



NSW POLICE FORCE

Eastern Beaches Local Area Command

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Referral of Development Application for comment under the NSW Environmental Planning & Assessment Act 1979, 79C Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Guidelines.

Development Application No: DA/850/10
Property: 77-97 Alison Road, Randwick NSW 2031
Proposed: Demolition of the Randwick Pavilion, Teahouse and paddock Stand, excavation and site works and construction of a new 7 level above ground level grandstand with basement, amphitheatre parade ring, 3 storey Owners and Trainers pavilion, single storey amenities block, together with the refurbishment of the QE11 Stand, modification of the junction of the Official Stand to the QE11 Stand, adaptive-reuse of the Swab building and on-site landscape works.

In April, 2001 the NSW Minister for Planning introduced the **Environmental Planning & Assessment Act, 1979, Section 79C Crime Prevention Guidelines (1)**. These guidelines require consent authorities to ensure that any development within their Local Government Area provides safety and security to users and the community. If a development presents a crime risk, the guidelines can be used to justify modification of the development to minimize crime risk, or refusal of the development on the grounds that crime risk cannot be appropriately minimized.

In line with these guidelines, Eastern Beaches Local Area Command has conducted a Safer by Design Crime Risk Evaluation as requested by Randwick City Council, Frances Street, Randwick on the proposed development on 10/11/2010. The developer will also need to consider the Randwick City Council Development Control Plan No: 23 Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (2) in reviewing this development. Approval from the Department of Environmental Climate Change and Water is also required for the proposed activity.

This proposed development is; demolition of the Randwick pavilion, Teahouse and Paddock Stand, excavation and site works and construction of a new 7 level above ground grandstand with basement, amphitheatre parade ring, 3 storey Owners and Trainers pavilion, single storey amenities block, together

with the refurbishment of the QE11 Stand, modification of the junction of the official Stand, adaptive-reuse of the Swab building and on-site landscape works.

This proposed development has the potential to introduce new victims, crime opportunities and offenders to the development and its surroundings. It is highly probable therefore, that reported crime will increase in the future.

The NSW Police Safer by Design Evaluation process is based upon the **Australian and New Zealand Risk Management Standard ANZS4360:1999 (3)**. It is a contextually flexible process that identifies and quantifies crime hazards and location risk. The process includes measurement of crime likelihood (probability), consequence (outcome), distributions of reported crime (hotspots), socio-economic index for areas (SEIFA) (disadvantage), crime opportunities. As a result of this process a **Moderate** crime risk rating has been identified for this development on a sliding scale of low, moderate, high, extreme crime risk. The **Environmental Planning & Assessment Act, 1979, Section 79C Crime Prevention Guidelines (2)** requires that Randwick Council (consent authority) ensure that this development provides safety and security to users and the community. With this in mind **natural, low organised, and low technical/mechanical** Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) treatment options need to be considered to reduce opportunities for crime.

Police have reviewed the proposed development application and have made recommendations in regards to a number of areas which have been highlighted in the attached Safer by Design Crime Risk Evaluation.

Should you have any questions in relation to the evaluation contact Constable Shawn Majeski, Crime Prevention Officer, Eastern Beaches LAC, Phone 02 9349 9214

Yours sincerely,

S. Majeski
Crime Prevention Officer



Disclaimer

The New South Wales Police Force has a vital interest in ensuring the safety of the members of the community and their property. By using the recommendations contained in this evaluation, any person who does so acknowledges that:

- It is not possible to make areas evaluated by the NSWPF absolutely safe for members of the community or their property.
- It is based upon the information provided to the NSWPF at the time the evaluation was made.
- This evaluation is a confidential document and is for use by the consent authority or organizations referred to on page 1 only.
- The contents of this evaluation are not to be copied or circulated otherwise than for the purposes of the consent authority or organization referred to on page q.

The NSW Police Force hopes that by using the recommendations contained in this document, criminal activity will be reduced and the safety of members of the community and their property will be increased. However, it does not guarantee that all risks have been identified, or that the area evaluated will be free from criminal activity if its recommendations are followed.

1. Introduction

In April, 2001 the NSW Minister for Planning introduced the **Environmental Planning & Assessment Act, 1979, Section 79C Crime Prevention Guidelines** ⁽¹⁾. These guidelines require consent authorities to ensure that any development within their Local Government Area provides safety and security to users and the community. If a development presents a crime risk, the guidelines can be used to justify modification of the development to minimize crime risk, or refusal of the development on the grounds that crime risk cannot be appropriately minimized.

In line with these guidelines, Eastern Beaches Local Area Command has conducted a Safer by Design Crime Risk Evaluation as requested by Randwick City Council, Frances Street, Randwick on the proposed development on 10th November 2010.

Site description

The proposed development is; demolition of the Randwick pavilion, Teahouse and Paddock Stand, excavation and site works and construction of a new 7 level above ground grandstand with basement, amphitheatre parade ring, 3 storey Owners and Trainers pavilion, single storey amenities block, together with the refurbishment of the QE11 Stand, modification of the junction of the official Stand, adaptive-reuse of the Swab building and on-site landscape works.

Site risk rating

The Safer by Design Crime Risk Evaluation for this development has identified the crime risk rating as **Medium** on a sliding scale of low, moderate, high, extreme crime risk. With this in mind **natural, low organised and low technical/mechanical**, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) treatment options need to be considered to reduce opportunities for crime.

2. Crime Prevention through Environmental Design

Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) is a crime prevention strategy that focuses on the planning, design and structure of cities and neighbourhoods. It reduces opportunities for crime by using design and place management principles that reduce the likelihood of essential crime ingredients from intersecting in time and space.

Predatory offenders often make cost-benefit assessments of potential victims and locations before committing crime. CPTED aims to create the reality (or perception) that the costs of committing crime are greater than the likely benefits. This is achieved by creating social and environmental conditions that:

- Maximise risk to offenders (increasing the likelihood of detection, challenge and apprehension)
- Maximise the effort required to commit crime (increasing the time, energy and resources required to commit crime)

- Minimise the actual and perceived benefits of crime (removing, minimising or concealing crime attractors and rewards), and
- Minimise excuse-making opportunities (removing conditions that encourage/facilitate rationalisation of inappropriate behaviour).

There are four principles that need to be considered in the assessment of development applications to minimise the opportunity for crime:

- Surveillance
- Territorial reinforcement
- Space/activity management.
- Access control

Surveillance

Natural surveillance increases the threat of apprehension by taking steps to increase the perception that people can see and be seen. Surveillance occurs by designing the placement of physical features, activities and people in such a way as to maximise visibility and foster positive interaction among legitimate users of private and public space. Potential offenders will often feel threatened by the increased scrutiny and limitations on escape ways.

Where natural surveillance opportunities are restricted it may be necessary to increase surveillance opportunities by using either technical/mechanical (Closed Circuit Television Systems, etc) or organised (using people to supervise areas) treatment options.

There is a proven correlation between poor street lighting, fear of crime, the avoidance of public places and crime opportunity (Painter, 1997). With this in mind the **Australia Standards, Lighting AS:1158** now require lighting engineers and designers to factor-in crime risk and fear when choosing the type of luminaries/lighting levels. Lighting (lux) levels for this development must be commensurate with a high crime risk identified in this evaluation.

Recommendations:

1. The development should be designed to maximise natural surveillance opportunities to and from the development.
2. Lighting which has been designed to the Australian Standard should be installed in and around the proposed development. The light (lux) levels should be commensurate with a Moderate crime risk rating. Uniform lighting distribution should cover the entire property. The emphasis should be on installing low glare/high uniformity lighting levels in line with Australian Standard AS:1158 <http://www.standards.org.au>. The objective of lighting should be to deny criminals the advantage of being able to operate unobserved.
3. Luminaries (light covers) should be designed to reduce opportunities for malicious damage (vandalism). Lighting needs to be checked on a regular basis to ensure that it is operating

- effectively. The lighting sources should be compatible with requirements of any closed circuit television system installed. A limited amount of internal lighting should be left on at night to enable patrolling police, security guards or passing people to monitor activities within the development.
4. A monitored intruder alarm system which complies with the **Australian Standard – Systems Installed within Clients Premises, AS:2201** <http://www.standards.org.au> should be installed within the premises to enhance the physical security and assist in the detection of unauthorised entry to the premises. This standard specifies the minimum requirements for intruder alarm equipment and installed systems. It shall apply to intruder alarm systems in private premises, commercial premises and special installations. The system should be checked and tested on a regular (at least monthly) basis to ensure that it is operating effectively. Staff should be trained in the correct use of the system.
 5. Detection devices should be strategically located throughout the premises to detect any unauthorised access. The light emitting diodes (LEDs red lights) within the detectors should be deactivated, to avoid offenders being able to test the range of the system.
 6. As a number of business premises have had telephone lines cut to prevent alarms being reported to the security monitoring company, a supplementary system such as Global Satellite Mobile (GSM) or Radio Frequency (RF) systems should be used to transmit alarm signal by either mobile telephone or radio frequency.
 7. A Closed Circuit Television System (CCTV) which complies with Australian Standard – Closed Circuit Television System (CCTV) AS:4806 <http://www.standards.org.au> should be installed within the development to receive, hold or process data for the identification of people involved in anti-social or criminal behaviour.
 - *The system is obliged to conform with Federal, State or Territory Privacy and Surveillance Legislation.*
 - *Staff need to be trained in the operation of the system.*
 - *This system should consist of surveillance cameras strategically located within the development to provide maximum surveillance coverage of the area, particularly areas that are difficult to supervise by staff and assist in the identification of people involved in anti-social or criminal behaviour: Police recommend that that all bar areas and any high risk/high activity areas within the AJC are to be totally covered by CCTV Cameras.*
 - *Police recommend a control room with facilities to monitor live CCTV footage would be advantageous to help monitor/control large crowds. Police could monitor any anti-social or criminal behaviour and deploy resources to problem areas as required.*
 - *Digital technology should be used to receive, store and process data. It is recommended that data should be kept for minimum of 28 days.. This equipment should be secured away from public access areas to restrict tampering with the equipment and data.*

- *Cameras should be strategically mounted at appropriate heights with vandalism resistant covers to avoid tampering. When multiple cameras are in use, vandalism can be reduced by pointing cameras towards other cameras (camera to camera protection).*
- *Overt CCTV cameras are likely to deter some crimes. In many instances however, they passively record events rather than prevent them. The capability of guardians to respond to incidents, however, is likely to be tested by probing offenders. System weaknesses and blind spots undoubtedly be identified and exploited by persistent criminals.*
- *Police request the AJC agree that all CCTV footage be made available to Police as required.*

Territorial reinforcement

Territorial re-enforcement promotes control through increased definition of space and improved proprietary controls. An environment designed to clearly delineate private and public space does a number of things. Owners have a vested interest in the space and are more likely to take the appropriate action to protect the space. Strangers or intruders stand out in that space and are more easily identified. By using buildings, fences, footpaths, signs, lighting and landscape can be used to delineate space and express ownership of space. Space which is not clearly defined may encourage anti-social or criminal behaviour.

Territorial reinforcement can be achieved through:

- Design that encourages people to gather in space and to feel some responsibility for its use and condition
- Design with clear transitions and boundaries between public and private space
- Clear design cues on who is to use space and what it is to be used for. Care is needed to ensure that territorial reinforcement is not achieved by making public spaces private spaces, through gates and enclosures.

Recommendations:

1. The development should be designed to maximise natural surveillance opportunities to and from the development. The floors, walls & ceilings of the development should be of solid construction to clearly define the boundaries and restrict access. Where possible parking positions should be in-front of the building line to reduce concealment opportunities. Try to limit the number of entry/egress points to the property.
2. The street number must be prominently displayed at the front of your property to comply with the Local Government Act, 1993 Section 124 (8). Failure to comply with any such order is an offence under Section 628 of the Act. Offences committed under Section 628 of the Act attract a maximum penalty of 50 penalty units (currently \$5500) for an individual and 100 penalty units (currently \$11000) for a corporation. The number should be in contrasting colours to building materials and be a minimum height of 120 mm.

3. Warning signs should be strategically posted around the property to warn intruders of what security treatments have been implemented to reduce opportunities for crime. Warning, trespasser will be prosecuted. Warning, these premises are under electronic surveillance.
4. Directional signage should be posted at decision making points (eg. Entry/egress points) to provide guidance to visitors. This can also assist in access control and reduce excuse making opportunities by intruders.
5. A current Fire Safety Statement must be prominently displayed within the property to comply with the Environmental Planning & Assessment Regulations (1994) Clause 80GB. The annual fire safety statement is a statement issued by the owner of a building to the effect that: each essential fire safety measure specified in the statement has been assessed by a properly qualified person and was found when it was assessed, to be capable of performing.
6. Signage needs to be provided at (fire) exits to assist occupants to identify exits in emergency situations. Signage needs to be provided to assist occupants to identify fire suppression equipment, e.g. extinguishers, fire hoses, etc.
7. Trees & shrubs should be trimmed to reduce concealment opportunities and increase visibility to and from the property. Landscaping needs to be maintained on a regular basis to reduce concealment opportunities. Remove obstacles & rubbish from property boundaries, footpaths, driveways, car parks & buildings to restrict concealment & prevent offenders scaling your building.

Space/Activity management

Popular space is often attractive, well maintained and well used space. Linked to the principle of territorial reinforcement, space activity management ensures that space is appropriately utilised and well cared for. Space/activity management strategies should include activity coordination, maintenance, rapid repair of vandalism and graffiti, and the replacement of burned out lighting and the removal or refurbishment of decayed physical elements. Space activity management can support and increase the use of the built environment for safe activities with the intent of increasing the risk of detection to criminals and undesirable activities.

Recommendations:

1. An Emergency control and evacuation plan which complies with the **Australian Standard, Emergency Control Organisation and Procedures for Buildings, Structures and Workplace, AS:3745** <http://www.standards.org.au> should be prepared and maintained by your development to assist management and staff in the event of an emergency. This standard sets out the requirements for the development of procedures for the controlled evacuation of building, structures and workplaces during emergencies. Further information in relation to planning for emergencies can be obtain from Emergency NSW <http://www.emergency.nsw.gov.au> or Emergency Management Australia <http://www.ema.gov.au> .

2. An annual fire safety assessment and inspection of an essential fire safety measure or building must have been carried out within the period of 3 months prior to the date of which the annual fire safety statement is issued. The choice of person to carry out an assessment or inspection is up to the owner of the building. The person who carries out an assessment must inspect and verify the performance of each fire safety measure being assessed. The annual fire safety statement must be given to council and Fire Commissioner and prominently displayed in the building to comply with the Environmental Planning and Assessment Regulations 1994 Clause 80GB.
3. While the sensible maintenance of vegetation is encouraged, the objectives of safety, aesthetics and horticulture need to be balanced.
4. Maintenance policies need to be developed and implemented for the proposed development to deal with rubbish collection and disposal, damage and repairs to property, eg. Lighting and structures as quickly as possible.
5. Management and staff need to be aware of their obligations in respect of responsible service of alcohol. Under the NSW Occupational Health and Safety laws you as an employer have a duty of care to ensure the health, safety and welfare at work of all your employees and clients. That duty extends (without limitation) to the following:
 - ensuring that any premises controlled by the employer where the employees work (and that means of access to or exit from the premises) are safe and without risk to health,
 - ensuring that any plant or substance provided for use by the employees at work is safe and without risks to health when properly used,
 - ensuring that systems of work and the working environment of the employees are safe and without risks to health,
 - providing such information, instruction, training and supervision as may be necessary to ensure the employees health and safety at work,
 - providing adequate facilities for the welfare of the employees at work.
6. That duty must also ensure that people (other than the employees of the employer) are not exposed to risks to their health or safety arising from the conduct of the employers undertaking while they are at the employers place of work.
7. The use of glass bottles and glass cups on external balconies present a risk to public safety if dropped/thrown. Police suggest the implementation of a no glass bottles or glass cups policy within balcony areas as a crime preventative measure. The implementation of PVC containers, positioning of no glass near balcony signs and pro-active reinforcement by security should be considered and would help to lower the risk to public safety.

Access control

Access control should be designed to limit the opportunity for crime by taking steps to clearly delineate public, semi-public and private space. This can be achieved by using physical and symbolic barriers to

attract, channel or restrict the movement of people into and throughout the development. By making it clear where people are permitted to go or not go, it becomes difficult for potential offenders to reach and victimise people and their property. Illegible boundary markers and confusing spatial definition make it easy for criminals to make excuses for being in restricted areas. However, care needs to be taken to ensure that the barriers are not tall or hostile, creating the effect of a compound.

Effective access control can be achieved by creating:

- Landscapes and physical locations that channel and group people into target areas
- Spaces which attract, rather than discourage people from gathering
- Restricted access to internal areas or high-risk areas (like car-parks or other rarely visited areas). This is often achieved through the use of physical barriers.

Recommendations:

1. Fences should be installed around the perimeter of the development to clearly define the property boundaries and restrict access to the property. Optically permeable (open design) should be considered to increase surveillance and reduce concealment opportunities. Fences and gates should be maintained in good condition and should be checked regularly to assist with the protection of your property. Gates of similar construction to the fence should be installed to control access to and from the property. Gates should be secured with quality locks which comply with the Australian Standards, Lock Sets, AS:4145 to restrict access.
2. The doors and door-frames to these premises should be of solid construction. These doors should be fitted with locks which comply with the **Australian Standard – Mechanical Locksets for doors in buildings, AS:4145** <http://www.standards.org.au> to restrict unauthorised access and the Building Code of Australia (fire regulations). This standard specifies the general design criteria, performance requirements, and procedures for testing mechanical lock sets and latch sets for their resistance to forced entry and efficiency under conditions of light to heavy usage. The standard covers lock sets for typical doorways, such as wooden, glass or metal hinged swinging doors or sliding doors in residential and business premises, including public buildings, warehouses and factories. Requirements for both the lock and associated furniture are included. Certain areas may require higher level of locking devices not referred to in this standard. (e.g. locking bars, electronic locking devices, detection devices, alarms).
3. There are some doors within the premises which are designated as (fire) exits and must comply with the Building Code of Australia 2006. This means that they provide egress to a road or open space, an internal or external stairway, a ramp, a fire isolated passageway, a doorway opening to a road or open space. In a required exit or path of travel to an exit, the unobstructed height throughout must not be less than 2m, except the unobstructed height of any doorway may be reduced to not less than 1980mm and the unobstructed width of each exit or path of travel to an exit, except for doorways must not be less than, 1m. (The width of the fire exit door dictates the width of egress path leading to it). The door in the required exit must be readily open-able without a key from the side that faces the person seeking egress, by a single hand downward

action or pushing action on a single device which is located between 900mm and 1.2mm from the floor.

4. The windows and window-frames to these premises should be of solid construction. These windows should be fitted with locks with comply with the **Australian Standard – Mechanical Locksets for windows in buildings, AS:4145** <http://www.standards.org.au> to restrict unauthorised access. This standard specifies the general design criteria, performance requirements, and procedures for testing mechanical lock sets and latch sets for their resistance to forced entry and efficiency under conditions of light to heavy usage. The standard covers lock sets for typical windows, such a wooden, glass or metal hinged swinging windows or sliding windows in residential and business premises, including public buildings, warehouses and factories. Requirements for both the lock and associated furniture are included. Certain areas may require higher level of locking devices not referred to in this standard. (e.g. locking bars, electronic locking devices, detection devices, alarms).
5. A safe designed and installed to the Australian Standards should be used to provide additional security to money and other valuables. The safe should be anchored to the floor to prevent easy removal. The safe should incorporate a drop-chute facility to restrict access to the safe. The safe should incorporate time delay facility to restrict access to the safe. The safe should be installed in an area away from public view where access is limited. The safe should be locked at all times when not in use.
6. As your business deals in cash a robbery prevention program needs to be established to ensure that management and staff are aware of their responsibilities in the event of such an event taking place. Establish clear cash-handling procedures within your business to reduce opportunities for crime. Staff should be trained in cash handling procedures to reduce opportunities for crime. Limit the amount of money carried in the cash drawer at any time (\$200.00 float). Lock cash drawers when not in use and clear money from the cash drawer on a regular basis, e.g. to a safe. Avoid counting cash in view of public. Use a minimum of two staff, or security services, when transferring money to financial institutions, or consider using a reputable security company especially when transferring large amounts of money. Avoid wearing uniform or identification when transferring money. Don't use conspicuous bank-bags when transferring money, as this can be a clear indication to the thief.
7. Consideration for a high increase in both vehicle and pedestrian traffic during race days in the surrounding area requires the implementation of traffic control measures. The higher demand on both public and private transport during these times could have an adverse affect on the area for both residents of the location and visiting members of the public.
- Police strongly recommend that improvements be considered in relation to the entry/exit points being the intersection of Darley Road/ Alison Road, Intersection of Doncaster Road and Alison Road and Intersection of Ascot and Doncaster. It is recommended that a review of these locations with specific consideration to the re-engineering of traffic control measures and placement of security/traffic personal as these are currently critical locations and present a high level of risk to public safety.

- Depending on the size and nature of events being held at the racecourse, currently a demand of between 7 and 15 Police alone are required to control pedestrian/vehicular traffic at the intersection of Darley Road and Alison Road. A total of up to 30 Police can be required to manage these three high risk locations at any one time.
- Police suggest the introduction of a drop off/ pick up area (on site) for private vehicles, including privately hired buses. Police have currently identified high risk areas located at numerous points along Anzac Parade, that are being utilised by public vehicles to drop off/ pick up pedestrians. Vehicles stopping along Anzac Parade present a high risk of vehicle collisions between vehicles and pedestrians.
- Police ideally suggest the inclusion of a pedestrian footbridge, over Alison Road at the northern frontage of the AJC, to help alleviate the high level of risk existing to pedestrian traffic attempting to cross Alison Road. Overpasses should be screened to prevent pedestrians from throwing missiles at property, vehicles or other pedestrians.

Further recommendations:

1. Police request that the Australian Jockey Club continues adherence to negotiated local licensing agreements already in place, with respect to the sale and supply of liquor and continue to liaise with Eastern Beaches licensing Police.
2. Police request that the Australian Jockey Club continue to liaise with Eastern Beaches Police with **ALL** upcoming events, by notification in a prescribed format to the Operation and Planning Officer. Events occurring at the AJC may impact other events occurring within the area and Police require notification to obtain a proper appreciation of all events and the combined resources required by Police.
3. Police recommend continued funding of user charge Police at appropriate events to help with crowd control and reductions in both anti-social and criminal behaviour. With few exceptions, criminals do not want to be detected, challenged or apprehended. For offenders, the capability of a guardian to detect, challenge or apprehend is an important consideration. The perceived or actual presence of security officers and/or Police can be a strong deterrent.
4. Police request that a suitable Plan of Management be prepared for the balcony areas to ensure the safety of the public. There are concerns that glasses and/or glass bottles could either fall from the balcony or be thrown. It is recommended that the Plan of Management or design of the balcony would address this issue.
5. Police recommend that on major events voluntary undertakings in relation to, any drink (whether it contains liquor) must not be served or supplied in a glass or breakable plastic containers.

3. References

- (1) Department of Urban Affairs and Planning (2001) Crime Prevention Guidelines to S79C of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act, 1979, Sydney.
- (2) Australia and New Zealand Standard - Risk Management: ANZS 4360. Standards Australia, Phone 1800 035 822 Website: <http://www.standards.org.au>
- (3) Australian Standard – Lighting: ANZS 1158. Standards Australia, Phone 1800 035 822 Website: <http://www.standards.org.au>
- (4) Australian Standard – Closed Circuit Television System (CCTV) AS:4806. Standards Australia, Phone 1800 035 822 Website: <http://www.standards.org.au>
- (5) Australian Standard – Systems Installed within Clients Premises, AS:2001. Standards Australia, Phone 1800 035 822 Website: <http://www.standards.org.au>
- (6) Local Government Act, 1973 Section 124 (8)
- (7) New South Wales Occupational Health & Safety Act,.
- (8) Australian Standard - Lock Sets: AS:4145. Standards Australia, Phone 1800 035 822 Website: <http://www.standards.org.au>
- (9) Australian Standard Safes and Strongrooms, AS:3809:1998. Standards Australia, Phone 1800 035 822 Website: <http://www.standards.org.au>
- (10) McCamley, P (2001) Assessing and Reducing Crime Risk: A Practical Guide for Planners, Designers and Crime Prevention Professionals. NSW Police, Sydney.
- (11) McCamley, P (2001) Crime, Design and Urban Planning: From Theory to Practice. New Planner, Royal Australian Planning Institute, Sydney
- (12) National Crime Prevention (1999) Pathways to Prevention: Developmental and Early Intervention approaches to crime in Australia, Canberra.
- (13) Painter, K (1997) 'The Crime Reducing Effect of Improved Street Lighting: The Dudley Project' in Clarke, R.V (Ed) Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies. Harrow and Heston, New York.
- (14) Weatherburn, D (2001) What Causes Crime? NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, Sydney.