

Our Ref: ID 3850
Your Ref: SSD-65595459

2 June 2026

Teresa Gizzi
Department of Planning, Housing and Infrastructure
Locked Bag 5022
Parramatta NSW 2124
Via Major Portal

email: teresa.gizzi@planning.nsw.gov.au
CC: lisa.ignatavicius1@ses.nsw.gov.au

Dear Teresa,

State Significant Development Application for Hunter Indoor Sports Centre (HISC)

Thank you for the opportunity to provide advice on Response to Submission (RTS) for the State Significant Development Application (SSDA) Hunter Indoor Sports Centre at 2 Monash Road and 24 Wallarah Road, New Lambton, Newcastle LGA. It is understood that this SSDA is seeking consent for:

- Demolition of existing amenities block and flood lighting infrastructure.
- Site remediation and Tree removal.
- Site layout including carpark and landscaping.
- A single storey plus mezzanine indoor sports centre with amenities, administration spaces and retail tenancy, mezzanine level function rooms, administration space and training areas. The centre will provide 12 sports courts including a show court with retractable grandstand seating for 2,500 people and high-performance training facilities (teaching space and gym).
- GFA of approximately 17,700m², comprising ground floor of approximately 15,300m² and first floor mezzanine of 2,400m² and maximum building height of RL 25.25 (16.03m).
- Civil works including construction of new vehicular access and egress point to Turton Road and an internal roadway.
- Service infrastructure provision.
- Car park with 240 spaces.
- Site landscaping.
- Pedestrian paths.
- Building and site signage.
- Public domain works to part of the site frontage to Turton Road.
- Consent is sought for the entire proposal, with flexible staging to construction and operation of the HISC in two stages.

It is understood that as a result of the matters raised in the submissions, the agency advice and the agency consultation there have been minor design refinements to the project as follows:¹

- Incorporation of permeable paving to all carparking spaces on site
- Refinement of swale design and inputs to flood model to incorporate proposed stormwater infrastructure within the car park
- Further façade articulation and refinement
- Modifications to the perimeter fire-truck accessway, to better relate to the refined façade presentation.
- Additional external bicycle parking
- Modifications to the 10m wide future public circulation corridor
- Addition of 15 additional street trees along Monash Road
- Increase in planting to northern boundary of the site between residential townhouses and the proposed HISC.

We have reviewed the following documents provided as part of the preparation of our advice.

- Urbis. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Response to Submissions report
- Torrent Consulting. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Flood Impact and Risk Assessment (Revision 09)
- Torrent Consulting. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Flood Emergency Response Plan (Revision 07)

The NSW State Emergency Service (NSW SES) is the agency responsible for dealing with floods, storms and tsunamis in NSW. This role includes planning for, responding to and coordinating the initial recovery from floods. As such, the NSW SES has an interest in the public safety aspects of the development of flood prone land, particularly the potential for changes to land use to either exacerbate existing flood risk or create new flood risk for communities in NSW.

We recommend flooding issues are considered in accordance with the requirements of NSW Government's Flood Prone Land Policy as set out in the [Flood Risk Management Manual](#) 2023 (the Manual) and supporting guidelines, including the [Support for Emergency Management Planning](#) and relevant planning circulars and directions under the *Environmental Planning and Assessment Act, 1979*, including 4.1 Flooding and PS24-001.

We refer to our previous response dated 11 November 2024 – with reference ID2728, and 24 September 2025 – with reference ID3316, including key emergency management considerations.

In a 5% Annual Exceedance Probability (AEP) event post-development conditions there is some low hazard (H1) flood affectation around the site access point onto Turton Road²,

¹ Urbis. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Response to Submissions report, page 6

² Torrent Consulting. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Flood Impact and Risk Assessment (Revision 09), Figure B-6

increasing to H3 hazard level flooding in a 1% AEP event.³ Flooding progressively encroaches onto the site, with complete inundation occurring in the Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) event, and **high hazard flooding (H5 flood hazard level)** along the site's southern boundary and the entire eastern part, including access onto and Turton Road itself experiencing high hazard flooding.⁴ The site and surrounds are subject to inundation periods of **6 to 9 hours**.⁵

In summary, we:

- **Note** that the proposed flood risk management measure is to close the site when flooding is expected, with a shelter in place strategy proposed if people are present of site during a flood.
- **Note** that the proposed development results in a significant increase in the flood velocity (in excess of 80% increase in some areas) and resultant hazard level (from H4 to H5 hazard level) within the site and on neighbouring areas, including on Turton Road, in a PMF event,⁶ which would result in **an increase in risk to life from flooding associated with this development**.
- **Note** that vehicle access off Womboin Road was considered, however, it was deemed unviable due to resultant increase in traffic to Womboin Road and likely associated impacts to adjoining properties.⁷ While the site would become isolated for vehicular traffic, the existing pedestrian access to Womboin Road would provide an escape route rising away from floodwaters in very rare events, including the 0.2% AEP event.⁸
- **Reiterate** that any access/egress route impacted by H3 – H4 hazard level flooding⁹ **is not a safe available overland escape route**.¹⁰ The suggestion for people to navigate medium hazard floodwaters is **unacceptable, as it can put people's lives at significant risk**, and any such suggestions **must be removed** from the Flood Emergency Response Plan (FERP).
- **Advise** that the proposed private warning system,¹¹ upon which the shelter in place strategy would be relying on, is not fail-safe as private systems and plans are dependent on human application and often rely on technical support systems. The water level alarms and the access gate (*be it manual or automatic*) will require adequate maintenance, testing and monitoring, which may not be achieved under private ownership. Having areas with multiple private or site-specific flood warning systems, each with varying efficacy, increases the complexity of deriving flood warning advice at the community scale. It is also more challenging to monitor these

³ Torrent Consulting. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Flood Impact and Risk Assessment (Revision 09), Figure B-7 & B-8

⁴ Torrent Consulting. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Flood Impact and Risk Assessment (Revision 09), Figure 7-1, page 56

⁵ Torrent Consulting. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Flood Impact and Risk Assessment (Revision 09), page 52

⁶ Torrent Consulting. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Flood Impact and Risk Assessment (Revision 09), Figure C-17 & C-24

⁷ Urbis. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Response to Submissions report, page 56

⁸ Torrent Consulting. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Flood Impact and Risk Assessment (Revision 09), Figure B-10

⁹ Torrent Consulting. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Flood Impact and Risk Assessment (Revision 09), Figure 5-7

¹⁰ Torrent Consulting. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Flood Emergency Response Plan (Revision 07), page 9

¹¹ Torrent Consulting. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Flood Emergency Response Plan (Revision 07), page 9

flood warning systems and effectively incorporate information into strategic emergency management response for the community in the Local Flood Plan (LFP). The NSW SES, therefore, generally does not support the use of private or site specific warning systems for individual developments that have not been developed in a strategic context.¹²

- **Note** the reference to the (automatic) boom gate has been updated to a **manually operated** hinge bar gate,¹³ which would require a person to go to the site entrance to close the gate when the site access/egress point is already *compromised through flooding of the access road and Turton Road*. We **advise** that the emergency management strategy for the site should not put people at risk by directing them towards floodwaters to manually close the gate and **recommend** reconsidering this approach.
- **Highlight** that the floor level of the shelter in place part of the development should be above the PMF, as per the Shelter in Place Guidelines¹⁴ and **caution against** the *Use of the upper floor as a flood refuge would only be required once flood water inundation of the ground floor level occurs (..) as the areas available on the ground floor level of the facility are available for “sheltering in place”, up until these events*.¹⁵
- **Recommend** ensuring the shelter in place protocol is enacted early and not wait until inundation of the ground level occurs, to allow all site users, including those requiring specific assistance,¹⁶ to reach the safety of the refuge ahead of the onset of flooding around the building, particularly noting the flash flooding nature of the catchment.
- **Recommend** seeking further clarification in relation to the available refuge area and what the *combined floor area* entails,¹⁷ noting that at Stage 2 the available floor area would be approximately 1500sqm,¹⁸ while the FERP suggests a combined floor area of around 2400 sqm would accommodate 2500 people.¹⁹ We **advise** the consent authority is satisfied that the proposal is compliant with the [Shelter in Place Guideline](#) (NSW Government, 2024) **criteria** and **intent** and can provide adequate refuge in line with the Guidelines criteria. Alternatively, we recommend considering a reduction in the development capacity to ensure adequate refuge conditions can be met. For emergency management purposes, consideration must be given to flood events up to the PMF with the site at full capacity.

You may also find the following Guidelines on the NSW SES website useful:

- [Reducing Vulnerability of Buildings to Flood Damage](#)

¹² Department of Planning and Environment. 2023. Support for emergency management planning – Flood risk management guideline EM01, Section A2.6, page 12

¹³ Torrent Consulting. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Flood Impact and Risk Assessment (Revision 09), page xii

¹⁴ NSW Department of Planning, Housing and Infrastructure. 2024. Shelter in place guideline for flash flooding, page 5

¹⁵ Urbis. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Response to Submissions report, page 56

¹⁶ Torrent Consulting. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Flood Emergency Response Plan (Revision 07), page 20

¹⁷ Torrent Consulting. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Flood Emergency Response Plan (Revision 07), page 20

¹⁸ Urbis. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Response to Submissions report, page 56

¹⁹ Torrent Consulting. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Flood Emergency Response Plan (Revision 07), page 20

- [Designing Safer Subdivisions](#)
- [Managing Flood Risk Through Planning Opportunities](#)

Please feel free to contact Ana Chitu via email at rra@ses.nsw.gov.au should you wish to discuss any of the matters raised in this correspondence. The NSW SES would also be interested in receiving future correspondence regarding the outcome of this referral via this email address.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in grey ink, appearing to read 'P. Cinque', is positioned below the 'Yours sincerely,' text.

Peter Cinque
Senior Manager, Emergency Risk Management
NSW State Emergency Service

ATTACHMENT A: Principles Outlined in the Support for Emergency Management Planning Guideline²⁰

Principle 1 Any proposed Emergency Management strategy should be compatible with any existing community Emergency Management strategy.

Any proposed Emergency Management strategy for an area should be compatible with the strategies identified in the NSW State Flood Plan²¹ and the City of Newcastle Flood Emergency Sub Plan,²² where evacuation is the preferred emergency management strategy for people impacted by flooding.

Principle 2 Decisions should be informed by understanding the full range of risks to the community.

Decisions relating to future development should be risk-based and ensure Emergency Management risks to the community of the full range of floods are effectively understood and managed.

Flood risk

In a 5% Annual Exceedance Probability (AEP) event post-development conditions, flooding within the site is generally contained within the swale, with some low hazard (H1) flood affectation around the site access point onto Turton Road.²³ The modelling suggests that in post-development scenario, flooding conditions in the eastern part of the site, including around the site entry to slightly improve, showing a reduction in flood levels in events more frequent than the 2% AEP.²⁴ However, site vehicular access is cut in events rarer than the 2% AEP event, with access/egress onto Turton Road cut by H3 hazard level flooding in a 1% AEP event.²⁵ Flooding progressively encroaches onto the site, with complete inundation occurring in the Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) event, with **high hazard flooding (H5 flood hazard level)** along the site's southern boundary and the entire eastern part, including access onto and Turton Road itself experiencing high hazard flooding.²⁶

While the site would become isolated for vehicular traffic, we **note** *the existing pedestrian access from the west of the proposed facility to Womboin Rd, is proposed to be maintained. This path can provide emergency egress for pedestrians if required, although vehicular*

²⁰ NSW Government. 2023. Principles Outlined in the Support for Emergency Management Planning Guideline

²¹ NSW Government. 2024. NSW State Flood Plan. Section 5.1.7, page 34

²² NSW SES. 2022. City of Newcastle Flood Emergency Sub Plan, Section 1.6.2, page 7

²³ Torrent Consulting. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Flood Impact and Risk Assessment (Revision 09), Figure B-6

²⁴ Torrent Consulting. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Flood Impact and Risk Assessment (Revision 09), Figure C-1 & C-2

²⁵ Torrent Consulting. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Flood Impact and Risk Assessment (Revision 09), Figure B-7 & B-8

²⁶ Torrent Consulting. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Flood Impact and Risk Assessment (Revision 09), Figure 7-1, page 56

*emergency access isn't practicable.*²⁷ The existing pedestrian access would provide an escape route rising away from floodwaters to Womboin Road in very rare events, including the 0.2% AEP event.²⁸ We also note that vehicle access off Womboin Road was considered, however, it was deemed unviable due to resultant increase in traffic to Womboin Road and likely associated impacts to adjoining properties.²⁹

It is understood that flood inundation times are expected to be less than 12 hours, with the PMF inundation duration analysis in the Broadmeadow Place Strategy FIRA noting that the site and surrounds are subject to inundation periods of **6 to 9 hours**.³⁰

The proposed building, with the finished floor level of 9.2 m AHD, is also expected to experience internal flood inundation below 0.5 metres depth and a H1-H2 flood hazard level in a PMF event.³¹ It is noted that the proposed building's first-floor level *is elevated significantly higher than the PMF level and so offers full immunity from flooding and can be regarded as a flood-free space*.³²

We **note** that the proposed development results in a significant increase in the flood velocity (in excess of 80% increase in some areas) and resultant hazard level within the site and on neighbouring areas (from H4 to H5 hazard level), including on Turton Road, in a PMF event,³³ which would result in **an increase in risk to life from flooding associated with this development**.

It is understood that further consideration was given to mitigate modelled off-site flooding impacts, attracting a marginal gain.³⁴ This included maintaining the swale that runs north-south along the Turton Road frontage of the Site providing a flood storage and conveyance function, retention of a 3 m wide buffer zone to the north of the existing shared path that runs along the northern side of Lambton Ker-rai Creek, and incorporating the proposed site stormwater drainage into the modelling and assessment.³⁵ *These design and model refinements result in a modest improvement to the modelled flood impacts to properties at Monash Road in the 1% AEP and 0.5% AEP events. The average change in 1% AEP 2050 peak flood level was calculated for each individual residential allotment and confirmed to be 10 mm or lower.*³⁶

²⁷ Urbis. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Response to Submissions report, page 56

²⁸ Torrent Consulting. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Flood Impact and Risk Assessment (Revision 09), Figure B-10

²⁹ Urbis. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Response to Submissions report, page 56

³⁰ Torrent Consulting. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Flood Impact and Risk Assessment (Revision 09), page 52

³¹ Torrent Consulting. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Flood Impact and Risk Assessment (Revision 09), page 52

³² Torrent Consulting. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Flood Emergency Response Plan (Revision 07), page 13

³³ Torrent Consulting. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Flood Impact and Risk Assessment (Revision 09), Figure C-17 & C-24

³⁴ Urbis. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Response to Submissions report, page 32 - 33

³⁵ Torrent Consulting. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Flood Impact and Risk Assessment (Revision 09), page 25 -27

³⁶ Urbis. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Response to Submissions report, page 32 - 33

The Submissions report notes the risk of vehicles in the site carpark mobilising into floodwater in flood events exceeding the 1% AEP 2050 condition, suggesting it would have a *negligible risk of structural blockage. If mobilisation did occur, vehicles would most likely move north-east into the swale or along the site boundary rather than into Lambton Ker-rai Creek, and this risk is lower than for nearby, more flood-prone residential areas.*³⁷ We **advise** that the risk of cars being swept away by floodwaters and blocking hydraulic structures and impacting flows is a real risk for this broader catchment area, as it has been documented in the Throsby, Styx & Cottage Creek Flood Study.³⁸ We **recommend** consulting with the NSW Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water (DCCEEW) to investigate options for mitigating this risk and potential adverse impacts to the community.

Principle 3 Development of the floodplain does not impact on the ability of the existing community to safely and effectively respond to a flood.

The ability of the existing community to effectively respond (including self-evacuating) within the available timeframe on available infrastructure is to be maintained. It is not to be impacted on by the cumulative impact of new development.

Risk assessment should have regard to flood warning and evacuation demand on existing and future access/egress routes. Consideration should also be given to the impacts of localised flooding on evacuation routes. **Evacuation must not require people to drive or walk through flood water.**

Emergency management

It is understood that the *principal risk management measure is to close the Site when flood conditions are expected, for example when a large weather system threatens to bring heavy rain, with a shelter in place strategy proposed if people are present of site during a flood.*³⁹

*Even during the peak conditions of a PMF event, an overland escape route is available through medium hazard flood waters. Although facing its own challenges and constraints, this provides an opportunity for ingress by emergency services in the event of a medical emergency.*⁴⁰ We **reiterate** that any route impacted by H3 – H4 hazard level flooding⁴¹ **is not a safe available overland escape route.** The suggestion for people to navigate medium hazard floodwaters is **unacceptable, as it can put people's lives at significant risk,** and any such suggestions **must be removed** from the Flood Emergency Response Plan (FERP).

An alarm system will activate once the water level within the swale area is sufficiently high to require an emergency response. This will occur when Site egress by vehicle is compromised

³⁷ Urbis. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Response to Submissions report, page 32

³⁸ Rhelm. 2023. Throsby, Styx & Cottage Creek Flood Study – final report, Version 04, page 41

³⁹ Torrent Consulting. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Flood Emergency Response Plan (Revision 07), page 9

⁴⁰ Torrent Consulting. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Flood Emergency Response Plan (Revision 07), page 9

⁴¹ Torrent Consulting. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Flood Impact and Risk Assessment (Revision 09), Figure 5-7

through flooding of the access road and Turton Road. A **remotely operated gate** at the Site entrance will then be closed, to be re-opened once it is safe to vacate the Site. If the flood level continues to rise to a level at which the car park becomes flooded then a second alarm will be activated, signalling a requirement to relocate to the first floor of the building.⁴²

We **advise** that the proposed private warning system, upon which the shelter in place strategy would be relying on, is not fail-safe as private systems and plans are dependent on human application and often rely on technical support systems. The water level alarms and the access gate (be it manual or automatic) will require adequate maintenance, testing and monitoring, which may not be achieved under private ownership.

Having areas with multiple private or site-specific flood warning systems, each with varying efficacy, increases the complexity of deriving flood warning advice at the community scale. It is also more challenging to monitor these flood warning systems and effectively incorporate information into strategic emergency management response for the community in the Local Flood Plan (LFP). The NSW SES, therefore, generally does not support the use of private or site specific warning systems for individual developments that have not been developed in a strategic context.⁴³

In addition, we **note** the reference to the (automatic) boom gate has been updated to a **manually operated** hinge bar gate,⁴⁴ which would require a person to go to the site entrance to close the gate when the site access/egress point is already *compromised through flooding of the access road and Turton Road*. We **advise** that the emergency management strategy for the site should not put people at risk by directing them towards floodwaters to manually close the gate and **recommend** reconsidering this approach. In addition,

We also **recommend seeking further clarification** in relation to the available refuge area and what the *combined floor area* entails,⁴⁵ noting that at Stage 2 the available floor area would be approximately 1500sqm,⁴⁶ while the FERP suggests a combined floor area of around 2400 sqm would accommodate 2500 people.⁴⁷

We **advise** the consent authority is satisfied that the proposal is compliant with the [Shelter in Place Guideline](#) (NSW Government, 2024) **criteria** and **intent** and can provide adequate refuge in line with the Guidelines criteria. Alternatively, consider a reduction in the development capacity to ensure adequate refuge conditions can be met. For emergency management purposes, consideration must be given to flood events up to the PMF with the site at full capacity.

⁴² Torrent Consulting. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Flood Emergency Response Plan (Revision 07), page 9

⁴³ Department of Planning and Environment. 2023. Support for emergency management planning – Flood risk management guideline EM01, Section A2.6, page 12

⁴⁴ Torrent Consulting. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Flood Impact and Risk Assessment (Revision 09), page xii

⁴⁵ Torrent Consulting. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Flood Emergency Response Plan (Revision 07), page 20

⁴⁶ Urbis. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Response to Submissions report, page 56

⁴⁷ Torrent Consulting. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Flood Emergency Response Plan (Revision 07), page 20

Consideration should also be given to how the community can be **effectively informed** of the flood risk at the site and risks associated with the emergency management strategy, particularly noting **high hazard (H5) flooding** emerging at the site in a PMF event.⁴⁸

We also **highlight** that the floor level of the shelter in place part of the development should be above the PMF, as per the Shelter in Place Guidelines⁴⁹ and **caution against** the *Use of the upper floor as a flood refuge would only be required once flood water inundation of the ground floor level occurs (..) as the areas available on the ground floor level of the facility are available for “sheltering in place”, up until these events.*⁵⁰

In addition, noting consideration of additional support that may be required by people with reduced mobility to relocate to the refuge area at the first floor of the building - *an evacuation chair will be available at each of the stair wells within the building to assist site management in the relocation of physically impaired patrons to the upstairs flood refuge area -*,⁵¹ we **recommend** ensuring the shelter in place protocol is enacted early, and not wait until inundation of the ground level occurs, to allow all site users to reach the safety of the refuge ahead of the onset of flooding around the building, particularly noting the flash flooding nature of the catchment.

Development strategies relying on an assumption that mass rescue may be possible where evacuation either fails or is not implemented are not acceptable to the NSW SES.

Principle 4 Decisions on development within the floodplain does not increase risk to life from flooding.

Managing flood risks requires careful consideration of development type, likely users, and their ability respond to minimise their risks. This includes consideration of:

- **Isolation** – There is no known safe period of isolation in a flood, the longer the period of isolation the greater the risk to occupants who are isolated.
- **Secondary risks** – This includes fire and medical emergencies that can impact on the safety of people isolated by floodwater. The potential risk to occupants needs to be considered and managed in decision-making.
- **Consideration of human behaviour** – The behaviour of individuals such as choosing not to remain isolated from their family or social network in a building on a floor above the PMF for an extended flood duration or attempting to return to a building during a flood, needs to be considered.

Principle 5 Risks faced by the itinerant population need to be managed.

⁴⁸ Torrent Consulting. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Flood Impact and Risk Assessment (Revision 09), Figure 5-7

⁴⁹ NSW Department of Planning, Housing and Infrastructure. 2024. Shelter in place guideline for flash flooding, page 5

⁵⁰ Urbis. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Response to Submissions report, page 56

⁵¹ Torrent Consulting. 2026. Hunter Indoor Sports Centre – Flood Emergency Response Plan (Revision 07), page 20

Any Emergency Management strategy needs to consider people visiting the area or using a development.

Principle 6 Recognise the need for effective flood warning and associated limitations.

An effective flood warning strategy with clear and concise messaging understood by the community is key to providing the community an opportunity to respond to a flood threat in an appropriate and timely manner.

As the site is affected by flash flooding there are no Bureau of Meteorology quantitative flood warnings available. Severe Weather Warnings and Thunderstorm Warnings will be the most likely form of advice about the potential for flood producing storms and rainfall, which will not provide the community time to respond to a flood threat in an appropriate manner.

Principle 7 Ongoing community awareness of flooding is critical to assist effective emergency response.

Development within a floodplain will necessitate ongoing involvement from the NSW SES in community awareness, preparedness, and response activities. It is essential that all site users, both during and after the construction phase, are informed of the flood risk and the measures in place to reduce risk to life. This includes:

- Raising awareness of flood risk
- Promoting preparedness actions
- Installing appropriate signage
- Conducting emergency drills

Importantly, a private flood management plan alone is insufficient to address flood risk on this site.