

**URBIS**

# **CRIME RISK ASSESSMENT**

Yiribana Logistics Estate

Prepared for  
**GPT**  
11 May 2022

**URBIS STAFF RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS REPORT WERE:**

Director	Rachel Trigg
Associate Director	Sarah Braund
Consultant	Hugo Walton
Project Code	P0039831
Report Number	Final

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Crime Risk Assessment has been prepared by Urbis Pty Ltd (Urbis) on behalf of GPT (the Applicant) to inform a State Significant Development Application (SSDA) at 754-770 and 784-786 Mamre Road, Kemps Creek (the site). The SSDA seeks consent for the Stage 1 works which includes the development and operation of two warehouses and associated infrastructure on the site.

Under Section 4.15 of the *Environmental and Planning Assessment Act 1979*, the likely impacts of a development are required to be considered and assessed as part of the planning process. This includes the impacts on the natural and built environments, as well as the social and economic impacts in the locality.

This Crime Risk Assessment has been prepared in accordance with Section 4.2.9 of the Mamre Road Precinct Development Control Plan 2021

## CRIME RISK ASSESSMENT

A Crime Risk Assessment is a specialist study undertaken to help reduce opportunities for crime by using design and place management principles. The NSW Police Safer by Design Guidelines direct that a Crime Risk Assessment consider the four key principles of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED):

- Surveillance
- Access control
- Territorial reinforcement
- Space and activity management.

## CONCLUSION

Urbis has undertaken a Crime Risk Assessment for the proposed development against the four CPTED principles and has identified potential risk areas and recommendations to help reduce crime and anti-social behaviour. The assessment has been informed by a review of relevant local and state policies, and crime and demographic data.

The assessment found the proposal aligns with the provisions of Section 4.2.9 of the Mamre Road Precinct Development Control Plan. By increasing the effort required and the perceptions of risk in committing an offence, reducing actual and perceived crime rewards and eliminating or reducing conditions that offenders can use to rationalise or excuse criminal behaviour the proposal demonstrates incorporation of the four CPTED principles: surveillance, access control, territorial reinforcement, and space and activity management. To further increase safety and reduce crime risk, the following recommendations should be implemented:

- Ensure all entrances, stairwells, elevators, communal areas and pedestrian paths are well lit in accordance with Australian Standards.
- Use balanced lighting between internal and external spaces to avoid the mirroring of glazing at night and allow for a continuation of sightlines from and into the building.
- Select vegetation with consideration given to future maintenance. To maximise sightlines, ensure the lowest tree limbs are above average head height and lower shrubs do not provide obstruction, opportunity for concealment or entrapment.
- Currently pedestrian and bicycle access between the building's main entrances and bicycle parking areas is by narrow and indirect pathways. More direct formalised pedestrian and bicycle access should be provided to and from the main Entrance 3 to the surrounding pedestrian and cycle infrastructure network. These routes should be of an adequate width and provide well-lit, and direct access with clear sightlines for pedestrians and cyclists.
- Provide on-ground directional signage in car parking and loading areas to guide the flow of vehicle traffic.
- Install security hardware on all back of house areas to restrict unauthorised access by non-staff members.

- Maintain all access points, including fire exits and stairs, to ensure they remain in good working order and inaccessible from the outside. Magnetic door locking systems linked to fire sprinkler alarms can ensure that fire exits are used for emergencies only. Fire exits and stairs can often be targets for offenders.
- Implement clear wayfinding signage with definitional legibility throughout all internal and external areas onsite, including the offices, warehousing, carparking and internal road network.
- Use signage, speed control measures (bollards, speed humps) and design cues (eg. surface coverings) to slow vehicles exiting and entering the carparks and loading areas.
- Consider additional articulation or design treatments on the exterior of the warehouse buildings particularly lower to ground level. Building design that avoids large, blank walls and instead utilises external surfaces and cladding for facades including glazing and highly textured/articulated elements can reduce incidents nuisance graffiti. Spaces that are well maintained and display territorial reinforcement will attract visitation.
- Clarify ownership of the car park area using signage, boundary markers and other environmental cues. This will increase perceptions of risk to potential criminals and increase community ownership.
- Ensure vegetation on site is maintained, monitored, and reported on in accordance with the Vegetation Management Plan (Cumberland Ecology) that forms part of this SSDA. Additional consideration should be given to the selection and maintenance of landscape elements, including vegetation, to ensure that over time they do not obscure sightlines and compromise the perceived level of safety.
- Prepare a Plan of Management for the operation of the site. This should include particulars on operating hours, maximum capacities, access and egress arrangements, maintenance responsibilities and cleanliness. Repairs and maintenance should be documented clearly to enforce accountability to relevant staff.

# 1. INTRODUCTION

This Crime Risk Assessment has been prepared by Urbis Pty Ltd (Urbis) on behalf of GPT (the Applicant) to inform a State Significant Development Application (SSDA) at 754-770 and 784-786 Mamre Road, Kemps Creek (the site). The SSDA seeks consent for the Stage 1 works which includes the development and operation of two warehouses and associated infrastructure on the site.

Under Section 4.15 of the *Environmental and Planning Assessment Act 1979*, the likely impacts of a development are required to be considered and assessed as part of the planning process. This includes the impacts on the natural and built environments, as well as the social and economic impacts in the locality.

This Crime Risk Assessment has been prepared in accordance with Section 4.2.9 of the Mamre Road Precinct Development Control Plan 2021 (MRPDCP).

## 1.1. AIM

A Crime Risk Assessment is a specialist study undertaken to help reduce opportunities for crime by using design and place management principles. A Crime Risk Assessment employs the four key principles of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) as shown in Figure 1.

Where CPTED risks are identified in the proposed design, recommendations are made within this report to help reduce the likelihood of the crime from occurring.

Figure 1 CPTED principles



## 1.2. METHODOLOGY

Our methodology for completing this Crime Risk Assessment has included three main stages.

Local context analysis	Proposal analysis	Recommendations
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Review of surrounding land uses and desktop site analysis</li> <li>Review of relevant state and local policies to understand the strategic context and approach to crime and community safety</li> <li>Analysis of relevant data to understand the existing context and crime activity.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Review of site plans and technical assessments</li> <li>Review of proposal against CPTED principles.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Design recommendations</li> <li>Draft and final reporting.</li> </ul>


## 2. PROPOSAL

The SSDA seeks approval for:

- Detailed development approval as the first stage of development for:
  - Construction and use of Warehouse 1 and 3 for the purposes of other manufacturing industries and/or warehouse and distribution centres which will operate 24 hours/day, seven days/week
  - Provision of site servicing infrastructure to allow the operation of the industrial unit for warehouse and distribution and/or other manufacturing industries
  - Bulk earth works
  - Construction of retaining walls
  - Internal road network (north-south)
  - Associated carparking
  - Signage
  - Landscaping throughout the site.

In future, a second detailed development application will be submitted for construction of warehouse buildings 2, 4 and 5. The concept plan for the site is shown in Figure 1 below.

Figure 2 Site master plan – Stage 1



Source: SBA Architects

# 3. SITE CONTEXT

## 3.1. CONTEXT DESCRIPTION


The site is located at 754-770 and 784-786 Mamre Road, Kemps Creek, within the Penrith LGA, approximately 20km west of the Parramatta CBD and 13km southeast of the Penrith CBD.

Kemps Creek is generally characterised by its rural-residential lots and agricultural lands. The site is currently unoccupied and is generally surrounded by vacant, rural land. There are some rural-residential properties located opposite the site along Mamre Road, with one property surrounded on three sides by the site. This property is currently vacant and has been sold for redevelopment purposes. Further north, there is a small development containing three schools and a retirement village, as shown in Figure 3 below.

While there is currently limited urban development in the area, the site surrounds are expected to experience considerable change as a result of the Western Sydney Aerotropolis. The site is located within the Mamre Road Precinct, one of ten key precincts in the Aerotropolis. The precinct is intended to be developed as an industrial warehousing and logistic hub, supporting the creation of 17,000 new jobs. To facilitate this, the Mamre Road Precinct was rezoned in June 2020 from RU2 Rural Landscape to IN1 General Industrial zoning under the State Environmental Planning Policy (Western Sydney Employment Area) 2009 (WSEA SEPP).

The NSW Government has identified an opportunity for non-sensitive land uses to locate in this precinct, such as warehouse and logistics facilities. As a result, there have been several proposals in the precinct to develop the existing agricultural lands for industrial warehouse uses, a trend which is expected to continue for the foreseeable future.

Figure 3 Site context



Source: Urbis

## 3.2. SITE VISIT OBSERVATIONS

A detailed desktop site analysis has been undertaken. Online mapping and imagery tools including Google Maps, Google Street View, NSW Six Maps and Nearmaps have been used to understand existing activity around the site and the interface with surrounding land uses.

Site photos are located below and demonstrate that the site and surrounding area are generally well-kept with little evidence of vandalism or rubbish.

Figure 4 Site photos



Picture 1 The site viewed from Mamre Road



Picture 2 Opposite the site on Mamre Road



Picture 3 Recent industrial development north of the site on Mamre Road



Picture 4 Emmaus Catholic College north of the site on Bakers Lane

Source: Google Street View

## 4. POLICY CONTEXT

The following section provides a summary of relevant state and local policies in relation to crime and safety.

### **NSW Crime Prevention and Assessment of Development Applications (2001)**

In April 2001, the NSW Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources (now the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment) introduced the Crime Prevention Legislative Guidelines (the Guidelines) to Section 4.15 (formerly Section 79C) of the *Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979*. These guidelines require consent authorities to ensure that development provides safety and security to users and the community.

The Guidelines introduce the four CPTED principles introduced in Section 1. These are: surveillance, access control, territorial reinforcement and space management.

The Guidelines aim to help councils implement and consider the CPTED principles. CPTED assessments seeks to influence the design of buildings and places by:

- Increasing the perception of risk to criminals by increasing the possibility of detection, challenge and capture
- Increasing the effort required to commit crime by increasing the time, energy or resources which need to be expended
- Reducing the potential rewards of crime by minimising, removing or concealing 'crime benefits'
- Removing conditions that create confusion about required norms of behaviour.

### **NSW Department of Planning, Industry and Environment, Mamre Road Precinct Development Control Plan (2021)**

In November of 2021, the Mamre Road Precinct Development Control Plan (DCP) was adopted. The DCP includes planning controls for future industrial development within the Mamre Road Precinct. This includes building design controls, a road network, drainage strategy, landscaping and biodiversity controls.

Section 4.2.9 of the DCP contains objectives specific to safety and surveillance including:

- (a) ensuring personal safety for workers and visitors
- (b) ensuring that design minimises the opportunity for crime and maximises opportunities for passive surveillance.

The objectives of Section 4.2.9 are supported by the following controls

1. A Crime Risk Assessment Report must be prepared for the development of new buildings.
2. Buildings should be designed to overlook public domain areas and provide casual surveillance.
3. Building entrances should be orientated towards the street to ensure visibility between entrances, foyers, car parking areas and the street.
4. Appropriate lighting should be provided to all cycle and pedestrian paths, bus stops, car parks and buildings.
5. Development should provide clear sight lines and well-lit routes between buildings and the street, and along pedestrian and cycle networks within the public domain.
6. Consideration should be given to the use of landscape elements so as to not compromise the perceived level of safety.

# 5. SOCIAL BASELINE

## 5.1. DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

The profile of a community can influence the type and likelihood of crime that may impact a development. The following section contains a brief analysis of the characteristics of Kemps Creek based on data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (DPIE).

While population data from the 2016 Census now dates to five years ago, it remains the most recent population data source until the release of 2021 Census data in June 2022.

Key characteristics of the Kemps Creek community include:



### Older adult population

The median age in Kemps Creek is 41 with most of the population aged 40 years and older (50.4%). In comparison, Penrith LGA has a median age of 34 and Greater Sydney has a median age of 36.



### Family households

Most people in Kemps Creek live in family households (87.3%). This is a higher proportion than in the Penrith LGA (78.2%) and Greater Sydney (73.6%).



### Low density housing

Nearly all dwellings in the study area are separate houses (99%), which is significantly higher compared to Greater Sydney (57%).



### Predominately blue-collar workers

Most of the study area work across the construction and manufacturing sectors, with 28% of Kemps Creek and 23% of Mount Vernon employed as either technicians and trade workers or machinery operators and drivers.



### Motor vehicle dependency

Half of all households in Kemps Creek own three or more vehicles. Just 3.0% of workers in Kemps Creek use public transport to travel to work, a significantly lower rate compared to Greater Sydney (22.8%).



### Strong population growth

Between 2021 and 2041 the population of Penrith LGA is expected to increase by 60%, growing from 196,066 people to approximately 370,000 people.

## 5.2. CRIME PROFILE

Crime data from the Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR) was analysed to identify the crime profile at Kemps Creek. Data for Penrith LGA and the NSW average has been used to help assess risk compared to LGA and state wide averages. The full crime profile is contained in Appendix A.

Key crime findings relevant to this assessment include:

- BOCSAR produces hotspots to illustrate areas of crime density relative to crime concentrations across NSW. The maps show the site is not within a crime hotspot for any relevant crimes.
- Kemps Creek generally has lower rates of crime per 100,000 people compared to Penrith LGA. However, crime rates (January 2021 to December 2021) indicate the suburb does experience higher rates per 100,000 people of motor vehicle theft (464.7 in Kemps Creek compared to 173.4 in the Penrith LGA)
- Kemps Creek also generally has lower rates of crime per 100,000 people compared to NSW. However, crime rates (January 2021 to December 2021) indicate the suburb does experience higher rates per 100,000 people of:
  - Non-domestic assault (380.2 in Kemps Creek compared to 344.6 in NSW)
  - Motor vehicle theft (464.7 in Kemps Creek compared to 128.2 in NSW).
- While the site is within an LGA that experiences higher rates of certain crimes, two-year crime trends from January 2020 - December 2022 indicate that crime rates are generally reducing across the LGA. The COVID-19 pandemic and associated restrictions on travel, public gatherings and business operations may have contributed towards the reduction in crime rates over the two-year period.

## 6. CRIME RISK ASSESSMENT

This section provides an assessment of the proposal against the CPTED principles of surveillance, access control, territorial reinforcement space and activity management and the requirements of the Mamre Road Precinct DCP.

### 6.1. SURVEILLANCE

Places that are well supervised through casual, mechanical or organised surveillance are less likely to attract criminal behaviour. Important considerations for natural surveillance are building orientation and location, design of spaces, landscaping and lighting. Technical surveillance is achieved through measures such as CCTV. Organised surveillance is achieved through measures such as security guards and staff members.

Surveillance is an important consideration as it can make people feel safe when they are able to see and interact with others. Crimes are less likely to occur in places that are well supervised. BOSCAR crime data indicates that Kemps Creek has high rates of crime relevant to the proposal include 'motor vehicle theft' and 'non-domestic assault'. The use of surveillance will therefore be important to reduce the likeliness of these types of crime from occurring.

#### Assessment of proposed development

The proposal incorporates the following CPTED principles related to surveillance:

- Warehouses 1 and 3 are designed so as to have their office components closest to the front of their respective sites overlooking the surrounding public domain and allowing casual surveillance both out of and into the building.
- Main entrances to Warehouses 1 and 3 are oriented towards the street providing direct lines of sight between these entrances, their foyers, the carpark and the street.
- The use of glazing on a large portion of the office components' external surfaces allows for a continuation of sight lines in and out of the building. This maximises natural surveillance and increases the risk to potential offenders.
- The lunchroom and outdoor areas on ground floor of Warehouses 1 and 3 provide casual surveillance of the neighbouring hardstand carparking and internal road network.
- The buildings address the newly proposed street network and facilitate natural connection between occupants and visitors. Less active and unoccupied structures such (i.e. warehousing and plant rooms) do not dominate street frontages.
- The location of the bicycle parking adjacent areas of activity including office space and lunch rooms allows for opportunities for passive surveillance to this area.
- The main vehicular entrances are clearly defined and visible from the new internal road network and sight lines are maintained between these entrances and to the street.

#### Recommendations and design considerations

- Ensure all entrances, stairwells, elevators, communal areas and pedestrian paths are well lit in accordance with Australian Standards.
- Use balanced lighting between internal and external spaces to avoid the mirroring of glazing at night and allow for a continuation of sightlines from and into the building.
- Select vegetation with consideration given to future maintenance. To maximise sightlines, ensure the lowest tree limbs are above average head height and lower shrubs do not provide obstruction, opportunity for concealment or entrapment.

## 6.2. ACCESS CONTROL

Access control involves the designing of spaces to control who enters and to prevent unauthorised access. Important crime prevention considerations for access control include way-finding measures, desire-lines and the provision of formal and informal routes. Natural design measures include building configuration, definition of formal and informal pathways, landscaping, fencing and gardens. Implementation of security hardware, such as swipe cards and on-site security officers, are technical and formal considerations for access control.

Given the higher rates 'motor vehicle theft' and 'non-domestic assault' in the area, the implementation of appropriate control measures will be important to define patron and employee and access across the site and reduce likelihood of these types of crime occurring.

### Assessment of proposed development

The proposal incorporates the following CPTED principles related to access control:

- The proposal includes access control measures to loading and carparking areas in the form of sliding security gates to restrict public access to these areas.
- Dedicated, secure off-street parking reduces vehicle theft. Direct access for workers and visitors to the hardstand carparking parking through office components of the buildings building reduces opportunities for theft from vehicles, motor vehicle theft and entrapment. A separated and visible loading area for trucks will assist in reducing vehicle conflict, vehicle theft and opportunistic crime.
- Physical barriers increase the effort required to commit crime. The ramps servicing the main vehicular entrances and changes in elevation provide symbolic cues that define the transition between public and semi-public/private space.

### Recommendations and design considerations

- Currently pedestrian and bicycle access between the building's main entrances and bicycle parking areas is by narrow and indirect pathways. More direct formalised pedestrian and bicycle access should be provided to and from the main Entrance 3 to the surrounding pedestrian and cycle infrastructure network. These routes should be of an adequate width and provide well-lit, and direct access with clear sightlines for pedestrians and cyclists.
- Provide on-ground directional signage in car parking and loading areas to guide the flow of vehicle traffic.
- Install security hardware on all back of house areas to restrict unauthorised access by non-staff members.
- Maintain all access points, including fire exits and stairs, to ensure they remain in good working order and inaccessible from the outside. Magnetic door locking systems linked to fire sprinkler alarms can ensure that fire exits are used for emergencies only. Fire exits and stairs can often be targets for offenders.
- Implement clear wayfinding signage with definitional legibility throughout all internal and external areas onsite, including the offices, warehousing, carparking and internal road network.
- Use signage, speed control measures (bollards, speed humps) and design cues (eg. surface coverings) to slow vehicles exiting and entering the carparks and loading areas.

## 6.3. TERRITORIAL REINFORCEMENT

Territorial reinforcement is defined by the way in which a community demonstrates ownership over a space. Places that feel owned and cared for are likely to be used, revisited and protected. People who have a sense of guardianship over a space are more likely to protect it and intervene in crime, compared with passing strangers.

The use of actual and symbolic boundary markers, spatial legibility and environmental cues are ways to connect people and encourage communal responsibility over spaces.

### Assessment of proposed development

The proposal incorporates the following CPTED principles related to territorial reinforcement:

- The proposal uses clear signage and lighting to create legible and inviting entrances.
- The design of the internal floor plan of the office areas of Warehouses 1 and 3 demonstrates good territorial reinforcement as it creates a welcoming and open space that encourages social interaction between occupants and visitors.
- A change in grade and landscaping provide transitional cues to let people know they are moving from a public space to a semi-public/private space.

### Recommendations and design considerations

- Consider additional articulation or design treatments on the exterior of the warehouse buildings particularly lower to ground level. Building design that avoids large, blank walls and instead utilises external surfaces and cladding for facades including glazing and highly textured/articulated elements can reduce incidents nuisance graffiti. Spaces that are well maintained and display territorial reinforcement will attract visitation.
- Clarify ownership of the car park area using signage, boundary markers and other environmental cues. This will increase perceptions of risk to potential criminals and increase community ownership.

## 6.4. SPACE AND ACTIVITY MANAGEMENT

Space and activity management involves monitoring site usage, managing site cleanliness and repairing vandalism and broken physical elements to decrease fear of crime. Spaces that are regularly used by the community are less likely to be vandalised.

Space and activity management are important to consider in the design and operation of this proposal to increase offender risk and crime effort.

### Assessment of proposed development

The proposal will include logistics and warehousing uses that once operational will accommodate up to 400 full time jobs. The site is proposed to be operational 24 hours a day.

The proposal incorporates the following CPTED principles related to space and activity management:

- Increased activity and visitation onsite throughout the week and evening associated with the proposed uses will assist in discouraging perpetrators of crime in an area formerly rural area with little activation on evenings and weekends.

### Recommendations and design considerations

- Ensure vegetation on site is maintained, monitored, and reported on in accordance with the Vegetation Management Plan (Cumberland Ecology) that forms part of this SSDA. Additional consideration should be given to the selection and maintenance of landscape elements, including vegetation, to ensure that over time they do not obscure sightlines and compromise the perceived level of safety.
- Prepare a Plan of Management for the operation of the site. This should include particulars on operating hours, maximum capacities, access and egress arrangements, maintenance responsibilities and cleanliness. Repairs and maintenance should be documented clearly to enforce accountability to relevant staff.

## 7. CONCLUSION

Urbis has undertaken a Crime Risk Assessment for the proposed development against the four CPTED principles and has identified potential risk areas and recommendations to help reduce crime and anti-social behaviour. The assessment has been informed by a review of relevant local and state policies, and crime and demographic data.

The assessment found the proposal aligns with the provisions of Section 4.2.9 of the Mamre Road Precinct Development Control Plan. By increasing the effort required and the perceptions of risk in committing an offence, reducing actual and perceived crime rewards and eliminating or reducing conditions that offenders can use to rationalise or excuse criminal behaviour the proposal demonstrates incorporation of the four CPTED principles: surveillance, access control, territorial reinforcement, and space and activity management. To further increase safety and reduce crime risk, the following recommendations should be implemented:

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# APPENDIX A: BOCSAR CRIME DATA

Table 1 Crime rates per 100,000 people, December 2020 – December 2021

Crime type	Kemps Creek	Penrith LGA	NSW
Assault (non-domestic)	380.2	432.8	344.6
Assault (domestic)	464.7	511.8	393.4
Break and enter dwelling	42.2	266.3	218.4
Break and enter non-dwelling	42.2	91.1	87.3
Liquor offences	0.0	24.0	102.0
Malicious damage to property	464.7	750.9	601.6
Motor vehicle theft	464.7	173.4	128.2
Steal from dwelling	169.0	219.6	201.4
Steal from motor vehicle	126.7	514.1	339.3
Steal from person	0.0	42.5	21.9
Steal from retail store	211.2	334.7	219.4
Trespass	42.2	89.2	114.0

Source: BOCSAR

Table 2 Two-year crime trend, December 2019 – December 2021

Crime type	Kemps Creek	Penrith LGA	NSW
Assault (non-domestic)	n.c.	Stable	Stable
Assault (domestic)	n.c.	Down 20.0% per year	Stable
Break and enter dwelling	n.c.	Stable	Stable
Break and enter non-dwelling	n.c.	Down 15.8% per year	Stable
Liquor offences	n.c.	Stable	Stable
Malicious damage to property	n.c.	Down 12.8% per year	Stable
Motor vehicle theft	n.c.	Stable	Down 10.7% per year
Steal from dwelling	n.c.	Stable	Stable

<b>Crime type</b>	<b>Kemps Creek</b>	<b>Penrith LGA</b>	<b>NSW</b>
Steal from motor vehicle	n.c.	Stable	Stable
Steal from person	n.c.	Stable	Stable
Steal from retail store	n.c.	Stable	Stable
Trespass	n.c.	Stable	Down 8.9% per year

- Source: BOCSAR

# DISCLAIMER

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