crime Prevention Office.

26-32 Bourke Road Alexandria falls within the South Sydney Police Area Command which operates out of the Mascot Police Station located at 965 Botany Road, Mascot.

2.4. Establishing the Context

2.4.1. The site and Surrounding Area Description

Alexandria is an inner-city suburb of Sydney, New South Wales, Australia. Alexandria is located 4 kilometres south of the Sydney central business district and is part of the local government area of the City of Sydney.

The rough boundaries of Alexandria are Botany Road to the east, Gardeners Road to the south, Mitchell Road and Sydney Park to the west, and Boundary Road to the north. It is approximately 2 km south of the Central railway station.

2.5. Crime Statistics

2.5.1. Recorded Incidents for City of Sydney LGA

Information obtained online from the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR) includes crime trend analysis for the City of Sydney LGA and the suburb of Alexandria.

The latest information available from the BOCSAR NSW Local Government Area excel crime table for the City of Sydney LGA lists 60 offences of which 16 are classified as major offences. BOCSAR do not calculate LGA rankings across the state of New South Wales where the population of the LGA is less than 300,000. As at June 2020, the estimated population of the City of Sydney LGA was approximately 248,736 which represents approximately 4.6% of Greater Sydney's total population¹. In the absence of LGA rankings being available for the City of Sydney LGA, the 60-month rate of these offences occurring has been noted. In that regard, 2 x offences are stable, 10 x have declined by percentage rates between -7.8% and -19.4%. The occurrence rate for 3 offences was not calculated by BOCSAR (see *Worksheet A in Appendix A*).

2.5.2. Crime Risk Assessment (City of Sydney LGA)

As a part of determining the overall crime risk rating for the project, the quantitative measures of recorded crime occurring in the City of Sydney LGA (i.e. the likelihood of the offences occurring – see **Table 1**) and the qualitative measures associated with recorded crime (i.e. the consequences associated with the commission of these offences) were assessed.

In terms of assessing the *likelihood* of crime typically experienced in the City of Sydney LGA occurring, the percentage occurrence trend over a 60-month trend has been taken into account (as per BOCSAR rankings obtained on 25 May 2022) to estimate a likelihood rating for each offence in *Worksheet A in Appendix A*. Likelihood and consequence levels were then used to determine a Crime Risk Opportunity Level.

Table 1:

Likelihood (LGA)			
Risk	State LGA Ranking	Likelihood	Description
A	01-28	Almost certain	Is expected to occur in most circumstances
B	28-56	Likely	Will probably occur in most circumstances
C	57-84	Possible	Might occur at some time
D	85-112	Unlikely	Could occur at some time
E	113-140	Rare	May occur only in exceptional circumstances

¹ City of Sydney LGA website (<https://www.cityofsydney.nsw.gov.au/>)

In terms of assessing the consequence of crime typically experienced in the City of Sydney LGA, the 'method of operation' information was applied against the description criteria contained in **Table 2** and the consequence rating that resulted was then recorded within the Consequence column of *Worksheet A in Appendix A*.

NB: NEAL Consulting Solutions has approximated the consequence values concerning the 13 offences indicated, to determine the crime risk opportunity levels. Further detail is provided in *Worksheet A in Appendix A (Likelihood and Consequence Chart for the City of Sydney LGA)*.

Table 2:

Consequence		
Risk	Consequence	Description
1	Insignificant	No injury to people; small loss or damage to property or reputation
2	Minor	Injury to people but not requiring on-site treatment; some loss or damage to property or reputation
3	Moderate	Injury to people requiring on-site treatment; high loss or damage to property or reputation
4	Major	Injury to people requiring hospital treatment; major loss or damage to property or reputation
5	Catastrophic	Death, serious injury to people requiring hospital treatment; major loss or damage to property or reputation

With both likelihood and consequence ratings ascertained and based on the 'Level of Crime Risk Opportunity' matrix in **Table 3**, the crime risk opportunity level for each offence typically experienced in the City of Sydney LGA was determined (see *Worksheet A in Appendix A*).

Table 3:

Likelihood	Consequence				
	Insignificant (1)	Minor (2)	Moderate (3)	Major (4)	Catastrophic (5)
Almost Certain (A)	High	High	Extreme	Extreme	Extreme
Likely (B)	Medium	High	High	Extreme	Extreme
Possible (C)	Low	Medium	High	Extreme	Extreme
Unlikely (D)	Low	Low	Medium	High	Extreme
Rare (E)	Low	Low	Medium	High	High

As a result of this analysis, the **crime risk assessment** rating for the **City of Sydney LGA** is assessed as '**Medium**' (see *Worksheet A in Appendix A*).

2.5.3. Crime Risk Assessment (the suburb of Alexandria)

Information about the type of crimes that are typically experienced in the **suburb of Alexandria** has been ascertained from the BOCSAR website utilising the Crime Mapping Tool.

Eleven offence types were selected from the BOCSAR Crime Tool for the period December 2020 to December 2021. For the year to September 2021, 3 of the 11 offences (i.e. Fraud, Theft – Break enter & steal, vehicle theft etc, and drug offences) occurred at rates at least twice as high as that recorded for NSW, per 100,000 head of population (see *Worksheet B in Appendix A*).

The various comparative incident rates derived from the BOCSAR Crime Mapping Tool were then applied against the assessment criteria in Table 4 (see below) to identify a likelihood rating for each crime type selected from the BOCSAR Crime Tool (see the Likelihood column in *Worksheet C in Appendix A*).

Table 4:

Likelihood (Suburb of Alexandria)			
Risk	Comparative incident rate (Yr to December 2021 compared to NSW rate)	Likelihood	Description
A	> 2.0	Almost Certain	Is expected to occur in most circumstances
B	1.5 – 1.9	Likely	It Will probably occur in most circumstances
C	1.0 – 1.4	Possible	Might occur at some time
D	0.5 – 0.9	Unlikely	Could occur at some time
E	0.0 – 0.4	Rare	May occur only in exceptional circumstances

NB: NEAL Consulting Solutions has approximated the consequence values concerning the 11 offences indicated, to determine the crime risk opportunity levels. Further detail is provided in Worksheet C in **Appendix A** (Likelihood and Consequence Chart for the suburb of Alexandria).

With both *likelihood* and *consequence* ratings ascertained and based on the 'Level of Crime Risk Opportunity' matrix in Table 3, the crime risk opportunity level for each offence typically experienced in the suburb of Alexandria was determined.

As a result of this analysis, the **crime risk assessment** rating for the suburb of Alexandria is assessed as '**Medium**' (see Worksheet C in **Appendix A**).

2.6. Moderated Crime Risk Assessment

The crime risk assessment analysis result for the City of Sydney LGA and the suburb of Alexandria were both assessed as 'Medium'. Based on these findings, a **moderated crime risk opportunity** rating of '**Medium**' has been adopted for this crime risk assessment.

The remedial action required for a 'Medium' crime risk assessment rating (derived from Table 5), is defined in the following terms:

"Actions need to be incorporated in planning, still important but can be scheduled to occur; may require short and long term solutions".

Table 5:

Risk	Definition	Suggested Time Frame
Extreme	The situation is critical; action needs to be taken urgently; Site/premises may need to be closed or work ceased until remedial action is taken.	Now
High	Actions need to be prioritised in planning; must be fixed as soon as possible.	Week/Fortnight
Medium	Actions need to be incorporated in planning; still important but can be scheduled to occur; may require short and long-term solutions.	1 to 3 months
Low	Actions can be managed by routine procedures/scheduled maintenance; if the solution is quick and easy then consider fixing it today.	>3 months or as per maintenance schedule

This information has been taken into consideration concerning the various CPTED treatments recommended for this project (see Section 3.3 Recommendations and Treatments).

3. CPTED Site Opportunity Assessment

Utilising the initial set of architectural drawings provided by NBRS Architects for the proposed Health Centre a CPTED based Site Opportunity Assessment (SOA) of the development has been undertaken (see *Worksheet D in Appendix A*). The SOA was conducted based on the set of the following set of site drawings provided by NBRS Architects:

- a) 21476-NBRS-SD-A-SK101 – basement and ground levels.
- b) 21476-NBRS-SD-A-SK102 – mezzanine level.
- c) 21476-NBRS-SD-A-SK103 – levels 1, 2 and 3.
- d) 21476-NBRS-SD-A-SK104 – level 5.
- e) 21476-NBRS-SD-A-SK105 – levels 6 and 7.
- f) 21476-NBRS-SD-A-SK106 – roof level.
- g) Enscape image (rendered 3D image) – northern elevation.

In addition to the architectural drawings cited above, the 'Draft Sydney Development Control Plan 2021 – Southern Enterprise Lands' published by the City of Sydney LGA has also been taken into consideration.

The SOA has been conducted against the following CPTED principles:

- 1. Surveillance.
- 2. Lighting.
- 3. Territorial Reinforcement.
- 4. Environmental Maintenance.
- 5. Activity and Space Management.
- 6. Access Control.
- 7. Design, Definition, Designation of site.

Each of these principles, including the sub-element of each principle, has been assessed and scored against all available planning and development material and the information gleaned as part of conducting the overall crime risk assessment. Elements of applicability, quantity, and quality have been considered as part of the SOAs for this project.

Each of the seven CPTED principles and sub-elements has been assessed and scored against the assignment and individual site opportunity scores arrived at for each CPTED area.

Each sub-element has been assessed and deemed as either 'good' or 'deficient'. The term 'deficient' should be given its normal meaning (i.e. lacking in some necessary quality or element).

An initial SOA was undertaken (before applying treatment recommendations) and the following scores were obtained:

- 64 x 'Good' features, 4 x 'Deficient' features and 32 'not applicable' features were assessed and recorded.

The following deficient features were identified as part of the SOA (see *Worksheet D in Appendix A*):

- 1. Delivery/loading areas.
- 2. Concealment – entrapment opportunities.
- 3. Vulnerability – night workers/customers.
- 4. Building – ease of access to side/rear.

To calculate the percentage rating of the initial SOA, the number of N/A questions was subtracted from the total number of site opportunity questions (i.e. 100) resulting in a total of 68 applicable questions answered. Based upon the number of applicable questions, **94.1%** of features being assessed returned a **‘Good’** response and **5.8%** of features being assessed were considered **‘Deficient’**.

A percentage result of 94.1% in the ‘Good’ criteria equates to a **Low** project risk rating, and a percentage result of 5.8% in the ‘Deficient’ criteria also equates to a **Low** project risk rating (see Table 7).

Following discussions with the client and after applying various CPTED based treatments to the identified deficiencies, *a second SOA* was conducted. This SOA resulted in 68 features assessed as ‘Good’, 0 as ‘Deficient’, and 32 as ‘Not Applicable’ (see Table 6 over page).

Table 6 (SOA scores):

First Site Opportunity Assessment Totals	Good	Deficient	N/A
1. Surveillance	17	0	12
2. Lighting	11	0	2
3. Territorial Reinforcement	9	0	2
4. Environmental Maintenance	7	0	2
5. Activity and Space Management	6	0	5
6. Access Control	13	0	9
7. Design, Definition & Designation	5	0	0
Totals	68	0	32

3.1. Final Percentage & Assignment Rating

A percentage result of 100% in the ‘Good’ criteria equates to a **Low** project risk rating, and a percentage result of 0.0% in the ‘Deficient’ criteria equates to a **Low** project risk rating (see Table 7 below).

Table 7:

Total ‘Good’ features	Risk Rating	Total ‘Deficient’ features	Risk Rating
0 – 25%	Extreme	0 – 25%	Low
26 – 50%	High	26 – 50%	Medium
51 – 75%	Medium	51 – 75%	High
76 – 100%	Low	76 – 100%	Extreme

3.2. CPTED Rating

The SOA resulted in a **‘Low’** CPTED rating for the project (see Table 8).

Table 8: CPTED Rating

Deficient Risk Rating	Good Risk Rating				
		Low	Medium	High	Extreme
	Extreme	High	High	Extreme	Extreme
	High	Moderate	High	High	Extreme
	Medium	Low	Moderate	High	Extreme
	Low	Low	Low	Moderate	High

Actions required for a 'Low' CPTED rating are defined as 'Actions can be managed by routine procedures' (see Table 9).

Table 9:

RISK	ACTION REQUIRED
Extreme	Actions need to be urgently taken
High	Actions need to be prioritised in planning
Moderate	Actions need to be incorporated into the planning
Low	Actions can be managed by routine procedures

CPTED strategies required to address a 'Low' risk level include, Natural, Organised (Low) and some Technical/Mechanical (Low) treatments. The following CPTED treatment levels are recommended for use where an assignment risk rating of 'Low' has been returned.

Natural: Clear site design, territorial definition, and designation (purpose). Natural surveillance, strategically located windows, doors, and other vantage points; open building and landscape sightlines; natural access control measures including symbolic and real barriers; clearly defined vehicle/pedestrian routes and channel systems.

Organised: Low level organised guardianship – e.g. the strategic placement of employee workstations and the location, timing, and use of managed activity (community and/or private); active place management and routine environmental maintenance.

Low Technical: These low-level technical strategies will build upon the following low level and natural measures including, basic target hardening, good quality access control hardware, corridor mirrors, public address systems, help phones, and motion detectors.

3.3. CPTED Recommendations and Treatments

The following sections of this report contain further detail about the reduction of CPTED risk as outlined in the 'Associated Comments' column of **Worksheet D in Appendix A**.

3.3.1. Surveillance


Buildings

1. Orientation.

The Hospital is orientated as follows (see Fig 4):

- Pedestrian street entry to the Hospital from Bourke Road, on the northern side of the site.
- Vehicle entry via the proposed driveway to be constructed on the western side of the Hospital which provided vehicle access to the rear external car park, loading bay, ambulance bay and entry/exit point to the below-ground basement car park.
- 58 x car parking spaces and 2 x motorbike parking spaces located within the below-ground basement level car park.
- 12 x external undercover car parking spaces (inclusive of 2 x disabled parking spaces) 2 x motorbike parking spaces located at ground level on the southern side (rear) of the building.
- Ambulance bay, loading dock and vehicle waiting space located adjacent to the rear undercover external car park at ground level on the southern side (rear) of the building.
- 5 x fire stair exits with 1 x located at the front (north) of the property, 2 x adjacent to the ambulance bay (rear of the site), 1 x at the southeastern fire stairs and 1 x at the southwestern fire stairs leading from the basement car park.

Figure 4: (left image – below ground car park. Right image – Ground level, Bourke Rd):




2. Foyers, lobbies, internal visibility, delivery loading dock areas, and communal areas.

Care should be taken to ensure that the glazing on the glass foyer windows and doors of the Hospital does not obstruct the view of the external areas at the front of the property by departing occupants of the building (see Fig 5).

At night, the vision of departing occupants can be affected by reflections on the interior of the glass which can prevent clear vision from inside to outside the building. It is important that people departing buildings (especially at night) can see 'ahead of travel' to avoid potential danger (e.g. persons lying in wait, antisocial behaviour etc).

Figure 5:



At night the vision of departing occupants can be affected by reflections on the interior of the glass (i.e. can't see outside). Mirroring can be reduced by using appropriate external lighting adjacent to the main office foyer area.

Entry areas can be supervised 'naturally' through the strategic placement of capable guardians, adjoining occupants, caretakers, or work supervisors.

3. Delivery/loading docks/communal areas.

Loading docks and delivery areas should be protected by strategically positioned offices and other communal areas should not be located in a buildings' leftover space'. Poor supervision of communal facilities can greatly increase the risk of predatory crime, theft, and vandalism. Areas that are sporadically used after hours should not be accessible to the public.

The waste collection area for the Hospital has yet to be designated, but it is likely to be located within the loading bay area at the rear of the site. The waste area will likely be located within the secure perimeter of the site, however, care must still be taken to ensure that area is not treated as 'leftover space' and neglected in terms of maintenance and security arrangements.

4. Wayfinding.

Wayfinding in large environments such as business parks etc can be confusing. Design and definitional legibility are important in terms of safety at these locations.

When confirming the final wayfinding plan for this site, care should be taken to ensure that elements including knowing how and where to enter, exit and find assistance within the site are incorporated. Reference should also be made to AS1428 when designing wayfinding for the Hospital. Signage should reinforce, but not be an alternative to legible design.

5. Vegetation – coverage/quantity.

Research and strong anecdotal evidence reveal that vegetation is commonly used by criminals to aid concealment. A safety convention concerning vegetation is that lower tree limbs should be above average head height and shrubs should not provide easy concealment. Care should be taken to ensure that the vegetation being considered for the front of the Alexandria Health Centre does not conceal the front of the property from Bourke Rd and passing members of the public (see Fig 6).

Figure 6:



3.3.2. Lighting

An indicative high-level external lighting plan has yet to be prepared for this development. To aid the lighting plan, the following general lighting recommendations should be observed when considering overall lighting for the site.

In terms of *Brightness, Distribution, Reflection, and Obstructions* it is recommended that special attention be paid to lighting for pedestrian pathways and movement predictors (to permit the facial recognition of approaching persons at 15 metres). Area adjoining pathways should be illuminated to avoid opportunities for concealment/entrapment.

UK research has demonstrated that lighting upgrades and maintenance reduce the fear of crime, increase street usage by pedestrians (by an average of 50%), and increase visibility and informal surveillance. Studies at several sites resulted in crime reductions by 75% and 80% (NSW Police 'Safer by Design' Manual Companion).

It is accepted that effective lighting can reduce fear, increase community activity, improve visibility and increase the likelihood that offenders will be detected and apprehended.

The lighting plan when fully developed for this site should consider the need to mitigate opportunities for crime, both real and perceived.

Lighting Maintenance Program:

It is specifically recommended that a proactive lighting maintenance program be incorporated as part of the construction phase and upon completion, the day-to-day operation of this site. At regular intervals, a physical inspection of all lighting fixtures should take place with a view to pre-empting the repair or replacement of faulty lighting fixtures in addition to immediately replacing all failed lighting fixtures.

This measure is designed to ensure that the required lighting levels within all areas of the development are maintained and the creation and prolonged presence of dark zones that can attract and create opportunities for crime to occur are avoided at all times.

Colour Rendition:

To obtain the best results in terms of lighting colour rendition, the use of any low-pressure sodium lamps is not recommended as they have a colour rendering index (CRI) of '0'.

In addition to their colour-draining characteristics which can stimulate fear and avoidance, low-pressure lights make the identification of parked vehicles troublesome for many owners, and witnesses to crime often report difficulty in describing crime scene characteristics and offenders in this type of light.

Metal Halide (60-80 CRI) or Mercury Vapour (20-60 CRI) lights that emit whiter, cooler light is recommended over the low-pressure sodium lighting that tends to produce an orange light or at best a pale gold light in the case of high-pressure sodium lamps.

Vandal Resistance:

Where lighting fixtures are located in publicly accessible spaces (in the case of this project the loading dock driveway, the front driveway, and ramp to the basement car park on the northern and southern side of the site and fire exit points around the external perimeter of the site) it is recommended that robust, vandal resistance lighting be used. High-quality vandal resistance lamps are less likely to require replacement or maintenance as a result of malicious damage.

Distribution/Reflection:

White ceilings and walls greatly assist to reflect light. Painted surfaces not only look larger but lux levels can be increased without adding additional lighting fixtures. Light coloured surfaces are therefore recommended for use within the loading dock and basement car park areas.

1. *Closed Circuit Television (CCTV).*

The use of CCTV at the site is an important crime prevention method both in terms of deterring crime and importantly for assisting post-incident investigations. When used CCTV should cover all areas of risk. The ability for CCTV recordings to identify and record faces, shapes, and colours is an accepted yardstick of CCTV effectiveness.

Recommendation:

The use of a digital CCTV system is recommended for this site. The system should allow on-site monitoring and recording in addition to the ability for off-site monitoring by a remote electronic monitoring centre.

Ideally, the system should support motion detection with the ability to generate and dispatch alarm events on-site and to an off-site monitoring centre. In terms of camera placement, the following locations should be the subject of CCTV surveillance and recording at the site:

- The uninterrupted vision of the perimeter of the site (i.e. the front and rear and eastern and western sides of the building).
- The vehicle entry/exit point at Bourke Rd and the length of the proposed laneway on the western side of the site.
- The external undercover car park at the rear of the site and the below-ground car park.

- The vehicle/entry and exit point to the below-ground car park.
- The loading dock area and then entry/exit to the loading dock.
- The internal and external sides of all fire exit doors on the site.
- CCTV surveillance of various internal areas of the Hospital including the main foyer and entry and exit points, and the various drug safes located on-site located within staff-only medication rooms.

N.B. Where CCTV is recording the movement of motor vehicles at the site it is important that the recorded vision clearly shows the registration number, colour, and type of vehicle.

With the assistance of a CCTV technical specialist, the required fields of view and the absence of any blind spots may be achieved. In any case, the cameras should also be located to ensure that every camera is captured within the field of view of at least one other camera.

Police access to CCTV recordings:

It is also a requirement that police can acquire recorded CCTV images from the site as soon as possible following an event/incident and in any case no longer than 12 hours. This also applies to the site during the construction phase.

A central point of contact (e.g. facility manager) must be available at the Hospital for local police to approach and request CCTV recordings.

3.3.3. Territorial Reinforcement

1. *Formal Guardians – Security during the construction phase.*

NSW Police have advised that offences such as theft and malicious damage occur frequently at building sites during the construction phase of developments in the area. This occurs primarily out of hours when the site is vacant and can be attributed to poor perimeter security and the presence of attractive items that are stored on-site (e.g. tools, machinery, building materials, etc). Often these items are poorly secured and are easily stolen from the site by offenders.

Recommendation:

The following recommendations should also be adhered to during the construction of the development:

- Arrangement for regular security patrols to be conducted at the site after hours or when it is unattended to guard against unlawful entry to the site and to prevent opportunities for crime to occur.
- The placement of temporary CCTV on-site during the construction phase to protect vulnerable entry/exit points and/or valuable property items.
- The placement of security signage at key points of the construction site warning that the site is protected by on-site security officers, CCTV surveillance, and regular NSW police patrols.
- Signage to be placed at all entry points of the site that provides the name and contact details of the site manager or persons to contact in the event of an emergency or incident.
- The serial numbers and identification details of all high-value items on site are recorded and available to provide to the police in the event of theft and/or damage (e.g. earth moving equipment, Bobcats, front end loaders, etc).

In addition to these recommendations, the building site must be physically secure and protected during the construction period. This includes substantial temporary perimeter fencing as well as ensuring that all vehicle and pedestrian entry points are adequately secured.

2. *Signage/location markers.*

Signage is useful and should be used to supplement and reinforce behavioural expectations and advice. Signs should be clear, legible, and useful.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that the following type of signage be included at all perimeter entry points of the Hospital:

- Private Property – Staff and authorised visitors only.
- These premises are patrolled by Security Guards.
- CCTV surveillance (e.g. this property is protected by 24 hour CCTV and electronic surveillance).
- No cash is kept on-premises.
- All visitors must report to Reception.

3. Vulnerability – night workers/customers.

Crime risk can be reduced for late-night staff and at-risk car park users by reserving easily accessed and well-lit car spaces near guardians.

Recommendation:

In an effort to enhance the safety and security of staff who will be parking at the site either within the below ground secure car park or the external undercover car park, consideration should be given to implementing a parking management plan whereby, persons using the car park during the hours of darkness are always able to park in a secure location that is close to the main building. The below-ground car park is ideal in this regard as it allows staff to enter and exit the building directly via the internal lifts located in the car park.

3.3.4. Environmental Maintenance

Vandalism – malicious damage (including graffiti)

The act and outcome of graffiti can reward offenders. The display of tagging can be a strong motivation to repeat the behaviour. The longer that ‘tags’ are left on display, the greater the reward for the offender.

To counteract the appeal to graffiti vandals, several preventative measures are recommended to reduce the likelihood of the area falling prey to this form of malicious damage.

As such, areas should be highly visible and well used and any independent signage in the vicinity should be highly visible, yet hard to reach. The surface of the walls should be well lit at night with the light sources located out of reach and protected against vandalism.

The security fencing and secured vehicle and pedestrian entry points at the perimeter of the site should be sufficient to prevent unlawful access to the site and therefore prevent graffiti attacks upon the warehouse building itself. Efforts should be taken to protect the perimeter of the site from graffiti attacks notwithstanding the low likelihood of unlawful access to the site.

Recommendation:

It is highly recommended that protective ‘anti-graffiti’ coatings be applied to the following areas of the site:

- The publicly accessible walls of the front of the building adjoining Bourke Road, including the building support poles and garden retaining walls.
- The surface of structures that may form part of the perimeter of the site including but not restricted to all forms of advisory signage, and other surfaces that may be seen as attractive to graffiti offenders (e.g. lighting poles, external driveway/ramp surfaces, water/power facility structures).

In terms of remedial action, **rapid removal** is highly recommended as it counteracts the purpose of the graffiti which is prolonged public display.

3.3.5. Access Control

Security Perimeter – Vehicle and Pedestrian Ingress/Egress Points.

Gates and fences increase the effort required by offenders to access favoured areas. The combined palisade/chain mesh security perimeter fence at the site will serve to protect the internal perimeter areas, warehouse and office area in this regard.

Particular attention has been paid to the rear (south side) of the Hospital as the parking area, ambulance bay and loading dock are covered by the building which creates an undercroft. Undercrofts and other similar areas that are separated from routine street activity have the potential to create safety and crime risks (e.g. assaults, theft, robbery, drug use etc).

Careful consideration has been given to fencing this area and applying access control measures to secure the space to prevent unlawful access to the area. Whilst this option is physically possible, it is not operationally feasible given the nature of the Hospital and in particular, the need for ambulance vehicles, delivery vehicles, medical supply vehicles and commercial vehicles (e.g. waste removal trucks) to enter the site frequently. In the absence of fencing the undercroft perimeter with a palisade security fence and designated access-controlled vehicle entry/exit gates, a range of measures designed to mitigate the risk of antisocial and unlawful behaviour is recommended.

Recommendation:

The following activities are envisaged to take place within the undercroft area:

- Staff and visitor parking (including disabled parking).
- The transfer of patients via ambulance.
- The removal of waste via waste removal truck.
- Commercial deliveries via courier van/truck.

To mitigate the risk of antisocial and/or unlawful behaviour within the undercroft area the following CPTED based treatments are recommended:

- **Closed Circuit Television (CCTV):** The undercroft area should be under the surveillance of CCTV cameras 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Camera installation must ensure that the absence of any blind spots and the field of view (FoV) must ensure that the following detail is captured:
 - the ability to view and record the movement of persons through all areas of the undercroft with the ability to view and record a person's facial features sufficient to establish that person's identity.
 - The ability to view and record the movement of vehicles entering, exiting and parking within the undercroft including the vehicle registration number and colour make and model of the vehicle.
 - Camera position should also enable vision along the sides, front and rear of parked vehicles to eliminate the ability for a person/s to conceal themselves next to, in front of or behind a parked vehicle.

It is also recommended that the CCTV system is monitored in real-time via the use of LCD monitoring screens positioned within the Hospital. The monitoring screens should be placed within the easy view of security personnel if they are to be engaged on-site and also within the easy view of Health Centre staff (e.g. at nursing stations, reception foyer/s). The ability to view the CCTV cameras in real-time has the benefit of staff noticing unusual or indeed unlawful behaviour in the undercroft area and taking preventative action.

- **Lighting:** The area must be well lit at night and if required – during the day to ensure maximum visibility within and of the undercroft is achieved. Motion-sensitive lighting should NOT be used in this area, as the area shouldn't fall into darkness at any time.

This area must be well lit at all times during the hours of darkness and if required during the day if the level of illumination is insufficient to ensure the safety and security of persons using the area. See also section 3.3.2 concerning specific recommendations concerning lighting.

- **Undercroft Painted Surface Colours:** The surfaces of the undercroft area (e.g. staunches, walls and ceiling) should be painted in white reflective colour to maximise the effectiveness of lighting during the hours of darkness and natural light during daylight hours. This will also enhance the quality of the CCTV monitoring and recording in the area.
- **Surveillance – Capable Guardians:** The design of glazing (windows) facing west onto the driveway (Health Centre lobby) and south into the undercroft (lobby, back of house areas and loading bay) should visibility of these areas from within the Hospital. Care should be taken to ensure that the undercroft lighting is sufficiently bright to avoid any ‘mirroring’ effect that may impede the view of persons inside the Hospital seeing out into the undercroft areas. Persons exiting from the Health Centre into the undercroft must also be able to observe the undercroft from within the building before their exit (e.g. via clear vision from windows, and/or CCTV screens) and must be able to see well ahead of their intended travel.
- **Signage:** Observable signage should be erected at the driveway entrance to the site and again within the undercroft area reinforcing the fact that the space is for private use and that trespassing without a lawful excuse is an offence. See section 3.3.1 (4) for recommendations relating to wayfinding.
- **Public to Private Space Transition:** Clear transitional cues including the change of surface material and/or pattern, colour should be present at the driveway entrance at Bourke Rd and again from the proposed driveway into the undercroft to alert members of the public and emphasise the transition from public space to private space. Signage will also amplify this effect and serve to reduce the excuse-making behaviour by persons with nefarious intent.
- **Concealment:** Items must not be stored in the undercroft that could obstruct clear lines of sight or be used by persons to conceal themselves or lie in wait for a victim/s.
- **Parabolic mirrors:** The use of enhanced field of view mirrors should also be considered in the undercroft if their placement can enhance the vision and/or surveillance capabilities of persons using the area including capable guardians such as staff or visitors.

Figure 7 (depicting the driveway and undercroft area inside the broken red line):



Car park

1. Vehicle and pedestrian access

Effective access control measures can be an effective means of regulating vehicle movement to and from car parks and increasing the effort required to steal vehicles or steal from vehicles whilst unattended in car parks.

Recommendation:

The vehicle entry/exit point to the below-ground car park located at the rear of the Hospital should be fitted with robust roller shutter doors or similar to prevent unauthorised access to the car park. These doors should be fitted with an electronic access control system to allow access by users that have been issued an access card. A video intercom system connecting the car park entry/exit to a designated station inside the Hospital should also be installed to allow Hospital staff to identify persons requesting car park entry/exit and remotely open the car park roller shutter doors.

3.3.6. New South Wales Police – CPTED Checklist

The NSW Police CPTED Checklist has also been referred to and taken into consideration as part of this CRA (see **Appendix B**).

In consultation with NBR Architects, all the requirements set out within the NSW Police CPTED checklist will be complied with as part of this development. Where certain requirements are not relevant to this particular project, they have been highlighted in Appendix B.

4. Conclusion

Based on the recognised methodology, statistical crime research, and a physical inspection of the intended site of the proposed development, this report concludes that the Crime Risk Opportunity for the site is 'Medium' (based on a medium rating level for the City of Sydney LGA and a medium-risk rating for the suburb of Alexandria). Based upon an assessment of the available architectural plans of the development, a CPTED rating of 'Low' has been returned for this development. Based on the Crime Risk Opportunity and the CPTED rating, an overall project risk rating of 'Medium' should be assumed for this development. Based on this assessment the recommended actions described in this document should be incorporated into the planning for this development and incorporated into the final design and build of the Hospital.

The measures that have been recommended are specifically designed to enhance the safety and security of the residents, staff, and visitors at the site.



Dave Neal (Grad Dip Crim)

Principal Consultant

4 July 2022.

NEAL Consulting Solutions

NSW Security Industry Licence No 40 8072 702

NSW Security Industry Master Licence No 41 0853 313

Appendix A (Worksheet A)

Worksheet A- Likelihood and Consequence Chart (City of Sydney LGA)

Type of Crime	LGA Ranking	60 mth Trend	Likelihood		Consequence	Crime Risk Opportunity Level
Murder	N/A	Not counted	Unlikely		Catastrophic	Extreme
Domestic violence related assault	N/A	Stable	Possible		Moderate	High
Non-domestic violence related assault	N/A	-11.1%	Likely		Moderate	High
Sexual assault	N/A	Stable	Possible		Moderate	High
Sexual touching, sexual act and other sexual offence	N/A	-12.8%	Possible		Minor	Medium
Robbery	N/A	-19.4%	Possible		Moderate	High
Break and enter dwelling	N/A	-12.8%	Possible		Minor	Medium
Break and enter non-dwelling	N/A	-17.6%	Possible		Minor	Medium
Motor vehicle theft	N/A	-12.1%	Possible		Minor	Medium
Steal from motor vehicle	N/A	-15.5%	Possible		Minor	Medium
Steal from retail store	N/A	-14.2%	Likely		Minor	Medium
Other stealing offences	N/A	-15.2%	Likely		Minor	Medium
Malicious damage to property	N/A	-7.8%	Likely		Minor	Medium
Attempted murder	N/A	Not counted	Unlikely		Major	High
Murder accessory, conspiracy	N/A	Not counted	Unlikely		Major	High
Manslaughter	N/A	Not counted	Possible		Catastrophic	Extreme
Crime Risk Opportunity Levels			Low	Medium	High	Extreme
			0	8	6	2

Overall Crime Risk Rating =			Medium
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Appendix A (Worksheet B)

NSW Crime Statistics: Year to December 2021: Incidents of Assault				
Area	2 Year Trend to December 2021	Count	Year to December 2021 Rate	ALEXANDRIA Rate compared to NSW for year to December 2021
New South Wales	stable	62864	769.7	0.8
ALEXANDRIA	stable	57	578	
Incidents of Homicide (Murder)				
Area	2 Year Trend to December 2021	Count	Year to December 2021 Rate	ALEXANDRIA Rate compared to NSW for year to December 2021
New South Wales	Down 28.7% per year	72	0.9	0.0
ALEXANDRIA	n.c	0	0	
Incidents of Robbery				
Area	2 Year Trend to December 2021	Count	Year to December 2021 Rate	ALEXANDRIA Rate compared to NSW for year to December 2021
New South Wales	Down 16.6% per year	1760	21.5	0.9
ALEXANDRIA	n.c	2	20.3	
Incidents of Sexual Offences				
Area	2 Year Trend to December 2021	Count	Year to December 2021 Rate	ALEXANDRIA Rate compared to NSW for year to December 2021
New South Wales	stable	14560	179.4	0.6
ALEXANDRIA	n.c.	10	101.4	
Incidents of Theft (Inc Break & Enter dwelling and non dwelling, vehicle theft, steal from person etc.)				
Area	2 Year Trend to December 2021	Count	Year to December 2021 Rate	ALEXANDRIA Rate compared to NSW for year to December 2021
New South Wales	stable	169206	2071.7	2.1
ALEXANDRIA	stable	421	4268.9	

Appendix A (Worksheet B)

Incidents of Theft (Fraud)				
Area	2 Year Trend to December 2021	Count	Year to December 2021 Rate	ALEXANDRIA Rate compared to NSW for year to December 2021
New South Wales	stable	44899	549.7	2.1
ALEXANDRIA	stable	115	1166.1	
Malicious damage to property (includes graffiti)				
Area	2 Year Trend to December 2021	Count	Year to December 2021 Rate	ALEXANDRIA Rate compared to NSW for year to December 2021
New South Wales	stable	49136	601.6	0.9
ALEXANDRIA	stable	56	567.8	
Incidents of Disorderly Conduct (Trespass)				
Area	2 Year Trend to December 2021	Count	Year to December 2021 Rate	ALEXANDRIA Rate compared to NSW for year to December 2021
New South Wales	Down 8.9% per year	9311	114	1.2
ALEXANDRIA	n.c.	14	142	
Incidents of Drug Offences				
Area	2 Year Trend to December 2021	Count	Year to December 2021 Rate	ALEXANDRIA Rate compared to NSW for year to December 2021
New South Wales	Down 9.7% per year	47282	578.9	2.7
ALEXANDRIA	stable	154	1561.5	
Incidents of Arson				
Area	2 Year Trend to December 2021	Count	Year to December 2021 Rate	ALEXANDRIA Rate compared to NSW for year to December 2021
New South Wales	stable	3760	46	0.2
ALEXANDRIA	n.c	1	10.1	

Appendix A (Worksheet B)

Incidents of Other offences against the person				
Area	2 Year Trend to December 2021	Count	Year to December 2021 Rate	ALEXANDRIA Rate compared to NSW for year to December 2021
New South Wales	Up 37.8% per year	1883	23.1	0.0
ALEXANDRIA	n.c	0	0	

Appendix A (Worksheet C)

Worksheet C - Likelihood and Consequence Chart (Suburb of Alexandria)				
Type of Crime	Likelihood		Consequence	Crime Risk Opportunity Level
Incidents of Assault	Unlikely		Moderate	Medium
Incidents of Homicide (Murder)	Rare		Catastrophic	High
Incidents of Robbery	Unlikely		Moderate	Medium
Incidents of Sexual Offences	Unlikely		Moderate	Medium
Incidents of Theft (Inc. Break & Enter dwelling and non dwelling, vehicle theft, steal from person etc.)	Almost Certain		Moderate	Extreme
Incidents of Theft (Fraud)	Almost Certain		Moderate	Extreme
Incidents of malicious damage to property	Unlikely		Minor	Low
Incidents of Disorderly Conduct (Trespass)	Possible		Minor	Medium
Incidents of Drug Offences	Almost Certain		Minor	High
Incidents of Arson	Rare		Moderate	Medium
Incidents of Other offences against the person	Rare		Minor	Low
Crime Risk Opportunity Levels	Low	Medium	High	Extreme
	2	5	2	2

Overall Crime Risk Rating =	Medium
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Appendix A (Worksheet D)

Surveillance						
No	Feature being assessed		Good	Deficient	N/A	Associated Comments
1	Buildings	- orientation	1			
2		- frontages/set backs	1			
3		- doors, windows, balconies	1			
4		- foyers, lobbies, lifts	1			Care should be taken to ensure that the window glazing on the ground level of the facility does not obstruct the view of the Bourke Rd external foyer area or the rear parking area by departing occupants of the building.
5		- internal visibility	1			The use of opaque glass on the frontages of commercial premises should be avoided. Clear lines of sight into these premises from outside serves to enhance natural surveillance by passers-by and reduce opportunities for crime to occur.
6		- delivery/loading areas	1			The loading dock located at the rear (south side) of the property is adjacent to the external undercover car park and specifically the ambulance bay and waiting space. This area creates an undercroft which will be out of public view from Bourke Rd. Notwithstanding, there will be some level of natural surveillance of the dock area by staff and persons using the undercroft parking area. The area should also be subject to CCTV surveillance in the form of monitoring and recording. See Section 3.3.5 - Access Control re treatment recommendations for this area.
7		- communal areas	1			The waste area for the site is expected to be located within the vicinity of the loading bay at the rear of the property within a secure space. The waste area should not be located in leftover space. When these areas are located they ideally should be located in active and well supervised areas and should be the subject of CCTV surveillance.
8	Grade separated space		1			The potential for grade separated space has been examined. This occurs at the driveway to the site and the front stairs leading to the front foyer of the building. The driveway entry at the front of the site (Bourke Rd) has a reduced level (RL) of 8.410 and 10.410 at the rear (sth end) of the driveway which represents 2m fall from south to north. The bottom of the stairs at Bourke Rd is 8.410 and the top of the stairs is 10.410 which also represents a fall from the top to the bottom of the stairs of 2m. The driveway and the front stairs will not create grade separated space (where line of sight and surveillance can be adversely affected).
9	Spatial gaps - vacant land		1			
10	Public telephones				1	
11	Automatic teller machines				1	
12	Transport stands - shelters				1	
13	Off street parking		1			
14	Underpasses - Tunnels				1	
15	Overpasses - footbridges				1	
16	Car park - internal obstructions		1			
17	Car park - configuration of bays		1			
18	Car park - ceiling height		1			The ceiling height for the below ground and undercover car park is expected to be 3.6m and 4.5m respectively based upon preliminary plans provided within Appendix E of the RFP prepared in Jan 2022 by Johnstaff Projects Pty Ltd.
19	Fencing - perimeter visibility				1	
20	Public toilets and change rooms				1	
	Parks				1	
22	Playgrounds				1	
23	Pedestrian - cycle pathways/routes				1	
24	Way finding		1			Wayfinding signage will be required at the site in order to direct vehicle traffic to the appropriate parking space (e.g. either below ground or undercover car park), emergency (ambulance) and commercial (waste) vehicle parking spaces. Signage will also be required to direct pedestrians to the facility sought (e.g. pharmacy, hospital etc) if approaching on foot from the street or after parking on the site.
25	Vegetation - type /quality		1			
26	Vegetation - coverage/quantity		1			
27	Street furniture				1	
28	Cycle parking				1	
29	Concealment - entrapment opportunities		1			See Section 3.3.5 - Access Control re treatment recommendations for the rear undercroft area of the hospital.
Totals			17	0	12	

Appendix A (Worksheet D)

Lighting						
No	Feature being assessed		Good	Deficient	N/A	
30	Lighting	- type	1			A lighting plan will be prepared for the site. Lighting has been assessed as 'good' on the basis that the lighting recommendations provided in the main CRA report will be followed (see Sect 3.3.2).
31		- brightness	1			
32		- distribution/reflection	1			
33		- reproduction of colour	1			
34		- vandal resistance	1			
35		- obstructions	1			
36		- of signs & important structures	1			
37	Mirrors - corridors/tunnels/fire exit stairs				1	
38	Mirrors - ATMs/night safes				1	
39	CCTV - type/use		1			Strategically located digital CCTV cameras connected to a suitable CCTV DVR will need to be installed as part of this development. Specific areas of the site have also been identified where CCTV surveillance and recording will be especially important (see Section 3.3.2 - CCTV).
40	CCTV - coverage		1			As above.
41	CCTV - vandal resistance		1			As above.
42	Help phones/intercoms/public address		1			
			11	0	2	

Appendix A (Worksheet D)

Territorial Reinforcement					
No	Feature being assessed	Good	Deficient	N/A	
43	Community guardians	1			
44	Formal guardians	1			During the construction phase, regular security patrols will be required during out of hours periods when the site is unattended.
45	Clarity of ownership	1			
46	Place marking/street art/animation			1	
47	Space transition	1			Recommendations regarding clear transitional clues have been provided in the main report. See Section 3.3.5.
48	Celebrated entries	1			
49	Signage/location markers	1			See item 24.
50	Vulnerability - night workers/customers	1			The safety and well being of night staff (e.g. doctors, nurses, kitchen staff etc) and visitors to the site would be enhanced via access to secure parking on site (e.g. either the secured undercover or below ground car parks) in addition to well lit and signposted pathways to the building from these car parks.
51	Street vendors/buskers			1	
52	Proximity to high risk groups/locations	1			
53	Area reputation	1			
Totals		9	0	2	
Environmental Maintenance					
No	Feature being assessed	Good	Deficient	N/A	
54	Area image	1			
55	Vandalism - malicious damage (includes graffiti)	1			
56	Rubbish	1			
57	Urban decay	1			
58	Lighting - maintenance	1			
59	Landscaping - maintenance	1			
60	Other - maintenance	1			
61	Robustness of structures - materials			1	
62	Rubbish bins			1	
Totals		7	0	2	
Activity and Space Management					
No	Feature being assessed	Good	Deficient	N/A	
63	Clarity of land use	1			
64	Conflicting activity	1			
65	Safe activities are located in unsafe areas			1	
66	Unsafe activities are located in safe areas			1	
67	Proximity to licensed premises			1	
68	Night activity - transport	1			
69	Street activity during the night	1			
70	Street activity during the day	1			
71	Functional vulnerability - mixed zoning	1			
72	Crime displacement			1	
73	Neighbourhood edges			1	
Totals		6	0	5	

Appendix A (Worksheet D)

Access Control					
No	Feature being assessed	Good	Deficient	N/A	
74	Street - type	1			
75	Linking pathways			1	
76	Building - number of entry/egress points			1	
77	Building - ease of access to side/rear	1			The undercover car park at the rear of the premises creates an undercroft that is subject to little natural surveillance and concealed from public view from Bourke Road. See Section 3.3.5 - Access Control re treatment recommendations for the rear undercroft area of the hospital.
78	Building - fire exits and stairs	1			
79	Building - dumpster bays/loading docks	1			See Item No 7.
80	Building - natural ladders	1			
81	Gardens - storage sheds			1	
82	Doors - security/entry control systems	1			Electronic access control and some remote release door switches will be required for installation at the site to control access to back of house areas used by staff/contractors and other sensitive areas of the hospital (e.g. drug storage rooms etc). Remote door release switches and video intercoms may be required to assist with the control of staff and visitors into the facility after hours via staff entry points and/or lobby areas.
83	Windows - glazing protection	1			
84	Windows - skylights/security hardware	1			Access to the roof of the property will be strictly controlled and limited to authorised personnel only.
85	Car park - pedestrian access	1			Pedestrian and vehicle access to the car park and loading docks will be secured and access controlled to prevent unauthorised use and/or unlawful entry.
86	Car park - vehicle access	1			As above.
87	Car park - actual/symbolic barriers	1			
88	Car park - management of space	1			
89	Car park - recreational use	1			
90	Safe routes			1	
91	Child play areas			1	
92	Shortcuts - trespassing opportunities			1	
93	Defensive vegetation			1	
94	Cash carry routes			1	
95	Reception - cashier/mail rooms			1	
Totals		13	0	9	
Design, Definition and Designation Conflict					
No	Feature being assessed	Good	Deficient	N/A	
96	Design, purpose and space definition in harmony	1			
97	It is clear who is responsible for the space	1			
98	Spatial boundaries/boarders (intended function)	1			
99	Social/cultural norms accord with intended function	1			
100	Legal and administrative requirements are reinforced	1			
Totals		5	0	0	
Site Opportunity Section -Totals		Good	Deficient	N/A	
1. Surveillance		17	0	12	
2. Lighting		11	0	2	
3. Territorial Reinforcement		9	0	2	
4. Environmental Maintenance		7	0	2	
5. Activity and Space Management		6	0	5	
6. Access Control		13	0	9	
7. Design, Definition & Designation		5	0	0	
Totals		68	0	32	




Appendix B


NSW POLICE








Crime Prevention through Environmental Design Checklist



CPTED MEASURES	RECOMMENDATIONS	COMPLY YES ✓	IF NO, PLEASE PROVIDE JUSTIFICATION
<p>* Where relevant, each item is to be shown on the architectural plans. A description of how the development complies, together with the corresponding plan reference number, should also be provided.</p> <p>* This checklist is designed to assist the Developer to introduce these CPTED measures into a final Safer By Design Report.</p>			
1. STREET NUMBER / WAY FINDING SIGNAGE	<p>1.1 The street number must be clearly visible from the street.</p> <p>1.2 The street number must be visible at night.</p> <p>1.3 Unit block identification signage must be visible from the street frontage.</p>	✓	
2. SIGNAGE	<p>2.1 There must be directional signage located at the entry to the estate/complex clearly indicating location of estate managers office, building names and unit numbers.</p> <p>2.2 There must be warning signs displayed.</p> <p>2.3 The warning signs must be appropriate.</p> <p>2.4 A map must be displayed of the complex.</p>	✓	
3. FENCES AND GATES	<p>3.1 Alcoves or recesses must be monitored by CCTV.</p>	✓	





CPTED MEASURES	RECOMMENDATIONS	COMPLY YES 	IF NO, PLEASE PROVIDE JUSTIFICATION
	<p>3.2 Garbage bays must be locked to restrict unauthorised entry.</p> <p>3.3 There must be a 'Rapid Removal' policy for graffiti.</p> <p>3.4 There must be graffiti resistant materials utilised in the design of the building. For example painted on masonry garden walls, fencing.</p> <p>3.5 There must be perimeter fences erected around the property.</p> <p>3.6 Access must not be restricted by large garbage bins or other objects.</p> <p>3.7 Fences must be fitted with locks.</p> <p>3.8 Fences and gates must be in good condition.</p> <p>3.9 Fences must be constructed of appropriate materials.</p> <p>3.10 Gates must be secured.</p> <p>3.11 If the estate complex is a gated complex local Ambulance, Fire Brigade and Police must have keys/swipe cards etc for access in an emergency.</p> <p>3.12 Gate locking mechanisms must be at a distance unable to be reached by a human arm.</p> <p>3.13 Fences need to be at a height that does not allow jump access.</p> <p>3.14 Box lights, garden beds or any other fixed objects must not be built near fence lines and used as a ladder.</p>		The recommendations referred to will be adhered to by the site tenants upon taking up occupation.
4. LANDSCAPING	<p>4.1 People must be able to see your unit/premises clearly from the street.</p> <p>4.2 Landscaping must be regularly maintained.</p> <p>4.3 No person should be able to conceal themselves behind vegetation or gardens.</p>		




CPTED MEASURES	RECOMMENDATIONS	COMPLY YES ✓	IF NO, PLEASE PROVIDE JUSTIFICATION
5. SECURITY LIGHTING	5.1 Security lighting must be installed. 5.2 Security lighting must be operating. 5.3 The entry and exit points must be adequately lit. 5.4 Lighting must be positioned in a way to reduce opportunities for vandalism. 5.5 The lighting must be sufficient to support images obtained from CCTV footage. 5.6 Light switches for all lights must be located in a secure area within the premises. 5.7 There must be light timers.	✓	
6. POWER BOARD & LETTERBOX	6.1 The power board must be enclosed in a cabinet or room. 6.2 The cabinet or room must be fitted with a lock set approved by the local authority. 6.3 The cabinet or room must be kept locked. 6.4 The letter box must be fitted with an appropriate lock set and kept locked.  <p><i>This is a strongly recommended method on how to secure the letter box collection facility in a unit complex.</i></p> 6.5 The letter box collection facility must be enclosed in the foyer window of the property that has street frontage. 6.6 The letter box collection facility must be in view of video surveillance.	✓	In terms of item 6.4, it is anticipated that mail will be delivered directly to reception staff in the foyer of the facility during the day. If the tenancies on upper levels of the site require mail boxes, they will be located in the secure ground floor foyer of the site.
7. GARAGE	7.1 The garage must be lockable. 7.2 The garage 'tilta' door must have a bolt lock installed.	N/A	

CPTED MEASURES	RECOMMENDATIONS	COMPLY YES 	IF NO, PLEASE PROVIDE JUSTIFICATION
	<p>7.3 The garage facility must have floor to ceiling wall. For example strong mesh or masonry walls.</p> <p>7.4 The garage ceiling and walls must be painted white or a light coloured concrete must be used. This will enhance the light in the basement.</p> <p>7.5 The contents inside the garage facility must not be able to be visible from the outside.</p> <p>7.6 The garage facilities must have CCTV coverage.</p> <p>7.7 The garage facility area must be restricted to non-residents by way of security gates.</p>		
8. BALCONY	<p>8.1 The balcony must be designed so as not to act as a natural ladder.</p> <p>8.2 The balcony must be adequately designed so as not to allow hand and foot holds to potential offenders trying to scale up the outside of the building.</p> <p>8.3 The railings must be designed so that foot or hand grips cannot be used by offenders.</p> <p>8.4 The balcony must have a sensor light to automatically activate when motion is detected.</p> <p>8.5 Sliding doors and windows adjacent to balconies must be re-enforced with adequate locks etc to restrict unauthorised access.</p>	N/A	

CPTED MEASURES	RECOMMENDATIONS	COMPLY YES 	IF NO, PLEASE PROVIDE JUSTIFICATION
9. DOORS AND FIRE EXITS	<p>9.1 The external doors must be of solid construction.</p> <p>9.2 The door frames must be of solid construction.</p> <p>9.3 The doors must be fitted with quality lock sets to restrict access when not in use.</p> <p>9.4 The locks must be in good working order.</p> <p>9.5 A peep hole (door viewer) must be installed.</p> <p>9.6 An Australian standard security/screen door must be installed on the front door or any glass sliding doors.</p> <p>9.7 Security screen doors are recommended for ground to 3rd Floor unit complexes.</p> <p>9.8 Balconies are to be designed with anti climb features.</p> <p>9.9 Sliding doors must be fitted with a suitable lock sets.</p> <p>9.10 Entry/exit points must be clearly identified by signage.</p> <p>9.11 All fire exit doors must be self-closing.</p> <p>9.12 All external door hinges must be mounted so they cannot be removed?</p>		
10. WINDOWS	<p>10.1 All external windows must be solidly constructed.</p> <p>10.2 All windows must be fitted with quality lock sets.</p> <p>10.3 All unused windows must be permanently closed & secured.</p> <p>10.4 Windows must be able to be locked in a partially open position. For example with a bolt lock.</p> <p>10.5 Skylights must be suitably secured.</p> <p>10.6 Keys must be removed from locks when no persons are home.</p>		
11. CARPARK	<p>11.1 There must be security car parking facilities available.</p> <p>11.2 Residents must have an individual secured garage spaces.</p>		

CPTED MEASURES	RECOMMENDATIONS	COMPLY YES 	IF NO, PLEASE PROVIDE JUSTIFICATION
	<p>11.3 The access to residential car park must be restricted to residents only.</p> <p>11.4 Access and control must be restricted to residents only by keypad, swipe card or remote system.</p> <p>11.5 'Park Smarter' signage must be displayed within this area to warn motorists to secure their vehicle and property.</p> <p>11.6 CCTV system must be installed and monitor inside the car park facility.</p> <p>11.7 All residents must be supplied with additional storage facilities so that items are not left in areas where they can be seen or easily removed.</p> <p>11.8 The car park must be well lit.</p> <p>11.9 The ceiling of the car park must be painted white.</p> <p>11.10 The car park entry must be restricted by a security roller shutter.</p> <p>11.11 Access to the security roller shutter must have access control measures such as swipe card, key pad or remote system.</p> <p>11.12 Bicycle racks must be positioned in visible areas from the street.</p> <p>11.13 Emergency Services parking should be provided in a large unit complex.</p>		
12. SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM	<p>12.1 CCTV systems must be installed at vehicle entry points.</p> <p>12.2 CCTV systems must be installed at all foyer entry points.</p> <p>12.3 CCTV systems must be installed on the perimeter of the building.</p> <p>12.4 CCTV systems must be installed near to letter box collection facilities.</p> <p>12.5 CCTV systems must be installed near to waste facilities.</p> <p>12.6 CCTV systems must be installed near to fire exits.</p> <p>12.7 Footage must be recorded appropriately.</p> <p>12.8 Footage must be kept for a minimum of 14 days.</p> <p>12.9 The property must be free of dummy cameras.</p>		<p>CCTV will be installed to monitor the mail boxes if they are to be installed into the secure foyer of the site.</p> <p>All other requirements will be complied with.</p>

CPTED MEASURES	RECOMMENDATIONS	COMPLY YES 	IF NO, PLEASE PROVIDE JUSTIFICATION
	<p>12.10 The cameras must be placed in suitable locations to positively identify an individual from recorded images.</p> <p>12.11 Information must be provide on where the CCTV system will be stored.</p> <p>12.12 Information must be provided on who will be able to access the footage.</p>		
13. FIRE SAFETY	<p>13.1 Smoke detectors must be installed within foyer areas and garages of unit blocks to comply with the Building Code of Australia?</p> <p>13.2 Smoke detector must be installed in the unit complex.</p> <p>13.3 Gutters must be kept clean.</p> <p>13.4 The unit complex must have a site plan displayed in a prominent position.</p> <p>13.5 Waste bins must be stored in a secure place after hours.</p>		
14. Construction Stage	<p>14.1 During construction stage all tools and building materials must be stored in strong rooms with tamper proof security systems.</p> <p>14.2 Construction sites should be fenced with appropriate security fencing.</p> <p>14.3 Security Guards should be used during high risk times.</p> <p>14.4 CCTV should be used during construction stage.</p> <p>14.5 Lighting should be installed on the grounds of the construction site.</p> <p>14.6 Lighting should be installed near to containers/storage facilities.</p>		
15. Rooftop	<p>15.1 Are retaining walls/fencing/ barriers adequate to prevent accidental falls/ slips/suicide attempts</p> <p>15.2 Are there protocols in place to monitor and regulate the times in which the roof common areas can be used by residents (to minimise noise issues)</p>		

CPTED MEASURES	RECOMMENDATIONS	COMPLY YES 	IF NO, PLEASE PROVIDE JUSTIFICATION
16. Security Consultant	<p>16.1 With the large developments, it is advantageous to engage a Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Consultant to compile a Safer by Design Report.</p> <p>16.2 It is also advantageous to engage a Security Consultant to assist with the correct camera placements.</p>		<p>In terms of item 16.2, consideration will be given to engaging a suitable qualified security consultant to assist with camera placement as part of the CCTV system installation process.</p>
17. Emergency Management	<p>17.1 An Emergency Management / Evacuation Plan must be developed for the building prior to occupation and forwarded to Emergency Services.</p> <p>17.2 Police recommend that there must be an inspection with a Town Planner and the Building Manager prior to Occupancy Certificate Stage.</p>		

Disclaimer

NSW Police Force has a vital interest in ensuring the safety of members of the community and their property. By using recommendations contained within this document, any person who does so acknowledges that:

- It is not possible to make areas evaluated by NSW Police Force absolutely safe for the community and their property.
- Recommendations are based upon information provided to, and observations made by NSW Police Force at the time the document was prepared.
- The evaluation/report is a confidential document and is for use by the person/organisation referred to at the start of this document.
- The contents of this evaluation/report are not to be copied or circulated otherwise than for the purposes of the person/organisation referred to at the start of this assessment.
- NSW Police Force hopes that by using the recommendations contained within the document, criminal activity will be reduced and the safety of the community will be increased.

Appendix C

Photographs taken by David Neal during the site visit to 28-32 Bourke Road, Alexandria on Tuesday, 24 May 2022.

Image 1: General image of 28-32 Bourke Rd Alexandria building frontage.



Image 2: Front of 28-32 Bourke Rd adjoining the Mecca Coffee building.



Image 3: Front of 28-32 Bourke Rd depicting graffiti.



Image 4: Front of 28-32 Bourke Rd depicting graffiti



Image 5: Rear pathway behind 28-32 Bourke Rd looking east.




Image 6: Rear pathway behind 28-32 Bourke Rd looking west.

