

# Report

## Crime Prevention through Environmental Design Report

ATLASSIAN CENTRAL  
Atlassian

# Report

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**Revision:** 4.0 – SSDA submission  
**Issued:** 1 October 2020



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A TETRA TECH COMPANY

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## 1 INTRODUCTION

Norman Disney & Young (NDY) has been commissioned by Atlassian (the Applicant) to prepare this report in accordance with the technical requirements of the Secretary's Environmental Assessment Requirements (SEARs), and in support of the SSD-10405 for a commercial and hotel development above the Former Inwards Parcel Shed at 8 – 10 Lee Street, Haymarket.

Specifically, this report addresses the following SEARs:

SEARs	Report Reference
<p>The EIS must address the following specific matters:</p> <p><b>1. Statutory and Strategic Context</b></p> <p>The EIS shall address the relevant planning provisions, goals and strategic planning objectives in the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Principles</li> </ul>	<p>Section 5 Executive Summary</p> <p>Section 6 Crime Context</p> <p>Section 7 Design Assessment</p> <p>Section 8 Design Recommendations</p>
<p><b>3. Built form and urban design</b></p> <p>The EIS shall:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- address Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Principles (CPTED).</li> </ul>	<p>Section 5 Executive Summary</p> <p>Section 6 Crime Context</p> <p>Section 7 Design Assessment</p> <p>Section 8 Design Recommendations</p>
<p><b>4. Integration with surrounding area</b></p> <p>The EIS shall demonstrate how the proposal:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- addresses the future over station connection between Henry Deane Plaza and Devonshire Street</li> </ul>	<p>Section 5 Executive Summary</p> <p>Section 7 Design Assessment</p>
<p><b>5. Public domain</b></p> <p>The EIS shall:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- identify how ground level uses are configured to provide safe and active street frontages and provide visual interest to the public domain</li> </ul>	<p>Section 7 Design Assessment</p>
<p><b>13. Transport, traffic, parking and access (construction and operation)</b></p> <p>The EIS shall include a Traffic and Transport Impact Assessment that includes the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- details of the provision and access to bicycle parking facilities (and end of trip</li> <li>- facilities) in secure, convenient, accessible areas close to main entrances incorporating lighting and passive surveillance</li> <li>- details of any road and pedestrian upgrades or safety measures required in the vicinity of the proposed development</li> <li>- details of loading dock size and accessibility, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- modelling of forecast freight and service vehicle movements, including daily and peak hour volumes</li> <li>- proposed management strategies</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<p>Section 7 Design Assessment</p> <p>Section 8 Design Recommendations</p>

SEARs	Report Reference
<p>These are to be provided as part of the EIS (as appendices) rather than as separate documents.</p> <p>In addition, the EIS must include the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- CPTED assessment</li> </ul>	<p>This entire report</p>

Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) is the use of design and space management methods to influence human behaviour to affect a reduction in the fear and incidence of crime and facilitate an improved quality of life. CPTED relies on passive interventions to the environment to reduce opportunity for crime and is thus focused primarily on the deterrence of opportunistic criminals. CPTED is also applicable in the reduction of terrorism related risks.

As part of the Atlassian Central project, CPTED has been considered within a broader security design process to ensure it complements the overarching security strategy. The CPTED report has drawn from the *Crime prevention and the assessment of development applications Guidelines under section 79C of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979*.

## 2 DESCRIPTION OF THE SITE

The Site is known as 8-10 Lee Street, Haymarket. It is an irregular shaped allotment. The allotment has a small street frontage to Lee Street, however this frontage is limited to the width of the access handle.

The Site comprises multiple parcels of land which exist at various strata. All the lots are in the freehold ownership of Transport for NSW, with different leasing arrangements:

- Lot 116 in DP 1078271: YHA is currently the long-term leaseholder of the Site which covers the areas shown in blue below.
- Lot 117 in DP 1078271: This is currently in the ownership of TfNSW and the applicant is seeking the transfer of the leasehold on this land to provide for an optimised basement and servicing outcome for the Site.
- Lot 118 in DP 1078271: This is currently in the ownership of TfNSW and the applicant is seeking the transfer of the leasehold for part of the air-rights above part of this allotment to allow for an optimised building envelope for the project. The proposal also uses a part of Lot 118 in DP 1078271 within Ambulance Avenue for Day 1 bike access, secondary pedestrian access and fire service vehicle access.
- Lot 13 in DP 1062447: This is currently in the ownership of TfNSW but TOGA (who hold the lease for the Adina Hotel) have a long-term lease of this space in the lower ground area.

The Site has an area of approximately 3,764sqm which includes 277sqm of air rights that apply from RL40.




Image Source: BVN / SHoPBVN / ShoP

**Figure 1 – Site Location and Dimensions**

### 3 SITE AND SURROUNDING CONTEXT

The Site is directly adjacent to the Western Wing Extension of Central Station, and forms part of the 'Western Gateway Sub-precinct' of the Central Railway Station lands. It is situated between the existing CountryLink and Intercity railway platforms to the east and the Adina Hotel (former Parcel Post Office) to the west.

Existing vehicle access to the Site is via Lee Street, however the Lee Street frontage of the Site is only the width of the access handle.

Current improvements on the Site include the Parcels Shed, which operated in association with the former Parcels Post Office (now the Adina Hotel). The Site is currently used as the Railway Square YHA. The Site also includes the western entryway to the Devonshire Street Pedestrian, which runs east-west through Central Station under the existing railway lines.

The Site is situated in one of the most well-connected locations in Sydney. It is directly adjacent to Central Station Railway which provides rail connections across metropolitan Sydney, as well as regional and interstate connections and a direct rail link to Sydney Airport. The Site is also within close proximity to several educational institutes and is a city fringe location which provides access to key support services.

Central Railway Station is currently undergoing rapid transformation to allow for integration of rail, metro and light rail transport infrastructure. This will elevate the role of Central Station not only for transport but also enhance opportunities for urban renewal and revitalisation of the surrounding precinct. This is one of the key drivers for the identification of the Central SSP and the Western Gateway Sub-precinct to accommodate a new innovation and technology precinct.

The proximity of the Western Gateway Sub-precinct to the city, while still being located outside the core Sydney CBD, provides opportunity for it to evolve to attract technology and innovation companies. It has access to all required services while being sufficiently separate to the CBD to establish a distinct technology industry ecosystem. Its CBD fringe location will provide affordable commercial rents which will support Startups and entrepreneurs which are a key component of an innovation precinct.



## 4 PROJECT DESCRIPTION

The proposed SSDA will facilitate the development of a new mixed-use development comprising 'tourist and visitor accommodation' (in the form of a 'backpackers') and commercial office space within the tower form. Retail, lobby and food and drink premises at the Lower Ground level and Upper Ground level.

Atlassian Central at 8-10 Lee Street will be the new gateway development at Central Station which will anchor the new Technology Precinct proposed by the NSW Government. The new building will be purpose-built to accommodate the Atlassian Headquarters, a new TfNSW Pedestrian Link Zone, and the new Railway Square YHA backpacker's accommodation, in addition to commercial floorspace to support Tech Start-ups.

The new development is to be built over the existing heritage former Inwards Parcels Shed (the Parcels Shed) located on the western boundary of Central Station with the Adina hotel to the west. The works includes a 38-storey mixed-use tower with basement loading dock facilities and EOT facilities accessed off Lee Street, 2 storey lobby utilising the Parcels Shed building, lower ground and upper ground retail, YHA hostel and commercial tower with staff amenities to the mid-level and roof top areas and a pedestrian Link Zone works for TfNSW.

The building design has been conceived to support the delivery of a site plan designed to connect with future developments to both the south and east and integrate with a cohesive public realm for the broader Sydney community in accordance with NSW government strategic planning.

The tower design is a demonstration project for Atlassian, representing their commitment to environmental sustainability and contemporary workplace settings through tower form and construction systems along with a set of emblematic outdoor workplaces stacked in the tower form.

The existing Parcels Shed will be adaptively re-used in accordance with best practice heritage process and form the upper level of a 2-storey entry volume that connects visually with the 2 level Link Zone. Over the roof of the Parcels Shed, a new privately owned but publicly accessible landscaped area will be created as the first part of a new upper level public realm that may extend to connect to a future Central Station concourse or future Over Station Development.

The proposed mixed use tower directly adjoins a live rail environment to the east and public domain to the north, west and south. These works will consider these rail environments and have been designed to ensure that all TfNSW external development standards are achieved. This ensures there is no impact to the operation or safety of these TfNSW assets.

Interfaces from the overall site and especially the State works Link Zone have been designed in consultation with the adjoining stakeholders. These stakeholders include TfNSW to the north and south, Toga and the Adina Hotel operator to the west and the Dexu Fraser's site to the south. Connections via the Link Zone, through the basements, and off the proposed new Link Zone dive ramp will be designed to enable existing and future developments to function in both the day 1 scenario and end state when all developers have completed their works.

The overall project aspiration is to create a world class tech precinct with effective pedestrian links through the Atlassian site to the Central Station western forecourt to Central Walk west and adjoining stakeholder's sites.



## 5 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CPTED has been considered within a broader security design process to ensure it complements the overarching security strategy. The CPTED report has drawn from the *Crime prevention and the assessment of development applications Guidelines under section 79C of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979*.

### 5.1 Key Recommendations

Overall, the building design provides substantial crime prevention elements, with some opportunities for improvement at this design stage. Key recommendations for the development include:

- Ensure robust physical security at future common/shared basement level.
- Reception areas need to be defined – formal presence required in lobbies
- Pedestrian turnstiles should be planned (Day 1 or future) for office lobbies.
- Reduce ‘dead areas’ that have limited functional purpose at this stage of the design
- Consider thrown or dropped object from the building exterior locations.
- Vegetation choice in the outdoor areas should reduce the potential for object concealment.
- Review fire stair access arrangements, ensure territoriality and safety for persons within.

### 5.2 Precinct Assessment

Atlassian Central is part of Central tech precinct which has three phases of development. On Day 1, Atlassian is the only development realised within the Western Gateway Sub-Precinct. On Day 2, the following developments are to be realised: Dexus-Frasers, Central Walk West and Toga / Henry Deane Plaza. On Day 3, the development of the wider Precinct: The Third Square, The OSD and the pedestrianisation of Lee St are provided.

From a Crime Prevention through Environmental Design perspective, the Day Two Scenario Two and Three options are preferred. These scenarios provide the most opportunity to deter opportunistic crime through passive security approaches, and most readily support CPTED principles.

### 5.3 Design Assessment

NDY have conducted a comprehensive crime prevention through environmental design assessment of the Atlassian Central development. We have reviewed natural access control, natural surveillance, and territoriality aspects of the site, and noted areas for potential improvement. This assessment has included the basement, public areas, YHA, tower floors, and roof levels.

### 5.4 Other Security Works

The Atlassian Central security design process has consisted of a structured and rational assessment of security risks, and their inter-relation to the precincts design features. NDY, as part of this project, will produce a Security Risk Assessment, CPTED Report, and Security Management Plan. As part of the CPTED design process, an assessment of the security environment from a criminal perspective was undertaken (summarised in this report in Section 3), identifying potential crime actors, and appropriate security measures to counter these actors. Subsequently, this CPTED report details the passive security elements of this overarching security strategy to reduce opportunity for crime.

## 5.5 Key Areas of Consideration

### 5.5.1 Lower and Upper Ground

The building features a two-level base containing lobbies and other public-facing areas. The Lower ground level is accessible by pedestrians from Ambulance Ave to the north, Henry Deane Plaza in the south, and the Link Zone in the west. The Upper Ground level is accessible by pedestrians via the Link Zone in the west.

### 5.5.2 Link Zone

The Link Zone is a publicly accessible Transport for New South Wales (TfNSW) asset which traverses the Atlassian Central site. On Lower Ground, the link zone connects Ambulance Ave and Henry Deane Plaza. On the Upper Ground, the Link Zone is accessed from Lee street on the west (via an existing ramp) and from Henry Deane Plaza on the south (via an existing stair). It also provides private vehicular access to B1 and B2 through an existing ramp accessed from Lee Street.

### 5.5.3 The Shed


The Shed is an existing heritage building on site, which is to be dismantled and re-constructed in its present location as a feature in the final design. The amount and type of historic elements to be preserved will be identified in this project and are subject to Heritage Council approval.

### 5.5.4 Access Zones

There are two basement levels, B1 and B2, which can be accessed by vehicles through a ramp located on Lee Street, by cyclists through a cyclist stair within the Lower Ground Link Zone, and by pedestrians through Atlassian shuttle and goods elevators (private access).

## 5.6 Security Design Process and Methodology

The Atlassian Central security design process has consisted of a structured and rational assessment of security risks, and their inter-relation to the precinct's design features. As part of this process, an assessment of the security environment from a criminal perspective was undertaken (summarised in this report in Section 3), identifying potential crime actors, and appropriate security measures to counter these actors. Subsequently, this CPTED report details the passive security elements of this overarching security strategy to reduce opportunity for crime.



## 5.7 CPTED Principles

The passive security strategy for Atlassian Central consists of a review of the precinct and community, its design, and the expected uses of the development through the lens of first and second generation CPTED concepts, which are presented below.

Element	Definition
<b>Natural Surveillance</b>	Natural surveillance increases the perceived risk of attempting criminal or antisocial actions by improving visibility of potential offenders to the public. Natural surveillance occurs by designing the placement of physical features, activities and people in such a way as to maximise visibility of the space and its users and fostering positive social interaction among legitimate users of private and public space. Potential offenders feel increased scrutiny, and thus inherently perceive an increase in risk.
<b>Natural Access Control</b>	Natural access control limits the opportunity for crime by taking steps to clearly differentiate between public space and private space. By selectively placing entrances and exits, fencing, lighting and landscape to limit access or control flow, natural access control occurs.
<b>Territoriality</b>	Territorial reinforcement promotes social control through increased definition of space and developing a sense of ownership amongst legitimate users.
<b>Social Cohesion</b>	Creating neighbourhood cohesion through participation and responsibility of residents, decision making within the community and restorative justice.
<b>Threshold Capacity</b>	Neighbourhood threshold capacity relating to scale / size and density, extensive common facilities, and pedestrian oriented environments. This includes consideration of crime generators and facilitators. Overuse of space is of particular concern.
<b>Community Culture</b>	Community culture as it relates to sense of place, shared history and the commemoration of significant neighbourhood events or people.
<b>Connectivity</b>	Extensive outside connections that create community partnerships and coordination with other government agencies.

## 5.8 Stakeholder Engagement

Stakeholder engagement will be undertaken with the relevant authorities as the design progresses. A record of workshops will be appended to this report prior to final submission.

## 6 CRIME CONTEXT

### 6.1 Overview and Summary

A review of the local activities, spaces, and adjacencies to Atlassian Central has been undertaken to understand the operating context throughout the week, and across the day and night. Different operating times attract different types of criminal activity, and this is further influenced by the surrounding environment.

Subsequently, NDY advise that Atlassian is proximal to several locations with differing crime profiles. These locations include a transport hub, a university, commercial offices, and food and beverage outlets (including bars, pubs, and cafes).

Table 1. Key Crime Categories by Proximal Premise Type Source: BOCSAR

Proximal location	Key Crime Types
Public Transport	Non-Domestic Violence Related Assault, Malicious Damage to Property, Steal from Person
Retail/wholesale/office	Non-Domestic Violence Related Assault, Malicious Damage to Property, Break and Enter Non-Dwelling
Licensed premises	Non-Domestic Violence Related Assault, Malicious Damage to Property, Steal from Person
Residential	Domestic Violence Assault, Non-Domestic Violence Related Assault, Malicious Damage to Property
Outdoor/Public Place	Non-Domestic Violence Related Assault, Malicious Damage to Property, Steal from Motor Vehicle
Education	Non-Domestic Violence Related Assault, Malicious Damage to Property, Break and Enter Non-Dwelling

### 6.2 Crime Assessment and Treatment Approach


NDY have reviewed the Sydney Local Government Area crime statistics gathered from the Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research to understand the crime context for the Atlassian Central development.

In review of data captured by Plan International, as part of the Free to Be campaign where women and girls were asked to identify and share public spaces that make them feel uneasy, scared or happy and safe, the area proximal to Atlassian Central is generally viewed as an unsafe place by the participants. Some participants reported harassment and confronting behaviour which would align with the BOCSAR crime statistics.

#### 6.2.1 Crimes Against People

NDY have categorised 17 offence types into the 'Crimes Against People' identifier (Refer Appendix A for a list). In review of the last five years, crimes against person in Sydney has decreased by 22%, with a continuing downward trend.

Comparatively, the NSW trend remains relatively stable, with a 3% increase for these crime types over the last five years.



**Figure 2. Against Person Trends 2015-2019. Source: BOCSAR**

In 2019, the most common crimes against people in Sydney included:


- Fraud;
- Non-domestic violence related assault;
- Domestic violence related assault;
- Steal from person;
- Indecent assault; and
- Assault police.

A focus on deterrence of crimes against people for Atlassian Central is the priority for passive security treatments. Such a focus includes developing strong natural surveillance, increasing user confidence in the location (including space navigation) and clearly defining defensible areas to increase the perceived risk of being caught undertaking against person crimes.

### 6.2.2 Crimes Against Property

NDY have categorised 12 offence types into the 'Crimes Against Property' identifier (Listed in Appendix A). In a review of the last five years, crimes against property in Sydney have decreased by 1.7%, with an upward trend between 2015 and 2016, and a downward trend between 2016 and 2017. The ongoing trend from 2017 to 2019 is increasing.

This down trend is consistent with the state-wide trends, with crimes against property in NSW decreasing 4.5% over the last five years.



**Figure 3. Against Property Trends 2015-2019. Source: BOCSAR**


In 2019, the most common crimes against property in Sydney included:

- Other theft;
- Steal from retail store;
- Malicious damage to property;
- Harassment;
- Receiving or handling stolen goods;

A focus on reducing the rewards of vandalism and graffiti style incidents, and an increase in natural surveillance to reduce theft opportunity will be the priority. This will also include natural access control strategies to reduce opportunity for access to offenders.

### 6.2.3 Anti-Social Behaviour

NDY has categorised 11 offence types into the 'Anti-social Behaviour' identifier (Refer Appendix A for a list). In review of the last five years, anti-social behaviour in Sydney has increased by 8.7%, with an upward trend between 2014, 2015, and 2016, and 2017 and a reduction from 2017 to 2018 (from 620 offences to 467 offences). This trend is consistent with the state-wide trends, with NSW showing an 8.4% increase in anti-social behaviour in the last five years.



**Figure 4. Anti-Social Trends 2015-2019. Source: BOCSAR**

In 2018, the most common anti-social behaviours in Sydney included:

- Possession/use of cannabis;
- Prohibited and regulated weapons offences;
- Offensive Conduct;
- Possession/use of other drugs;
- Possession/use of ecstasy; and
- Possession/use of amphetamine.

The passive security strategy for anti-social behaviour will focus primarily on deterrence through rule-setting, natural access control, and an overt security presence. Furthermore, reducing concealment opportunities or areas of relative obscurity, particularly at night should be incorporated in the design where practicable.



## 7 DESIGN ASSESSMENT


NDY have conducted a comprehensive crime prevention through environmental design assessment of the Atlassian Central development. We have reviewed natural access control, natural surveillance, and territoriality aspects of the site, and noted areas for potential improvement. The assessment is provided below, with the design recommendations provided in further sections of this report.

### 7.1 Precinct Assessment

As discussed in the Introduction and Overview, the Atlassian Central precinct will go through various stages of development over time. The below sub-sections identify some key crime prevention opportunities for each stage.

#### 7.1.1 Precinct Connectivity

Overall, the Atlassian Central development is well connected with the surrounding precinct, providing clear pathways of travel between key areas such as public transport, food and beverage outlets, and other parts of the inner city. Due to the expected busyness of these routes care must be taken to discourage the transitory nature of public transport pedestrian routes. Atlassian Central should explore opportunities to encourage public involvement and dwelling around their site to maximise natural surveillance and territoriality aspects.



**Figure 5. Precinct Connectivity Diagram**

If the precinct does not encourage legitimate users to remain in and around the location for varying purposes (office commute, food and beverage, retail experiences, parkland etc), there is a possibility that opportunistic crime could be encouraged due to the limited guardianship and perception that the space is not monitored by passers-by.

### 7.1.2 Day One

The existing stairs on the southern side of the Shed are retained to accommodate for pedestrian movement to the upper level. Service vehicle access happens via a drive structure cutting through the existing ramp. This guarantees a self-sufficient basement, however this access is to be removed or reduced for bike access only in later stages to limit undesirable pedestrian/vehicle conflicts. Bicycle EOT into the site can potentially be serviced via Ambulance Avenue. During the construction of Central Walk West, bicycle EOT might temporarily be serviced from the southern edge of the Atlassian Site only.





Figure 6. Day One Overview

The Day One arrangement presents some challenges to maximise crime prevention through environmental design outcomes, however this can be balanced with formal security elements to deter opportunistic criminal behaviour. A summary is presented below:

- Constrained pedestrian movement on the lower ground level encourages a transitory location which can be conducive to opportunistic crime;
- Lack of pedestrian movements beyond the Atlassian cyclist entry pathway may result in anti-social behaviour, loitering, and other similar activities;
- There is limited opportunity to maximise natural surveillance due to limited seating areas; and,
- The overall crime prevention strategy is to focus on formal security measures to deter opportunistic crime.

### 7.1.3 Day Two – Scenario One

The first scenario for Day 2 considers the development of Central Walk West without modifying the wall to the north of Ambulance Avenue. For Henry Deane Plaza, we consider in this scenario a design that elevates the height of the plaza to RL21 in its entirety.



**Figure 7. Day Two Overview - Scenario One**

The Day Two (Scenario One) arrangement presents similar challenges to Day One in maximising crime prevention through environmental design outcomes, however this can be balanced with formal security elements to deter opportunistic criminal behaviour. A summary is presented below:

- Constrained pedestrian movement on the lower ground level encourages a transitory location which can be conducive to opportunistic crime;
- Pedestrian traffic is increased, but natural surveillance opportunities are not increased, resulting in a potential increase in crime opportunity;
- Seating arrangements in Henry Deane Plaza support natural surveillance activities; and,
- The overall crime prevention strategy is to focus on formal security measures to deter opportunistic crime.

#### **7.1.4 Day Two Scenario Two (Ambulance Ave Wall Demolished)**

In Scenario 2, the wall to the north of Ambulance Avenue is modified to better accommodate pedestrian flows and wayfinding for Central Walk West. For Henry Deane Plaza, we consider a re-development that suggests one continuous plane ramping up from Devonshire St tunnel to meet Lee St. This promotes legibility of the public domain and allows for light and air to penetrate the lower ground level.



**Figure 8. Day Two Overview - Scenario Two**

From a crime prevention perspective, Scenario Two provides substantial benefits over Scenario One. The increase in site visibility and access changes the perception of the location from a restrained thoroughfare to a public promenade. This arrangement:

- Maximises legitimate dwelling opportunities and thus natural surveillance;
- Maximises site legibility and accessibility; and,
- Encourages territoriality through provision of more green space and seating areas.

#### 7.1.5 Day Two Scenario Three (Shed Ramp Demolished)

Scenario 3 considers the opportunities when eliminating the ramp structure and western wall to the Adina hotel. This establishes the hotel as a building in the ground and the Atlassian Tower as a structure with colonnade on lower ground level. Also considered is the sloped scenario for Henry Deane Plaza in this option, to strengthen the condition of one continuous lower ground plane.






**Figure 9. Day Two Overview - Scenario Three**

From a crime prevention perspective, as with Scenario Two., Scenario Three offers substantial benefits. Both options provide opportunities for natural surveillance, territoriality, and legitimate use of the space throughout the day and week.


## 7.2 Basement Levels

NDY have reviewed the Basement levels of the development, with some commentary on its natural surveillance, natural access control, and territoriality aspects. We note that the level two basement has limited CPTED considerations and is generally configured appropriately for such a location within a building. Access to these levels will generally be by contractors and building facilities staff and as such require less consideration from a crime prevention perspective. Given the future phases that will connect this basement to other buildings, it is important to have clear territoriality and robust security measures in place at Day 1.



The level one basement however is where staff will arrive for the end of trip facilities which makes this a semi-public space; it has multiple entry and exit points. The configuration of the level one basement generally supports good wayfinding and the path from the lifts, the pedestrian stair, and the end of trip facilities appears appropriately defined. Maintenance areas are appropriately segregated behind doors, given these spaces are accessed from semi-public areas effective physical security including self-closing doors is essential. It is noted that the end of trip facilities are positioned at a distance from the bike store, so directional signage will be important. Automatic doors (or powered operators) help to maintain the physical integrity and security of portals and doors by reducing damage during use, as well as enhanced amenity and should be considered on delivery and bike routes.

It is important that critical spaces are protected to ensure ongoing and effective operation of the facility, the architectural design should consider adjacencies and incorporate recommendations made by other specialists such as fire engineers.



**Figure 10. Basement 1**

Behind the stairs is an open space that may be used to conceal an individual. While it is passively surveyed by the entry ramp into the lower ground, traffic may not be frequent and as such an individual or object may be able to remain concealed for periods of time.

The bollard line between the pedestrianised area and the entry ramp provides appropriate segregation and defines the use of space clearly.

The bike storage area presents appropriate levels of natural surveillance and it is recommended to be supplemented with CCTV surveillance. For better visibility of internal bike store areas, provisioning of glazed walls to be reviewed by the architectural package during detailed design.

The provision of a dock master as an authority to these spaces acts as formal guardian of this location to manage incoming and outgoing traffic, as well as provide a passive guardian to the space to deter opportunistic crime.

### 7.3 Public Areas


The public areas of the site are extensive. For the purposes of this report, we have considered 'public areas' as those that are on the ground plane or could be accessed during business hours by anyone without having to proceed through a security control point (i.e. card reader, turnstile, etc).

Overall, the configuration of the building lobby (lower ground) is appropriate from a crime prevention perspective, however the location or presence of a reception is not evident at this stage of the design. It would be recommended that an official presence is provided to the lobby to provide natural surveillance and enforce passive guardianship of the space. The split-level lobby needs to have clearly defined zones to ensure people know where to go, reducing misuse of spaces and security and safety consequences.



There are a few architectural artefacts that should be reviewed for their purpose and use at this stage as they currently present dead areas that may attract opportunities for concealment or entrapment. It is recommended that these locations be designed out architecturally.

The commercial (office) lift lobby should be able to be fitted with turnstiles (full or half height) in the future, strong consideration should be given to this at Day 1 given the shared nature of the lobby.



**Figure 11. Lower Ground**

The stair leading down to the end of trip facilities does not appear securable, and this will attract unwanted behaviour and attempted trespass particularly outside of building operation hours. Provision of natural and formal access control to this point should be provided through a door or other operable barrier.

Importantly, the provided café on the lower ground level supports passive surveillance of the link zone and lobby and encourages activity throughout the day. This surveillance continues on upper ground, where multiple retail outlets are provided.



## 7.4 YHA Typical Floor

NDY have reviewed a typical accommodation floor for the YHA levels to provide some high level recommendations to reduce opportunistic crime in these areas. Generally, the accommodation levels provide good natural surveillance along the corridors, and the interconnecting stair will encourage activity between floors.

The building core areas including laundry, WC at the north eastern side and few spots along the corridor should be reviewed as they have limited natural surveillance which may present an area of potential anti-social behaviour. Consider reviewing the rooms/walls aligned to the corridor walls to prevent opportunities for individuals hiding or to be cornered in these locations.




Figure 14. Level 2

Another entrapment opportunity is provided near one of the columns near a bedroom opening. This location is very enclosed and may restrict freedom of movement or present an opportunity for somebody to conceal themselves behind the column.


Finally, the fire stair entry and ambulant toilet area has limited natural surveillance opportunities. If inter-floor travel via fire stairs is to be permitted, measures should be made to improve safety and security of such spaces including intercom and possibly CCTV facilities.

## 7.5 Tower Floors

In review of the tower floors (office levels) there are limited crime prevention observations. Generally, these locations will have ongoing activity and are by design open and accessible. Due to the unique arrangement of these floors with interior, semi-interior, and exterior zones, consideration should be given to accidental and deliberate security incidents relating to thrown or dropped objects from the building. Further, consideration to vegetation choice in the outdoor areas should include the potential for object concealment. As noted

against “Public Areas”, planning should incorporate future pedestrian turnstiles at public lift lobby’s for commercial office tenants.


NDY have reviewed the plant levels and have some comments on level six and seven.



**Figure 15. Level 6**

In level six services area it is noted that the entry to mechanical room, corridors in the core and the stairs leading to the plant areas has a limited natural surveillance. Door locations to be reviewed/addressed for these locations. It is assumed only select lifts will land at the plant room level and YHA guests will not be able to access office lifts (not clear from plan). In back-of-house areas, recessed and obscured areas are more a safety concern for service personnel than a security risk for tenants or patrons.

As in other YHA floors, level-6 also has a potential zone for concealment which needs to be reviewed and may be addressed in design development of plant design.



**Figure 16. Level 7**

As on level-6, level-7 one of the corridors in the core presents entrapment opportunities. It is recommended that a door be provided at each end of the corridor access to this location if possible.

It is also noted that the stairs leading to the plant areas presents a location of limited natural surveillance and could be used as an area of concealment. Typically these areas could be treated with architectural modifications and by provisioning CCTV cameras.

## 7.6 Tower Roof Levels

The tower roof levels present a unique mix of exterior, office, and plant spaces from Level 36 through 39. These areas of the building present some opportunities to maximise crime prevention in the architectural design as noted below.

For most of these floors, the key opportunity is to maximise natural surveillance to outdoor and interior areas that have arisen due to architectural arrangements. These are shown on the drawings below.






Figure 17. Level 36




Figure 18. Level 37

Current architectural design at Level 38 and Level 39 is well organised to complement general security of the premises does not present any significant issues at this stage.

Beyond these observations, the tower roof levels are generally well arranged from a crime prevention perspective, with overall good access control and natural surveillance elements. As with the other tower levels, consideration should be given to vegetation selection and thrown or dropped objects.



## 8 DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS

NDY have assessed the design and have summarised our recommendations below. Overall the current building design provides substantial crime prevention elements, with some opportunities for improvement.

It is noted that the Anti-Social behaviour is extremely difficult to stop and hence the approach is to primarily deter/limit these types of threats. Generally, it is recommended to provide open walkways and areas that fosters natural surveillance.

The main security philosophies considered here includes the use of CPTED, landscaping, regular maintenance of the landscaping and area in general, appropriate lighting, where required CCTV and Help points. This will assist in creating a 'Natural Surveillance' approach by allowing people to see persons committing crimes or anti-social related acts. This will also have a psychological effect as those committing such offences is likely to be aware that they can be seen. Hence incorporating lighting, landscaping and CCTV aids in this approach and are the main principles to incorporate into the area to reduce anti-social behaviour.

In addition it is also recommended to use the physical application of objects such as having metal lumps on benches and walls limits skateboarders using these for rail slides, having an anti-climb halo underneath a pole mounted CCTV camera limits a person's ability to access the camera, landscaping types used that do not create hiding places for persons may be considered.

### 8.1 Basement

In review of the basement levels, the following recommendations are made:

- Provide CCTV coverage of fire stair entry points to allow monitoring of potential entrapment areas through formal surveillance.
- Bike store areas and airlock to the EOT facilities (Basement 1) should be monitored by CCTV to provide formal surveillance deter opportunistic crime.
- Areas around the 'Day 1 Cycle Stair' (Basement 1) should be reconfigured where possible to reduce opportunity for concealment of people or objects.
- Provide clear wayfinding and signage to reduce opportunity for confusion.
- Ensure protection of critical spaces and equipment, some of which will support security operations.

### 8.2 Public Areas

For the public areas, the following is recommended:

- Reception areas need to be defined – a formal presence required in lobbies.
- Reduce opportunity for entrapment and concealment of people and objects
- Reduce 'dead areas' that have limited functional purpose at this stage of the design
- Ensure public lift is treated with anti-vandal materials and is graffiti resistant. Glazed elements should be anti-scratch and anti-shatter.
- 100% CCTV coverage of the building perimeter areas, entry points, ramp and the link zones to provide formal surveillance.

### 8.3 YHA

The YHA design should consider:

- 100% CCTV coverage of accessible floor areas to provide formal surveillance.

- Reducing opportunities for concealment near bedroom entrances.
- Reducing opportunities for entrapment in laundry areas – consider multiple entrances where possible or remove the entry door to increase surveillance of this space.
- Ensure rules and acceptable conduct guidelines are provided throughout the tenancy to reinforce territoriality aspects.

## 8.4 Tower Levels

Tower levels should adopt the following recommendations:

- Consider restricting opportunities for thrown or dropped objects from the building exterior locations.
- Vegetation choice in the outdoor areas should reduce the potential for object concealment.
- Providing CCTV coverage of back of house areas in less trafficked parts of the building.
- Providing access restrictions to long corridors that could allow for entrapment of an individual.
- Particular attention to the common fire egress stair, use of, and mitigation measures to ensure territoriality is maintained and that these are safe spaces.

## 8.5 Roof Levels

Roof levels should incorporate the following:

- Review architectural arrangements as shown on the mark-ups for natural surveillance.
- Review treatments to prevent thrown or dropped objects.
- Vegetation choice in the outdoor areas should reduce the potential for object concealment.
- Review fire stair access arrangements.

## 9 APPENDIX A – CRIME DEFINITIONS

Term	Definition
Crimes Against Person	Crimes from BOCSAR that includes: fraud, non-domestic violence related assault, domestic violence related assault, indecent assault, act of indecency, and other sexual offences, sexual assault, steal from person, assault police, robbery without a weapon, other offences against the person, robbery with a weapon not a firearm, abduction and kidnapping, robbery with a firearm, blackmail and extortion, murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, murder accessory, and conspiracy.
Crimes Against Property	Crimes from BOCSAR that includes: Malicious damage to property, steal from motor vehicle, harassment, threatening behaviour, and private nuisance, other theft, break and enter dwelling, steal from retail store, steal from dwelling, motor vehicle theft, break and enter non-dwelling, receiving or handling stolen goods, arson, and stock theft.
Anti-Social Behaviour	Crimes from BOCSAR that includes: possession and/or use of cannabis, prohibited and regulated weapons offences, trespass, possession and/or use of amphetamines, possession and/or use of other drugs, offensive conduct, possession and/or use of ecstasy, offensive language, possession and/or use of cocaine, criminal intent, and possession and/or use of narcotics.

## 10 GLOSSARY

Following table identifies all technical terms and their contractions as applicable.

### 10.1 GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS

Term	Definition
Atlassian Site	8 – 10 Lee Street, Haymarket
The Project	Commercial and hotel development above the Former Inwards Parcel Shed at 8-10 Lee Street, Haymarket
Block B or “Dexus/ Frasers Site”	14-30 Lee Street Haymarket. Adjoining land immediately to the south currently comprising three 8 storey commercial buildings.
Block C or Adina Hotel	2 Lee Street, Haymarket The Former Parcels Post Office The Adina Apartment Hotel Sydney Central
Central Sydney	Land identified as Central Sydney under the Sydney LEP 2012 and includes Sydney’s Central Business District
Sub-precinct	Western Gateway Sub-precinct
Atlassian Central	The Atlassian tower building (building only)
Atlassian Central development	The whole Atlassian development within the Atlassian Site including the tower and public domain works.
Devonshire Street Tunnel	The pedestrian and cycle tunnel running between Chalmers Street and Lee Street
Link Zone	The publicly accessible land within the Site.
Central Walk West	The future western pedestrian entry to the new 19 metre wide underground concourse customers to suburban rail and Sydney Metro platforms.
Habitat Level 1	Flexibly ventilated workspace areas

### 10.2 ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation	Meaning
ACHAR	Aboriginal Cultural Heritage Assessment Report
AHIMS	Aboriginal Heritage Information Management System
APAR	Airports Protection of Airspace Regulations
AS	Australian Standard
ASS	Acid Sulfate Soils
ATP	Australia Technology Park
BC Act	Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016

Abbreviation	Meaning
BCA	Building Code of Australia
BDAR	Biodiversity Assessment Report
Camperdown-Ultimo Strategy	Camperdown-Ultimo Collaboration Area and Place Strategy
CDRP	Central Design Review Panel
Central SSP	Central Station State Significant Precinct
C2E Strategy	Central to Eveleigh Urban Transformation Strategy
CMP	Conservation Management Plan
Council	City of Sydney Council
CPTED	Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
CPTMP	Construction Parking and Traffic Management Plan
CSPS	Draft Central Sydney Planning Strategy
DES	Design Excellence Strategy
Design Brief	Architectural Design Competition Brief
Design Competition	Architectural Design Competition
Design Guideline	Western Gateway Design Guideline
Devonshire Tunnel	Devonshire Street Pedestrian Tunnel
District Plan	Eastern City District Plan
DPC	NSW Department of Premier and Cabinet
DPIE/Department	NSW Department of Planning, Industry and Environment
DP	Deposited Plan
DSI	Detailed Site Investigation
EIS	Environmental Impact Statement
EPA	NSW Environment Protection Authority
EPBC Act	Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999
ESD	Ecologically Sustainable Development
GANSW	NSW Government Architect's Office
GFA	Gross Floor Area (as defined under the Sydney Local Environmental Plan 2012)
HIS	Heritage Impact Statement
Infrastructure Strategy	State Infrastructure Strategy 2018-2038
LGA	City of Sydney Local Government Area
LSPS	Draft Sydney Local Strategic Planning Statement
m	metre
NIA	Noise Impact Assessment
OEH	NSW Office of Environment and Heritage
OLS	Obstacle Limitation Surface
OWMP	Operational Waste Management Plan
Parcels Shed	Former Inward Parcels Shed
PSI	Preliminary Site Investigation

Abbreviation	Meaning
Region Plan	A Metropolis of Three Cities – Greater Sydney Region Plan
RAP	Remediation Action Plan
RAPs	Registered Aboriginal Parties
RMS	Roads and Maritime Services
RTTC	Radar Terrain Clearance Chart
SEARs	Secretary's Environmental Assessment Requirements
SEPP	State Environmental Planning Policy
SEPP 55	State Environmental Planning Policy No.55 – Remediation of Land
SEPP Infrastructure	State Environmental Planning Policy (Infrastructure) 2007
SEPP SRD	State Environmental Planning Policy (State and Regional Development) 2011
sqm	Square Metres
SREP SH	Sydney Regional Environmental Plan (Sydney Harbour Catchment) 2005
SSD	State Significant Development
SSDA	State Significant Development Application
Sub-precinct	Western Gateway Sub-precinct
Sydney 2030	Sustainable Sydney 2030 Strategy
Sydney LEP 2012	Sydney Local Environmental Plan 2012
Taskforce	Tech Taskforce
TIA	Transport and Accessibility Impact Assessment
TfNSW	Transport for New South Wales
The Minister	The Minister for Planning, Industry and Environment
The Regulation	Environmental Planning and Assessment Regulation 2000
Transport Strategy	Future Transport Strategy 2056
Urbis	Urbis Pty Ltd
VIA	Visual Impact Assessment
WMP	Waste Management Plan
WSUD	Water Sensitive Urban Design
YHA	Youth Hostel Association (otherwise referred to as 'backpackers')

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
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Revision No: 4.0  
Revision Date: 1 October 2020  
Reason Description: SSDA submission  
File Location: \\ndy.group\sydw\S253xx\S25327\007\S-  
V24\_Reports  
Filename: rp200429s0001

Authorisation By: Frazer Holmes  
(NSW # 107365771)



Verification By: Vijayaprasath Rajendran

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