
Appendix O

CPTED assessment

Parramatta Over and Adjacent Station Development CPTED Assessment

Appendix O

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Technical Checker	Consultant	Simon West	19/09/2022
Technical Reviewer	Consultant	Mark Hill	19/09/2022
Coordinator Check	Senior Environmental Advisor	Jonathon Cook	20/09/2022
Approver	SM EDA Lead	Adrian Garnero	21/09/2022

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Glossary

Term	Definition
ASD	Adjacent Station Development
CBD	Central Business District
Concept and Stage 1 Approval	Application SSI-10038, including all major civil construction works between Westmead and The Bays, including station excavation and tunnelling, associated with the Sydney Metro West line
Concept SSDA	A concept development application as defined in section 4.22 of the EP&A Act. It is a development application that sets out the concept for the development of a site, and for which detailed proposals for the site or for separate parts of the site are to be the subject of a subsequent development application or applications
Council	City of Parramatta
CPTED	Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
CSSI	Critical state significant infrastructure
DPE	Department of Planning and Environment
EIS	Environmental Impact Statement
EP&A Act	Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979
GFA	Gross floor area
LGA	Local Government Area
OSD	Over Station Development
SEARs	Secretary's Environmental Assessment Requirements
SSD	State Significant Development
SSI	State Significant Infrastructure
Stage 2 CSSI Application	Application (SSI-19238057) seeking approval to carry out major civil construction works between The Bays and Sydney CBD including station excavation and tunnelling, associated with the Sydney Metro West railway
Stage 3 CSSI Application	Application (SSI-22765520) seeking approval to carry out rail infrastructure, stations, precincts and operation of the Sydney Metro West line
Sydney Metro West	Construction and operation of a metro rail line and associated stations between Westmead and the Sydney CBD as described in section 1.1

Term	Definition
The site	The site which is the subject of the Concept SSDA

Executive summary

This Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) report supports a Concept State Significant Development Application (Concept SSDA) submitted to the Department of Planning and Environment (DPE) pursuant to Part 4 of the *Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979* (EP&A Act). The Concept SSDA is made under section 4.22 of the EP&A Act.

Sydney Metro is seeking to secure concept approval for an over station development (OSD) and adjacent station development (ASD) on the Parramatta metro station site (referred to as the 'proposed development'). The proposed development will comprise three new commercial office buildings (Buildings A, C, D), and one new residential building (Building B).

The Concept SSDA seeks consent for a building envelope and mixed-use purposes, maximum building height, a maximum gross floor area (GFA), pedestrian and vehicular access, circulation arrangements and associated car parking, and the strategies and design parameters for the future detailed design of the proposed development.

This CPTED report responds specifically to the Secretary's Environmental Assessment Requirements (SEARs). It provides a desktop analysis of the concept architectural plans for the proposed development. The purpose of CPTED is to utilise design and place-management principles to reduce the fear and incidence of crime.

This report assesses the plans against the following six key principles of CPTED which are natural surveillance, natural access control, territorial reinforcement, image and management / maintenance, activity support and site/target hardening. The assessment found that the concept design proposed has already incorporated a number of CPTED principles and provides adequate opportunity for the implementation of further CPTED principles in the future design. Mitigation measures for consideration during the preparation of the subsequent design stages are summarised below.

Natural surveillance

The proposed developments have an opportunity to create formal lobby areas with manned concierge / security personnel that can provide surveillance of their respective developments in addition to the adjacent public realm areas. By extension, the design of these ground floor areas, and immediate floors above, should maximise surveillance opportunities.

Natural access control

An effective lighting strategy is required for the proposed developments that will contribute to public perception of safety by reducing fear, increasing community activity and increasing the chance that offenders will be detected and apprehended.

Territorial reinforcement

Signage and wayfinding concept is required for the proposed developments as effective wayfinding systems contribute to a sense of well-being, safety, and security. Furthermore, synergy and integration between the proposed development and precinct wide signage and wayfinding can reduce any potential user confusion.

Image and management / maintenance

Ensure appropriate measures are in place to maintain the proposed development including landscaping, lighting, overall cleanliness of the site, removing and repairing vandalism or graffiti and promptly repairing and replacing any destruction to property.

Activity support

The internodal links between the proposed bus interchange on Smith Street and light rail station on Macquarie Street will encourage pedestrian flow. However, with this increased activity there is a high likelihood that this attracts increased level of loitering and vagrancy. Therefore, as a general rule, but particularly in this internodal link area, ensure the proposed development building design limits spaces or dark areas where loitering and vagrancy can take place.

Site / target hardening

Define an access control strategy for both pedestrians and vehicles, with associated security measures, for the proposed development that defines security zones such as public, semi-public, semi-private, private and restricted.

1 Introduction

1.1 Sydney Metro West

Sydney Metro West will double rail capacity between Greater Parramatta and the Sydney Central Business District (CBD), transforming Sydney for generations to come. The once in a century infrastructure investment will have a target travel time of about 20 minutes between Parramatta and the Sydney CBD, link new communities to rail services and support employment growth and housing supply.

Stations have been confirmed at Westmead, Parramatta, Sydney Olympic Park, North Strathfield, Burwood North, Five Dock, The Bays, Pyrmont and Hunter Street (Sydney CBD).

Sydney Metro West station locations are shown in Figure 1-1.




Figure 1-1 Sydney Metro West

1.2 Background and planning context

Sydney Metro is seeking to deliver Parramatta metro station under a two-part planning approval process. The station fit-out infrastructure is to be delivered under a Critical State Significant Infrastructure (CSSI) application subject to provisions under division 5.2 of the *Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979* (EP&A Act), whereas the over and adjacent station developments are to be delivered under a State Significant Development (SSD) subject to the provisions of part 4 of the EP&A Act.

1.2.1 Critical State Significant Infrastructure

The State Significant Infrastructure (SSI) planning approval process for the Sydney Metro West metro line, including delivery of station infrastructure, has been broken down into a number of planning application stages, comprising the following:

- Stage 1 CSSI Approval (SSI-10038) – All major civil construction works between Westmead and The Bays including station excavation, tunnelling and demolition of existing buildings (approved 11 March 2021)

- Stage 2 CSSI Application (SSI-19238057) – All major civil construction works between The Bays and Sydney CBD (approved 24 August 2022)
- Stage 3 CSSI Application (SSI-22765520) – Tunnel fit-out, construction of stations, ancillary facilities and station precincts between Westmead and the Sydney CBD, and operation and maintenance of the Sydney Metro West line (under assessment, lodged).

1.2.2 State Significant Development Application

The SSD will be undertaken as a staged development with the subject Concept State Significant Development Application (Concept SSDA) being consistent with the meaning under section 4.22 of the EP&A Act and seeking conceptual approval for a building envelope, land uses, maximum building heights, a maximum gross floor area, pedestrian and vehicle access, vertical circulation arrangements and associated car parking. A subsequent Detailed SSDA is to be prepared by a future development partner which will seek consent for detailed design and construction of the development.

1.3 Purpose and scope

This Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) report supports a Concept SSDA submitted to the Department of Planning and Environment (DPE) pursuant to Part 4 of the EP&A Act. The Concept SSDA is made under section 4.22 of the EP&A Act.

This report has been prepared to specifically respond to the Secretary's Environmental Assessment Requirements (SEARs) issued for the Concept SSDA on 22 February 2022 which states that the Environmental Impact Statement is to address the requirements shown in Table 1-1.

Table 1-1 SEARs and where this is addressed in this SSD report

Key Issue	SEARs requirement	Where addressed in report
6. Public Space	Illustrate the integration between station infrastructure and the development including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • any CPTED mitigation measures required that are related to the SSD. 	Sections 4 and 5
	Address how CPTED principles are to be integrated into the development, in accordance with Crime Prevention and the Assessment of Development Applications Guidelines.	Sections 3.2 and 4

2 The site and proposal

2.1 Site location and description

The subject application is in the Parramatta CBD, in the City of Parramatta Local Government Area (LGA). It is within the city block bounded by George Street, Church Street, Smith Street, and Macquarie Street.

The site presents a 164m long frontage to Macquarie Street, 125m frontage to George Street, 48m frontage to Church Street, and 15.5m frontage to Smith Street (in the form of Macquarie Lane).

The site location is shown in Figure 2-1.




Figure 2-1 Parramatta metro station precinct location

As described in Table 2-1, the site comprises fourteen different allotments of varying sizes. It is irregular in shape, with a total area of approximately 24,899m².

Table 2-1 Site legal description

Street address	Legal description
41-59 George Street	Lot 10 in DP858392
45A George Street	Lot 2 in DP701456
61B George Street	Lot 1 in DP607181
71 George Street	Lot 100 in DP607789
220 Church Street	Lot 1 in DP1041242
222 Church Street	Lot 1 in DP702291
232 Church Street	Lot 1 in DP651992
236 Church Street	Lot 1 in DP128437
238 Church Street	Lot 2 in DP591454
48 Macquarie Street	Lot B in DP394050
58-60 Macquarie Street	Lot 1 in DP399104
62-64 Macquarie Street	Lot AY in DP400258
68 Macquarie Street	Lot 1 in DP711982
70 Macquarie Street	Lot E DP 402952
72 Macquarie Street	Lot 3 in DP218510
74 Macquarie Street	Lot H in DP405846

2.2 Overview of this proposal

The Concept SSDA will seek consent for four building envelopes as detailed in Table 2-2 and Figure 2-2.

Table 2-2 Parramatta metro station proposed development overview

Item	Description
Building use	Building A: Commercial and retail Building B: Residential and retail Building C: Commercial Building D: Commercial and retail
Building Height (Number of storeys)	Building A: 38 storeys Building B: 33 storeys Building C: 26 storeys Building D: 25 storeys

Gross Floor Area (m²)

Building A: 78,700

Building B: 20,000

Building C: 35,950

Building D: 55,350

TOTAL: 190,000

Car parking spaces

455




Figure 2-2 Proposed Concept SSDA development and CSSI scope

3 Scope of assessment

3.1 Context

This report provides a desktop analysis of the concept architectural plans prepared by Sydney Metro for the proposed development including commercial, residential, and retail components above the Parramatta metro station.

This report assesses the plans against the following six key principles of CPTED:

- natural surveillance
- natural access control
- territorial reinforcement
- image and management / maintenance
- activity support
- site/target hardening.

The purpose of CPTED is to utilise design and place-management principles to reduce the likelihood of essential crime ingredients from intersecting in time and space. CPTED aims to create the perception that the risk of committing the crime is greater than the likely benefits.

This CPTED assessment has been prepared in accordance with the requirements detailed within:

- T MU SY 20001 ST Transport for New South Wales Physical Security Standards
- ISO 22341:2021 - Security and Resilience — Protective Security — Guidelines for Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design.

3.1.1 Assumptions

No assumptions have been made in preparing this CPTED assessment, where clarification may have a material change on the analysis and recommendations.

3.1.2 Constraints

The following constraints have been identified in preparing this CPTED assessment, where the limitation may have a material change on the analysis and recommendations:

- a site inspection has not been carried out
- certain aspects of the station/site design continue to evolve
- It should be noted that the application of CPTED principles is not a guarantee that all criminal or anti-social behaviour can be prevented. While CPTED principles may not eliminate all criminal behaviour, application of the principles to a development can significantly reduce criminal and anti-social behaviour. Also, the application of such principles can heighten awareness and increase positive perceptions of personal and public safety.

3.1.3 Exclusions

The following item has been excluded from consideration in this CPTED assessment:

- Internal area of Parramatta metro station (refer to Figure 2-2 for in scope areas).

3.2 Principles

CPTED is a strategy aimed at increasing the level of risk perceived by would-be-offenders, that they will be seen, challenged or caught. It simultaneously seeks to lower the risk perceived by legitimate users of the space who feel safer due to positive CPTED characteristics being present. This encourages use of space by legitimate users, who become available witnesses to offences which assists in deterring would-be-offenders.

3.2.1 Natural surveillance

Natural surveillance aims to create an actual and perceived risk of detection of antisocial and illegal activities. Natural surveillance can be achieved through ensuring and creating clear sightlines, generating more 'eyes on the street' by creating environments that encourage and attract legitimate users to a space for longer periods, and through adequate lighting to facilitate night-time activities. Areas with good natural surveillance ensure potential offenders are kept under observation from legitimate users of the space, or from oversight from neighbouring areas, or passing pedestrian and vehicular traffic, which deter and discourage illegitimate users of the space.

Natural surveillance aims to provide opportunities for people engaged in their normal daily business to observe the space around them. Natural surveillance works by designing the placement of physical features, activities, and people in such a way so that maximum visibility and positive interaction occurs among legitimate users of the space.

3.2.2 Natural access control

Natural access control involves the use of physical or symbolic barriers to attract, channel, or restrict the movement of people. Natural access control can be achieved through the use of footpaths, landscaping, fencing and gates, lighting, signage, way-finding, indicator boards, symbols, monuments, markers, or landmarks to direct and control pedestrian movement through an area, restrict access to assets, and to notify or symbolise building/precinct entries, boundaries or areas.

Effective natural access control decreases opportunities for crime by controlling access to a potential target, discouraging or deterring potential offenders from entering certain areas, and by creating a perception of risk to an offender.

3.2.3 Territorial reinforcement

The design concept of territorial reinforcement seeks to promote notions of proprietary concern and a sense of ownership in legitimate users of a space, thereby reducing criminal opportunities by discouraging the presence of illegitimate users. It includes symbolic barriers (e.g., signage, subtle changes in road texture) and real barriers (e.g., fences or design elements that clearly define and delineate private, semi-private and public spaces).

3.2.4 Image and management / maintenance

Image and management/maintenance seek to promote a positive image and routine maintenance of the built environment to ensure the continued effective functioning of the physical environment, and this also transmits positive signals to all users. The physical condition and image of the built environment has the potential to affect the amount of crime and the fear of crime positively or negatively in an area.

Poorly maintained urban space can attract crime and deter use by legitimate users. Proper maintenance allows for the continued use of a space for its intended purpose and serves as an additional expression of ownership. Maintenance prevents the reduction of visibility from landscaping overgrowth and obstructed or inoperative lighting.

3.2.5 Activity support

Legitimate activity support uses design and signage to encourage acceptable behaviour in the usage of public space, and places unsafe activities (such as those involving money transactions) in safe locations (those with high levels of activity and with surveillance opportunities). Similarly, safe activities serve as attractors for legitimate users who could then act to discourage offending. This concept has clear links with those of territoriality, access control and surveillance.

3.2.6 Site / target hardening

Site/target hardening increases the effort and risk of offending and reduces the rewards associated with the commission of a crime and is a long-established and traditional crime prevention technique. It focuses on denying or limiting access to a crime target through the use of physical barriers such as fences, gates, security doors and locks. Site/target hardening is often considered to be access control on a micro scale.

3.3 Methodology

In undertaking the CPTED assessment for this location, the assessment team used a risk-based approach and established CPTED design principles to enhance the inherent security and safety within the built environment. The CPTED approach used is in accordance with T MU SY 20001 ST Surface Transport Physical Security Standard, and ISO 22341:2021 - Security and Resilience — Protective Security — Guidelines for Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design.

The objective of this CPTED assessment is to identify opportunities for the design team to 'design out' security vulnerabilities and 'design in' risk mitigation measures by applying the six CPTED concepts mentioned above.

The methodology for this CPTED Review included the following:

- review of the Concept Design package and associated documentation to identify opportunities to enhance CPTED for this project location
- development of a CPTED report including an introduction to CPTED, methodology used, references, project location demographics, crime assessment, observations from design package review and recommendations for enhancing CPTED.

3.4 Key inputs

A range of primary sources has been drawn upon to provide the evidence base for the assessment, including internal subject matter expertise, stakeholder expertise, expert opinion, threat intelligence, and open source documentation to support our analysis.

3.4.1 CPTED assessment team

The CPTED assessment has been prepared by the resources shown in Table 3-1.

Table 3-1 Security Consulting Group CPTED assessment team

Resource	Delivery Role
Matt Oyston (Security Construction and Equipment Committee)	Principal Security Consultant, Project Lead
Simon West	Senior Security Consultant, Peer Review and QA, SME
Jeremy Batcheldor	Security Consultant, Peer Review and QA, SME

All members of the assessment team have experience in preparing CPTED assessments, hold current NSW Class 2A Security Licences at the time of the assessment and are providing security advice under NSW master security licence 000101614.

3.4.2 Stakeholder engagement

The following stakeholder engagements were undertaken in support of the threat assessment:

- Sydney Metro West Security Team
- Sydney Trains Security Intelligence Team
- New South Wales Police Force Counter-Terrorism Command, Adam Scanlon, 3 September 2021
- Security discovery workshop held with the Parramatta Station design team on 7 October 2021.

This engagement is ongoing and any further relevant information will be incorporated in subsequent updates to the threat assessment.

3.4.3 Reference regulations, standards and relevant literature

The following references were referred to during the course of conducting this CPTED Assessment:

- T MU SY 20001 ST Surface Transport Physical Security Standard
- ISO 22341:2021 - Security and Resilience - Protective Security - Guidelines for Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
- NSW Police Force Safer By Design Evaluation process
- the CPTED requirements of section 4.15 (formally 79C) of the NSW Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979

- NSW Crime Prevention and the Assessment of Development Applications Guidelines.

3.5 Future works

As this report is based on the concept design scheme, it is recommended that as part of the future Detailed SSD applications, a further CPTED assessment will need to be undertaken for the final design scheme.

3.6 Demographic characterisation

The City of Parramatta is a major metropolitan centre which has both a significant resident population and a transient population who move into the city for employment. The demographics using the station should be expected to be highly diverse in terms of age, ethnicity, religion, education, employment, and socio-economic advantage and disadvantage. The ongoing development of the city is expected to drive continued population growth, which will in turn drive demand on the station.

3.7 Crime characterisations

Similar to the demographic characterisation, recorded crime within Parramatta reflects a diverse population. Crime heatmapping and crime statistics show that crime rates are higher relative to the broader service area. The urban nature of the Parramatta station precinct is expected to attract disorderly conduct, theft, assault, and property damage to the precinct which are the offences expected to have a higher annual incidence and consistent occurrence. This is due to the transient nature of the users of the nearby Metro service.

There are licenced premises with late night operating hours proximate to the proposed development. Late night alcohol consumption is a major driver of anti-social behaviour. There remains the possibility that antisocial behaviour (including disorderly conduct, assault and property damage) could occur within or proximate to the proposed development.

The redevelopment will include residential and commercial aspects which may increase the potential for burglary. Theft of property is less likely within the proposed development as people are not leaving their personal property unattended.

Figure 3-1 shows the crime density heatmap for non-domestic assault within the vicinity of the proposed development from April 2021 to March 2022. The area surrounding the proposed development falls within a high crime area. Both the higher potential for assault and the location of the proposed development within this area suggests that the precinct will be exposed to a higher potential for assault.




Figure 3-1 Crime density heatmap for assault in Parramatta (BOCSAR ©)

Figure 3-2 shows the crime density heatmap for robbery with a weapon within the vicinity of the proposed development from April 2021 to March 2022. The area surrounding the proposed development falls within a high crime area. Both the higher potential for robbery and the location of the proposed development within this area suggests that the precinct will be exposed to a higher potential for robbery.




Figure 3-2 Crime density heatmap for robbery in Parramatta (BOCSAR ©)

Figure 3-3 shows the crime density heatmap for malicious damage to property within the vicinity of the proposed development from April 2021 to March 2022. The area surrounding the proposed development falls within a high crime area. Both the higher potential for robbery and the location of the proposed development within this area suggests that the precinct will be exposed to a higher potential for malicious damage to property.




Figure 3-3 Crime density heatmap for malicious damage to property (BOCSAR ©)

The crime density heatmaps provide a measurement the number of crime incidents within a 50 metre by 50 metre area. The measurement takes into consideration the clustering and dispersion of crime incidents and are produced relative to the crime concentrations across NSW. Where incidents are clustered within a small area, the area will have high density. Where incidents are dispersed over a large area they will have a low density score. Note that the hotspots are not adjusted for the number of people residing in or visiting the LGA and so do not necessarily reflect areas where people have a higher-than-average risk of victimisation.

4 Assessment

The following sections make a general assessment of the CPTED strategy against the concept design followed by specific CPTED principles – Natural Surveillance, Natural Access Control, Territorial Reinforcement, Image Maintenance/Management, Activity support and Target Hardening identified during the desktop design package review.

4.1 Natural surveillance

The following measures have been proposed in the concept design that enhance natural surveillance:

- building layouts not creating blind spots or concealment opportunities noting it is mainly in block planning stage and therefore it is important this concept is maintained through the subsequent design stages
- street frontages with glazed facades, offering opportunity for overlooking the surrounding public domain
- passive surveillance from the upper building levels to the surrounding public domain
- clear sight lines between the building entries and the public domain
- active frontages at ground level would help create an environment for people to be engaged in their normal behaviour while observing the space around them, essentially creating natural community policing of the precinct.

It is expected that the principle of natural surveillance would be carefully considered during the detailed design of the building, including glazing and entry design.

4.2 Natural access control

The following measures have been proposed in the concept design that enhance natural access control:

- The ground plane features distinct and easily identifiable access points for individual uses, serving to channel persons into the intended locations. Although the detailed internal layout is unknown at this concept stage, corridors within each building would also serve to funnel person to the intended locations. It is anticipated that the specific design of these measures would be developed at the detailed development application phase.
- It is anticipated signage and security doors would use used to control access to restricted areas. Vehicle barriers would also be used to restrict access to loading docks and station basement areas.

4.3 Territorial reinforcement

The following measures have been proposed in the concept design that enhance territorial reinforcement:

- The delineation between the public realm, semi-public, semi-private and private spaces within the proposed development, along with the defined purposes of the buildings (i.e. commercial, residential and retail), is conducive of territorial reinforcement.
- At ground level, the proposed uses are clearly defined through the use of separate entries distinct from one another and from the station uses. The distinct entries would direct persons to the intended locations. The separate entries allow for the inclusion of various design cues at the detailed design stage, including colours, materials, landscaping, signage and other elements, to further reinforce the specific uses.

4.4 Image and management / maintenance

The concept proposal involves no impediments to proper environmental maintenance. It is presumed that ongoing maintenance would be provided by the future building manager.

4.5 Activity support

The following measures have been proposed in the concept design that enhance activity support:

- It is likely that the proposed active street frontages, including the station entries and proposed retail opportunities in addition to the various lobbies for the proposed development land uses, would naturally attract users and extend activity in the area beyond core business hours. Generally, mixed use developments also offer extended hours of trade and around-the-clock use of space. This increased activity increases the risks for potential offenders or intruders.

5 Mitigation measures

The following general recommendations have been provided to improve the safety and security of the future proposed development design and its future users:

5.1 Natural surveillance

The proposed developments have an opportunity to create formal lobby areas with manned concierge / security personnel that can provide surveillance of their respective developments in addition to the adjacent public realm areas. By extension, the design of these ground floor areas, and immediate floors above, should maximise surveillance opportunities.

5.2 Natural access control

A strategy for security lighting in the proposed development public realm has not yet been detailed. It is important this is defined and agreed with all stakeholders. The security lighting strategy must meet the Sydney Metro design requirements, which includes but is not limited to providing even distribution of lighting, supporting the public realm CCTV placement, assisting with differentiating between vehicle and pedestrian movements, improving general visibility, and defining activity spaces. An effective lighting strategy will contribute to public perception by reducing fear, increasing community activity and increasing the chance that offenders will be detected and apprehended.

5.3 Territorial reinforcement

Signage and wayfinding have been considered in the concept design; however, it is noted that further development is required including stakeholder engagement with Transport for NSW. The design team should ensure this is developed through the proposed development and broader precinct design process, including synergy and integration between the proposed development and precinct, as effective wayfinding systems contribute to a sense of well-being, safety, and security.

5.4 Image and management / maintenance

The ongoing maintenance and upkeep of the precinct should be managed by the operator of the public realm and building managers of the proposed development. Considerations should include, but not be limited to:

- landscape and lighting maintenance
- maintaining cleanliness of the site
- removing and repairing vandalism or graffiti
- promptly repairing / replacing any destruction to property and incorporating this into the contractual service level agreement.

5.5 Activity support

Ensure the proposed development building design limits spaces or dark areas where loitering and vagrancy can take place, particularly in the vicinity of the proposed bus interchange on Smith Street and the light rail station on Macquarie Street.

5.6 Site / target hardening

Define an access control strategy for both pedestrians and vehicles, with associated security measures, for the proposed development that define security zones such as public, semi-public, semi-private, private and restricted.

5.7 Built environment

For CPTED principles to be successful three functions need to be considered – spaces within the built environment need to have a *designated* purpose, they need to have social, cultural, legal or physical *definitions* and need to be *designed* to support and control the function of the space.

Thus, the three functions of *designation*, *definition* and *design* all contribute to the concept of CPTED. In practical terms when executing the future development designs, it is recommended the following is considered for each space:

- a space should 'belong' or be designated to a person or group
- the intended use of a space should be clearly defined
- the physical design of a space should match its intended use
- the design of a space should provide means for normal users to naturally control the activities, to control access and to provide surveillance.

6 Conclusion

This report presents the results of a CPTED assessment of the proposed development above Parramatta metro station.

This report has been prepared to outline the opportunities for reducing crime at the future development and to specifically respond to the SEARs issued for the Concept SSDA.

The assessment has found that the concept proposal has already incorporated a number of CPTED principles and provides adequate opportunity for the implementation of further CPTED principles in the future design. The proposed mitigation measures should be considered during the preparation of the subsequent design stages.